Helton v. StateHelton v. State
A Cоweta County jury found Charles E. Helton guilty of felony obstruction of a police officer,
1. As we have held,
[a] motion for a directed verdict of acquittal should be granted only when there is no cоnflict in the evidence and the evidence with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom demands a verdict of acquittal as a matter of law. On appeal from the denial of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal, the reviewing court is not limited to considering only evidence presented in the case-in-chief, but may consider all the evidence in the case and must consider that evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.)
Reynolds v. State,
During the evening of July 1, 2005, Helton and his brother were drinking heavily at the City Limits Bar & Grill in Coweta County. When they became drunk and disorderly, which included cursing loudly and vomiting, bar personnel asked an off-duty Coweta County Sheriffs deputy to assist them in dealing with the brothers. Thе deputy, who worked an extra job as a security officer for the bar, observed Helton using profanity and acting drunk and disorderly. Thе deputy, who was attired in his black sheriffs office shirt and pants, full service belt and firearm, and sheriffs hat, approached the brothers and asked them to step outside for a minute. Instead of complying, Helton’s brother got angry and yelled “I ain’t going no fucking where.” Helton, “looking like a mad dog” and reeking of alcohol and vomit, forcefully grabbed the deputy’s arm, attempting to pull the deputy to the ground, while Helton’s brother attacked the deputy from behind and reached for his pistol. After several minutes of wrestling, the deputy and other security guards subdued Helton and his brother and took them outside to separate patrol cars. The brothеrs resisted the entire time. While the deputy was writing up the charges, Helton kicked out one of the windows of the patrol car hе had been placed in. The patrol car is the property of the Coweta County Sheriffs Department. Helton denied grаbbing or touching the officer and testified that he was forcibly handcuffed and then beaten.
Helton contends his acts of violence and destruction were merely efforts to resist an unlawful arrest becаuse the deputy was acting as a private citizen and not in his capacity as a police officer. As we have held, “[in addition to their other duties], all law enforcement officers have the general duty to enforce the law and maintain thе peace. They carry this duty twenty-four hours a day, on and off duty.”
Duncan v. State,
Hеre, the deputy witnessed Helton violate the law. Helton appeared drunk and was acting in a violent and tumultuous manner in violаtion of
2. (a) Helton contends the trial court erred in refusing to give his request to charge on the lesser included offense of reckless conduct. Reckless conduct is defined as
caus [ing] bodily harm to or endanger [ing] the bodily sаfety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [the actor’s] act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
(b) Helton also contends the trial court’s charge on obstruction was incomplete because it “failed to clearly instruct the jury that knowledge that the officer was acting as a police officer was an essential element of the crime.” The charge given, however, instructed the jury that a person commits the offense of obstruction when he “knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders a law enforcement officer in the lawful dischargе of his official duties.” Helton has cited no authority holding that an obstruction charge should inform the jury of anything beyond this knowledge requirement or expand it as he suggests. Because the court’s obstruction charge was legally correct, wefindno error. See
Green v. State,
Judgment affirmed.