313 F.2d 764 | 3rd Cir. | 1963
Lead Opinion
Did a district court judge err when, in a wrongful death action in admiralty which alleged unseaworthiness and negligence, he entered a Pre-Trial Order which resolved the issue of liability in favor of the libellant and directed that the trial of the cause be restricted exclusively to the issue of damages ?
That question is presented on thjs appeal from a subsequent decree entering judgment in favor of the libellant and against the respondent in the amount of
The Government has premised its appeal on the grounds that the judge who entered the Pre-Trial Order erred- (1) “in summarily holding the United States liable notwithstanding the existence of genuine issues of material fact” and (2) in imposing liability without making specific findings of fact and stating conclusions of law “as required by Admiralty Rule 46%”; and on its contention that there can be no recovery for unseaworthiness under the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Statute.
Albert Mascuilli, a longshoreman employed by Northern Metals Company, stevedoring firm, was fatally injured under circumstances later detailed while assisting in loading cargo aboard the US NS Marine Fiddler, a vessel owned and operated by the United States. The libellant, his widow and Administratrix of his estate, filed action in admiralty against the United States for wrongful death alleging unseaworthiness of the vessel and negligence of its employees.
The Government, in its Answer to the libel, denied generally the allegations of unseaworthiness and negligence and affirmatively alleged that Maseuilli’s death was caused solely by the negligence of Northern which, it was averred, had exclusive custody, control and supervision over the entire cargo loading operation. It later filed its Answers to the Interrogatories which accompanied the libel. Thereafter, the libellant filed written Requests for Admissions of Facts, to which the Government made no reply.
There followed a pre-trial conference at which libellant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the unanswered Requests for Admissions must be deemed admitted and that these Admissions were sufficient to support a finding of liability against the Government. She then withdrew
“We are convinced from an examination of the requests for admissions, which were not denied, that the liability of the respondent is established beyond question. * * * We conclude, therefore, that the Court has the authority in these particular circumstances, and in the light of Rule 44% of the Admiralty Rules, 28 U.S.C.A. to limit the issues to be tried to the question of damages.”
In the Pre-Trial Order it was said in part:
“The liability issue is resolved by reason of the admitted facts and there is no issue as to liability now existing between the parties to this action; the admitted facts clearly establish liability of the respondent for the death of Albert Mascuilli on May 1, 1959; it will be unnecessary to adduce any further proofs relating to liability at the trial of this cause; the evidence at the trial shall be restricted exclusively to proof of the quantum of damages.”
As was earlier stated, at the trial on the issue of damages only, the trial judge issued a Decree awarding $124,000 to the libellant.
These facts are undisputed:
On May 1, 1959, the Marine Fiddler, a military transport, was being loaded in part with a cargo of 61%-ton Army
The vessel was equipped with a heavy lift swinging boom. This consisted of a large jumbo boom, capable of supporting weights up to 150 tons, which was located amidship at the after portion of the No. 3 hold, and three vang guys which were powered by winches and which swung the jumbo boom into the desired position. Two of the vang guys were on the starboard side of the vessel and one on the port side. The vang guys were electrically powered and each was equipped with a tripper (circuit breaker) in the electrical circuit designed to shut off the winch should the strain exceed the designated safe load to be carried. The vang guys were attached to the cargo hook by means of fish plates (triangular shaped pieces of metal) and shackles. The vang guy on the port side which figured in this accident was attached to a separate fish plate which, in turn, was shackled to the cargo hook. The shackle was 2^4 inches in diameter and weighed approximately 90 pounds. It had a rated strength of 225 tons and a safety factor of four giving it a safe working load of 56 tons.
Just prior to the accident, one of the Army tanks had been lifted from the pier and was centered over the hatch opening of No. 3 hold preparatory to its being lowered into the hold. Mascuilli was assisting in guiding the tank through the hatch opening when the shackle connecting the port vang guy to the fish plate on the boom parted causing the vang guy and its appurtenances to lash back and strike Mascuilli. He died half an hour later.
That the vang guy shackle parted because of excessive strain was never disputed. The Government had so stated in its Answers to libellant’s Interrogatories. Moreover, Requests for Admissions No. 18, admitted by reason of the Government’s failure to reply, stated that “The shackle parted because of the excessive strain placed upon it in the loading operation.”
In its Pre-Trial Memorandum below, the Government took the position that the accident was caused solely by the improper handling of the boom and winches by the stevedoring contractor and its employees and not by reason of fault or negligence on its part or by any defect in the shackle which parted.
The libellant in her Pre-Trial Memorandum did not make any claim that the shackle was defective. She, in sum, ascribed the parting of the shackle to the excessive strain placed upon it in the loading operation by reason of the asserted circumstances that the 61%-ton weight of the Army tank being loaded at the time of the accident was “heavier than the safe working load of the shackle”, viz. 56 tons. The Government, said the libellant, “knowing the nature of the cargo to be loaded aboard the vessel, and being aware of the working capacity of the gear, was negligent in not providing stronger shackles, and the use of a shackle whose safe working load was less than the weight of the draft made the deck of the vessel an unsafe place to work” and “these circumstances constitute an unseaworthy condition.”
On this appeal the libellant urges that the admitted fact that the 56-ton safe working load of the shackle was exceeded by the, weight of the cargo carried — 61% tons — established beyond question the liability of the Government on both the issues of negligence and unseaworthiness of the vessel and that the entry of the Pre-Trial Order was therefore not erroneous. On this score it must immediately be noted that neither the Pre-Trial Order nor the Memorandum which accompanied it indicated the character of the liability resolved by the Court, viz. whether it was negligence or unseaworthiness or both.
The libellánt here also contends that an added or alternative basis ¿or the court’s finding of liability was the pos
We come now to the critical issue as to whether there existed in this case a genuine issue as to a material fact which precluded the entry of the mooted Pre-Trial Order which was in effect a summary judgment on the issue of liability.
We have time and again held that summary judgments cannot be granted when there is a genuine issue as to a material fact presented by either of the parties to an action; that pre-trial procedures are not intended to serve as a substitute for the regular trial of cases, nor are they intended to transfer to the pre-trial conference judge the traditional jury function of resolving factual issues.
It is true that in the instant case the Government admitted that the vang guy shackle “parted because of excessive strain placed upon it in the loading operation” and that this “parting” resulted in the fatal injuries to Mascuilli. But, as the Government points out, “the origin of the excessive strain and how it was generated, the extent of the excessive strain, the parties who caused the excessive strain, and who bore the responsibility for preventing an excessive strain are all plainly material questions” which were not resolved by the admitted facts (facts admitted by reason of failure to answer the Requests for Admissions).
As earlier stated, the Government in its Answer to the libel denied unseaworthiness of the vessel and denied negligence on its part in the happening of the accident. Further, in its Answer, the Government presented an affirmative defense that the accident was caused solely by the negligence “of others” and on this score it averred that the stevedore Northern was in “sole custody and exclusive control of the cargo areas” of the vessel, “its gear and appurtenances” and had contracted to load the cargo. In its Answers to the libellant’s Interrogatories the Government stated that “the actual loading operation was performed by the stevedores from Northern Metal Company”, and paragraph 3 of the libellant's Requests for Admissions was to the same effect.
In its Answers to the Interrogatories the Government specifically stated that the shackle was not defective and that laboratory tests by a named metallurgist at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard made after the accident showed the shackle to be “free from defects”.
The Government indicates in its brief its theory that the excessive strain which caused the parting of the shackle was due to the fact that during the course of lowering the Army tank through the hatch opening the longshoremen improperly allowed the boom and vang guys to be placed at such an angle that the vang guys and their winches were pulling against one another in almost opposite-directions.
The Government here also takes issue with the libellant’s contention that the finding of liability below was justified on the admitted fact that the 56-ton safe working load of the parted shackle was exceeded by the weight of the ei^-ton Army tank being loaded at the time of
What has been said plainly discloses that there were genuine issues as to material facts presented and that accordingly the entry of the mooted PreTrial Order resolving the issue of liability in favor of the libellant was in error, and must be reversed.
It may well be that the trier of the facts when the case comes to trial on the issue of liability will credit the libellant’s view as to the cause of the tragic accident here involved but the Government is clearly entitled to present its testimony in an effort to sustain its version of the occurrence.
Because of the view stated it is unnecessary to consider the other points presented.
For the reasons stated the Decree filed April 11, 1961 entering judgment in fav- or of the libellant in the amount of $124,-000 against the United States will be vacated and the Pre-Trial Order filed December 5, 1960 will be reversed with directions to proceed in accordance with Shis Opinion.
. The instant appeal is focused on the Pre-Trial Order.
. The Government in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, had pointed out that the Buies of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime Gases then prevailing, did not authorize summary judgments. It may be noted, parenthetically, that the Admiralty Buies were amended the following year to provide for summary judgments, by adding Buie 58, the counterpart of Buie 56 of the Federal Buies of Civil Procedure.
. The Government in its Answers to Interrogatories — Nos. 38 and 39, stated that the winches were equipped with “trippers” (shut-off devices), described their setting and said all were “in working condition.”
. Lynn v. Smith, 281 F.2d 501, 506 (3 Cir. 1960) and the cases therein cited.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring).
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but not fgr all of the reasons upon which they predicate it.
The reason given by the majority for reversing the lower court and remanding the matter for trial is, quoting the Government’s brief, “The origin of the excessive strain and how it was generated, the extent of the excessive strain, the parties who caused the excessive strain, and who bore the responsibility for preventing an excessive strain are all plainly material questions” and, accordingly, Pot being answered in the record, should be decided by a jury. However material these might be, they are all answered, in my judgment, with the exception of one which I shall advert to later, by the admission of the Government that the “vang guy shackle” parted because of “excessive strain placed upon it in the loading operation.” This is so because of the admissions in the record that the loading was done by the stevedores of the Northern Metals Company, in attaching the tank to the cargo hook and the fall of the boom, as well as in operating the No. 3 winch which controlled the vang guy and shackle. Therefore, we know the “origin of the excessive strain”, who generated it, as well as the parties causing it. Further, “the extent of the excessive strain” is shown by the further admission that the weight of the load on the cargo hook and the fall of the boom was a 61% ton tank and the safe working load to be carried by the vang guy shackle, was 56% tons. Therefore, while the weight of lifting the tank was on the cargo hook and the fall of the boom, which did not break, the positioning of the tank, to put it in the square of the hatch, was done by means of the vang guy and shackle which was only rated for a working load of 56% tons. Accordingly, in the loading operation of the tank, there was too great a strain upon the vang guy and shackle in-positioning it over the square of the hatch with the contending stresses and strains attendant to so doing and it broke and lashed back and killed the plaintiff’s decedent. On the winch controlling the vang guy for the No. 3 hatch, there was a tripper which, when properly set, would shut off the current or give warning that an excessive strain was being placed on the
Additionally, it should be determined upon remand, if liability is to be imposed, whether the death of the plaintiff’s decedent was caused by negligence or unseaworthiness, or both, for an interesting problem is posed for the Court as to whether, under the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Act
. Act of April 15, 1851, P.L. 669, § 19, 12 P.S. § 1601.
. Act of April 18, 1949, P.L. 512, art. VI, § 601, 20 P.S. § 320.601.