Merrimon, J.

(after stating the case.) The assignment of error is so indefinite that we can scarcely discern what it is.

As well as we can learn, the appellant insists that its right of way across the appellee’s land mentioned was acquired by force of the charters and the long possession of the former corporations under which it claims, and throu,gh which it derives its title to the same; that if any right to damages ever arose on account of such right of way across the appel-lee’s land, it arose long before he became the owner thereof, and in"favor of the former owner thereof under whom he claims, and therefore the appellee cannot maintain this proceeding. It further insists that if such corporation, or any one of them, was liable in the past for such damages, it is not; that it did not succeed to such liabilities, and that the defendant’s right, if he ever had any, is barred by the Statute of Limitations.

In our opinion the grounds of error assigned are unfounded, and the appellant is clearly liable for the value of the land— the damages — assessed against it. This appears from the nature of the rights, property and advantages it acquired, *623 and the duties and obligations it assumed, by its creation and by its purchase of the right of way, and the other property of the corporations mentioned, from which it derives title mediately and immediately, and statutory provisions hearing upon and applicable to it.

As appears, it is the successor, mediately, of "The Wilmington and Charlotte Railroad Company,” afterwards styled “ The Wilmington, Charlotte and Rutherford Railroad Company.” The charter of that company (Acts 1854-55, § 28) provided, as to damages occasioned to individuals by the location and construction of its right of way, as follows: “ That in the absence of any contract or contracts in relation to the land through which said road or any of its branches may pass, signed by the owner thereof or his agent, or any claimant or person in possession thereof, which may be confirmed by the owner thereof, it shall be presumed that the land over which said road or any of its branches may be constructed, together with a space of one hundred feet on each side of the center of said road, has been granted to said company by the owner or owners thereof; and the said company shall have good right and title thereto, and shall have, hold and enjoy the same so long as the same shall be used for the purposes of said road, and no longer, unless the person or persons owning the land at the time that part of the said road which may he on said land was finished, or those claiming under Mm, her or them, shall apply for an assessment of the value of mid lands, as hereinbefore directed, within tivo years next after that part of said road which may he on the said land was finished,” &c.

The immediate successor of the last company was “ The Carolina Central Railway Company,” and its charter (Acts 1872-73, ch. 75, §§ 11, 15) contains the same provision last above recited, and it is authorized to purchase the property of “ The Wilmington, Charlotte and Rutherford Railroad Company,” and to succeed to and “ thenceforth have, hold, *624 possess and be entitled to the said railroad, extending from Wilmington to Rutherfordton, about two hundred and fifty miles, and its contracts, franchises, rights, privileges and immunities, and all the estate and property of every description, real and personal, belonging to the said Wilmington. Charlotte and Rutherford Railroad Company, and by such purchase the said company hereby incorporated shall acquire all the rights, privileges and immunities conferred on the Wilmington, Charlotte and Rutherford Railroad Company by its charter and amendments made thereto.”

The appellant is the immediate successor of the last above named “ The Carolina Central Railway Company,” taking- and having the name “ The Carolina Central Railroad Company.” The latter was organized and purchased the right of way, other property and franchises of the former under authority conferred by a power of sale contained in a mortgage foreclosed as allowed by the statute (The Code, §§ 697, 698), and its organization was ratified and made effectual by the subsequent statute (Acts 1881, ch. 5, § 1), and it is therein expressly “ declared to be a lawful corporation, succeeding to and legally possessed of all the rights, powers, privileges and franchises which were owue I and possessed by the former corporation, the Carolina Central Railway Company, on and prior to the day of the sale, to-wit, the thirty-first day of May, one thousand eight hundred and eighty,” and its right to the right of way is again ratified by the statute (Acts. 1885, ch. 239, § 4).

The statute (The Code, § 698) above cited applies to the appellant as to its organization, rights and duties as the successor of “ The Carolina Central Railway Company,” and it provides among other things that “ the corporation created by or in consequence of such sale and conveyance shall succeed to all such franchises, rights and privileges, and perform all such duties as would have been or should have been performed by the first corporation but for such sale and con *625 veyance, save only that the corporation so created shall not be entitled to the debts due to the first corporation, and shall not be liable for any debts of or claims against the first corporation,” &c., &c.

This resume of the facts and the statutory provisions applicable show that the appellant is the successor of the two former corporations mentioned; that it has purchased and owns the property that formerly belonged to them respectively, in the order of their existence, including the right of way, and has succeeded to and become the owmer of the franchises, rights, privileges and immunities that belonged to them, and it took such parts of the right of way located but not perfected in the condition and subject to the burdens incident to such perfection as they came to it — that is, ithad therightto perfect and complete its incomplete right of way, and it became liable to pay damages to the lands of individuals occasioned thereby. It would be unreasonable and unjust to hold that it took the incomplete right of way free from liability for damages or the value of the land appropriated to individuals occasioned by perfecting it. There is nothing in the statutes applicable nor in the nature of the matter that renders it necessary to so hold. Such liability grows out of the exercise of the rights, franchises, privileges, and immunities the appellant purchased, and arises out of the exercise of them subsequent to the 'purchase. It purchased an incomplete railroad; in the exercise of its rights and powers to complete it, it was bound to pay for its incomplete right of way so far as incomplete, as urell as for the incomplete grading, cross-ties, iron, and other necessary things.

The contention that any right to such damages or value of land appropriated accrued many years ago in favor of a former owner of the lands mentioned, is not tenable. N> doubt such owners had a right to have damages or the value *626 of the land assessed when the line of the road was at first located, and he might have insisted upon it, but he waived it, probably on the ground that the real damage had not then been done. But the statute gave the plaintiff the right to claim such damages. It (Acts 1854-55, ch. 225, §28; Acts 1872-73, ch. 75, §11) provides, among other things, that “ the person or persons owning the land at the time that part of the railroad which may be on said land, or those claiming under him, he or them, shall (may) apply for an assessment of the value of said lands, as hereinbefore directed, within two years next after the part of said road which may be on said land was finished,” &c. Such assessment embraces the damages; its effect is to give and perfect the right of way in the railroad company, and to assess the value of the land taken under existing circumstances, -as they affect the immediately adjoining lands. Thus, if the right of way taken would, in the use of it, very injuriously affect the adjoining lands, such fact would enhance the assessment. This is to be made in the light of the circumstances of the land, the value of which is assessed. The value assessed is really the damages contemplated by the statute.

Neither the appellant nor either of its predecessors was bound to wait and allow the appellee or the former owner of the land to apply for such assessment; either of them might have made application when the line of the road was first 'located, or afterwards, to have the land for the right of way ■condemned. The statute makes ample provision in such respects.

It thus appears that the appellant is liable for the value ■of the land — the damages — assessed, and that the statute :gave the appellee, as the owner of it at the time the railroad •was finished, the right to apply for and have such assessment.

*627 This proceeding was begun within two years next after the road was finished, and is, therefore, not barred by the statute.

There is no error. Affirmed.