Opinion
Donald L. Henderlite appeals a decision of the Circuit Court of Smyth County granting Judith O. Henderlite a judgment for $3,859 for delinquent child support. Finding no error, we affirm.
Donald and Judith Henderlite were divorced on August 18, 1978. The final decree incorporated a written separation agreement signed by the parties on April 11, 1978. This agreement provided for the custody and support of their three minor children. Specifically, Article IV of the agreement provided in pertinent part that “custody of the children born of this marriage will be in both parents, with physical control and care of the children to be worked out between the parties from time to time.” Article V of the agreement provided in pertinent part:
The [father] hereby agrees that he will pay ... the [mother] . . . $67.00 per month per child for the support and maintenance of the children . . . said payments are to be paid monthly until the children reach the age of eighteen or otherwise become emancipated.
In September, 1985 Judith filed a motion for a rule in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of Smyth County alleging that Donald was in arrears in his child support payments. *541 At the subsequent hearing, Donald introduced a chart which showed his payments and the times when one, two or three of the children were in his physical custody. Based on this evidence, he maintained that he made the required child support payments when the children were in the physical custody of Judith. The district court and the circuit court on appeal found the agreement unambiguous and, in awarding a judgment for arrearages, held that Donald was required to pay the entire child support amounts to Judith even during the periods he had physical custody of the children.
The issue before us is the proper interpretation of the parties’ agreement. The trial court found, and we agree, that the agreement is unambiguous. Where the agreement is unambiguous, its meaning and effect are questions of law to be determined by the court and the same rules of interpretation applicable to contracts generally apply to these agreements.
We adhere to the “plain meaning” rule in Virginia: “[W]here an agreement is complete on its face, is plain and unambiguous in its terms, the court is not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument itself .... This is so because the writing is the repository of the final agreement of the parties.”
Tiffany
v.
Tiffany,
Donald contends that the “plain meaning” of the agreement required him to pay $67.00 per month per child
only
when that child was in Judith’s physical custody. The answer to that contention is simply that the agreement does not so provide. “[Cjourts cannot read into contracts language which will add to or take away from the meaning of the words already contained therein.”
Wilson v. Holyfield,
Finally, we address Donald’s contention that our decision in
Acree
v.
Acree,
*543 Accordingly the decision below is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Hodges, J., and Moon, J., concurred.
