Jаmes Heller was charged by accusation in Cobb County with DUI, speeding, and failure to maintain lane. A jury found him guilty on all counts. He appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered thereon. We find no error, and we affirm.
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1. Heller first contends that the implied consent warnings, given to him as directed by OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2), were misleading and coercive in that they failed to inform him of the privilege against self-incrimination granted by Art. I, Sеc. I, Par. XVI of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 and OCGA § 24-9-20. This is patently without merit. The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that this privilege is not violated eithеr by the admission into evidence of the results of the State-administered blood test following the reading of implied consent warnings,
Fantasia v. State,
2. Heller next complains of the admission of the arresting officer’s testimony regarding Heller’s “sway,” as compared to that of a normal, sober person. He appears to argue that the officer’s testimony was inadmissible, either because an insufficient foundation was laid to show that the officer was qualified to testify as to the sway of a “normal” person, or because the officer’s testimony referred to field sobriety tests, which constitute nonscientific evidence in viоlation of
State v. Pastorini,
(a) Heller is correct that the arresting officer, Michael Bowman of the Cobb County Police Department, had no “mediсal training” that would lay a foundation for his testimony that Heller’s “sway was more defined than the give or take of two inches that a normal pеrson has.” Bowman was not qualified as an expert. But even expert testimony may be based upon foundation other than “medical training”; it may be based upon observation, experience, and training.
Bacon v. State, 225
Ga. App. 326, 329 (
(b)
Pastorini,
supra, actually
supports
the admission of the officer’s testimony. In
Harper v. State,
3. Heller contends that Bowman’s testimony regarding the results of the alco-sensor test violated
Turrentine v. State,
Turrentine teaches that the alco-sensor “is used as an initial screening device to aid the police officer in determining probable cause to arrest a motorist suspected оf” DUI. Id. at 146. It is not used to determine the amount of alcohol in a person’s blood, id., and it is impermissible to testify to the results of an alco-sensor test giving а numeric reading as to the amount of alcohol in the person’s blood. But Bowman did not testily to a numeric reading on the alco-sensоr test. He clearly identified the test as an initial screening measure that gives a positive/negative result. He testified that two alco-sensor tests were given. Between the first and second alco-sensor tests, Bowman had Heller perform the field sobriety tests.
After describing the fiеld sobriety evaluations, Bowman testified that a second alco-sensor test was done, “trying to give the driver every benefit of the doubt.” He testified that “[t]he results on the alcosensor were positive, which indicated possible impairment to the extent that he was a less than safe —.” At that point, Heller objected and requested a mistrial, interrupting Bowman’s testimony. The trial court disagreed with Heller’s statement that Bowmаn had testified impermissibly and stated, “I heard him say that he had a positive alcosensor result, which again indicated to him that the driver might possibly bе impaired. I see nothing wrong with that testimony.”
We agree with the trial court. The jury was never told that the alco-sensor measured the amount of alcohol in Heller’s blood, or even that a numeric reading could be obtained from an alco-sensor. Bowman’s testimony did not violаte Turrentine.
4. Heller characterizes certain statements in the State’s closing argument as improper “golden rule” arguments. “In a classic ‘golden rule’ argument, jurors are invited to place themselves in the victim’s place in regard to the crime itself. [Cit.] However, any argument,
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regаrdless of nomenclature, which importunes the jury to place itself in the position of the victim for any purpose must be carefully scrutinizеd to ensure that no infringement of the accused’s fair trial rights has occurred.”
Horne v. State,
In this case, in closing argument the prosecutor stated, before being interrupted by Heller’s objection: “I’m going to ask you this question. If you were out latе working, if you were out late with family —.” The trial court cautioned the State to rephrase its argument, and the State continued: “Seeing what you see here now, do you think he was less safe? Do you want to expose the people of Cobb County to the risk that he presented . . . southbound on US 41?” This time, Heller’s objection was overruled.
This is not a “golden rule” argument. This Court has held that asking jurors to put themselves as passengers in the car the accused was driving while he was impaired was not impermissible because “[t]here had been no passengers in fact.”
Gray v. State,
Judgment affirmed.