94 Kan. 1 | Kan. | 1915
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The appellant brought this action in the district court of Sumner county against certain nonresidents of the state, and joined as defendant W. M. Winsor, the appellee, who is a resident of Marion county. Jurisdiction over the property in Sumner county belonging to the nonresident defendants was obtained by attachment, and they afterwards entered their appearance in the action. The appellee was served by a summons issued to the sheriff of Marion county. The action was to recover a commission for procuring a purchaser of real estate pursuant to a written agreement executed by Winsor, the appellee.
As against the Illinois defendants the petition alleged that in nfaking the contract for the sale of the real estate and in the employment of the appellant to procure a purchaser, Winsor acted for himself, and also as agent and representative of the other defendants, and that they were jointly liable with him for the commission which the appellant claimed he had earned in procuring a purchaser.
The nonresidents answered by a verified denial of the agency of W. M. Winsor, or his authority to act for them. Winsor challenged the jurisdiction of the court by motion to quash the summons. The challenge was sustained, and on appeal the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
On the trial at the close of plaintiff’s evidence a demurrer was sustained on the part of the nonresident defendants, and the action was left pending solely against Winsor, a resident of Marion county. He thereupon filed a motion to have the cause dismissed for the reason that, the action having failed as to the nonresident defendants, the court had no jurisdiction over him. The court sustained the motion and rendered judgment against the appellant for costs.
It is clear that the ruling of the court dismissing as to the appellee must be sustained. ■ The appellant cites and relies upon the case of Edwards v. Gildemeister, 61 Kan. 141, 59 Pac. 259, where it was held that:
“A contract executed by an authorized agent in his own name, but in fact in behalf of his principal, is the contract of the principal, and suit may be brought against him to enforce-its provisions.” (Syl. ¶ 2.)
. The doctrine of that case has no application here because the appellant failed to produce any evidence showing that the contract sued upon was in fact made in behalf of the Illinois defendants as principals. No evidence was offered which tended to show that Winsor was authorized by the nonresident defendants to employ any real-estate agent to assist him in procuring a purchaser for the land, or that they were to become liable for the payment of a commission to.any person.
(See, also, 31 Cyc. 1570, and cases cited.)
The case of Renwick v. Bancroft, 56 Iowa, 527, 9 N. W. 367, is not in point. • It was there held that an agent having authority to sell land, exercising his discretion as to price, may employ a real-estate agent to find a purchaser and a sale by him will be enforced.
It is true, there was evidence that one or more of the nonresident defendants had written Winsor to sell, and the evidence tended to show that the other Illinois defendants consented to his selling the land; but there was no evidence that any of them authorized him Lo employ a subagent. The fact that they conveyed then’ interests to him in order that he might convey the title to a purchaser can not be held as a ratification of his employment of a subagent so as to bind them to pay the compensation of the .subagent.
In the former decision (Hembrow v. Winsor, 87 Kan. 714, 125 Pac. 22), nothing was decided further than that the acceptance of service by the nonresident defendants made the case rightly brought in Sumner county so far as appeared from the pleadings. On the trial it was disclosed that the action was not rightly brought in Sumner county, because of the failure of the evidence to sustain a cause of action against the nonresident defendants, and it left a case standing alone against the appellee, who is a resident of Marion county.’ It follows that the court in Sumner county had no jurisdiction over his person, 'and the motion to dismiss was rightly sustained. (Brenner v. Egly, 23 Kan. 123; Rullman v. Hulse, 32 Kan. 598, 5 Pac. 176, and 33 Kan. 670, 7 Pac. 210; Linney v. Thompson, 44 Kan. 765, 25 Pac. 208; Wells v. Patton, 50 Kan. 732, 33 Pac. 15.)
The judgment is affirmed.