274 Pa. 448 | Pa. | 1922
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
Plaintiff appeals from a decree of the court below dismissing his bill in equity to have the Act of May 11, 1921, P. L. 479, “imposing a state tax on anthracite coal,” declared unconstitutional. The case was heard upon the pleadings, without evidence being produced; hence, while only those averments of the bill which are unchallenged by the answer, are to be accepted as true, all the averments of the latter must be so regarded, if they have any bearing on the controversy.
At the threshold of the argument, we are met with the allegation that stare decisis controls; the basis of this claim is that, — at the time we decided, in Com. v. Alden Coal Co., 251 Pa. 134, and Com. v. St. Clair Coal Co., 251 Pa. 159, that the cognate Act of June 27, 1913, P. L. 639, violated article IX, section 1, of the Constitution of the State, — all the facts existed which are now relied on to sustain the Act of 1921, though many of them were not proved, admitted or found in the trial of those cases. This contention indicates a misconception of legal principles, in that it attempts to apply the rules growing out of a former adjudication between the same parties, to those appertaining to a prior judgment between different parties. When res adjudicata is applicable, every essential fact, proved or unproved, as well as the ultimate fact found, must be treated as established, when pertinent for consideration in a later suit .between the same parties; whereas stare decisis simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. Similarity of the relevant facts being necessary, it follows that if here they are essentially different from those in the Alden Coal Co. and St. Clair Coal Co. cases, supra (as the court below found they were), its ruling that stare decisis did not apply was necessarily correct. Indeed this is particularly so, where, as here, the decision depends not on
Moreover, stare decisis has no real place in constitutional law when the validity of another statute is under consideration. The reasons which actuated our predecessors in declaring an act unconstitutional, have and should have great weight with us, when determining whether or not a later similar statute is likewise objectionable, but if, after having fully considered the matter, we are nevertheless impelled to the conclusion that the later enactment is constitutional, we cannot decide otherwise, unless we are to forget our duty to support the Constitution as the supreme law. Our reason for this conclusion cannot be better expressed than by interpolating a few appropriate words into the wonderfully simple and convincing language of Chief Justice Marshall, when considering whether or not the courts have the power to declare a statute unconstitutional: “If both the law [i. e. the statute backed by the court’s prior error, if it was such] and the Constitution apply to a case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law [i. e. the erroneous decision declaring it to be so], disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty”: Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 178. To this it may be added (though somewhat aside from the present inquiry) that it is at least as important now as it ever was, that doubts as to the constitutionality of a statute (though arising from a prior decision) should always be resolved in favor of constitutionality.
On the main question, — is the Act of 1921 constitutional? — we first observe that article IX, section 1, of the Constitution, relied upon to defeat the statute, in
We are told also, and the point is strongly presented, that the chemical constituents of anthracite and bituminous coal are much alike, as are also some of the processes of nature which brought each of them into existence ; but neither one nor both of these facts conclude the question under review. Pursuing to its logical conclusion the line of inquiry thus suggested, we find that the ascending grade from wood to lignite, cannel coal, bituminous coal, anthracite, and, finally, to graphite or diamonds, is only the further carrying on of the same chemical reactions, resulting principally in the formation and expulsion of more and more of the hydro-carbons and other gases; lignite being wood with some of them expelled, anthracite coal being wood with most of them gone, and graphite and diamonds being wood with practically all of them eliminated. So, also, coke is anthracite coal in all essential respects; in the former man has expelled these gases by the artificial application of heat; in the latter nature has eliminated them by
Recognizing this in part, appellant admitted, at the bar of this court, that, since only bituminous coal can practically be used for the manufacture of coke, so much thereof as was in fact used for that purpose could be separately taxed; but claimed that if anthracite is to be taxed it must be in conjunction with so much of the bituminous coal as is used for like purposes. He also says: “Mere competition between two wholly different articles, could not, of itself, bring them within the same ‘class of subjects.’” Taken together, these two statements amount to this: the legislature may classify, however alike the articles may be, if they do not come into competition; it may classify, though they come into competition, provided they are not alike; but if they are alike and also come into competition, it may not classify; that is, a “class of subjects,” in the constitutional sense, is one in which the articles are not only alike but are competitive. If this contention was sustained then natural ice and artificial ice would have to be taxed similarly or left untaxed, natural gas and manufactured gas would have to be treated in the same way, and doubtless many other subjects of taxation would be unnecessarily yoked together. Reasonably applied, the rule
Moreover, as applied to the matter under consideration, any attempt to thus divide bituminous coal into two classes would result in disaster. The tax could not be levied at the mines, unless there was also a provision for refunding in case the coal was not afterwards used in the manufacture of coke; and even this would be ineffective to sustain the tax, so far as relates to that great part of the coal which is shipped in interstate or foreign commerce; for, as soon as it starts on its journey, it is beyond the taxing power of the State: Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. Hancock, 253 U. S. 284; McNeill v. Director General of Railroads, 272 Pa. 525. Relying upon, but apparently misapprehending this legal principle, appellants argued in the court below that the Act of 1921 was unconstitutional, because a large part of the anthracite coal would be shipped ultimately in interstate or foreign commerce, though the tax was imposed before the j ourney was even begun; a contention not made orally and but briefly referred to in appellant’s paper-book here, possibly because of Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. State of Mississippi, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on November 14, 1921.
Moreover the contention upon this point, practically considered, asks us to reverse the legislature on a disputable question of fact, viz: Has the new use to which bituminous coal may now be put, carried it into a separately taxable class? When anthracite coal was first ascertained to be available for domestic and manufacturing purposes, it found wood in practical possession of the field. For some time the former entered but slightly
It is perhaps not possible for us to so' answer these questions as to cover all cases which may arise, nor is it necessary that we should. In Com. v. Delaware Division Canal Co., 128 Pa. 594, 623, we said: “Classification for purposes of taxation, as a general rule, is a matter for the legislature; it is the uniformity of taxation, according to that classification, which is for the courts.” In Sharpless v. Phila., 21 Pa. 147, 164; and in Speer v. School Board, etc., of Blairsville, 50 Pa. 158, we said: “We can declare an act of assembly void, only when it violates the Constitution clearly, palpably, plainly, and in such manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in our minds.” So also in Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Ewing, 241 Pa. 581, 589, and in Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 274 Pa. 489, we quoted with approval the following language froln Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549: “The scope of judicial in
In the light of these considerations we can only hold, as already stated, that, so far as concerns the classes into which articles may be arranged for purposes of taxation, the matter is one for the legislature and not for the courts; and the latter not only have no duty to classify but they are and should be forbidden to interfere with the legislative classification unless they can say with certainty that it is purely illusory, clearly intended as an evasion of the Constitution. It is not so in the present case; on the contrary we have findings of undisputed facts, showing a wide difference in the character
“Anthracite coal differs from bituminous coal in the following physical properties: The amount of fixed carbon, the amount of volatile matter, color, lustre and structural character. The percentage of fixed carbon in anthracite coal is much higher, and the percentage of volatile matter is much lower than in bituminius coal. Anthracite coal is hard, compact and comparatively clean and free from dust and is commonly termed ‘hard coal,’ while bituminous coal is very much less hard, and is dusty and dirty and is commonly termed ‘soft coal’ [hence] bituminous coal burns with more or less smoke while anthracite coal burns with practically no smoke.
“The fuel ratio......of bituminous coal differs from that of anthracite coal; as the fuel ratio of bituminous coal rises the coal is more soft, as the fuel ratio of anthracite coal rises the coal is more hard.
“Sixty-one per cent of anthracite coal produced in Pennsylvania is used for domestic purposes and substantially all anthracite coal is used for fuel in the production of heat for domestic purposes and of steam for domestic purposes and for power; but bituminous coal is used not only for fuel but as a raw material from which a great number and variety of commercial products are manufactured.
“A small percentage of anthracite produced in Pennsylvania is used in the production of gases, known as water-gases and producer-gas. Said gases, which are*461 also produced from coke, are of a different character from that produced from bituminous coal [the latter] known as coal gas, is produced from the volatile matter in said coal; [in addition] a large amount of bituminous coal produced in Pennsylvania is used in the production of gas for fuel and illumination in addition to the gas produced in connection with the manufacture of coke.
“Methods of eliminating impurities from bituminous coal are being developed, whereby the percentage of the Pennsylvania bituminous coal available for the manufacture of marketable coke is increasing. Recent experiments in by-product ovens indicate that practically all the bituminous coal in Pennsylvania will be available for the manufacture of marketable coke when the elimination of high sulphur and high phosphorus has been accomplished.
“The gas liberated in the manufacture of coke by the by-product process is saved and used for fuel and illumination and, with some resultant chemical changes and by distillation and condensation, volatile matter is recovered in the form of tar or pitch, ammonia (used largely in the manufacture of fertilizers), cyanide and benzol, and other oils used to generate power by internal combustion and for other purposes.”
Much of the tar and pitch so recovered is used in surfacing highways, but from a large part thereof there are extracted, by various processes, fourteen or more separate articles of commerce and hundreds of medicinal and other products in common use, which, though it is possible to “extract them from anthracite, cannot be produced therefrom in quantities rendering such production commercially practicable and none are, in practice, produced therefrom.”
For more than sixty years congress has taxed anthracite and bituminous coal differently, as has the Canadian parliament for upwards of thirty-five years; and the general assembly of this State has repeatedly legislated for the two classes separately, as well regarding the regu
It is, of course, true, as pointed out in Com. v. Alden Coal Co., 251 Pa. 134, 141-2, that a difference in price would not alone justify a separate classification; but when it appears that the price varies because of the causes above pointed out, and that the life histories of the two kinds of coal are essentially different, during some of the time before and much of the time after man seeks to reduce them to possession, surely the courts could not properly say that their separate classification “violates the Constitution clearly, palpably, plainly and in such manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in our minds.”
Indeed it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand how we can rightfully assert1 the legislature is powerless to classify these two coals for the purpose of taxation, and yet approve, as we have done (Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 274 Pa. 489, a classification of the two industries for the purpose of enforcing a great public policy applicable to one but not to the other, and providing penalties and a means for enforcing that policy. This fact alone would seem to show that such great differences exist in relation to the subject as to prevent the courts from saying, as a matter of law, that the two commodities are in all respects alike. The only answer attempted is thus set forth in Com. v. Alden Coal Co., supra: “In determining whether legislative classification is special and discriminatory, regard must be had to the purpose for which the legislation is de
It is further alleged the act violates article III, section 7, of the Constitution in that it is local and special legislation ; we agree with appellant that this point is “covered by the foregoing argument on uniformity of taxation,” and hence it need not be repeated.
It is claimed also that the act violates the commerce clause of the federal Constitution; a sufficient answer to which is the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. State of Mississippi, already referred to.
It is finally contended that the statute does not give to appellant the “equal protection of the laws” guaranteed to him by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; a complete answer to which is the following quotation from District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138, 150: “We have repeatedly decided, — so often that a citation of the cases is unnecessary, — that it does not take from the states the power of classification, and also that such classification
The decree of the court below is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed at the cost of appellant.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
That the great Commonwealth of Pennsylvania should levy the tribute, on those within and without her borders, which indirectly will result from the taxing act now before us, is, in my opinion, a matter for regret; but, disregarding this, I dissent from the view of the majority, sustaining the legislation, .solely on the ground that, while some important differences between the present statute and the one previously declared unconstitutional (Com. v. Alden Coal Co., 251 Pa. 134) may be suggested, yet, on the controlling point upon which we rested our former decision, the two acts are in practical accord. When the other case was here, I reached the deliberate conclusion, stated by Mr. Justice Stewaet for the court (p. 142), that, if coal were to be taxed, there could be no valid classification between anthracite and bituminous; nothing has been brought forward since to change that conclusion. The fact that, for numerous other purposes, such as operating the mines, etc., classification between the two sorts of coal has been permitted, is beside the question: men and women may be classified separately for many legislative purposes, but when it comes to taxing them, differentiation is undoubtedly forbidden; so with coal. To my mind, the several kinds of coal can no more be separated for purposes of taxation than can the
In addition, notwithstanding my respect for the view of the writer of the majority opinion, I cannot agree with his statement that “stare decisis has no real place in constitutional law”; this thought, being unnecessary to the decision in hand, ought to be taken as dictum of that writer. The doctrine in question, while not always deemed controlling (and perhaps not so in the instant case), cannot be put aside as a principle of law when considering fundamental points; my idea of the limitations on it in that field are expressed in Luzerne County v. Morgan, 263 Pa. 458, 465, but, despite such limitations, that stare decisis has long been recognized as occupying a “real place” in American constitutional jurisprudence, is shown by many decisions in all jurisdictions.
Again, I think the words which the writer of the majority opinion “interpolates” into the quotation from Marbury v. Madison, are not “appropriate.” As I understand the governing principle, when a prior decision is overruled, — although, to avoid injustice, certain rights and positions, assumed on the faith thereof, may remain undisturbed — the theory is that such decision, being in error, never was law; not that it was the law and that the court changes it: Ray v. Natural Gas Co., 138 Pa. 576, 590; Harlow v. Beaver Falls Boro., 188 Pa. 263, 265-66. The latter theory would make courts creators, rather than interpreters, of the law, a position they never were intended to occupy.
I believe the Act of 1921 to be unconstitutional, and would so declare it; hence this dissent.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
It is because of the importance of this case that I record my dissent. This court, in Com. v. St. Clair Coal Co., 251 Pa. 159, passed on the same questions now involved, and declared the act then before us to be unconstitutional ; I feel bound by that decision for the follow
For the reasons given, I would apply the law of the former case and hold the present act unconstitutional.