Henderson v. Mayor of Baltimore ex rel. Eschbach

8 Md. 352 | Md. | 1855

Tuck, J.,

delivered the opinion of this court.

We do not think that the ordinances of the city of Baltimore, applicable to the present case, should receive the construction placed upon them by the counsel for the appellee to the full extent of their argument. They virtually confer on property owners, not only the right of having their own lots improved by paving in front of them, but also the power to compel others to submit to such supposed improvements, and to pay for the same against their will; and the tax being due immediately on the commissioners making out the lists, payment may be enforced even before any portion of the work is commenced, though laid, not by the municipal authorities in the ordinary exercise of their taxing powers, but at the instance of persons who may be influenced solely by a regard for their own interests. It is true that this is done subject to the approval of the commissioners and the mayor, acting under the provisions of the ordinances, but the machinery necessary to give them effect can be put in motion only by those so interested. This is certainly a veiy high power to be possessed by any portion of citizens over others. It may be presumed that proprietors, looking to their own interests, will not object if they can perceive that their property will be appreciated by the improvement. But it is not difficult to perceive, that combinations may be formed for the advantage of some to the prejudice of others; and on the other hand, that a single individual, owning a majority of the feet of ground, may subject his neighbors to the operation of the ordinances when illy able to incur the expense, without, in either case, promoting the public convenience to any great extent. To prevent the abuse of the power, certain prehminaries are prescribed which must appear to have been at least substantially complied with, and among these, as most important, is the assent of the proprietors of the requisite number of feet binding and fronting on the street to be paved.

The defendant’s second prayer asserts, that the evidence on this point was not legally sufficient, and as this proposition, if correct, will dispose of the case, we shall address ourselves to its consideration. There is no testimony to show that Shipley had authority to assent for the owners of the lot whom-he claimed to represent. He states in his evidence, that he told Eschbach that he did not feel authorised to sign for the heirs, but did sign upon the conditions mentioned in the agreement of the 3rd of April 1848. The deed, bearing date April 19th, executed as a compliance with the condition on which Shipley signed the application, and relied on by the appellees as evidence of ratification, cannot be considered as operative from its date, even if it be otherwise sufficient to remove the objection. Deeds take effect from delivery. It is manifest that this was executed and acknowledged by some of the grantors after the 4th of May, and could not have been delivered on the day of its date. There was no proof as to the delivery other than what appeared on the instrument. Being a point arising upon its face, unconnected with parol proof, it was for the decision of the court. Barry vs. Hoffman, 6 Md. Rep., 78. Where deeds, as in this case, are executed and acknowledged in different counties, and necessarily on different days, the presumption arising from the date that the instrument was delivered on that day cannot stand against the positive averment in the acknowledgment that it was executed afterwards. Though this deed may have been executed and delivered before the work was actually commenced, of which, however, there is no evidence, it was but a performance of the condition in the agreement of the 3rd of April, and not a compliance with the prerequisites of the ordinance.

But the frame of this prayer is objected to, on the ground that the latter clause assumes the want of assent without submitting the question to the jury, and that the instruction was, therefore, well refused. We do not think so. The theory of the prayer is, that there was no legally sufficient evidence on this point. The record shows there was no proof of assent by Shipley’s heirs, and without the number of front feet owned by them there was not a majority of feet. It is then a case of total failure of evidence, in the legal sense of that expression. There was nothing to be left to the jury. The purpose of the prayer was to take the case from them, on the concession that all the plaintiff’s evidence offered on this point was true and that the jury would so find, yet asserting that the facts conceded did not entitle the plaintiff to a verdict. If the words ■objected to, to wit, “and they not having assented,” had been omitted, or if, instead of these, the words “ therefore,” or “because they have not so assented,” had been used, we suppose the prayer would have been unobjectionable in form. The language employed we consider as a mere statement of a reason for the conclusion of law, that the plaintiff? were not vntilled to recover, as in the above examples.

Nor do we agree with the counsel for the appellees, that the certificate of the commissioners is conclusive on the question of assent. At best it has a prima facie effect only, as the warrant or authority to have the paving done. But the parties who act under it do so at their peril. If it were otherwise, these commissioners might deem it necessary, in the faithful discharge of their duty, to examine the records to satisfy themselves that the persons assenting as proprietors were really owners of the lots, and in this pursuit, they would doubtless find titles on which they would be wholly incompetent to decide. But if they did decide, the owners objecting would be bound by their judgment. We believe that no such power was designed to be conferred on them. Their authority is special, and limited both as to its scope and effect. It was granted for the purpose of giving sanction to acts in pais, affecting the property and rights of others; but when made the foundation of an action, as here, it must appear to have been exercised according to law,

Eschbach cannot justly complain of this result. Without waiting for the consent of the owners in legal form, he treated with a person who he knew had no authority to act for them, and as the liability of the owners not assenting depends upon the regularity of the proceedings under the ordinances, he must take the consequences of his haste. There being a radical defect in the preliminary proceedings, the judgment must be reversed without procedendo.

Judgment reversed and procedendo refused.