(Aftеr stating the foregoing facts.) Section 42 (a) of the act of 1933 (Ga. L. 1933, p. 290) provides that upon the renditiоn of a verdict or judgment in the municipal court of Atlanta any party to said cause may make an oral motion for a new trial, where the amount involved is less than three hundred dollars, and the court mаy hear the motion instanter or at such time as may be set for a hearing, and no brief of the evidenсe shall be necessary. Section 42 (b) provides: “All rulings of the trial court which under the practice in thе superior court would be the subject-matter of final bill of exceptions, cross-bill of exceptions, or exceptions pendente lite, shall likewise be the subject-matter of such exceptions in this court, and such exceptions shall be presented to the trial judge within fifteen days from the datе of the ruling complained of, and ordered filed and transmitted to the appellate division of said court, or to the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, as hereinafter provided for in case of appeals to said appellate division or bills of еxceptions to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.55 Section 42 (c) provides: “In all cases wherein the amount involved, exclusive of interest, attorneys5 fees, and costs, is less than three hundred dollars, an appeal shall lie from the order overruling or refusing the motion for new trial or the final order or judgment of the trial judge, as the case may be, to the appellate division of said court.55 The Code, § 6-804, provides: “In any case where the judgment, decree, or verdict necessarily has been controlled by one or more rulings, orders, decisions, or charges of the court, and the lоsing party desires to except to such judgment, decree, or verdict, and to assign *611 error on the ruling, order, decision, or charge of the court, it shall not be necessary to make a motion for nеw trial, nor file a brief of the evidence, but the party complaining shall be permitted to presеnt a bill of exceptions containing only so much of the evidence or statement of facts as may be necessary to enable the appellate court to clearly understand the ruling, order, decision, or charge complained of.”
The plaintiff, after dismissing the oral motion for a new trial, and within fifteen daj^s from the date of the verdict and judgment, entered an appeal from the finаl judgment to the appellate division of said court, and, assigning error on the antecedent rulings allowing the amendment to the answer and overruling the demurrer to the answer as amended, alleged that such rulings entered into and affected the proper progress and final result of the case, and, in fact, controlled the verdict and judgment, and that the court erred in permitting said verdict and judgment to be entered. The appellate division held that it did not have jurisdiction of the appeal and dismissed it fоr'that reason, it being recited in the order of dismissal that, “The motion for new trial in this case having been dismissed and the order or judgment excepted to being interlocutory and not such a final order and judgment from which an appeal would lie, the appellate division of this court does not have jurisdictiоn of this appeal and the motion to dismiss the same is hereby sustained.”
The fact that the plaintiff made a motion for a new trial and voluntarily dismissed it would not prevent him from entering an appeal from thе final judgment to the appellate division of the civil court, assigning error on the antecedent rulings сomplained of, if done, as it was in this case, within the time provided by law for entering such an appeal.
McGee
v.
Knox,
60
Ga. App. 72, 75 (2
S. E. 2d, 808);
Copeland
v.
Gilbert,
24
Ga. App.
387 (
The appellate division of the civil court of Fulton County erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the same.
Judgment reversed.