182 A. 392 | Pa. | 1935
During the years 1918 and 1920, Robert E. Henderson assigned several mortgages to plaintiffs, the latter being his children. He had the assignments recorded, but retained possession of them, together with the accompanying bonds and mortgages. The assignees were not informed of the transfers. During his lifetime the assignor continued to collect the interest on the mortgages and to receive the benefits resulting therefrom. He died on November 17, 1933. Since his death the papers have been in the possession of defendant, plaintiffs' sister, and executrix of the father's estate. Plaintiffs claim the mortgages as gifts inter vivos from their father, and the present bill in equity is brought to secure manual delivery of the bonds, mortgages and assignments; to compel defendant to account for interest collected by her subsequent to the testator's death; and to restrain defendant from collecting any further sums on account of interest or principal. From a decree in accordance with the prayer of plaintiffs' bill, defendant has appealed. *126
To constitute a valid gift inter vivos, there are two essential elements: (1) an intention or purpose to give, accompanied by (2) a delivery, actual or constructive, of a nature sufficient not only to divest the donor of all dominion over the property, but also to invest the donee with complete control over the subject-matter of the gift: Reese v. Phila. Trust, etc., Co.,
Delivery when objectively equivocal is often determined by intention. The latter is usually a matter of inference. The delivery required must be appropriate to the property. A delivery entirely not called for by the very nature of the property will not be exacted. We are here concerned with the transfer of bonds secured by mortgages. The property, being intangible, was incapable of physical delivery. A transfer of all of the assignor's legal rights in the choses in action, together with all similar rights in the security pledged therefor, was all that was required. Of course, the donor might have turned over the various documents representative of the debts and the security therefor. In view of the fact that the assignments had already been recorded, that was not an essential to the completion of the gift. Plaintiffs' contention is not based upon actual delivery, there being no doubt that the documents were not in fact delivered, but upon the theory that their father had effected such a complete transfer of all of his legal rights to the obligations and the property securing the debts, that his retention of the assignments after they had been recorded was immaterial. The fundamental principle of the law of gifts is that the property transferred be placed beyond the further control of the donor; there must be an absolute parting with all his dominion and ownership; and his right of control and disposition must pass beyond recall. The legal rights of ownership formerly *127 vested in the donor must pass to the donee. If these conditions are not fulfilled, there can be no effective gift. But if they are present, a valid transfer has been effected. These principles applied to the facts here present lead to the conclusion that the decedent did, in his lifetime, make a complete transfer of the mortgages to plaintiffs. Under the circumstances, the recording of the assignments by the donor, with the intent to pass title, was, in view of all the legal incidents that flowed therefrom, the equivalent of the delivery which the law requires. The execution, acknowledgment and recording in the public records, which was notice to all the world, was a sufficient delivery to satisfy the law's requirements.
It is insisted, however, that recording merely created a rebuttable presumption of delivery, which was negatived by the chancellor's finding that there had been no delivery, and that the inevitable consequence must be that no title passed. Defendant relies upon Boardman v. Dean,
Complaint is made of the failure of the chancellor to dispose of the new matter included in defendant's answer to plaintiffs' bill. The substance of her contention is that plaintiffs be restrained from converting the decedent's personal property, and that they be commanded to give her full and unopposed access to the testator's safe in the decedent's former home. Her evidence not only failed to establish her claim to equitable relief, but failed completely to show any necessity therefor.
The decree is affirmed at appellant's cost. *129