Opinion
{1 Christine B. Helfrich and Mary Anne Chesarek, on behalf of Carmen R. Finan's estate and trust (collectively, Plaintiffs), appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Luke L. Adams. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
{2 Finan, Adams, and Frankie A. Emley are siblings who inherited property from their mother. Because the value of the property Adams inherited exceeded that of the property his sisters inherited, he agreed to sign a promissory note (the Note) granting each of them a one-half interest in $26,340 1 to be secured by the property Adams had inherited. The Note provided that if the property securing the Note was "sold, assigned, or transferred for any reason or in any manner, then the entire remaining balance of [the Note would be] immediately due and payable." It also provided that if Adams were to sell the property for greater than $129,942, he would pay Finan and Emley 20.27% of the sale price instead of the agreed-upon $26,340.
13 On January 22, 1999, Adams transferred the property, which had previously been in his name only, to himself and his wife as joint tenants via quitelaim deed (the 1999 transfer). The deed was recorded the same day. In January 2005, Adams and his wife transferred the property to themselves as trustees of the Luke L. Adams Trust and the Diana C. Adams Trust. Adams did not notify Finan of either transfer. On February 22, 2006, Emley died, bequeathing her interest in the Note to Adams. On or about November 21, 2006, Adams filed a Petition to Approve Payment of Promissory Note and Authorize Partial Distribution of Estate (the 2006 Petition) in the probate case relating to Emley's estate, in which he represented that the Note was not yet due and payable because there had been no "event of transfer" or other triggering event. Adams requested that he be permitted to pay Emley's portion of $26,340 to her estate-and ultimately to himself-in satisfaction of his obligation to Emley under the Note.
T4 Finan learned of the transfers sometime after Emley's death in February 2006 and filed suit against Adams on September 14, 2007, more than eight and a half years after the 1999 transfer. Finan alleged that Adams was in breach of the terms of the Note for failure to pay the sum due to her at the time of the transfer. Finan died in September 2009, and Finan's daughters, Plaintiffs, were substituted as plaintiffs in May
T 5 Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's summary judgment ruling. Subsequently, Plaintiffs discovered the 2006 Petition and filed a rule 60(b) motion for relief from the summary judgment order, arguing that Adams's misleading statements in the 2006 Petition, which represented that the Note was not yet due and payable and that no transfer had been made, justified tolling the statute of limitations under the equitable discovery rule. The trial court denied the motion, and Plaintiffs contest this ruling as well.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
16 Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in granting Adams's motion for summary judgment and denying Plaintiffs'. "This Court reviews a trial court's entry of summary judgment for correctness and gives its conclusions of law no deference." Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook,
ANALYSIS
T7 Plaintiffs challenge several aspects of the trial court's summary judgment ruling. First, they argue that the trial court erred in employing Utah Code section 57-8-102(1) to determine that Finan had constructive notice of the transfer by virtue of Adams having recorded the quitclaim deed. See-ond, they assert that the trial court erred in determining that Adams did not conceal the transfer because there were disputed issues of material fact relating to that issue. In connection with this argument, they also contest the trial court's denial of their motion for rule 60(b) relief, which was premised on newly-discovered evidence that allegedly demonstrated Adams's misleading conduct. Finally, they maintain that exceptional circumstances justify applying the equitable discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations in this case. In the alternative, they assert that the 1999 transfer was not a valid triggering event that made the note due and payable and that the trial court therefore erred in determining that the statute of limitations began running as of that date. Because the running of the statute of limitations must be established before it becomes necessary to consider the applicability of the equitable discovery rule, we address Appellant's alternative argument as a threshold matter before considering the other issues on appeal.
1. The 1999 Transfer Triggered the Running of the Statute of Limitations.
18 The applicable statute of limitations in this case is six years. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-809(2). "In a breach of contract action the statute of limitations ordinarily begins to run when the breach occurs." Butcher v. Gilroy,
II. The Equitable Discovery Rule Does Not Apply.
T9 Plaintiffs next contend that the trial court erred in declining to apply the equitable discovery rule. There are two circumstances where the "equitable discovery rule may operate to toll an otherwise fixed statute of limitations period":
(1) where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct, and (2) where the case presents exceptional cireumstances and the application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action.
Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson,
A. Constructive Notice
{10 Utah Code section 57-8-102 provides that documents completed in accordance with Title 57, "from the time of recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of their contents." Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-102(1) (LexisNexis 2010). Thus, because the transfers were recorded at the time they occurred, the trial court determined that Finan had constructive notice long before the statute of limitations expired. Plaintiffs contest this determination, asserting that section 57-8-102 should be interpreted as applying only to individuals with a prospective interest in property, not those with an existing interest, because it would be unreasonable to require individuals with an existing interest to continually check the property records in order to protect their interest.
111 We acknowledge that "[in general, Utah law does not require one to inspect the public record to verify the truthfulness of statements made to him or her," Timothy v. Keetch,
112 Nor do we think it absurd to require an individual with an interest in property to take reasonable steps to periodically confirm the continuing viability of that interest. See generally Russell Packard,
113 In any event, we are not convinced that the equitable discovery rule would apply in this case even if Finan did not have constructive notice of the transfers. "Mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action will neither prevent the running of the statute of limitations nor exeuse a plaintiff's failure to file a claim within the relevant statutory period." Russell Packard,
B. Concealment
In order to successfully toll the statute of limitations under the concealment branch of the equitable discovery rule, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Finan did "not become aware of the cause of action because of [Adams's] concealment or misleading conduct." See Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson,
In support of their summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs argued "that [Adams's] failure to provide any notice to his sister of the transfers he made to his wife and later to his trust amounted to concealment under the cireumstances." The trial court declined to recognize Adams's failure to inform Finan of the transfers as the type of "concealment or misleading conduct" contemplated by the equitable discovery rule, see id., and determined that Plaintiffs had "not submitted any competent evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [Adams's] conduct was misleading." Plaintiffs renew this argument only cursorily in their brief and point us to no authority in support of the position that failure to inform rises to the level of concealment. Cf. First Sec. Bank of Utah NA v. Banberry Dev. Corp.,
116 Plaintiffs nevertheless assert that even if summary judgment was appropriate on the facts presented at the time of the summary judgment hearing, the trial court should have granted their rule 60(b) motion to set aside its summary judgment ruling based on the newly-discovered 2006 Petition, which contained Adams's false statements that as of 2006, the Note was not due and payable and no transfer had been made. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) ("On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (2) newly dis
C. Exceptional Cireumstances
117 Plaintiffs next assert that this case presents exceptional circumstances because by transferring the Property, Adams improperly denied Finan her rightful share of the inherited property by surreptitiously triggering the statute of limitations and letting it run without informing Finan. Plaintiffs also rely on "expectations of honesty among family members and the value of the property at stake" in support of their argument that exceptional cireumstances exist.
118 "The ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional cireum-stances is a question of law and turns on a balancing test" that "examines [the hardship the statute of limitations would impose on the plaintiff ... [against] any prejudice to the defendant from difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time." Berneau v. Martino,
CONCLUSION
{19 The trial court correctly determined that the statute of limitations began running as of the date of the 1999 transfer, that the recording of the transfers imparted constructive notice to Finan of their existence, that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Adams concealed the transfers, and that exceptional cireumstances did not justify the tolling of the statute of limitations. Thus, the trial court correctly granted Adams's summary judgment motion. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs' rule 60(b) motion because the newly-discovered evidence was not material to the determination of whether Adams concealed the transfers during the relevant time period. Accordingly, we affirm.
Notes
. This amount represented 20.27% of the property's $129,942 market value at the time the Note was signed. According to Plaintiffs, the property now appraises at $1,250,000.
. Had Finan's lack of actual knowledge been the result of affirmative concealment or misleading behavior on Adams's part-e.g., had Finan asked Adams about the status of the property and had he falsely represented to her that the property had not been transferred-then the equitable discovery rule might apply, despite the constructive notice provided by the recording. However, as discussed further infra 115, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence tending to suggest that Adams made any attempt to conceal the transfer.