Opinion by
This appeal is from the lower court’s refusal to enter judgment n.o.v. or grant a new trial following the jury’s verdict for the appellee in аmount of $16,350, including interest. The present dispute arose after the termination of a partnership venture, which had been established оrally by the parties, about June 1, 1949, and continued until April, 1950.
At time of trial the appellee introduced into evidence without objection certain portions of the pleadings, containing the provisions of the oral agreement. However, the defendant’s answer averred facts which constituted an affirmative defense, declaring, that in addition to plaintiff’s allegations, there Avere oral prоmises that each party would contribute certain sums of money to set up the business.
From an examination of the record it is apрarent the oral agreement provided as follows: That plaintiff
*523
was to act as agent for defendant in the purchasing and selling оf structural steel and scrap iron; that materials purchased were to be paid for by the defendant and stockpiled on his lot; thаt plaintiff ivas to hire employes and conduct the operation of the business; that defendant was to keep the books and rеcords; and that plaintiff was to receive 50% of the net profits for his efforts. This action in assumpsit was to recover the share of nеt profits due plaintiff. As this Court has declared many times, when passing upon motion for judgment n.o.v., we must examine the facts and all inferences deducible therefrom, in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Stark v. Lehigh Foundries, Inc.,
In support of the motion for new trial, appellants contend the lower court erred in permitting the introduction of appellee’s business books into evidence as books of original entry. The book entries, made only at the time materials were sold, indicated the purchaser, sale price, cost of materials and which of the parties received the procеeds of the sale. At no time were any entries made at the time of purchase, and all entries regarding the cost of the material were dependent upоn the memory and recollection of the appellee. This was the business accounting system employed by the partnership. The soundness of the system is not for us to pass upon, but the importance of the matter lies in the fact that it was their system, and continued for а period of almost two years. Moreover, the testimony indicates there existed an established market price for scraр iron and structural steel vendors, and the resale of the materials was made according to the prices and weights set. forth in a stock book-distributed, by the *524 steel companies. Therefore, as to whether or not the boohs were original entry books we have no doubt. They are, even though the entries regarding cost were made at a later date than at the actual time of purchase.
Section 2 of the “Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act” of May 4, 1939, P. L. 42, 28 PS §91b, provides : “A record of an act, condition or event shall, in so far as relevant, be competent evidence
if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preрaration,
and if it was made in the regular course of business
at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the court,
the sources of informatiоn, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.” [Italics supplied]. Prom the foregoing Act, it is clear that the legislаture intended to grant to the trial court discretionary power as to the admissibility of business records, provided, that they meet the standаrds set forth in the Act, and are otherwise admissible as evidence and not violative of other evidentiary rules. Here, Henderson testifiеd he made fche entries at the time of sale, noting the cost and distribution of the proceeds. Prom this simple arrangement plaintiff dеtermined the gross profits, deducting therefrom the business operational expenses in arriving at the net profit. While it may be true, that the books were not in accordance with modern bookkeeping principles, it cannot be denied that appellee tеstified to their preparation, maintenance and correctness. Significantly, these books were subject to periodic аuditing by the
appellant’s auditors;
and only in one instance was there a discrepancy disclosed, which, upon investigation was not the fault of Henderson, but that of appellant’s daughter. Taking into account the nature of the business, the testimony of the parties regarding
*525
their transactions, boоkkeeping methods and the thorough and searching cross-examination by appellant’s attorney, we are satisfied that the lowеr court did not err, and that the books were clearly admissible. See
Foster, Executor v. Wehr,
Appellant next complains that the jury was permitted to return its vеrdict to the court without the presence of counsel or any notice to them. The stipulation states that the jury retired at 11:30 A.M. and rеturned its verdict at approximately at 2:30 P.M. on the same day; and further declares that neither counsel was present when the verdiсt was taken and neither of them had been notified by the court of the disposition of the verdict. The lower court’s opinion states thаt the court was in session during the entire time and did not adjourn until after the verdict had been received and recorded. The appеllant does not controvert this fact. In
Reed v. Kinnik,