258 Pa. 510 | Pa. | 1917
Opinion by
Caroline Henderson died testate in April, 1899, and, after certain devises of real estate and bequests of personal estate, made the following bequest in paragraph three of her will to Frank H. Henderson, the appellant in this case: “I hereby direct my executors to pay to Frank H. Henderson the sum of twenty-five ($25) dollars per month for and during his natural life, and to keep sufficient funds invested therefor, and, in case of sickness, if the said sum is not sufficient for his maintenance, I authorize my executors to pay such additional amount as in their judgment may be necessary.” In the ninth paragraph of the will, the testatrix directs her “executors to keep sufficient of my personal property invested, and to use the income to pay the several bequests hereinbefore made. The surplus income, if any, to be paid to the said Pearl Critchfield,” the residuary legatee. The executors resigned, and the Orphans’ Court
It is not necessary in order to sustain the decree entered by the learned judge of the court below to hold, as he did, that the trust created by the third paragraph of the testatrix’s will is a spendthrift trust. It is clearly an active or special trust, and, until the purpose for which it was created has been accomplished, the court is without authority at the instance of the cestuis que trust to terminate it and decree a distribution of the corpus of the fund. “Active or special trusts,” says Mr. Pomeroy (3 Equity Juris., sec. 991), “are those in which, either from the express directions of the language creating thq
It may, therefore, be regarded as settled that a testamentary direction to a trustee to hold, invest and manage the corpus of a fund for a definite period, and pay the income therefrom at stated times to a beneficiary creates an active trust which the statute does not execute and which will continue to be operative and cannot be terminated until the purpose for which the trust was created has been accomplished. The rule has its foundation in the well established principle that, within the limits of the law, every man may do as he pleases with his own property. He may, therefore, dispose of it in fee, or create estates therein in different persons, or grant or devise it on such conditions or under such restrictions as he may desire. Hence, a donor may, by means of a testamentary trust, give a life interest in the whole or a part of his estate and protect the corpus of the fund for the remaindermen. It should be observed that in construing a trust provision in a will the intention of the donor is the primary and controlling consideration, and not the desire of the beneficiary, whose wishes as to the disposition of the corpus of the trust fund and the in
The language used by the testatrix in the case at bar is clear and explicit and leaves no room for doubt as to the purpose for which the trust was created. The testatrix manifestly intended that the corpus of the fund bequeathed should be retained by the trustee and the income be paid periodically to the beneficiary for his support and maintenance during life. The stipulated sum of twenty-five dollars is to be paid monthly, and a discretionary additional amount when the cestui que trust is ill. The amount and frequency of the payments were intended to act as a restraint on the dissipation of the fund in advance' of the. time it might be needed for the support of the recipient, and tend to show that it was to be- used for such purpose. In fact, the agreement between the appellant and the residuary legatee, distributing the fund, shows, not only their construction of .the trust clause of the will but also the necessity for continuing the trust and preserving the fund for the appellant’s maintenance by providing that if the appellant be indigent and unable to take care of himself when the last installment of five hundred dollars is due him under the contract from the residuary legatee, it shall be paid to some institution which will admit him as an inmate thereof and ágree to maintain him for the balance of his life. It follows that if no institution is available on such terms, the appellant has no1 protection and the bequest of the testatrix will not accomplish its purpose. If, however, there is any uncertainty arising out of the provision as to the testamentary intent in this regard, the doubt is entirely dispelled by the subsequent phrase, “and in case of sickness, if the said sum is not sufficient for his maintenance, I authorize my executors to pay such additional amount as in their judgment may be necessary.” The contingent bequest clearly points to the purpose for which the original monthly sum was to be
The trust was created for a definite period, the life of the beneficiary, and the trustee was directed “to keep sufficient funds invested” to produce an income which would meet the requirements of the bequest. The ninth paragraph of the will also provides that the trustee shall invest a fund sufficient to pay the bequests made in the will, which would include the additional sum to be paid Henderson during sickness. By the express provisions of the will, therefore, the trustee was required to invest the trust fund, collect the income therefrom, and, after deducting the expenses incident thereto, pay the same to the beneficiary during his life. The amount of the additional sum to be paid in case of illness of the cestui que trust is discretionary with the trustee.
This analysis of the trust clause in question clearly discloses the intention of the testatrix, and it is equally apparent that, under the authorities cited, the trust is an active one, and must be continued to carry out the don- or’s intention. The purpose for which the trust was established was the maintenance of the cestui que trust for life, and it can only be accomplished by the trustee performing the duties specifically imposed upon it by the testamentary provision creating the trust. The trustee is directed in express terms to keep sufficient funds invested, necessarily collect the income, and pay to
The order dismissing the petition is, for the reasons stated, affirmed at the costs of the appellant.