*2 Before CUMMINGS, SPRECHER, Cir Judges, BONSAL, cuit Senior District Judge.* SPRECHER, Judge. Circuit The employer, County Hendricks Rural Electric Membership Corporation (REMC), appeals from a decision of the National Labor Relations Board finding that REMC engaged in unfair practices labor in viola tion of 8(a)(1) section of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 158(a)(1). U.S.C. § principal presented issue by this appeal is whether personal secretary gen eral manager of REMC was an “employee” under 2(3) section of the Act. 29 U.S.C. We hold that the Board did not apply the appropriate legal standard for resolving this issue and remand for a factu application proper standard. I 9, 1977, general manager of May On REMC, Dillon, per- discharged his Wallace Bonsai, Dudley Judge * The Honorable B. Senior District of the Southern District of New sitting by designation. York is secretary, ditionally sonal Mary Weatherman. that the circulation Hadley charged General Counsel that Weatherman protected by was not conduct in concerted Mary Act and that activities by section of the Na- employee protected Although the Act. tional Labor Relations Act. The adminis- judge correctly we conclude that the char- trative law a hearing conducted acterized Weatherman’s conduct as *3 that determined Weatherman was an “em- “protected,” it necessary we find to remand ployee” coverage within the that the the decision for a new determination of her engaged she had protected in concerted ac- “employee” status. tivity discharged and that Dillon for her activity.
that The judge ordered REMC to II reinstate with back pay. Weatherman prac- was of an guilty REMC unfair labor surrounding facts dis- Weatherman’s only Mary tice in this case if Weatherman charge carefully were the by established discharged was in “concerted judge. Lloyd Hadley, administrative law a purpose activities the mu- Weatherman, close injured friend of was in protection.” 7, 29 tual aid Section U.S.C. 1976, the employment course of in February petition circulation of the resulting in the an loss of arm. In March among undoubtedly the was 1977, Hadley sought with reinstatement “concerted,” disputes but REMC that it was REMC. The Board of Directors notified “purpose circulated for the aid or mutual April Hadley in that he would not rein- be protection.” stated. recently only The Board has reiter petition The first week aMay, in request- of a on petition ated that circulation behalf ing reconsideration of the decision not discharged protected is activ employee Hadley reinstate was mailed members of ity Youngstown under section 7. Osteo the petition by Board. The signed was 26 Association, Hospital pathic 224 N.L.R.B. employees. Mary signed Weatherman the activity protected 574 is even Such petition; she was employee the sixth to do discharge employee if of the was lawful. the 7, Saturday, so. On May one of the di- Co., See, g., Pepsi-Cola Bottling NLRB v. e. rectors called Dillon at home to him advise 824, (5th 1971). 449 F.2d 830 n.5 Cir. petition. the Dillon drove to the di- day rector’s home that in the order to see similarly Employee conduct should petition. petition be criticizes the when the At Monday, 10:00 a. m. on May Dillon injured refusal to reinstate an employer’s discharged At hearing, Weatherman. the judge employee. The administrative law Dillon discharged testified that he Weather- specifically petition motivat found the was man Hadley for conduct unrelated to the part by employees’ pro ed in the desire to petition. The judge administrative law being their own well should mote future conducted extensive and careful evalua- a be faced with similar misfortune. tion of the evidence and concluded that company a former em Refusal reinstate explanation Dillon’s discharge was ployee seriously injured job on is an the “ludicrous.” the issue about which REMC conclude, contrary argu We legitimate interest ... in “had ment employer, making management judge’s that the deci views to known their sion discharged that interest.” being for that without Co., for signing the Hadley petition fully sup is v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. 167 NLRB ported by 1948).2 the argues (7th evidence.1 ad- REMC F.2d 988 Cir. Workers, 1. The ALJ also found the Local No. that REMC violated 2. Allied Chemical & Alkali Co., improperly interrogating Pittsburgh Act cleri- 92 another 1 v. Plate Glass employee strongly petition. (1971), cal relied about the 341 We find L.Ed.2d supported employer, simply undermine conclusion also the does not evidence. clearly III which we do not consider erroneous. judge therefore concluded that Weath- ALJ Although properly conclud statutory “employee.” erman was a ed that the circulation protected activity, protection only can erred We do not believe “employ extend to an individual who is an factually by finding that Weatherman did ee” Despite capacity under the with Act. breadth of not assist in a confidential policies. “employee,” We do definition of to labor relations conclude, however, the use of the B. F. Court has catego established certain Goodrich was an error law. impliedly ries of are standard excluded from that definition. NLRB v. Bell Aero held that “con previously This Court has Co., space 94 S.Ct. fidential” are excluded from the secretaries L.Ed.2d argues REMC that in NLRB, Peerless, F.2d 1108 Act. Inc. personnel dividuals working departments (7th 1973). Wheeling also NLRB v. Cir. See or as impliedly confidential secretaries are (4th 1971). Electric Cir. *4 excluded and that Weatherman fits in both represent The B. F. standard does Goodrich categories. question on the of current Board law should be secretary whether a considered an
In determining whether Mary Weather-
secretary.”
excluded “confidential
See Wil
statutory
man was a
“employee,” the ALJ
Co.,
lett Motor
Hartley interpreted in Bell Aero space, requires the conclusion that all secre BETAR, Samuel J. Public Administrator capacity, working taries in a confidential County, Cook and Administrator relations, without to labor be exclud Raghubir Law, Dutt De the Estate of the Act. The administrative law ed from *6 ceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, inquiry limited his factual in this case
to a determination that Weatherman had
v.
capacity with
not acted in a confidential
DE
AIRCRAFT OF CANA
HAVILLAND
to labor relations. We therefore
DA, LTD.,
Corporation,
a Canadian
necessary
the case for a
find it
to remand
Defendant-Appellee.
“by
of whether
the nature of
determination
No. 78-1911.
“given by
employ
duties” she was
[her]
na
er
that is of a confidential
information
Appeals,
United States Court
ture,
public,
that is not available to the
Circuit.
Seventh
competitors,
employees generally,
toor
Argued April
1979.
employer.”
for use in the interest of the
Aug.
1979.
Decided
2(12)(C),
Cong., 1st
H.R. 3020
Sess.
n.12,
Rehearing
Rehearing
also
propriately to Board discretion. committed in Bell Aero-
As the Court stated 1757; Sperry opinion & Hutchinson FTC 5. the Second Circuit See also note 10 of 233, 249, Bell, 31 L.Ed.2d necessity case such 6. As for remand in a this, Aerospace, see Bell 416 U.S. at
