110 Mo. 605 | Mo. | 1892
The plaintiff brought this suit against the defendant, a corporation engaged in manufacturing and selling steam threshing machines, to recover damages for the death of her husband, who received
Mr. Ellis applied to a Mr. McSwain, who was-an agent for the Birdsell thresher, for a machine of that pattern. They went to St. Louis, but being unable to get a machine of that make they called at the defendant’s shops. Ellis then gave the defendant a written order for a machine, by the terms of which defendant warranted it to be of good material and workmanship, and agreed to supply any parts which might fail during a specified time, free of charge. Though McSwain was not an agent for the defendant, still defendant agreed to pay him $25 for furnishing a purchaser, and he agreed with Ellis to start the machine. It was shipped to Ellis in due time, and he and his men used it-for threshing oats on Saturday and Monday, McSwain assisting them on Saturday. On Tuesday morning the cylinder flew into pieces, one of which struck Heizer above the eye, inflicting the injuries from which he died. Heizer was assisting Ellis in operating the machine. So far there is no dispute as to the facts.
The petition states, among other things, that defendant knew, when it constructed the machine, it-would be used and operated by a number of persons in the employ of the persons to whom it should be sold; that defendant, in selling the machine to Ellis, warranted the same to be free from defects and of first-class material; that the cylinder was made of poor material, was defective in construction, and was too weak to stand the ordinary strain; all of which defects were known to the defendant’s agents at the time of the sale; and that the machine gave way and flew into pieces by reason of such defects, etc.
The evidence on the issue as to whether defendant made, or should be deemed the maker of, the machine is, in substance, this: The Kingsland &
From the further evidence it appears that the cylinder, located in the front part of the thresher,' was composed of a shaft which passed through “two outside and two inside heads.” The outside heads were of solid cast iron. There were eight wrought iron cross bars extending from one to the other outside head, with four wrought iron bands around the bars. The teeth were set in the cylinder so as to pass between rows of teeth set in a concave which rested in grooves and could be removed when desired. The concave had been removed just before the accident, and after it had been replaced and some grain threshed Heizer took his place at the footboard, and had commenced or was about to commence feeding, when the cylinder gave way while revolving at full speed.
The evidence of several witnesses who were working at the machine is to the effect that nothing but grain and straw got into it, while one witness for the defendant gives it as his opinion that some foreign substance must have passed into the cylinder. Other evidence is to the effect that wrenches, bolts and the like sometimes get into the straw, and thence into the
The plaintiff produced two expert witnesses whose evidence is to the following effect: That the bands were irregular in thickness, varying from three-eighths to three-sixteenths of an inch; that they had been cut too short and had to be drawn out; that the iron in them was of a poor quality for such use; that in one instance, at least, the weld united on one side only. These witnesses say the cast iron in the heads was of a low grade and contained earthy matter; that the broken pieces disclosed old cracks or places where the iron did not unite when molded; that the heads were thus weakened from forty to sixty per cent.; that an inspection of the heads before they broke would have disclosed the poor quality of the iron, but not the cracks or places where the iron did not unite; and that, in their opinion, the heads first gave way and the other breakage followed .as a consequence.
The evidence for the defendant shows that this was one of one hundred or one hundred and twenty-five machines made in 1886; that they were all made out of like material; that with this exception they had all stood the test of practical use; that this machine was used daily during fair week at St. Louis in 1886, and again in 1887; that it had been twice tested, once when made, and again just before it was shipped to, Ellis; that the tests consisted in putting all the parts of the thresher in motion for three quarters of an hour, with the cylinder revolving at the rate of twelve hundred and forty revolutions' per minute. Mechanics, who made the cylinder, testified that the bands were purchased in large quantities, rolled and ready for use; that they
On this state of the case the trial court refused to nonsuit the plaintiff, and of this ruling error is assigned. In considering this question we must treat the defendant ■as both manufacturer and vendor of the machine, since there is evidence tending to show that it sold the same as one of its own manufacture. The first question is, whether the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for simple negligence. If there is any such liability, it is because of a breach of duty owing by the defendant to the plaintiff’s husband. If the defendant owed the deceased any duty whatever, that duty was created either, first, by the contract by which defendant sold the machine to Ellis, or, second, was a duty imposed by law upon defendant in addition to. or independent of any mere contract duty.
There is no doubt but a cause of action in tort! -often arises from the breach of a duty created by' contract, but in such cases there must be some privity of contract between the defendant and the person 1 injured. There being no privity of contract the suit]] cannot be maintained. Roddy v. Railroad, 104 Mo. 234; Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109; Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N. Y. 351; Losee v. Clute, 51 N. Y. 494; Necker v. Harvey, 49 Mich. 517; Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195; Safe Co. v. Ward, 46 N. J. L. 19; Curtain v. Somerset, 21 Atl. Rep. 244; Gordon v. Livingston, 12 Mo. App. 267; Kahl v. Love, 37 N. J. L. 8; Wharton on Negligence [2 Ed.] sec. 438. If
But in many cases the law imposes duties additional to those specified in the contract, and sometimes independent of it. Thus the relation of common carrier,- and passenger being created, the law casts upon the carrier the duty of using care, and in some instances: the highest care.known to the law. And still more toj the point are those cases where the law casts a duty to; use due care to third persons upon the manufacturer or vendor of dangerous goods, as in the case of poisonous drugs or explosive oils. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397; Norton v. Sewall, 106 Mass. 143; Wellington v. Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64; Hourigan v. Nowell, 110 Mass. 470; Callahan v. Warne, 40 Mo. 131. Smith says: “The true question always is, has the defendant committed a breach of duty, apart from the contract? If he has only committed a breach of contract he is liable to those only with whom he has contracted; but if he has committed a breach of duty he is not protected by setting up a contract in respect of the same matter with another person. ” Whitaker’s Smith on Negligence, 10.
The difficulty in the practical administration of the law is to fix upon the dividing line between those cases where the duty begins and ends with the contract, and where the law imposes a duty to third persons notwithstanding the contract. A recital of the salient facts in some of the cases before noted will the better enable us to say to which class this case belongs.
In the leading case of Winterbottom v. Wright, supra, the defendant had contracted with the postmaster general to provide a mail coach for carrying the
In Necker v. Harvey, supra, the defendant manufactured and put up in the factory of a soap company an elevator, under a contract with the soap company that it would lift at least two thousand pounds. The elevator fell by reason of defective shaft in three days after it had been put in place, and injured a workman in the employ of the soap company. Judge Cooley, speaking for the court, said: “The statement of facts so far makes out no cause of action in favor of this plaintiff. It discloses a duty on the part of the defendant to construct an elevator which should lift two thousand
In Losee v. Clute, supra, it was held that the manufacturer and vendor of a steam boiler was liable only to the vendee for defective materials and want of care in its construction; and that the vendor was not liable to a third person for damages caused by an explosion on account of defective materials and construction.
The facts in Curtain v. Somerset, supra (Supreme Court of Penn. 1891), were these: A contractor erected a hotel building, and turned the same over to the hotel company. Thereafter an entertainment was given at the hotel by the proprietor. A crowd of persons collected on a porch, when a girder gave way, and one of the persons attending the entertainment was injured, and he brought suit against the contractor. The contractor, it was held, was not liable to the plaintiff, because he owed the plaintiff no duty whatever. Says the court: “The consequence of holding the opposite doctrine would be far reaching. If a contractor who erects a house, who builds a bridge, or performs any other work, the manufacturer who constructs a boiler, piece of machinery or a steamship, owes a duty to the whole world, that his work or his machine or his steamship shall contain no hidden defect, it is difficult to measure the extent of his responsibility, and no prudent man would engage in such occupations upon such conditions. It is safer and wiser to confine such liabilities to the parties immediately concerned.”
"Wharton thinks the better reason for the rule is, that there is no causal connection between the negligence and the hurt; but be this as it may, the rule itself is well established in England and in the United States, and we think the case in hand comes within it. It is
We now turn to those cases where it is held that the vendor is liable for negligence to third persons,, and Thomas v. Winchester, supra, is the leading one in the United States. There the defendant, by his agent, put up a jar of belladonna, a deadly poison, and negligently labeled it dandelion, a harmless medicine. He sold the jar thus labeled to one druggist who sold it to another. The plaintiff’s wife being ill, her physician prescribed dandelion, and the prescription was filled by the last-named druggist from the jar, and administered to her, by which she was injured. The defendant was held liable for damages. The case is made to stand chiefly on the ground that sending into the market the poison mislabeled put human life in imminent danger.
And in Norton v. Sewall, 106 Mass. 143, an apothecary, by his agent, sold a deadly poison as and for a harmless medicine to one person who purchased it for and administered it to a third person. “ This finding,” says the court, “includes a violation of duty on the part of the defendant, and an injury resulting therefrom to the intestate for which the defendant was responsible, without regard to the question of privity of contract between them.” In these cases the articles sold were necessarily and inherently dangerous to human life, and they did not by their color or otherwise disclose their dangerous character, and, hence, the duty on the
The case of Heaven v. Pender, supra, before noted, and to which we are cited, was, by a majority of the judges, made to stand on the .ground that the defendant, the owner of the dry dock, invited the plaintiff upon his premises. Brett, M. R., formulated a general rule to which the other judges did not agree, which he says includes the .case of goods and machinery “suppliod to be used immediately by a particular person or' persons or one of a class of persons;” but he says, “it would exclude a case in which the goods are supplied under circumstances in which it would be a chance by whom they would be used.” He' approves the case of Collis v. Selden, supra, because there was nothing in the declaration to show that the plaintiff was more likely to be in the public house than any other member of the public; and he doubts the case of Thomas v. Winchester, supra, a case which has never been questioned in this country to the .knowledge of the writer. On the whole it seems to us Heaven v. Pender is not an authority in favor of the plaintiff in the present action.
The case of Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470, is more in point. There a carpenter negligently constructed a scaffold for the use of a painter who had a contract to paint the dome of a courthouse, and a workman employed by the painter was killed by reason of the negligence of the carpenter in constructing the scaffold,- and the carpenter was held liable by a divided court. The scaffold was ninety feet in height, and was built
Thus far we have treated this action as founded on negligence. In such actions fraud or an intentional wrong is not an element. The distinction between negligence and intentional wrong is important in tracing down Lability for the consequences arising therefrom. This distinction is pointed out with clearness in an article in the 16 American & English Encyclopedia of Law, 392, 434. Had the defendant sold this machine to Ellis, knowing that the cylinder was defective' and for that reason dangerous, without informing him of the defect, then the defendant would be liable even to third persons not themselves in fault. Shearman & Redfield on Negligence [4 Ed.] sec. 117. As said in Wellington v. Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64: “It is well settled that a man who delivers an article, which he knows to be dangerous or noxious to another person, without notice of its nature and qualities, is liable for any injury which may reasonably be contemplated as likely to result, and which does in fact result, therefrom to that person or any other, who is not himself in fault.”
But it seems out of place to pursue this inquiry further on this occasion; for there is no evidence showing or from which it can be fairly inferred that defendant knew the cylinder was in a dangerous condition. The plaintiff’s evidence tends to show that the iron in the heads and bands of the cylinder was óf a poor quality, that there was want of care in testing the pieces of iron before joined into the cylinder and perhaps want of care in testing the machine when completed ; but all this does not show that defendant knew this cylinder was defective or unfit for use. The case discloses no motive whatever on the part of defendant for sending out a defective machine. The plaintiff’s
The judgment in this case is, therefore, simply-reversed.