John C. HELMERT, Jr. v. Tara J. BIFFANY.
No. 2001-CA-01690-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
April 17, 2003.
842 So.2d 1287
Richard J. Smith, Gulfport, attorney for appellee.
EN BANC.
DIAZ, J., for the Court.
¶ 1. At issue in this case is whether the youth court of Harrison County has jurisdiction to modify a visitation and support order rendered in a family court that has since been abolished by statute. Finding jurisdiction improper, we reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2. On October 17, 1994, Tara J. Biffany (Biffany) filed a paternity proceeding in the family court of Harrison County, Mississippi, First Judicial District. Biffany alleged that John C. Helmert, Jr., (Helmert) was the naturаl father of her minor child, T.J.B. On October 2, 1995, the family court entered a judgment adjudicating Helmert to be the natural father of T.J.B. and setting forth child support obligations and a visitation schedule for the minor child.
¶ 3. In July 1996, Helmert filed a Petition for Contempt of the Judgment and Modification seeking, inter alia, to cite Biffany for contempt and to modify the visitation schedule set forth in the previous judgment. Biffany counter-claimed. On August 21, 1997, the family court entered a judgment citing both parties for contempt and modifying the previous child support obligation and the visitation schedule.
¶ 4. During the 1999 legislative session, the Mississippi Legislature abolished the Family Court of Harrison County, Mississippi. 1999 Miss. Laws Ch. 423. On March 31, 2000, Helmert filed a complaint with the Chancery Court of Harrison County, Mississippi, alleging, inter alia, that Biffany had interfered with his visitаtion. Helmert also sought modification of the previous family court orders in regard to his child support obligation and to enlarge his visitation schedule. Biffany answered and moved to dismiss the complaint.
¶ 5. Based upon the recent abolishment of the family court of Harrison County, the Chancellor found that all matters formerly before that court were transferred to the youth court аnd that the chancery court had no jurisdiction of family court matters, unless the youth court specifically approved the transfer of a matter to chancery court. Thus, the Chancellor instructed Helmert to re-file in youth court. No order reflecting these instructions appears in the record.
¶ 6. Helmert filed a Motion to Transfer to Chancery Court with the youth court of Harrisоn County, First Judicial District, Mississippi on March 20, 2001. However, the youth court judge concluded that in the absence of an agreement between the parties to transfer the matter, he had no authority to transfer and the matter had to remain in youth court. Therefore, the motion to transfer to chancery court was denied by the youth court on May 30, 2001. Aggrieved by this ruling, Helmert appeals to this Cоurt, presenting one issue for resolution:1
I. After the Family Court of Harrison County was abolished by statute, was it error for the Youth
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 7. Jurisdiction is a question of law. Entergy Miss., Inc. v. Burdette Gin Co., 726 So.2d 1202, 1204-05 (Miss. 1998). This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Saliba v. Saliba, 753 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Miss. 2000).
ANALYSIS
¶ 8. During the 1999 legislative session, the Mississippi Legislature abolished the Family Court of Harrison County, Mississippi. The law repealing the family court stated, in part, as follows:
From and after the effective date of this act, all Family Courts are abolished. All matters pending in any Family Court abolished shall be transferred to the County Court of the County wherein the Family Court was located without the necessity for any Motion or Order of the Court for such transfer.
1999 Miss. Laws Ch. 432, § 1 (emphasis added). The youth court concluded that it has jurisdiction оver the parties and subject matter of this post-judgment paternity proceeding by virtue of the above law authorizing the transfer of all “pending” cases of the family court to the youth court via the county court.
¶ 9. Helmert argues that the youth court had no jurisdiction because the action was no longer “pending” within the meaning of the law repealing the family court. He points оut that the initial judgment and an order of contempt of that judgment were rendered by the family court before it was abolished and neither party had filed for any further relief at the time that the Legislature abolished the family court. Though he acknowledges that a court retains jurisdiction over child custody, support, and visitation matters, and may modify those matters upon proper pеtition,2 Helmert argues that the retaining of jurisdiction does not mean a case is “pending” as that term is used in Chapter 432, § 1.
¶ 10. In further support of this argument, Helmert points out that a new filing fee is required to reopen cases subject to modification and a new civil cover sheet must be filed with the clerk of the court. He argues that “[u]nless a case is properly reopened by onе of the parties, it is clear that the matter is closed with the Court and is not a `pending’ case.”
¶ 11. One dictionary defines “pending” as “[n]ot yet decided or settled; awaiting conclusion or confirmation.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 969 (10th ed. 1981). While another defines “pending” as:
Begun, but not yet completed; during; before the conclusion of; unsettled; undetermined; in process of settlement or adjustment. Awaiting an occurrence or conclusion of action, period of continuance or indeterminancy. Thus, an action is pending from its inception until the rendition of final judgment. An action is “pending” after it is commenced by either filing a complaint with the court or by the service of a summons.
Black‘s Law Dictionary 785 (abr. 6th ed. 1991).
¶ 12. This Court has held that “[g]enerally, when prior proceedings conducted by another court determined the custody of
¶ 13. We conclude that the original action in the case sub judice was not “pending” within the meaning of the law abolishing the family court. No motions or other formal proceedings seeking to modify that finаl judgment were pending and the litigation had ended at the time § 432 was passed, despite the right of both Helmert and Biffany to petition the court for modification or to appeal the judgment itself. Had neither of the parties’ circumstances changed, this action would never have been re-opened and the family court judge‘s ruling would never have been disturbed. Moreover, the initiаl judgment in the case sub judice was entitled to full faith and credit in sister states.
¶ 14. The Mississippi Code does not specifically address this situation. Statutes grant both the chancery court and the youth court jurisdiction over the adjudication of minors. One difference, however, is that the general jurisdiction of chancery court encompasses that of youth court, whereas youth court jurisdiction is limited to specifically delineated matters, to-wit, abused, neglected, or delinquent children.
¶ 15. The chancery court has historically had full jurisdiction in divorce, alimony, and custody matters. See
When a divorce shall be decreed from the bonds of matrimony, the court may, in its discretion, having regard to the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case, as may seem equitable and just, make all orders touching the care, custody and maintenance of the children of the marriage.
In 1960, the Legislature provided, in
In addition to the right to proceed under section 2743, Mississippi Code of 1942, as amended, and in addition to the remedy of habeas corpus in proper cases, and other existing remedies, the chancery court of the propеr county shall have jurisdiction to entertain suits for the custody, care, support and maintenance of minor children and to hear and determine all such matters.
¶ 16. In addition, the Mississippi Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (
¶ 17. The youth court, a subsidiary of chancery court, specializes in abuse and neglect matters, over which it was granted exclusive jurisdiction.
The Youth Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all proceedings concerning a delinquent child, a child in need of supervision, a neglected child, an abused child, or a dependent child.
(i) “Delinquent child” means a сhild who has reached his tenth birthday and who has committed a delinquent act.
(j) “Delinquent act” is any act, which if committed by an adult, is designated as a crime under state or federal law, or municipal or county ordinance other than offense punishable by life imprisonment or death. A delinquent act includes escape from lawful detention.
¶ 18. The youth court was created as a division of the chancery court in counties which do not have county or family courts, and the chancellor presides over such youth court proceedings.
This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that each child coming within the jurisdiction of the youth court shall become a responsible, accountable and productive citizen, and that each such child shall receive such care, guidance and control, preferably in such child‘s own home as is conducive toward that end and is in the state‘s and thе child‘s best interest. It is the public policy of this state that the parents of each child shall be primarily responsible for the care, support, education and welfare of such children; however, when it is necessary that a child be removed from the control of such child‘s parents, the youth court shall secure proper care for such child.
¶ 19. Although this Court has never addressed the precise issue at hand, it has addressed the constitutional issue of the youth court in relation to the chancery court. In the case of In re T.L.C., 566 So.2d 691 (Miss. 1990), this Court held that the Youth Court system does not unconstitutionally usurp the power granted to the Chancery Court to adjudicate “minor‘s business.” In the companion case to T.L.C., the chancery court in Cortesi v. Cortesi, 566 So.2d 702 (Miss. 1990), stayed its ruling on the child custody until the abusе allegations were ruled upon by the youth court. This Court affirmed. This action by the chancery court indicates that the court recognized the youth court‘s exclusive jurisdiction over child abuse proceedings. However, both those cases dealt with abused children. Again, no allegations of abuse have been presented here.
¶ 20. Under Mississippi law, chancery court has continuous and exclusive jurisdiction over custody proceedings. Ladner v. Ladner, 206 So.2d 620, 624-25 (Miss. 1968). See also Chrissy F. by Medley v. Miss. Dep‘t. of Pub. Welfare, 780 F.Supp. 1104, 1122 (S.D. Miss. 1991), affirmed in part, and reversed in part, 995 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1993). In Medley, the
¶ 21. Conversely, paternity actions (the subject of the original action here) can never be brought in youth court. Although the former Family Court Act provided for much of the same jurisdiction of youth court, one critiсal difference was the inability of the youth court to hear paternity matters. Under
¶ 22. This Court has allowed the youth court to issue orders in contradiction of those issued by chancery court in matters of custody and visitation. See In re D.L.D., 606 So.2d 1125, 1127 (Miss. 1992) (holding youth court had exclusive original jurisdiction to determine custody and visitation rights with respect to abused child, even though its order was in direct conflict with that of chancery court in parents’ divorce proceedings which were initiated prior to youth court proceedings). However, a major distinction between that case and the case at bar was that it dealt with an abused child. This case does not.
¶ 23. This Court held in Griffin v. Bell, 215 So.2d 573 (Miss. 1968), that the youth court had no jurisdiction to award custody of a minor child to her maternal aunt, where the aunt‘s petition for custody showed on its face that the child was not neglected, as that term is defined by statute. See Miss. Code 1942 Ann. § 7185-02(h) (Supp. 1966). And in Morris v. Morris, 245 So.2d 22 (Miss. 1971), this Court held that where the chancery court had already granted a divorce and custody of the children to their mother, it had jurisdiction to act on a subsequent petition to modify the decree as to custody, even though the youth court in the interim had attempted to deal with an emergency temporary situation.
CONCLUSION
¶ 24. The matter should be transferred to chancery court. The original paternity action could not have been brought in youth court. No allegations of abuse, neglect, or delinquency have been asserted, thus the matter is not one for which the youth court has been granted jurisdiction. Furthermore, the matter, was not “pending” within the meaning of the law repealing the family court. It was a final, appealable judgment, entitled to full faith and
¶ 25. Adjustments in court-ordered custody and child support can and should be made without burdening courts. Varner v. Varner, 588 So.2d 428 (Miss. 1991). This action involves a young child and chances are high that this matter will eventually be back in court. Chancery is more accustomed to handling this subject matter. Allowing this matter to be heard in youth court will set a precedent that may cause a flood of divorces obtained in family court to go to youth cоurt to modify the decree. Youth court is neither equipped or authorized by statute to decide issues of paternity, custody, or visitation, absent allegations of abuse, neglect, or delinquency. Therefore, we reverse the youth court‘s retention of jurisdiction and remand this case for transfer of the matter to chancery court.
¶ 26. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
McRAE, P.J., EASLEY, CARLSON AND GRAVES, JJ., CONCUR. SMITH, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY PITTMAN, C.J., WALLER AND COBB, JJ.
John C. HELMERT, Jr. v. Tara J. BIFFANY.
No. 2001-CA-01690-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
April 17, 2003.
842 So.2d 1287
SMITH, P.J., dissenting:
¶ 27. This case is indeed narrow in scope because of the abolishment of the Harrison County Family Court. Although the subject matter of this case was not related to delinquency, abuse or neglect, it was originally brought before the Harrison County Family Court on a petition to determine paternity. Again in a second hearing, the issues of contempt and modification were heard by the Family Court. Helmert and Biffany are operating under a Harrison Family Court Order for the custody, visitation and support of their daughter.
¶ 28. In Tollison v. Tollison, 841 So.2d 1062 (Miss. 2003), we stated that the principle of continuing jurisdiction has long been recognized in domestic relations cases. Tollison, at 1064-65; Covington v. Covington, 459 So.2d 780, 781 (Miss. 1984) (citing Crum v. Upchurch, 232 Miss. 74, 98 So.2d 117 (1957); Gresham v. Gresham, 198 Miss. 43, 21 So.2d 414 (1945)). Further, we have held that only the court contemned has jurisdiction to punish the contemnor. Tollison, 2003 WL 751192 at *2 citing Culpepper v. State, 516 So.2d 485, 487 (Miss. 1987); (Kitchens v. State, 293 So.2d 815 (Miss. 1974); Prine v. State, 143 Miss. 231, 242, 108 So. 716, 719 (1926)).
¶ 29. We have taken note of the 1999 legislation abolishing the Family Court, 1999 Miss. Laws Ch. 432, which became effective on May 28, 1999. Section 1 of that legislation directs, in pertinent part: “all matters pending in any family court abolished shall be transferred to the county court of the county wherein the family court was located without the necessity of any motion or order of court for such transfer.” In re T.A.P., 742 So.2d 1095, 1105 n. 2 (Miss. 1999). In that case, the proceedings on remand were ordered to occur in the Youth Court which became the responsibility of the County Court of Harrison County.
(1) The youth court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all proceedings concerning a delinquent child, a child in need of supervision, a neglected child, an abused child or a dependent child.
(2) Jurisdiction of the child in the cause shall attach at the time of the offense and shall continue thereafter for that
offеnse until the child‘s twentieth birthday, unless sooner terminated by order of the youth court. The youth court shall not have jurisdiction over offenses committed by a child on or after his eighteenth birthday.
In order that the rule may be applicable which prevents interference by another court with the jurisdiction of the court first assuming it, the second action should be between the same parties, seeking on the one hand, and opposing on the other, the same remedy, and should relate to the same question.
Petition of Beggiani, 519 So.2d 1208, 1210 (Miss. 1988) (quoting 21 C.J.S. Courts § 492, at 751 (1940)).
¶ 30. In this case, although the Family Court of Harrison County has been abolished, the Chancery Court does not assume jurisdiction. Following the dictates of the Legislature, the County Court therefore the Youth Court, retains jurisdiction over these parties and this subject matter. The case should stay in the сourt that has adjudicated and heard all matters concerning the determination of paternity, custody, visitation and support of Helmert and Biffany‘s minor child.
¶ 31. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
PITTMAN, C.J., WALLER AND COBB, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.