95 Ind. 309 | Ind. | 1884
Complaint by Sarah Henderson against Sarah E. Truitt, to which a demurrer was sustained, and upon which there was final judgment for the defendant upon demurrer.
The complaint stated that on the 3d day of September, 1866, one Samuel D. Jones was the owner of the following real estate, in Montgomery county, in this State, to wit: The east half of the northeast fractional quarter of section one (1), in township nineteen (19) north, of range five (5) west, and six rods from off the east side of the west half, of the northeast quarter of said section one (1); that said real estate was conveyed to Jones by James Graham and wife and Nathan Graham and his wife; that on said 3d day of September, 1866, Jones and his wife executed to the said James Graham and Nathan Graham a mortgage on said real estate to secure the payment of the purchase-money due from Jones; that said
Wherefore the plaintiff demanded that an accounting might be had to ascertain the amount which ought to be charged against the said north part of the strip of land, six rods in width, in the possession of and claimed by the defendant as its share of the redemption money paid by the plaintiff; that the plaintiff might be subrogated as against that tract of land to all the rights of Binford under the decree of foreclosure, and that she might have all other proper relief.
When the estates of two persons are subject to a common encumbrance, and one pays the encumbrance .for the benefit of both, he has the right, either to hqld both estates thus redeemed until the other party shall pay his equitable proportion of such common encumbrance, or he may enforce contribution from the other party for such equitable proportion. But in all such cases the equities must be equal. Hence, if the party discharging the encumbrance is primarily liable for its payment, he can claim nothing from the other, however much the latter, may be benefited by having the encumbrance removed from his property.
“A mortgagor who has sold a portion of the land covered by the mortgage by warranty deed can not claim contribution of the purchaser, because he is himself liable for the whole debt. Neither can a subsequent purchaser call upon a prior one for contribution, because such subsequent purchaser acquires only the rights the mortgagor then had, and therefore the equities of the two purchasers are not equal. * * *
“ When a mortgage is foreclosed by a suit in equity or an equitable suit under the codes adopted in many States, the equities of purchasers of portions of the mortgaged estate are protected by a direction in the decree of sale that the parcels be sold in the inverse order of alienation.” 2 Jones Mort., section 1089. Chase v. Woodbury, 6 Cush. 143; Kilborn v. Robbins, 8 Allen, 466.
Where a mortgagor sells a part of the mortgaged land by
As has been seen, the purchase by Henderson of a part of the mortgaged lands was nearly a year and a half subsequent to the time at which John McClamrock received a warranty deed for the part purchased by him. Henderson, therefore, became the purchaser of that portion of the mortgaged lands which remained in Jones after he and his wife had conveyed and warranted a part to McClamrock. Consequently, applying the doctrine, deduced from the authorities as above, to the facts, as we find them in the complaint, the lands purchased by Henderson became primarily liable for the payment of the note sued on by Binford. If, therefore, Henderson should have paid that note, or have discharged the decree of foreclosure entered upon it, he would have acquired no right of contribution against the defendant as the grantee of McClamrock. As the plaintiff acquired the right to redeem the lands from the sheriff’s sale through her marital relations with Henderson, it would seem to follow, as an inevitable consequence, that she can assert no greater right, in that respect, than Henderson could have done upon payment of the mortgage debt.
Our inference from the facts pleaded is, that the complaint did not make out a case for contribution against the defendant. In our opinion, the complaint, also, failed to state facts entitling the plaintiff to subrogation to any right to proceed directly against that part of the mortgaged lands held by the defendant. Bradley v. George, 2 Allen, 392. By the terms of the decree of foreclosure, which was acquiesced in by, and is hence binding upon, all the parties to it, Binford was required to proceed primarily against the land held by and in the possession of Henderson. If, therefore, all the parties interested in that decree, and necessary to have given full jurisdiction in the premises, had been brought before the
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.