132 F.2d 729 | D.C. Cir. | 1942
The Act of October 2, 1942,
Appellee is a common carrier. On September 23, 1942, it filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission tariffs to increase from ten cents to fifteen cents the interstate rate of fare on its passenger bus line between Seat Pleasant, Maryland, and points within the District of Columbia. No modification, change or suspension of these tariffs was made by the Commission. At 12:01 a. m., October 25, 1942, without giving notice to the President, to the Director of Economic Stabilization, or to appellant, appellee increased its rates. On November 3, 1942, appellant filed his complaint in the District Court for an injunction to restrain appellee from making any charges for transportation services rendered by it in excess of such charges as had been made for such transportation services as of September 15, 1942, until such time as appellee had complied with the requirements of the Act of October 2, 1942. The District Court dismissed the complaint and this appeal followed.
We agree with the conclusion of the District Court that the rate increase made by appellee was a general increase within the meaning of the Act of October 2, 1942. Appellee’s busses carry approximately 13,000 passengers daily over its several routes. Of these, approximately 2,300 passengers daily, or 17.8% of the total, are affected by the increased rates. Its busses, which operate on the route between Seat Pleasant, Maryland, and the
The contemporaneous administrative construction of the words by the Price Administrator
Section 217(c) of the Interstate Commerce Act,
But, apart from all statutes existing prior to October 2, 1942, and all orders, rules and regulations made pursuant to those statutes, the Act of Octobsr 2, 1942 is conclusive of the issue presented for our decision. As it was enacted subsequent to the Interstate Commerce Act it supersedes that Act, to’ whatever extent may be necessary to achieve its own purposes. Its clearly expressed purpose was to stabilize prices, wages and salaries, affecting the cost of living, upon the basis of the levels which existed on September 15, 1942. To this end the President was authorized to issue a general order. To this end, also, a further express provision was added, prohibiting a common carrier from making any general increase in its rates which were in effect on September 15, 1942, unless it shall first give thirty days’ notice to the President, or his designated agent, and consent to timely intervention before the federal, state or municipal authority which has jurisdiction to consider such an increase. This imposes no undue hardship upon the carrier. But the new Act does plainly require the giving of such notice and permits timely intervention by the Price Administrator before the Interstate Commerce Commission, followed by such appropriate showing as he may wish to make. To that extent it adds a further requirement to Section 217(c) of the Interstate Commerce Act; and to that extent, it holds in abeyance the going into effect of any proposed general increase over the levels existing on September 15, 1942. Congress made no exception in the Act, in favor of carriers who had filed schedules prior to October 2, 1942, but had not put them into actual effect before September 15, 1942. We see no possible rea
We conclude, therefore, that appellee failed to comply with the requirements of the Act of October 2, 1942; consequently, that the increased rates which it is now charging are unlawful. The District Court should therefore set aside its judgment and grant the relief prayed for in appellant’s complaint.
Reversed.
50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 961 et seq.
50 U. S.C.A.Appendix, § 901 et seq.
Pub. L. No. 729, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 901 note; 7 Fed.Reg. 7871.
7 Fed.Reg. 8758.
49 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.
Eastern Case, 20 I.C.C. 243, 247: “It is estimated that the advances affect about 15 per cent of the total tonnage of this territory and about 30 per cent of the total freight revenues, but if reference be had to the articles affected, it will be found that almost everything, with the exception of a few of the heavier and coarser articles, is by this advance subjected to an increased transportation charge. It may be properly said, therefore, that these proposed tariffs work a general advance in freight rates within the limits to which they apply, and such was the professed intention of the carriers in filing them.” [Italics supplied]
Boots and Shoes from New York Points, 91 I.C.C. 591, 597: “However, under the circumstances, it is our opinion that the discrimination complained of should have been, and should now be, removed by respondents first establishing commodity rates to Baltimore, and then if at a later date they desire to again file schedules asking for a general increase in their boot and shoe rates, when the New England lines file their schedules proposing the increases herein-before referred to, the same could be considered on a more comprehensive record than that now before us.” [Italics supplied]
Grain and Grain Products, 122 I.C.C. 235, 264: “When, tixerefore, the carriers in an investigation and suspension proceeding propose what in substance amounts to a general increase in rates over a large area on agricultural commodities which have been shown to be affected by depression, they must cleai'ly demonstrate that such increase is justified under the law including the provisions of the resolution. * * * But it has always been recognized that the burden of transportation may reasonably be adjusted with some regard to the value of the service, in other words, that the higher grade, more valuable commodities may be required to pay a greater margin of profit than those that are of lower grade and less valuable.” [Italics supplied]
Procedural Regulation No. 11, Notice of Increases in Rates and Charges of Common Carriers and other Public Utilities, issued November 12, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 9390: “§ 1300.901 Definition. For the purpose of this Procedural Regulation No. 11, a general increase in the rates or charges of a common carrier or other public utility is defined as any change in its rates, fares, classifications, rules, regulations or practices which results in an increase in the charges for transportation or other public utility service applicable to a class of passengers, shippers or customers, including increases in wholesale or industrial rates or charges for public utility sex-vices, as distinguished from an increase of rates or charges applicable to a particular customer or transportation service under special arrangement.”
See Steele-Smith Dry Goods Co. v. Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co., 15 Ala.App. 271, 73 So. 215.
Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U.S. 547, 563, 16 S.Ct. 890, 40 L.Ed. 1069; Peirce v. Van Dusen, 6 Cir., 78 F. 693, 704, 69 L.R.A. 705 (Harlan, Taft and Lurton); Tullis v. Lake Erie & Western R., 175 U.S. 348, 351, 20 S.Ct. 136, 44 L.Ed. 192; In re Pittsburg, 217 Pa. 227, 231, 66 A. 348, 350, 120 Am.St.Rep. 845, affirmed sub nom. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151; People v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 304, 323, 182 N.E. 419, 430: “An act is general, not because it operates in every place or upon every person in the state, but because every place or person brought within the relations or circumstances provided for
§ 217(c), 49 U.S.C.A. § 317(c).
49 U.S.C.A. § 317(c).
49 U.S.C.A. § 316(g).
49 U.S.C.A. § 316(e).
Pub. L. No. 729, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.: “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in order to aid in the effective prosecution of the war, the President is authorized and directed, on or before November 1, 1942, to issue a general order stabilizing prices, wages, and salaries, affecting the cost of living; and, except as otherwise provided in this Act, such stabilization shall so far as practicable be on the basis of the levels which existed on September 15, 1942.” 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 961.