Henderson v. StateHenderson v. State
In Sylvester Henderson‘s pro se appeal from the trial court‘s order denying his “Objection to Order Denying Defendants Motion for Disclosure Grand Jury Testimony and Evidence,” we address the scope of this Court‘s appellate jurisdiction in light of the changes imposed by
On March 7, 2017, under the criminal docket number of his murder prosecution in Rockdale County Superior Court, Henderson filed a pro se “Motion to Disclose Grand Jury Testimony and Evidence,” which was denied in a brief order on March 13, 2017. On March 22, 2017, Henderson filed an “Objection to Order Denying Defendants Motion for Disclosure Grand Jury Testimony and Evidence,” which the trial court denied on March 28, 2017.2 In his notice of appeal, filed April 10, 2017, Henderson appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals “from the judgment of denial of defendants ‘Objection To Order Denying [sic] Motion for Disclosure Grand Jury Testimony And Evidence’ filed March 22, 2017.” He further directed that nothing be omitted from the record, and that “[a] transcript of evidence and proceedings will be filed for inclusion in the Record on Appeal.” By order of June 5, 2017, this appeal was transferred to this Court.
1.
We first address the question of the jurisdiction of this Court, as it affects this appeal.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction of the following classes of cases: (1) Cases involving title to land; (2) All equity cases; (3) All cases involving wills; (4) All habeas corpus cases; (5) All cases involving extraordinary remedies; (6) All divorce and alimony cases; (7) All cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals; and (8) All cases in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed. Review of all cases shall be as provided by law.
For all notices of appeal or applications for leave to appeal filed on or after January 1, 2017,
(a) Pursuant to Article VI, Section VI, Paragraph III of the Constitution of this state, the Court of Appeals rather than the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in the following classes of cases: (1) Cases involving title to land; (2) All equity cases, except those cases concerning proceedings in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed and those cases concerning the execution of a sentence of death; (3) All cases involving wills; (4) All cases involving extraordinary remedies, except those cases concerning proceedings in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed and those cases concerning the execution of a sentence of death; (5) All divorce and alimony cases; and (6) All other cases not reserved to the Supreme Court or conferred on other courts. . . .
This Court traditionally has taken an expansive view of its jurisdiction over murder cases. See, e.g., Neal v. State, 290 Ga. 563, 567 (722 SE2d 765) (2012) (Hunstein, C. J., concurring, opinion joined in by all Justices, reiterating that this Court‘s constitutional jurisdiction
Prior to the enactment of
There, the Court of Appeals considered a prisoner‘s appeal from the denial of a post-conviction copy of the transcript of his murder trial at public expense. Treating the motion as “a petition in the nature of mandamus,” the Court of Appeals concluded that while the denial of a petition for mandamus is generally directly appealable, that was not the case when a discretionary appeal was required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996,
Henceforth, if no petition for habeas corpus is pending at the time an indigent prisoner makes any application for a transcript of his trial for purposes of collateral attack upon his conviction or sentence, that application will be treated as a separate civil action subject to the procedures and requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996.
Id. But, after declaring that the defendant‘s post-conviction motion for a transcript was a civil action subject to the appeal provisions of
The language of
2.
Having established that we have subject matter jurisdiction, we now address Henderson‘s appeal. It is well established that “an indigent, on appeal, is entitled as a matter of right to a free copy of the transcript of trial court proceedings in which he has been a party.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Mitchell v. State, 280 Ga. 802, 802 (1) (633 SE2d 539) (2006). But [w]hile an indigent is entitled to a copy of his trial transcript for a direct appeal of his conviction, such is not the case in collateral post-conviction proceedings. After
Henderson failed to file a direct appeal, his motion for an out-of-time appeal was denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal by this Court. Because the law does not recognize a motion for a transcript at public expense filed in a criminal case after the opportunity for a direct appeal has ended, the trial court should have dismissed Henderson‘s motion as a nullity, and he has nothing cognizable to appeal. This appeal therefore is dismissed. See, e.g., Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) (686 SE2d 786) (2009) (petition to vacate or modify judgment not appropriate remedy in criminal case; appeal dismissed).
3.
Henderson has also filed a pro se pleading styled “Writ of Mandamus/Request for Discovery.” The style of the pleading is somewhat ambiguous, as it names the clerk of the Superior Court of Rockdale County as “Defendant” and is filed under both a Court of Appeals docket number and the original superior court docket number, but not the docket number of the instant appeal. In this pleading, Henderson declares that he seeks relief “pursuant to
Appeal dismissed. All the Justices concur.
Decided March 5, 2018.
Mandamus. Rockdale Superior Court. Before Judge Mumford.
Sylvester L. Henderson, pro se.
Alisha A. Johnson, District Attorney, Roberta A. Earnhardt, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Elizabeth H. Brock, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.