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Hendee v. Dewhurst
228 S.W.3d 354
Tex. App.
2007
Check Treatment

*1 participating me- that Jimenez resisted comply Relator has failed to with

diation. contract with

the terms Jimenez

setting up preconditions arbitration. either the Warehousemen or

Under theories, the arbitration

HIM/Kemiron not See triggered.

clause has been Ware

housemen, 488; HIM, F.3d Kemiron, 44; 290 F.3d at 1291.

F.3d at express any opinion regarding do not

We right

whether relator has waived upon precondi-

arbitrate satisfaction

tions, only right compel arbitra- yet under terms

tion has accrued express any we

of the contract. Nor do

opinion regarding whether lawsuit despite in the trial court

should continue dispute fact that an alternative resolu- agreement

tion and arbitration exists

(whether not), but enforceable or Jimenez complied it and the relator

has not it. On the undis- properly

has not invoked here, trial

puted presented record refus-

court did abuse its discretion compel

ing arbitration. petition writ of mandamus is

denied. HENDEE, Individually

Edd

and as Executive Director C.L.O.U.T., Appellant, Craddick, DEWHURST, Tom

David Leg Texas, Appellees. Board, Budget

islative

No. 03-06-00501-CV. Texas, Appeals of

Court of

Austin. 25, 2007.

May July

Rehearing Overruled *5 Polland, Austin, Rogers, Gary

David M. Associates, Houston, appel- Polland & for lant. Malish, Malish, Foster,

Christopher Milios, L.L.P., Cowan, Blair & Danica L. Mashburn, Gen., Timothy Asst. Solicitor Austin, Counsel, for appellee. General PATTERSON, Before Justices PEMBERTON and WALDROP. OPINION PEMBERTON, BOB Justice. judgment opinion our and We withdraw 17, 2007, April and substitute issued The has over- following place. its Court Defendants’ motions ruled rehearing and en banc reconsideration. Supreme response In to the Texas Neeley v. decision in West Court’s case,1 Legislature, the 79th Orange-Cove public supreme held that Texas’s court Neeley West-Orange In Cove Consolidated (Tex.2005). system an uncon- finance constituted Dist., S.W.3d 746 school dep. Sch. during jurisdiction. The district court April its third called session of and May 2005, enacted H.B. which the Gov- granted plea specifying May on signed ernor into law 81 of that grounds, and Plaintiffs’ claims dismissed year. Among things, other H.B. at- against the State Defendants want shift tempted to of the some burden of jurisdiction. funding schools from public Texas’s local interlocutory bring appeal this and,

property taxpayers to the state to from the district court’s order. See Tex. end, appropriations made additional 51.014(a)(8) §Ann. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code $3,825 ending billion for biennium (West Rio, Supp.2006); Perry v. Del In August June Edd (TexApp.-Austin Hendee, individually and as executive di- (Tex. 2001), dism’d, 239, pet. rector group Lowering of the Citizens Our 2001). affirm court’s order We the district (C.L.O.U.T.) Unfair (collectively, Taxes part, part, dismissal reverse Plaintiffs), against filed suit the Lieutenant remand for proceedings further consistent Governor, the Speaker House of opinion. with this Representatives, Comptroller, and the Legislative Budget members of the Board BACKGROUND (LBB),2 all in capacities, their official Texas, statutory seeking provisions State of declarations Constitutional and that H.B. 1 was unconstitutional un- jurisdictional turning Before is- lawful. allegation Plaintiffs’ central is that presented appeal, sues helpful the appropriation called for in H.B. 1 to *6 statutory consider the constitutional and caused the Defendants to ag- exceed the in context which arise. gregate biennial cap growth on the rate of 22(a) VIII, Article section of the Texas of appropriations VIII, under article sec- provides: Constitution tion 22 of the Texas Constitution and chap- In no biennium of growth shall rate ter 316 of the government code. These of appropriations from state tax reve- provisions mandate the “rate of by nues not dedicated constitution growth appropriations from state tax growth exceed rate of the estimated revenues” by not dedicated the constitu- economy. legislature state’s The tion not exceed the “estimated rate of proride by general procedures shall law growth of economy.” the state’s Tex. implement this subsection. Const, VIII, 22(a); § art. Tex. Gov’t Const, (West 22(a). 2005). § § Code VIII, Ann. All Tex. art. An “ap- 316.001 de- (collec- except propriation” fendants Comptroller legislative refers to enact- Defendants”) tively, the “State plea authorizing filed a ment state funds to be ex- property gave speaker. stitutional appointed by tax and members Tex. legislature 322.001(a) (West 2005). until June 2005 to enact correc- § Gov’t Code. Ann. legislation. tive at 800. Id. governor speaker The lieutenant and joint house are of the LBB. Id. chairs permanent joint 2. The LBB is a committee of 322.001(b). develops § budget The LBB Legislature comprised the Texas of the lieu- policy legislative appro- for recommendations governor, speaker tenant rep- of the house of priations, including Appropri a draft General resentatives, the chairman of the senate fi- session, 322.008(c) § ations Act Id. each committee, nance the chairman of the house (West 2005), impact and fiscal statements re- committee, appropriations the chairman of legislation. garding proposed other committee, ways the house and means three (West 2005). § 314.001 appointed by members of the senate lieu- governor, tenant and two additional house The pended particular purposes. speci- not exceed the priation amount requires constitution elsewhere VIII, “[n]o fied in the resolution. art. money Treasury shall drawn from be 22(b). Further, these expressly limits in pursuance specific appropriation alter, repeal do not amend or the Texas law; by any appropriation made nor shall “pay-as-you-go” Constitution’s balanced money term longer be made III, budget article 49a. limitation of section Const, See Tex. years.” than two art. 22(c). Id. art. VIII, § “pay-as-you- VIII, § 6.3 tax not dedi- “State revenues go” requires limitation that be- generally cated to one this constitution” refers any containing an appropriation fore bill could legislature source funds passed can be considered and be sent appropriate; others include non-tax reve- certify governor, comptroller must nues and is dedi- tax revenues whose use appropriated that each amount is within cated the constitution. amount to be of revenue estimated (b) VIII, Subsection of article section corresponding available affected legislature authorizes the to override 49a(b).4 Id. art. Ill, § funds. appropriations limit imposed otherwise Article of a section was borne (a) resolution, by adopting subsection late It was tax reform effort 1970s.5 house, approved vote by a record of each “Tax Relief components one of several finding emergency that an exists and iden- proposed Amendment” to the constitution tifying emergency, of that nature year legislature’s appro- legislature which case the earlier the 65th excess parties appear agree membership each 3. The that the relevant fifths vote the total biennium, House, appropriation “biennium” is the state’s fiscal no excess of September odd- which runs from 1 of each anticipated the funds cash revenue of through August year of the suc- numbered appropriation from which such is to ceeding year. odd-numbered containing shall No bill made be valid. passed shall be considered as III, provides 4. Article 49a in full: section or be sent the Governor for consideration Comptroller *7 until unless the of Public (a) duty Comptroller It of of shall be the the Accounts endorses his certificate thereon Regular Public Accounts in advance of each showing appropriated is that the amount Legislature prepare Session the and of the within amount estimated to be available Legisla- submit Governor the and to Comptrol- When in the affected funds. the upon convening under ture its a statement ler finds the an bill exceeds fully showing oath condition financial estimated he shall revenue endorse such Treasury of the of the last the close finding and return to thereon the House period proba- fiscal and an estimate of the originated. which same Such information receipts ble the then and disbursements for immediately be made to both shall known year. be current fiscal There shall also Representatives Sen- the House and the itemized es- contained in said statement an steps necessary and the be taken ate shall anticipated timate revenue based bring appropriation to the reve- such within received the laws then in effect that will be nue, by providing either additional revenue by and State from all show- for the sources reducing appropriation. or during ing the fund accounts to be credited Const, Ill, § Tex. 49a. art. succeeding and state- biennium said ment shall contain such other information Larry Toomey, Tax John Greene & The 5.See may required by Supplemental as be law. Act B Tex. .J. any Spe- statements shall be submitted Reform (1979) (contemporaneously observing, with Legislature cial and at such Session of taxpayer- notable California reference may necessary to show other times as 1970s, "Proposi relief measures of the probable changes. Leg (b) has invaded the Texas Except emergency im- tion 13 sentiment case of in the islature.”). necessity perative public and with a four- from the biennium to during special economy” a session current called for purpose by Dolph Briscoe. by “dividing Governor biennium the esti- the next Leg., appar H.J.R. 65th 2d C.S. It was personal total income for the mated Texas ently provision. modeled on Tennessee by estimated Texas to- next biennium the May, See The Con Janice C. Texas State income for current bienni- personal tal (1996). stitution: A Guide 310 (b). 316.002(a)(1), Reference “Using § um.” Id. VIII, Article was section ratified methods, statistical the board standard voters November 1978. by projecting shall make the estimate VIII, As the second sentence of Article the biennium the estimated Texas through 22(a) en- requires, legislature section by the personal reported total income implement provision. acted laws to Department of Commerce United States regular legislature during The did so successor in function.” Id. its January session imme- beginning 316.002(b). 316.002(c) However, § section diately VIII, following article section 22’s comprehen- contemplates more “[i]f generally ratification. See Acts 66th growth sive definition of the rate of of the R.S., Leg., intervening ch. 302. With some economy ap- is and is developed state’s amendments, these now enactments are governor, proved” committee of the codified in chapter government 316 of the governor, of the speaker lieutenant house 9, § code. See id. art. representatives, comptroller, “the 316.001, code, government Section may use that board definition.” VIII, tracks the mandate article section 2005). (West 316.002(c), §§ 316.005 The 22(a): growth “The rate of of appropria- that such an represent State Defendants in biennium tions from state tax revenue alternative, comprehensive” “more defini- not dedicated constitution adopted. tion has never been exceed the estimated rate of the growth 316.002 the LBB to requires Section also economy.” state’s Tex. Ann. Gov’t Code “the appropriations establish level of § provisions 316.001. chapter Other biennium from tax reve- current address how growth “the estimated rate of nues not dedicated constitution.” economy” the state’s is calculated 316.002(a)(2). figure is itself This that, provide for ensuring mechanisms estimate, relating partly an reasons 22(a) article requires, section of appropriations.6 the nature Even with- growth appropriations rate of does action, legislative out exceed the estimated rate of additional growth charged LBB as well as economy. appropriation, state’s amount of *8 source, with key responsibilities several this funding may change during within a bien- statutory scheme. nium, as when economic changes such originally impact not conditions forecasted 316.002(b),

Under is to section the LBB of composition funding the amount or “the rate of determine both estimated subject to an Be- appropriation. sources growth the economy” of the state’s “level of appropriations cause the the compar- appropriations growth by rate of tax current biennium from state revenues from of ing figures those the baseline the by the constitution” is calcu- dedicated to current biennium the next biennium. 2005). biennium, 316.002(b) (West during the it is § lated current Id. It calculates state’s of both actual of growth comprised appropriations “the estimated rate of of the regard- following public attached to their We base the observations documents Plaintiffs chiefly petition. ing appropriations on the nature of required by items information sec- (appropriated tax revenues the of non-dedicated 316.002, required al- the LBB is to pub- tax revenues that have tion non-dedicated ready Register lish the Texas the spent, proposed been and whose amount ascertainable) “a description thus items of information and finally and estimated methodology reve- the and sources used in the appropriations of non-dedicated tax (West 2005). (the § the Id. nues amount of such funds that calculations.” 316.003 spent anticipates pursuant LBB will be After LBB approves items appropriations of the during remainder 316.002, it required by section information biennium). Reflecting potential must submit the information to the com- changes in the amount or fund- unforeseen composed governor, mittee of the lieuten- ing in the appropriations source later governor, speaker rep- ant house biennium, level the LBB determines “the resentatives, comptroller. Id. for the current biennium appropriations 316.005(a). days § This committee has ten by from state tax revenues not dedicated items, any adopt amendments “subject adjustments the constitution” 316.005(b). § Id. If the might make. from forecast revisions resulting revenue ten-day fails to act within the committee by subsequent appropriations or certified by are period, approved the items deemed the Comptroller.”7 316.005(c). § the committee. Id. represent applies growth The LBB “rate of of State Defendants this com- approve never these economy” to the “the level mittee “has met state’s items,” historically “the appropriations for the current biennium so that items by com- by approved tax been the inaction of the from state revenues dedicated yield appropria- mittee.” constitution” to limit, “the cap”: tions or “spending compliance “To ensure with Article amount of state tax revenues not dedicated Constitution,” Section by appropri- the constitution that could be “in transmitting prohibited LBB is from limit within the ated for the next biennium any governor legislature form” rate of established the estimated “budget appropria- of estimated either the economy.” the state’s growth of general appropriations tions” or the bill 316.002(a)(3). Reflecting potential § rate of growth until “the limit current-biennium re- adopted has appropriations been spend- the LBB’s might change, baseline subchapter.” quired ing cap expressly made “sub- calculation is 316.002(d). ordinarily § These are events ject adjustments biennial [current] later than the fifth required to occur not appropriations.”8 reg- days, respectively, seventh after 322.008(c) & public hearing” ular session convenes. Id. The LBB is to “hold (West 2005). (d) “In the absence of of each even-numbered December (ie., adopt spending legis- [LBB] action year preceding regular those session) limit,” growth of the regard- rate of testimony “to the estimated lative solicit *9 zero, to economy is be and state’s deemed ing items information proposed next meaning for the appropriations calcu- that methodology making used in tax revenues Id. from non-dedicated by 316.002.” biennium required lations Section 2005). ap- (West amount of such approves could not exceed the § Before 316.004 Legislative Budget Id. Meeting 7. Notice of (C.R. (Nov. 17, 2004) Board, Agenda Item 3 57, petition). original Ex. E to Plaintiff’s 316,

propriations priations Chapter under the current biennium. established 316.002(e).9 § Government Code. 21(f), 5, § Tex. H.R. Tex. H.R. Rule Additionally, provides 316.006 section 108, 114; R.S., 79th Leg., 2005 H.J. Tex. by majority that unless authorized vote 7.20, Tex. S. Rule Tex. S. Res. 80th house, of the LBB from each members R.S., Leg., Tex. 24. In 2007 S.J. of other budget LBB’s relating recommendations words, a that believe would bill members proposed appropriations state tax cap subject spending exceed the to a revenue not dedicated the constitution point of order. If determined meritorious may not limit on exceed the estimated and presiding sustained the chamber’s (West 2005). § appropriations. 316.006 officer, ruling prevent pas- such a would Moreover, provides section 316.008 sage of the bill until the defect is remed- “proposed limit” on appropriations is 1, 9,§ ied. See Tex. H.R. Rule Tex. H.R. “binding on the legislature respect with R.S.; 4.03, Leg., 80th Tex. S. Rule Tex. appropriations all for the next biennium Leg., S. Res. 80th R.S. made from state tax revenues not dedicat- allegations Plaintiffs’

ed absent a constitution” resolution VIII, to raise cap under article section pleading Plaintiffs’ live before the dis- 22(b). (West 316.008(a) 2005). §Id. “The trict original petition, court was their filed rules of representatives the house of and it, sought in June 2005. In Plaintiffs relief senate provide shall for enforcement” of Declaratory under Judgments the Uniform 316.008(b). § this limitation. Id. Both the Act10 based on that the claims Defendants house and senate rules effect during the 22(a) VIII, violated article section 79th Legislature’s session, third called Texas Constitution section and 316.001 of enacted, when H.B. 1 was contained virtu- government code. Plaintiffs seek “de- ally identical provisions that: claratory prevent relief to stop and uncon- illegal spending stitutional the Tex- authority Unless within the of a resolu- government.” They allege as State two tion adopted or pursuant resolutions chief how H.B. regarding ap- theories l’s VIII, 22(b),

Article Section of the Texas propriation violates article section Constitution, it is not order for the chapter theory or as well [chamber] consider for final passage chapter separation pow- violates the on third reading, on motion to concur in ers. amendments, [the other chamber’s] or on motion to adopt legislature’s a conference commit- allege that the re- report, tee appropriating quirement a bill funds the “estimated rate of treasury from the growth economy” an amount pre- the state’s be that, sumptively when added amounts previously solely growth based in Tex- income, appropriated by previously passed personal bills as’s total see Tex. Gov’t 316.002(b) (c), sent or due to sent to the Code comp- Ann. & and the troller, measure, would the limit on appro- exceed LBB’s sole reliance on are (d) (e), 1991, ap compel Supreme Subsections added in with the Court to parently responded act). an initial failure LBB to comply refusal of LBB its statuto ry requirements spending cap. to set C.R. 10. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. 54; May, see Janice C. The Texas State Consti (West Supp.2006) §§ & 37.001-.011 (1996) (noting tution: A Guide Reference ("UDJA”). *10 twenty legislators sought had mandamus permit appropriations the text and intent of set on that basis to inconsistent with VIII, 22(a). exceeding the true constitutional limit. As a matter of article section that, complain way, Plaintiffs in this H.B. interpretation, Plaintiffs constitutional l’s unconstitutional rela- the urge, growth the “estimated rate of of to of growth tive the “real” rate economic of the en- economy” growth state’s means as to the the compared both baseline of economy, merely growth tire the biennium and when article single component personal of a income. — VIII, Regarding section was ratified. rely legislative Plaintiffs also on the histo- latter, complain the Plaintiffs that overesti- VIII, ry They ob- of article section growth have “com- mations of economic legislature apparently con- serve the pounded over the decades” correc- eventually rejected but sidered a version tion, causing spending cap the to likewise (a) of explicitly subsection that would have requirements.12 deviate from constitutional spending growth per- tied the limit to in income,11 urge intent sonal us infer Second, allege Plaintiffs that the mecha reject personal growth as the income legislature nisms has adopted imple the cap. sole for spending basis the VIII, article 22— ment and enforce section in- [personal that “this allege barometer chiefly govern in the chapter found 316 of growth] historically proven come has been ment code—constitute unconstitutional the wildly growth overstate of delegations legislative power of its economy,” causing spending caps separation-of-powers LBB in of state’s violation emergency representa- in the of exists and identifies the nature As introduced house Amendment, tives, proposed Tax legislature may provide Relief emergency, part, growth would have limited the relevant appropriations for of the amount excess legislative appropriations tax all from state (a) authorized Subsection of this section. per- to a revenue fixed annual increase of 7½ The excess authorized under this subsection Tex., Leg., cent. HJ. 2d C.S. 9 65th may specified exceed amount in the (1978). entirely provision That deleted was resolution. substitute, id. at the committee see but (d)In appropriations no case exceed shall following provision through a later added was III, provided revenues as in Article Section house floor amendment: 49a. That Article VIII the Texas Constitution provision 142-43. This version of by adding read be amended Section 21 to VIII, that became section remained article follows: as Taxpayer passed by in the Relief Amendment (a) Except provided Sec. as otherwise id., house, was deleted in senate Section, legislative appropriations committee substitute omitted from from State tax revenue for fiscal bienni- approved by that version chamber. appro- not exceed the total of those um agreed on 309. The conference committee preceding priations biennium appears language that now in article percentage than more would result from submitted to and rati- section which was percentage growth total equaling the fied the voters. during personal income biennium, reported by the previous as complaining 12. To the extent Plaintiffs are Comptroller Public Accounts. expendi- specific appropriations and about (a) (b) The hereof limitation subsection biennia, during prior opposed tures made apply appropriations and tax in- shall not forthcoming expenditures under H.B. provide necessary creases reimburse- standing appropriation, they would lack un- replace revenues ment to school districts to See principles der we discuss below. by partial of ad valorem or total abolition lost Davis, property Tex. taxes. Hoffman (c) adoption reso- legislature by (Tex.1937). If the of a approved by a vote of three- lution record house, of the members of each finds fifths *11 Const, II, alternative, allege limitations. Tex. l.13 In the Plaintiffs that art. appropriation ap- H.B. l’s total “cause[s] Plaintiffs that complain enacting also when propriations unap- even the exceed H.B. legislature upward relied on an proved staff-generated by limit billion $1.3 original spending revision of the LBB’s allege dollars.” the State Plaintiffs cap by made LBB the board —and staff—not acknowledge Defendants “based on —that which, contend, was invalid itself— prior the appropriation^] made to the Specifically, allege— and void. Plaintiffs session, special Legislature had acknowledge— the State Defendants appropriated billion Non-Dedicat- $53.0 that in approved November the LBB ed General Related Funds.” Revenue a resolution complying chapter 316 Plaintiffs concede that this left billion $2.6 $52,145 that spending set a limit of billion in appropriations non-dedicated from state appropriated could be from non-dedi tax revenues that could have been made cated during state tax revenues the 2006- exceeding “the billion staff $55.6 07 biennium.14 allege Plaintiffs also —and generated unapproved limit.”16 Because agree the State Defendants —that billion, H.B. appropriation l’s was $3.9 spending cap adjusted upward was in late allege, Plaintiffs it “caused total appropria- 2005 to billion. In contending that $55.6 unapproved tions to exceed even staff- adjustment void, empha was Plaintiffs generated by limit billion dollars.” $1.3 size statements a December 2005 LBB request Plaintiffs including declarations publication that “[t]he [LBB] instructed that “the in H.B. 1 ... appropriation adjust the level of ap staff unconstitutional basis that on the ex i[t] propriations from tax revenues not VIII, ceeds the mandates of Article Sec dedicated the Constitution and 2006- 22(a) enactment, applied tion since as 2007 spending limit calculations to reflect or alternatively that said subsequent appropriations certified is unconstitutional on the basis that added).15 by the Comptroller.” (Emphasis VIII, exceeds the mandates Article urge adjustment Plaintiffs such 22(a) Section over the applied last would have only been valid if enacted biennium, alternatively ap said legislature through general proce law propriation is unconstitutional because it dures, or at least the LBB itself extremely generous exceeds even the through a formal resolution under chapter and faulty provided by estimates adjustment 316. upward Because this is, Legislative Budget Board accord invalid, spending cap was ing calculations, to the LBB’s own vi assert, $52,145 billion, cap remained 22(a).” olation of Article Section a level undisputedly was exceeded Proceedings below subsequent appropriations for that bienni um. The State filed a plea Defendants original petition, Legislative Budget In Up Plaintiffs also Board’s "Fiscal Size alleged delegation legisla- 2005) unconstitutional (published 2006-2007 Edition” Dec. powers tive to the committee established (C.R. 58, 61, un- original peti- Ex. F to Plaintiffs’ 316.005, appear der section do tion). press appeal. this claim on 16. Meeting Legislative 14. Notice of Bud- Board, (Nov. 17, 2004) get Agenda Item 3 (C.R. original petition). Ex. E to Plaintiff’s

366 (Tex.1993)). 440, jurisdiction17 only pleader the challenging the suffi- 446 Whether question has met this is a law burden pleadings; they of Plaintiffs’ did ciency de novo. that we review Id. We construe the facts Plaintiffs challenge jurisdictional pleadings liberally the and look the to in pleaded support or submit evidence intent. If pleader’s pleadings do argued Defendants plea. The State affirmatively facts not contain sufficient to sufficiently plead that Plaintiffs failed to jurisdiction the trial court’s demonstrate (so or an act as to standing ultra vires affirmatively do incurable but defects sovereign and that the immunity18) avoid jurisdiction, pleading is one of the issue non-justiciable present political claims sufficiency plaintiffs should af be at questions. Following hearing a brief to opportunity forded the amend. Id. at evidence, presented which neither side 226-27; R.N., Elgin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. that it district court ruled from the bench 2006, (Tex.App.-Austin 191 272 S.W.3d juris- grant the State Defendants’ would pet.). affirmatively no If pleadings suit. plea dictional and dismiss Plaintiffs’ jurisdiction, a negate the existence then appeal This followed. jurisdiction may granted to plea allowing plaintiffs opportu DISCUSSION Miranda, nity to amend. 133 at S.W.3d a appeal, bring single On issue 227. complaining that the district court erred However, deciding “a court a the State granting abused discretion jurisdiction required is not plea plea jurisdiction. to the Defendants’ con solely pleadings look Standard of review must when neces sider evidence and do so A challenge a trial court’s sub sary jurisdictional to resolve issues ject jurisdiction may be matter asserted Bland, raised.” at 555. 34 S.W.3d “When Dep’t Texas plea jurisdiction. a to the jurisdiction challenges the plea Miranda, v. S.W.3d Parks & alleged by pleader Wildlife of facts existence (Tex.2004); Indep. Sch. 225-26 Bland subject matter establish the trial court’s Blue, (Tex. Dist. v. 34 S.W.3d jurisdiction, the trial court must consider 2000). subject mat Whether a court has par relevant evidence submitted jurisdiction question Mi ter law. Miranda, (citing ties.” 133 S.W.3d at randa, at 226. determina S.W.3d Bland, 555). varying To 34 S.W.3d subject tion a trial court has of whether jurisdictional degrees, inquiry may this begins plead jurisdiction matter pleader’s merits also implicate ings. Bland, Id. The has the initial bur pleader Compare cause of action. affirmatively challenges den of facts that alleging (citing to as jurisdiction jurisdic personal trial court’s standing demonstrate the sociational evidentiary entailing inquiry Texas “an (citing hear the Ass’n tion cause. Bd., significant ... does not involve [that] Bus. Control Air defendant, 22(a), adopting Article Although as a named judg- appropriate Stray- same be enforced Comptroller should Carole Keeton —then Court, to the extent authorized ments of this denying responsibility answer horn—filed an party Comptroller is not law.” The complained-of well appropriations, as for the appeal. Plain- Realignment” with as a "Statement of "contending that mean- to the extent of tiffs on, of, Strayhorn, 148 S.W.3d ingful See McLane Co. v. control and effective limitations denied). (Tex. pet. App.-Austin spending was intended the voters inquiry any into indulge every the substance of the claims” inference and resolve *13 holding challenge taxpayer and doubt in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at merits), standing did a implicate presents not with the evidence fact Whether (describ Miranda, question regarding jurisdictional 133 S.W.3d at 227-28 a fact is a jurisdictional ing question we overlapping and merits of law that review de novo. inquiry regarding challenge whether parks department and wildlife acted speci Because the district court did not gross negligence sovereign so as to waive dismissal, fy affirm grounds we immunity under recreational use stat on any ground meritorious on which the ute). trial When consideration a court have relied. See Atmos Ener could subject jurisdiction requires court’s matter Abbott, gy Corp. evidence, the examination the trial court 2004, no Prov (Tex.App.-Austin pet.); cf. exercises its discretion in determining Knott, ident Ins. Co. v. & Accident Life jurisdictional

whether determination (Tex.2004) (applying preliminary hearing should be made a context). principle summary judgment case, await fuller development court, noted, In previously the district as jurisdictional mindful that the determina challenged only the State Defendants tion practicable. must made as soon as sufficiency they of Plaintiffs’ pleadings; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227-28. did challenge jurisdictional facts or juris case

“[I]n which the juris support introduce evidence to their dictional challenge implicates the merits of However, plea. at dictional Plaintiffs did plaintiffs plea cause of action and the tach petition. appeal, evidence to their On jurisdiction evidence, to the includes attempt the State to broaden Defendants trial court reviews the relevant evidence to jurisdic their challenge attack certain if determine a fact issue exists.” Id. tional underlying facts Plaintiffs’ alterna standard, 227. This mir “generally which tive that H.B. “ex appropriation claim l’s summary rors that of a judgment under extremely generous ceeds even the and 166a(c),” Texas Rule of Civil Procedure faulty provided by Legisla estimates seeks to reconcile pre is, “the fundamental Budget according tive Board to the cept calculations, that a court proceed must not on the in violation Ar LBB’s own 22(a).” VIII, merits of a until legitimate challenges case Specifically, ticle Section jurisdiction to its they have been rec public decided” while attach to brief two “protecting] the interests of the state and conclusively ords assert establish that ... claimants in ... eases in which the H.B. did l’s not exceed subject determination of the spending cap matter of the as determined the LBB: (1) implicates parties’ April court the merits of the entirety Comptroller’s cause of action.” Id. at 227-28. Accord 79th 2006 “Revenue Estimate ingly, Session,”19 reviewing plea juris Legislature, when Third Called (2) which pleading requirement diction in 2006 memo the LBB’s April from has been met and deputy evidence has been sub director to Lieutenant Gover stating mitted support plea implicates Speaker nor and billion $3.95 case, the merits of the as all made appropriations we take true in additional could be general exceeding evidence favorable the nonmovant and from revenue “without portions petition, 19. Selected document were but not entire document. attached as Exhibits I and J to Plaintiffs’ department parks

the Article Section limit.”20 whether and wildlife acknowledge that State Defendants these gross negligence acted with so to waive the trial documents “were not before sovereign immunity under the recreational court,” judicial us no request statute). to take use It is also well-established them, urging tice of that the facts stated jurisdiction that where trial court’s de- subject them are within to reasonable pends upon whether state official’s acts dispute capable and are accurate statutory are within her constitutional or *14 ready reliable public ascertainment from plaintiff authority, alleges such as when a Tex. R. Evid. 201. sources. See sovereign ultra action to avoid immu- vires nity, may the trial court sometimes be able Plaintiffs that reply the State Defen- jurisdictional to the issue a mat- decide as seeking are liti- inappropriately dants to pleadings by ter on the con- of law based gate guise the merits of their claims in the struing statutory the constitutional and jurisdictional challenge. Allowing aof so, provisions defining authority the actor’s if “to especially them to do allowed alleged ascertaining whether the acts change theories and introduce evidence See, authority. appeal,” urge, e.g., Plaintiffs is inconsistent would exceed [on] supreme precedent Strayhorn, with court and “funda- McLane Co. denied) any process.”

mental notions of due In (TexApp.-Austin pet. event, contend, new docu- the (acknowledging that in determining wheth- bearing” no on whether the ments “have may declaratory judgment er suit be main- the complied spend- State Defendants official, against it tained a state was first ing cap. necessary, sovereign immunity light defining principles, to construe statutes of- question We will specific address powers “decide whether the [offi- ficial’s to the jurisdictional whether we consider or validly exercised her discretion act- cial] challenge and evidence that the De- legal authority.”); ed outside of her to cf. appeal fendants seek raise on as Dept. Agric. & Environ. v. Director analysis. relevant to our Howev- become Ass’n, Printing 600 S.W.2d Indus. er, sug- parties’ respective arguments (Tex.1980) (construing 265-70 constitution clarify here gest that we should some alleged ul- plaintiff determine whether principles governing broader our review. officials; had tra vires action state suggest To extent that Plaintiffs that it special issue via And exceptions).21 raised adjudicate, categorically improper jurisdictional Miranda further allow would jurisdictional jurisdictional a through plea, summary judgment-like via merits, challenges, its implicate overlap issues that acts process, alleged to the existence See notion is belied Miranda. Miranda, beyond are to have been (regarding asserted 133 S.W.3d 227-28 noted, appropriated agency’s powers, the basis for our hold previously As H.B. 1 $3,825 plaintiff billion. ing was had added this ultra that the hearing day a only one before on vires claim v. Burnam is not to Our decision Davis plea jurisdiction to other related (Tex. contrary. therefore, agency, had claims and that App.-Austin pet.). part, no In relevant inadequate might notice that the trial court a plea we a trial vacated court’s denial newly- regarding jurisdiction its over the rule jurisdiction challenged that had whether claim, inadequate opportunity to added alleged agency plaintiff had that a state arguments develop Id. & and authorities. While we director had acted ultra vires. involving n. 16. "the mer characterized issue as “statutory turning its” and construction” statutory actor’s constitutional or authori- They attempt article section 22. ty- political question invoke the doctrine self-executing the related doctrine of Yet this does mean that provisions, constitutional each of which defendants and trial courts have free rein separation-of-powers emanate from con- “require!] plaintiff prove his law, cepts. Long recognized in Texas case ... at pleading stage, any before of self-executing doctrine constitutional discovery conducted,” has been Plain as provisions is concerned with whether succeed, tiffs contend occurred here. To provision confers determinate sufficiently challenging jurisdictional defendant fact judicial permit standards ascertainment plea jurisdiction via a satisfy must and enforcement: the same initial burden in a “tradition provision A constitutional is said to be summary al” judgment conclusively ne — sufficient self-executing supplies if gating the judg existence of the fact—and *15 rule right given means of which the proper ment is in such if only instance may enjoyed and protected, be or the plaintiff present controverting cannot evi duty imposed may enforced; be is raising dence a genuine issue of material self-executing merely when it indi- Miranda, fact. 133 at S.W.3d 227-28. principles, laying cates down generally, More a trial court must exercise rules principles means of which these deciding sound discretion in ju whether a given of force law. risdictional implicating determination Neeley, at (quoting 176 S.W.3d 782 Mitch merits “should preliminary be made at a Bank, 361, ell v. County City Nat’l 91 Tex. or hearing await a development fuller of (Tex.1898) 880, 43 case, S.W. (quoting 883-84 T. mindful that this determination Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 99-100 must be made soon practicable.” as (6th 1890))). ed. 227; Bland, Similarly, “political see 34 It S.W.3d question,” at as it least has been defined that a follows trial court’s decision to de (1) courts, the federal is one that involves jurisdictional termine implicating issue “a lack of judicially discoverable and man particular merits at a preliminary (2) ageable it,” resolving standards for or stage case development may of be so arbi textually “a trary unreasonable, demonstrable constitutional given the state of record, political commitment to a de coordinate that it constitutes an abuse of partment.” (quoting at 777-78 Baker Burnam, discretion. Davis v. Cf. Carr, 186, 217, 691, 369 U.S. S.Ct. S.W.3d (Tex.App.-Austin (1963)). L.Ed.2d 663 pet.) no (vacating trial court’s of denial jurisdictional plea turning statutory on The State Defendants argue that article construction to alleged determine whether VIII, 22(a), by requiring section that “[t]he vires; acts were ultra defendant inad had legislature general shall provide by law issue). equate notice argue to brief and procedures subsection,” to implement this including determining method “the question/self-executing Political consti- growth rate of estimated of the state’s provision tutional economy,” a “textually embodies demon- The State argue Defendants strable constitutional commitment” of the district court’s of dismissal Plaintiffs’ these matters to the legislature. See Tex. Const, 22(a). VIII, claims should be affirmed because the art. section And subject jurisdiction court lacked matter to requirement no “[i]n biennium shall provide a remedy for any alleged growth violation the of appropriations rate of from power Legislature

state tax revenues not dedicated shall cities, towns, and enact laws to enable constitution exceed the estimated rate of ... Com- villages provide Workmen’s growth economy,” state’s Legis- pensation ... and Insurance urge, provide Defendants does not suffi- for the laws provide lature shall suitable judicial ciently permit definite standards to of in the administration such insurance determination and enforcement. payment of municipalities said and for article equate The State Defendants costs, pol- charges, premiums 22(a) section to the constitutional to be icies insurance the benefits provision City Corpus addressed paid thereunder. Pleasanton, v. City Christi 154 Tex. Const, No Ill, (repealed Tex. art. (Tex.1955). In City 2001). ques “the We held that vember

Pleasanton, the supreme applied court is within tion what a ‘suitable’ law self-executing doctrine of constitutional By its power of a court to decide. XVI, provisions to article section 59 nature, com very political question it is Constitution, it calls legislature which declares that mitted because beyond a pure public policy decisions development of all “[t]he conservation and City, City Bridge competence.” court’s the natural [are] resources this State at 415. rights public requires and duties” and *16 legislature may laws article sec “pass all such be Plaintiffs contend that Const, 22(a) VII, article comparable tion is appropriate thereto.” Tex. art. Constitution, 1 of and section the Texas XVI, provi- § 59. The court that this held ju Court’s emphasize Supreme the Texas provide sion did not courts basis de- is risprudence holding provision that this clare “what of conduits and reser- types prohibiting of self-enforcing to extent voirs transportation be used for the under it inconsistent laws and that claims water, storage lawfully and of obtained non-justiciable present political do not lawfully used” or “declare the use of VII, provides: 1 section questions. Article types certain of conduits and reservoirs to being diffusion general knowledge A of Legislature, be unlawful when the nec- of liber- preservation essential essary implication, has declared them to be it people, of shall rights ties and Pleasanton, 276 at City lawful.” S.W.2d of of the State duty Legislature 803. provision suitable to establish and make rely The also on a State Defendants of an for the maintenance support and prior decision of this Court which we system of free schools. public efficient III, 61 Const, held that the former article section VII, supreme The Tex. art. did not confer the Texas Constitution chal repeatedly reaffirmed that court has judicially right. Texas Work enforceable provision the “efficien lenges under this Comp. Bridge City, v. City ers’ Comm’n “suitability” Tex cy,” “adequacy” 411, (Tex.App.-Austin 900 S.W.2d do not public system as’s school finance denied). III, questions. non-justiciable political Article section 61 present writ Neeley, at 176 S.W.3d 776-80.22 Most provided: See Bridge City, supreme explicitly City v. 900 S.W.2d did not hold Comm’n The court VII, denied) (Tex.App.-Austin writ "suitability” claims under article 415 supreme justiciable (emphasizing court’s hold until after our that the section were Edge “efficiency” City Neeley, ing regarding clause in Bridge Compare decision. 776-80, Indep. Kirby, Comp. v. with Texas Workers' wood Sch. Dist. S.W.3d words, recently, Neeley, the court assumed defendants’ “the arbiter of edu- deciding overseeing without policy, the Baker v. Carr cation and such issues test applied testing development, to the as curriculum and Texas Constitution VII, approval, reaffirmed that claims textbook and teacher certifica- under article Rather, tion.” present judiciary’s duty section did not political ques legal decide the properly tions. Id. While issues before acknowledging that arti VII, policy matters. The dictating cle Legisla section 1 “commits to the ture, ap- constitutional standards provide the most democratic branch of the judicial propriate basis for review and government, authority to determine determination. the broad range policy issues in provid education,” ing public id. at I, 778-79; Id. at see also Edgewood court reiterated that duty is not “[t]his (“By express S.W.2d at 394 constitutional committed unconditionally legisla mandate, legislature must make ‘suit discretion, ture’s accompa instead is provision able’ system for an ‘efficient’ nied standards.” (quoting purpose the ‘essential’ ‘general diffu Edgewood Indep. Kirby, Sch. Dist. 111 sion of knowledge.’ While these are ad (Tex.1989) (“Edgewood mittedly precise terms, pro do I”)). As for whether those “standards” must, vide a which standard this court judicial capable enforcement, were so, when upon called to do measure supreme court stated: constitutionality of the ac legislature’s tions.”). agree

Nor do we with the defen- dants the constitutional standards Neeley rejected similarly court of adequacy, efficiency, and suitability VII, contention that article section 1 was are judicially unmanageable. These not self-executing susceptible and not standards import spectrum a wide judicial provisions. action to enforce its *17 admittedly considerations and are im- 176 at 782-83. recognizing While precise, VII, but are not without con- that article section 1 not was “self- tent. ... judiciary The is in executing” well-accus- of mandating sense to applying specific through tomed substantive standards means which the legisla- crux duty of which ture comply is must with its under reasonableness. that say provision, This is not to it that the court held that was “self- standards VII, executing” leg- article section 1 to the extent of prohibiting involve no political islative action beyond provi- inconsistent with the judiciary’s considerations sion: power to determine. We have acknowl-

edged that much design VII, of the of an The standards of article 1— section adequate public system efficiency, education cannot adequacy, suitability —do judicially prescribed. be Litigation over a particular dictate structure that of adequacy public may system education of free public schools must have. judicial well invite but policy-making, We have this repeatedly.... stressed accepted. VII, the invitation need be But ... article section dictates judiciary’s choice is not public system between what the education cannot VII, complete abstinence from article inadequate be: it cannot be so it issues, being, section provide general the State does not for a diffusion (Tex.1989) I”), task.”). ("Edgewood was which a court has undertaken such only "the of we instance which are aware in provisions “the ing: constitutional were of or so inefficient dis- knowledge, general only in self-executing prohibiting tricts which must achieve this conflict- knowledge preclude diffusion of do not sub- did not ing laws and statutes stantially equal to available reve- provisions.”). access passed to effectuate the mission, or so perform nues to Plaintiffs that the agree We with of its unsuitable that cannot because un Supreme jurisprudence Court’s purpose. structure achieve its VII, 1 compels section us to der article Thus, agree we State defen- VIII, that article section is self- hold VII, dants that article section does not executing prohibiting to the extent of declaring provide the courts a basis for with its legislative action inconsistent systems or finance will what education provisions, and that Plaintiffs’ claims satisfy pro- alone its standards. But non-justiciable present violations do not is insofar as it self-executing pro- vision legis political Although questions.23 any system that fails meet hibits authority make delegated lature is those standards. VIII, section implement article laws (footnotes omitted). For this Id. at 783 22(a), dele this not the sort of broad distinction, supreme court relied on the appro gation to enact “laws County City Nat’l rationale Mitchell Pleasanton, City priate” at issue Bank, County 43 S.W. at 883-84. Mitchell even the mandate XI involved two sections of article addressed laws” we “provide suitable 2, which Texas Constitution —section authority is City. This City Bridge jails, states that construction “[t]he unconditionally “not committed ... pro- shall be bridges court-houses discretion, ac instead is legislature’s laws,” by general vided for and section Neeley, standards.” companied prohibited and counties from which cities I, Edgewood (quoting S.W.Sd at incurring projects for certain debt 394). Specifically, legisla 777 S.W.2d at sinking imposing repay taxes for fund re implement the purports tion VIII, article section debt—and quirement no shall biennium “[i]n the amount certain taxes which limited from growth appropriations the rate of impose. and counties could that cities tax not dedicated revenues Const, 9, XI, §§ arts. Tex. rate exceed the estimated constitution *18 County court stated that Mitchell nec growth economy” must state’s that laws in conflict “[i]n the sense all with those stan essarily be consistent void, prohibitions these are section 9 at 882- County, 43 S.W. dards. Mitchell 11 are and 7 of article self- article 8 section but, in is executing; anything so far as VIII, Although article the standards of required carry them into be done 22(a) admittedly not precise “are section effect, so, they they pre- because are terms,” at Neeley, 176 S.W.3d by any act no rules which could be scribe 394), I, 777 at (quoting Edgewood S.W.2d require- in the done enforcement sufficiently 882-83; must be considered Neeley, they surely see ments.” S.W. if, by courts and enforceable this determinable (summarizing at 782 hold- S.W.3d ap- spending cap. economy On petition, or the original request- state In their Plaintiffs appear that to have conceded speci- peal, Plaintiffs have ed declarations that would several those they not be entitled to sorts would particular which fied methods declarations, determining that only those legislature would be re- or the Defendants VIII, violated. 22 has been growth article section quired rate of in the to calculate the doubtful; supreme held, as the court has such nebu cause it is with whatever concepts doubt, as “adequacy,” “efficiency,” lous with whatever difficulties case VII, it, “suitability” attended, under article section [we] must decide sum, 22(a) VIII, In are. article in judgment. section when arises gives legislature right “sole Gordon, 396, 397-98, Dallam Morton v. how decide to meet the standards set (Tex.1841); 1841WL see Neeley, also in that people” provision, but “the Ju (“what at 777 court said diciary has final authority to determine true.”). ... is still [in Morton] they whether have been met.” Id. at 777 Because article section is self- (quoting & n. 169 Orange-Cove West Con executing of prohibiting legis- to the extent Alanis, Indep. sol. Sell. Dist. v. action lative inconsistent with its stan- (Tex.2003)). 558, 563-64 dards, judicially ascertainable, which are and because Plaintiffs’ claims that these reasoning

Our is further informed pres- standards have been violated do Neeley court’s that observations non- non-justiciable ent a political question, we justiciable rare, political questions are id. cannot affirm the district 779-80, court’s order of City and that Pleasanton dismissal based these doctrines. instance in sole which it has used the self-executing doctrine of constitutional appropriation Unlawful provisions preclude judicial action. The State Defendants further at 782-83. are also We mindful of the standing lack contend supreme court’s observations that while that their claims are sovereign barred the Texas empower Constitution does not immunity they not, because have and can judicial engage in legislative branch not, assert valid claim that H.B. l’s policymaking in the guise of constitutional plead is unlawful. Plaintiffs interpretation, permit neither does it standing ed that have as “residential duties, courts avoid their when called taxpayers,” an allegation business upon, to strike down laws that are incon- construe, we in the context of their other sistent with provisions. constitutional allegations, they pay to assert at 776-82. the supreme As court observed taxpayer taxes that could establish standi when first summoned to strike down act ng.24 Supreme The Texas has ex Court Republic Congress: plained general, taxpayers do not “[i]n have not

[W]e been unmindful of the a right bring gov suit to contest magnitude involved, of the principles decision-making gov ernment ... because respect every and the due to the popular operate ernments cannot if citizen government.... public branch Fortu- that a who concludes official has however, nately, people, granted for the the func- the right abused his discretion is *19 judiciary tion in to deciding bring constitu- come into court and such official’s Bland, questions public tional is not one which it at is acts under review.” 34 Keith, liberty cannot, to v. (quoting decline.... as 555 Osborne [We] S.W.3d (Tex. legislature may, avoid a measure 142 Tex. 177 200 S.W.2d 1944)). approaches standing by because it the confines of the is conferred Unless statute,25 constitution; by it pass cannot be- must show as a rule taxpayers [we] 24. question The State "do not that 25. the UDJA Defendants Plaintiffs do contend that taxpayer standing Hendee is a the facts set forth to confer as tax- under alone suffices them pleadings.” payers. in the

374 “exceeds even the they appropriation have the H.B. 1 particularized

that suffered faulty extremely estimates generous that injury distinct from suffered Budget Legislative general public standing provided in order to have to they issues—as challenge government dispositive action or a Board.” The assert right. law, appeal controlling public at 555-56. Texas have evolved — however, validly pleaded have long recognized important has whether Plaintiffs raised, briefed, or taxpayer theory each were not exception general to this rule: court. enjoin developed in standing equity has the district sue funds, illegal expenditure public even jurisdic plea In their showing injury. a distinct tion, that Defendants contended State pleadings that Plaintiffs contend per the use of regarding claim Plaintiffs’ within this ex- allege bringing facts them spending cap did sonal income set ception. standing The foundation of their allege conduct because validly unlawful is theory they their contention that have complied had State Defendants that, if proven, sufficient facts alleged code, government of the section 316.002

would establish that H.B. violates article personal required which the use VIII, (which, chapter section As for whether section income measure. reason, any ex- they illegal would render VIII, article might violate 316.002 itself penditures appropriation). under the made did not Defendants section State Const, VIII, § See Tex. art. (forbidding other than comment address that claim expenditure pursu- of state funds “but invalidating “if Plaintiffs succeed that made specific appropriations ance (which 316.002(b),” injunctive relief law”).26 reasons, For the same be requested) would Plaintiffs had not urge pleaded claim have valid presumes “premature” the law because that is not barred ultra vires action comply Defendants would See, sovereign immunity. e.g., Cobb invalidi with a of the statute’s declaration Harrington, 144 Tex. 190 S.W.2d questions ty. appeal, response On (Tex.1945) sovereign (recognizing argument, the during from the oral Court immunity bar does not claim of ultra vires aspect to address one parties begun Co., acts); McLane Plaintiffs’ of a whether determination H.B. a valid claim that allegations conclude that the district assert We if the standard 1’s is unlawful: court would have abused discretion establishing of article dismissed on Plaintiffs’ a violation this basis claims (1) 22(a). parties that the personal use section concur income arbitrariness, is appropriate barometer” of “the estimated rate of standard “sole ap has court growth economy” supreme of the state’s causes the standard that the public spending plied challenging on that to claims Texas’s caps permit set basis VII, under article unconstitutionally appropria system excessive school finance tions, Neeley, at 783- appropria and that H.B. such an section 1. See (2) addressed tion; claim that 85.27 Yet much remains their alternative arbitrary it is taken 27. An action is when The State Defendants raise several other *20 princi guiding rules or without reference disputing arguments whether Plaintiffs have (citing Neeley, Gener ples. 176 S.W.3d pleaded standing adequately under the tax- Tire, Kepple, 970 S.W.2d al Inc. argu- payer exception. We address those (Tex.1998)). legislative enactment Whether opinion. this ments in the next section of is a arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional concerning apply (considering how this at 445-46 associational standard would here. parties Because the have not had an standing appellant sponte),28 there sua adequate opportunity develop these is- are chal principle limits to this where the sues, the district court would abused jurisdictional lenge concerns evidence. by dismissing discretion Plaintiffs’ where, here, Miranda indicates that as Davis, claim on this basis. See 137 S.W.3d jurisdictional fact challenge concerns at 335 & n. 16. merits, challenges that implicates the such (1) court, must raised in the trial

Similarly, the State Defendants (2) separately challenge by jurisdictional did not be supported the district evidence subject jurisdiction court’s matter over that conclusively negates the existence Plaintiffs’ claim H.B. alternative l’s challenged jurisdictional fact. This appropriation, even the LBB’s own “generally standard thus a “tradi mirrors” 316.002(b), measures under section exceed summary tional” judgment motion. Mi spending ed the On as cap. appeal, previ randa, (citing 133 S.W.3d at 227-28 Tex.R. noted, ously attempt State Defendants 166a(a)). Civ. supreme P. court ex a challenge jurisdictional initiate to the plained this appropriately standard fact of whether H.B. l’s appropriation ex competing balances the interests LBB, spending ceeded the limit set juris state and claimants in cases where they attempt which support evi implicate dictional issues also the merits: dence they did not present to the district We precept adhere the fundamental court. Although subject jurisdic matter that a proceed court must not tion, general principle, as a may be chal (and legitimate merits of case until chal- lenged for the first appeal time on may jurisdiction appellate lenges be raised to its de- court sua have been sponte), Bus., see Ass’n cided. accomplishes This standard this differ, question Although of law. Id. at 785. this could is not a sufficient basis part upon striking legislation determination arbitrary rest determi down or un- " time, matters, disputed "[[legisla- At nations of factual find reasonable.’ the same such ings tive ... deciding “have a action is not without bounds.” In limited role” in ulti assessing challenges public mately school the constitutional issues. Id. VII, system under article section courts VII, applied As to article section must not on the one hand substitute arbitrariness standard accounts for the discre- policy Legislature's, choices for the howev-

tion the legislature constitution affords the may appear, er undesirable the latter fashioning public system school finance sat- Legis- must on the other hand examine the isfying requirements "adequacy,” "effi- carefully lature’s choices to determine ciency,” "suitability” recognizing while require- those whether choices meet the judiciary's proper enforcing role in these By steering ments of the Constitution. requirements: course, Judiciary can assure Legislature's If the choices are informed people’s guarantees under the Constitution guiding principles properly rules and relat- protected straying pre- are into the is, public ed to education—that if the rogatives Legislature. arbitrary system are choices —then (footnotes omitted). and citations provi- does violate the constitutional sion. instances, appellate In such must courts VII, For article section as with other petition, plead consider the construed in the provisions, authority and, "[t]he final to deter- favor, necessary, er’s if review the entire mine adherence to the Constitution resides any supports record to determine if evidence " said, Judiciary.” with the As we have 'a subject jurisdiction. matter Texas Ass’n of Bd., judges opinion mere difference of [between Bus. v. TexasAir Control (Tex. 1993). legislators], where reasonable minds *21 376 protects independent grounds summary It the less

goal and more. also —much presented to the injured judgment the evidence—not interests of the state and See, e.g., Ins. one, trial court. Cincinnati like in claimants cases which Life Cates, (Tex. Co. v. 927 S.W.2d 626 subject the the of matter determination 1996). compels that Miranda We believe jurisdiction implicates of the court the regarding the same result the State Defen the of action. parties’ merits of cause attempt jurisdictional to attack facts dants’ timely The the in a standard allows state appeal. with evidence on litigation to extricate itself from manner However, if it truly immune. re- is v. Independent Bland School District fact finder the resolution serving the Blue also be instructive. As dis- jurisdictional of facts that im- disputed below, in detail the case involved a cussed claim plicate the merits of the or de- appeal from a its school district’s denial of fense, preserve right the to parties’ we plea jurisdiction the the challenging at present permanent the of their case trial. standing taxpayers merits to seek a plea injunction against expen- the a the a purpose Similar to school district’s relating jurisdiction, which is to defeat a cause of ditures funds construc- building. tion of school S.W.3d the has not waived action which court, had In trial district immunity (usually before the sovereign had presented building that the evidence litiga- the full state has incurred costs constructed, already implicated been which tion), summary judg- purpose “ standing taxpayers. plaintiffs’ to sue patent- ‘to eliminate ments Texas is trial court had refused consider The ly claims unmeritorious and untenable ” that it was evidence the belief bound Brand, v. defenses.’ Casso S.W.2d only pleadings, ruling consider (Tex.1989) (quoting City Court later held erro- Supreme the Texas Auth., v. Houston Clear Creek Basin Id. In on the trial neous. at 555. reliance (Tex.1979)). 589 S.W.2d 678 n. 5 not to consider the evi- court’s decision By requiring the state to meet sum- dence, plaintiffs attempted had not judgment proof mary standard appeal, On contrary offer evidence. Id. one, protect plain- like this we cases not to con- they urged supreme court “put on their case having tiffs from giving sider district’s evidence Bland, jurisdiction.” simply establish opportunity on remand to have them Instead, at 554. after the S.W.3d evidentiary hearing. supreme full supports with evidence state asserts and would court stated that such a remand subject matter that the trial court lacks plaintiffs’ if the appropriate have been jurisdiction, simply require plain- we dependent on evidence standing had been tiffs, underlying facts the mer- when the disputed had and contended was subject jurisdiction matter are However, because the conclusive. intertwined, that there is a dis- to show dispute plaintiffs did “not BISD’s evidence puted regarding juris- material fact building that construction the school v. dictional issue. See Huckabee Time proceeded court to consider complete,” the L.P., Warner Entm’t Co. 19 S.W.3d undisputed evidence con- “whether this Pena, (Tex.2000); Phan Son Van project defeats cerning status (Tex.1999). standing.” claim of Id [plaintiffs’] Miranda, Here, dispute the conclusiveness summary Defendants reviewing judg of the evidence that the State When ment, appeal. present would appellate court cannot consider

377 fact, jurisdictional The we urge State Defendants This issue of as have observed, that oppor overlaps Plaintiffs are not entitled merits of with the instances, tunity dispute jurisdictional the new Plaintiffs’ claim. In such Mi- they present appeal— employ evidence seek courts randa instructs trial 17, to, the Comptroller’s summary judgment-like April procedures revised 2006 27, April protect revenue estimate and memo among things, plaintiffs 2006 other from the LBB’s their deputy against premature director —because extinction of together guise jurisdictional rulings. those documents of are conclusive claims Miranda, proof spending cap Regardless that the raised at was so 133 S.W.3d as to permit ap juris- billion additional of what State $3.95 Defendants’ new propriations. show, ultimately The State might Defendants add dictional evidence judicial that we bound attempt challenge are to take notice of their raise jurisdictional these documents and appeal inescapably these “conclusive” facts on facts they part legisla because are improperly proce- would circumvent the 1, history tive of H.B. see Humble Oil & dural protections required Miranda.29 Tex., Refining v.Co. Railroad Comm’n We that an appellate also note court’s deci- 813, 85 judicial S.W.2d 814 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin sion to take notice of a fact on 1935, dism’d), writ may appeal do even on generally discretionary,30 so appeal because concern that appellate generally the district are reluc- courts subject jurisdiction. court’s matter tant We to do when has not so such evidence disagree. See, argu presented State Defendant’s been to the trial court. Fiorenza, ment they challenge e.g., 740, overlooks that Tran v. 934 S.W.2d jurisdictional fact-whether, 1996, existence of (Tex.App.-Houston 742-43 [1st Dist.] writ). Thus, allege not, Plaintiffs in them alternative no even if Miranda does claim, the State Defendants strictly speaking, holding exceeded the our compel spending cap as determined the LBB. we not consider the State Defendants’ 1989, writ) Wellborn, immediately Nor is (citing obvious no Judicial No jurisdictional State Defendants’ evidence is tice Article II Rules Under Texas conclusive, Evidence, necessarily though (1987)). express we Mary’s no 19 St. L.J. 20 opinion juncture. on that issue this We emphasize The State Defendants that, agree State Defendants previously least Court to a has held itself bound under their alternative claim—which assumes duty, mandatory requested even when not validity spending cap— the LBB-set parties, judicial regarding to take notice "go Plaintiffs would not have a be- basis to regulations agency published administrative dispute validly hind” and estimates made Register in the Texas or Administrative However, Comptroller or LBB. Rosiers, Code. v. S.W.2d Eckmann Des 940 dispute could nonetheless whether additional (Tex.App.-Austin pet.); no see subsequent superseded estimates also Public Util. Util. Counsel v. Pub. Office April undeveloped those made in Comm’n, 2006. Also (Tex. 1994) legal is the basis (court for the State Defendants’ appeals refusing erred to take April that the assertions memo from the order). judicial published notice of P.U.C. deputy represents LBB’s director official disagree holdings concerning We that these point, actions of the LBB More decisions, itself. regulations and administrative contemplates cases, Miranda that Plaintiffs have that which are akin to statutes and court opportunity to raise such the trial matters in logically jurisdictional would extend to the court, regardless jurisdictional of what the challenge. facts the Defendants seek to ultimately might Eckmann, evidence establish. (noting See also S.W.2d at government requires code courts to take Antonio, City judicial Regis 30. See San notice contents of Texas Martinez Code). (Tex.App.-San Antonio ter and Texas Administrative *23 evidence, jurisdictional challenge regarding proposed legislative new mendations including a draft appropriations, to General we our discretion to decline exercise session, Act each Appropriations judicial light this take notice of evidence 322.008(c); § re- impact fiscal statements neither nor of our concerns that Plaintiffs garding proposed legislation, id. other opportunity court have had the the district 314.001; § of spend- and calculations this For all of these to address evidence. As cap. reported with bills from other ing affirm, reasons, on the we cannot based committees, legisla- the ultimate legislative jurisdictional new evi- State Defendants’ an containing power tive bill dence, of the district court’s dismissal —whether amended, re- appropriation passed, is or regarding Plaintiffs’ alternative claim com- jected the LBB or its with —remains as set pliance spending cap with staff, respective with each chamber but LBB. members, who can utilize and its individual However, the district court would procedural mechanisms to resist several not have erred or abused its discretion containing appropriations passage bills delegation” dismissing Plaintiffs’ “unlawful spending believe would exceed it. claim based on record before Plain 316.006, §§ Plaintiffs ac- 316.008. cap. pleadings that claim regarding tiffs’ dem allege cordingly cannot a violation of jurisdictional onstrate fatal and incurable powers on separation constitutional Miranda, at defects. 133 226- See S.W.3d basis. allege legislature 27. Plaintiffs that standing issues Other separation-of-powers principles by

violated improperly delegating legislative pow additional, raise State Defendants spending cap to the LBB or ers over challenges to Plain- potentially dispositive Const, II, 1,§ art. its staff. See Tex. standing. previously As pleadings tiffs’ (“A interpretive commentary max settled noted, rely exception Plaintiffs power im of law is that the constitutional general standing requirements per- that upon legislature make conferred enjoin taxpayer equity to sue in mits delegated by depart laws cannot be funds, illegal even expenditure body any authority.”). ment other injury. See showing distinct However, of chap as our earlier discussion (Tex. Lara, 171,180 v. 52 S.W.3d Williams illustrates, only “delegation” 316 ter Bland, 555-56; 2001); Cal 34 S.W.3d attack is legislative power that Plaintiffs (Tex. Hull, 907, vert v. 475 908 S.W.2d merely within the assignment duties 1972) v. Osborne (citing approval legislative branch akin to each chamber’s Keith, 198, 200- 142 Tex. prior McCall, referral bills to committees (Tex.1944)); City Austin v. 01 (Tex. the entire chamber. consideration before 793-94 Tex. 68 S.W. only Middleton, contem The Texas Constitution 1902); 187 S.W. Terrell requires 1916), chamber of the plates each (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio committee, all bills to a legislature refer ref'd, Tex. writ S.W. (Tex.1917)). that, report must the bill before consider which contend be Plaintiffs Const, Tex. allege ation the entire chamber. that the H.B. pleadings cause their fashion, Ill, § and ille art. In similar is unconstitutional appropriation LBB, necessarily “spe joint gal, they complain committee of permanent funds illegal expenditure” Ann. of state Legislature, Tex. Gov’t Code. cific See 322.001(a), appropriation. to that pursuant for each chamber’s made proposes Const, (requiring § 6 Tex. art. policy recom- budget consideration expended state funds not be pursu- penditures “but in challenge should specific ance of appropriations made Bland, already spent. be deemed See law”). In addition to challenges 556-57.31 predicate Plaintiffs’ allegations Regarding the Defendants’

H.B. 1 illegal, the State argument, disagree first we that Plaintiffs *24 Defendants contend that fail Plaintiffs to lack standing challenge “specific illegal to allege illegal expenditures sufficient to expenditures” they complain because that bring them within taxpayer the standing a limit has been exceeded and do not al exception. Specifically, the State Defen- (1) lege that expenditures are directed urge dants that required Plaintiffs were specifically plead purposes. to that to unlawful expenditures While being are made particular many for illegal purposes ends, upholding taxpayer cases or not merely that standing enjoin illegal amount of the to appropria- expenditures authorizing tions expenditures would have challenges legality involved to the (2) spending exceed the cap; and ex- expenditures’ those purposes,32 we dis suggest The State Defendants do not ize them to obtain regarding declarations standing challenge Plaintiffs lack prospec- component to expenditures issue of whether the tive expenditures unlawful excep- under illegal. were Hosp. El Paso Co. Dist. v. Cf. merely Gilbert, they 200, tion yet sought because have not (Tex.App.-El 64 S.W.3d 202-03 injunction against an expenditures, 2001, denied) (where those pet. plaintiffs Paso had request only ap- declarations that the H.B. justiciable 1 controversy arising interest in un propriation expenditures code, made under it property they der section 26.04 of like fact, illegal. are plea In juris- UDJA). standing wise had to seek relief under diction, the State Defendants contended that Lara, 171, injunctive "premature” relief would be See Williams v. before 52 S.W.3d 180- (Tex.2001) had opportunity comply any (complaint public 83 to funds be might ing expended prison declaration the court issue because at in violation of Estab presumes Clause); Hull, "[t]he law that a defendant will lishment Calvertv. 475 S.W.2d recognize 907, respect rights (Tex. 1972) (suit enjoin declared a 908 ap funds declaratory judgment and will propriated by legislature abide procure site of judgment carrying out University its duties.” Plea to of Texas of the Permian Basin on Jurisdiction, (quoting C.R. 139-40 Howell appropriation basis that conditions for were Comm'n, met); Keith, v. Texas Comp. 262, Workers' 143 S.W.3d v. Osborne 142 Tex. 177 416, 2004, denied)). 198, (Tex.App.-Austin 433 pet. (Tex.1944) ("recog S.W.2d 200-01 nizing] right taxpaying of a citizen to At least to the extent properly that Plaintiffs equity maintain an action in a court of challenge legality expenditures of future enjoin public officials under a contract that is made under the H.B. appropriation, 1 we McCall, illegal.”); City void or Austin v. conclude standing that Plaintiffs would have 565, 791, (Tex.1902) Tex. 68 S.W. 793-94 to assert that claim under the UDJA without (same). seeking injunctive relief. While the UDJA expand Middleton, jurisdiction does not suggest trial court’s Plaintiffs that Terrell v. dispense case,” Hull, justiciability requirements with the the notable “chicken salad see ripeness 908, standing, provide it does closely analogous 475 S.W.2d at to this remedy subject jurisdiction where matter squarely supports proposition oth- case and erwise exists. Tex. taxpayers may Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code enjoin expen sue to state 37.003(a) (West 1997) ("A §Ann. court of spending ditures that exceed constitutional fact, jurisdiction record power within its has limits. In it is somewhat unclear wheth rights, legal declare allegedly status and other expenditures relations er the unlawful -”) added); Bus., (emphasis standing upon TexasAss'n taxpayer plaintiff conferred Thus, 852 S.W.2d at 444. if expenditures Plaintiffs would did so because the exceeded a standing have injunction prevent to seek an purposes constitutional limit or because the expenditures that the expenditures trial court allegedly determined were unlawful. illegal, to be the UDJAwould (Tex.App.-San likewise author- See 187 S.W. An Terrell, pose); (challeng- at 374 agree preclude applica- that such S.W. facts $2,000 standing ing appropriation and additional taxpayer exception tion of distinction, $1,500 deficiency meaningful see Gover- here. We no expenses). Similarly, example, taxpayer personal nor’s coun- between suit ty long permitted have enjoin expenditures allegedly taxpayers under been contract, county illegal long permitted enjoin expenditures sue to void or law, Osborne, properly budget, in contra- see authorized S.W.2d McCall, 200-01; Act. 793-94, Budget and a vention of the Uniform See 68 S.W. (Tex. State, expenditures suit to un- Garcia v. taxpayer prevent Antonio writ legislative appropriation, Civ.App.-San der an unlawful ref'd McClellan, fact, n.r.e.); In allege here. Guerra (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio taxpayers permitted to sue to been *25 21, 1931, writ); May expenditures allega- no see also Act of enjoin state based R.S., 206, ch. Tex. Leg., that the would not be 42nd Gen. expenditures tions 339, 30, April Laws Act of pursuant appropriation. repealed by to a valid See 1987, R.S., 149, 49(1), 153, § Ferguson, Leg., v. 155 70th ch. 1987 Johnson dism’d) (current 1932, (chal- 707, Tex. version (Tex.App.-Austin writ Gen. Laws 1306 111.010, injunction §§ grant pro- of at Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. lenging temporary 1999)). .039(b) (West reject the State hibiting highway further state construction We taxpayer the any legis- contracts because there was Defendants’ narrow view of appropriation pur- standing exception.33 lative available for that Marrast, 14, 1916), ref'd, plunder.” (quoting Wap v. writ 108 Tex. S.W. Id. les 108 tonio 191 180, 5, (Tex.1916)). (Tex.1917). Tex. 184 S.W. 182 involved the 1138 Terrell whether Comptroller pay could use state funds to cer unpersuasive 33. We find the State Defen- also gover incurred tain entertainment bills the equate attempts claims dants’ to Plaintiffs’ to nor-including salad from the chicken Driskill. Neeley, v. those asserted in Robinson 192 Although expenditures would these have vio 2006, (Tex.App.-Dallas no S.W.3d the lated constitutional limits on amount of they pet.), proposition cite the that which for governor’s salary, appeals the court the of activity authority engage to in an “when the is emphasized items to also that the that were disputed, legality not the the action but paid by Comptroller private the "were be for itself, standing taxpayers challenge to have no pub and not for the purposes, and individual it.” arose education com- Robinson from the good, and the made that lic for appointment manag- of a board missioner’s purpose by Legislature directly was in operations of the Wilmer- ers to control Constitution, 16, § face of article 6 of Independent District. After Hutchins School appropriation for which commands that 'no "essentially down shut board voted purposes private or individual shall district,” group that a district tax- included " added). (emphasis Id. at The made.’ injunctive payer declaratory re- sued for lending noted "a of the credit court also that petition for want of lief. was dismissed Their private State to Governor for his appeals standing, affirmed. which court compensation expenses, is not to increase his standing, Regarding taxpayer's the court only provision a violation of the constitutional "[njowhere appellants' active in observed compensation, is in to his violation they pleading do accuse the or brief § at the Constitution.” Id. article Commissioner, [board], superin- [the or III, 373; (pro see also Tex. Const. art. illegal expending public funds on tendent] giving lending hibiting legislature from or complain expenditures activity [but] person any pledging of State credit by an were made ‘invalid’board.” any manner whatsoever for "[a]ppellants credit of in The noted that cite court further liabilities). payment public authority proposition individual's no for faith, officer, opinion by stating good his is performing court’s concluded duties private illegal authority imposed pur engaged activity if his taxes in an whenever are dispute.” poses, taxation and become "cease to be Turning building already to the State Defen new had opened, the dis- argument, full, dants’ second paid is well-estab trict had contractor lished that taxpayers standing only only obligation that remained was for challenge prospective state expenditures, make district to semiannual loan re- but do not have standing complain of payments Citicorp through 2011. 34 public funds that have already spent. been S.W.3d 549-50. Under these circum- supreme As the court has explained: stances, supreme court held that the a taxpayer brings taxpayers standing When an lacked to sue the action to illegal enjoin restrain the ... expenditure school district the future loan himself, tax money he repayments. explained: sues and it is The court held that subject- his interest in the We are not inclined to excep- extend the action; matter is sufficient to support the tion to taxpayer standing to include the money but when the already had been jurisprudential justifi- Blues’ suit. The spent, action for its recovery is for cation for taxpayer enjoin per- suits to [taxing entity]. The cause of action illegal agreements formance of is that belongs to it alone. the interference such pose gov- suits Davis, slight compari- 128 Tex. ernment activities is Hoffman (Tex.1937); Bland, protection taxpayers see son to the afforded *26 S.W.3d at 556-58. The State Defendants from preventing the culmination of ille- assert expenditures the authorized gal agreements by public made officials. under appropriations in H.B. 1 “have But the balance in and costs benefits essentially already spent.” They been ap- significantly shifts once governmen- parently mean this in a functional rather entity tal has received all that it bar- than literal sense. The State Defendants gained for and simply pay must for it. urge that “schools across the state have gov- We need not decide here a whether relied on funding in planning their entity’s receipt something ernmental of yearly budgets as though they have been performance less than full al- under an placed use,” received and in permanent legedly agreement illegal enough is to and that “[t]o reverse the preclude taxpayer prohibit a suit to fu- upset would the settled expectations of the performance. ture When all that re- district employees.” and their The State mains is a school repayment district’s rely Defendants on an extension of the a loan for completed, work allowance of principles applied in Bland. taxpayer prohibit action to repay- such Bland,

In ment threatens a substantial taxpayers interfer- enjoin sued to governmental school ence with making payments district from un- actions. The they only der what contended an Blues’ action not threatens BISD’s was invalid lease-purchase agreement already in Citicorp. with substantial investment its school, agree- high The district had entered into the and what now are the help ment to finance the expectations taxpayers construction of settled of other suit, new high By school. the time of the district who are also served attempt bring allegedly In an this case within ant to unconstitutional or unlawful Robinson, most, might appropriations. the State Defendants characterize At Robinson "attacking] only pro- implications standing Plaintiffs’ claims as have for Plaintiffs’ chapter cess which the funds were allocated.” assert their claims that 316 unlawful- LBB, clearly ly delegates legislative power are Plaintiffs’ claims not so limited. to the They challenge expenditures already claimed that we claim have held is barred being pursu- standing sovereign immunity. unlawful because are made lack of school, sponte high but should the action suc- Issues sua raised merits, it in- signal ceed on the would standing Associational creased risks to lenders and others the State Defendants While dealing governmental entities. The challenged separately have associa disruption potential government C.L.O.U.T., standing tional we must operations great taxpay- is too allow a sponte. See consider that issue sua injury special with no distinct from er Bus., Ass’n 445-46. An public’s prohibit general sue standing association to sue on behalf has paying goods from government (1) if: its members would members already it has received and and services standing to sue otherwise have placed permanent use. (2) right; organiza own the interests the protect germane tion seeks to are urge Id. at 557-58. The State Defendants (3) organization’s purposes; neither teachers, just that “the school districts requested claim relief nor the asserted Bland, building as contractor in have requires participation individual on an ex- operations ordered their based Id. (adopting members in the lawsuit. State,” pectation from payment from Washington Apple test Hunt v. deprive salary teachers increases “[t]o Comm’n, 333, 343, 97 Adver. 432 U.S. S.Ct. money districts of for their and school (1977)). 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 We construe budgets midway operating through Plaintiffs’ that C.L.O.U.T. would allegation year precisely ‘disruption’ Bland taxpayer a state standing as as avoid,” and sought Court that we should assertion would have in that its members is, money that “the a matter of conclude taxpayers, standing dividual to sue as thus law, already spent.” *27 element of the associa addressing the first district, school the Bland howev- Unlike However, standing tional test. Plaintiffs’ er, Defendants have not devel- the State remaining pleadings do not address evidentiary oped might an record that elements, nor is there evidence establish previously a conclusion. As support such ing these in the attachments to elements noted, present did not evidence But pleadings. See id. because plea jurisdiction, support of their not affirmatively Plaintiffs’ do pleadings broad, rely entirely upon unsupported merely negate fail to these elements H.B. 1 on assumptions about the effect of them, address Plaintiffs are entitled to the Moreover, this le- Miranda, Texas school districts. amend. See opportunity to 133 gal theory presented was not to the dis- 226-27; Elgin, at S.W.3d S.W.3d court, parties only and the have be- trict gun appeal. Especially address it on “ripeness” concern The concurrence’s circumstances, are reluc-

under these we pro- adopt tant to the State Defendants’ Finally, the concurrence would posed of Bland’s See extension rationale. any issue decline address this case Davis, 16; 334-35 & n. see concerning S.W.3d the claim al other than those Supplies, Animal Inc. v. Schus delegation also Petco leging pow unconstitutional ter, (Tex.App.-Austin S.W.3d ers. The basis is other stated of the are decision” pet.). “ripe no Given claims evidence, law, argument pleadings, this does a “fuller record and ventilation district court” would be affirming briefing us a basis for provide advisory opinion. We order. needed avoid district court’s do not ripeness view as an issue in this CONCLUSION Ripeness whether, case. concerns at the reasons, foregoing For the we affirm the brought, time a lawsuit is the facts have district dismissal of claim court’s Plaintiffs’ developed sufficiently injury such that an alleging delegation leg- unconstitutional occur, likely has occurred or is rather powers jurisdiction. islative for want of being contingent than Patter remote. However, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ re- Parenthood, son v. Planned maining two claims seek declarations that (Tex.1998). 489, 442 requirement It is a expenditures appro- future under H.B.l’s subject jurisdiction. matter Indep. Waco priation illegal, are unconstitutional or Gibson, Sch. Dist. district court erred or abused its discretion (Tex.2000). If the State Defendants have in dismissing those claims based on acted in a manner so as to violate the it, record before and we reverse those spending cap, allege, as Plaintiffs those portions of the district judgment. court’s completed actions have been and Plaintiffs’ Additionally, that, we hold while Plaintiffs ripe. claims are We also note that none of sufficiently plead failed to the associational parties suggested ripeness C.L.O.U.T., standing Plaintiffs are enti- a problem, and that remedy the con tled to leave to amend to address currence proposes rather than —remand defect. dismissal—is inconsistent with the exis tence of a ripeness defect. See id. at 853. Concurring Opinion by

The concurrence’s reference to a “fuller Justice evidence, ventilation pleadings, and PATTERSON.

briefing” may express a concern that there PATTERSON, Justice, JAN P.

is a problem here with the State Defen concurring. raising jurisdictional dants them com plaints through the procedural device of a we to Were address the issues raised plea jurisdiction opting without fully litigation, but not formed we some other device summary judg like a would speaking portfolio. ment motion. Similar concerns were Tempting speak be to to these

voiced dissenting justices in Mi *28 issues, important posture of this case randa, but carry their views did not using plea shows the inefficiencies of day. (Jefferson, See id. 235-36 jurisdiction, particularly without C.J., (Blis dissenting); id. at evidence, production of essential to force ter, J., dissenting). The concurrence judge the trial this Court—to make —and intend its comments as an invitation to the an ad hoc give advisory decision and an supreme so, court to revisit If Miranda. opinion that should be determined after a it would seem more simply say direct to so. evidence, pleadings, fuller ventilation of event, any In as an intermediate appellate briefing and in the district court than oc- court, we are bound to follow Miranda By allowing parties opt curred here. until the supreme court reverses or modi procedures out full designed to allow Petco, fies that decision. issues, and fair consideration of these we 565. To the extent the concurrence ex greater uncertainty games- introduce and presses concerns that issues have been system. manship employ- into the raised for the first appeal time on without record, ment development procedural of standard motions adequate of an we have noted those the district court allows issues to be ruled issues and remand proceedings. upon ed them for further first the district court instead appeal being raised for the first time only is- adequate record. The ripe for decision is the district court’s

sue alleging of the claim unconstitu-

dismissal delegation powers, of legislative

tional join

I in this Court’s affirmance in revers- only I otherwise concur

issue. the dis-

ing remanding this cause to

trict court. KIZER, Appellant, D.

Robert

MEYER, LYTTON, ALEN & WHIT

AKER, INC. MLAW Consul d/b/a Engineers, Appellee.

tants

No. 03-05-00652-CV. Texas, Appeals

Court

Austin.

May

Case Details

Case Name: Hendee v. Dewhurst
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Jul 27, 2007
Citation: 228 S.W.3d 354
Docket Number: 03-06-00501-CV
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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