In these consolidated appeals, Rudolph Heiny, the husband, and Fran Pupello, the wife, both appeal a final judgment of dissolution entered in 2009 and a final judgment of attorneys’ fees entered against the husband in 2010. The husband argues that the trial court made four errors in the equitable distribution plan and in ordering him to pay 100% of the wife’s fees as a sanction against him. In her cross-аppeals, the wife argues that the trial court
I. Introduction
The parties married in 1996. They had two children during the marriage. The husband is a pool contractor, and the wife is an accountant. During the marriage, they worked together in the husband’s pool construction business. Before the parties married, they signed an аntenup-tial agreement. The general purpose and intent of the agreement was to protect each party’s premarital assets as separate property. The antenuptial agreement contained a specific provision regarding the wife’s premarital home, which is discussed in further detail below. During the marriage, the parties and their two minor children resided in the wife’s premarital home. The parties bought adjacent property and made improvements to both the wife’s premarital home and the adjacent property for the benefit and use of the family.
At the time of the dissolution, the marital property subject to equitable distribution included the property adjacent to the wife’s premarital home; rental property (the Genessee property); various investment, retirement, and bank accounts; a car; and other personal property. The parties also sought a determination regarding the husband’s interest in the wife’s premarital home and the wife’s interest in the pool business. The parties’ marital debts consisted of a homе mortgage with a balance of $276,000 and a mortgage on the Genessee property with a disputed balance somewhere between $36,000 and $60,000.
In the final judgment, the trial court awarded the wife her premarital home as a nonmarital asset. As part of the equitable distribution plan, the trial court awarded the husband a one-half interest in the appreciatiоn of the wife’s premarital home. The trial court awarded the wife the adjacent pool property in the equitable distribution plan. The trial court awarded the husband the pool business as a nonmarital asset. The trial court then ordered the husband to pay 100% of the wife’s attorneys’ fees based on his litigation misconduct.
As noted in the final judgment of dissolution, the pаrties did not litigate the time-sharing schedule and parenting plan involving the children, but the final judgment contained rulings regarding child support, which neither party challenges on appeal.
II. Discussion
A. The wife’s premarital home
The antenuptial agreement provides in relevant part:
6. Agreements Concerning Fran’s House. The parties hereto intend to reside in Fran’s house.... The House shall be and remain titled in Fran’s name alone and, except as specifically provided in Section 6, Rudy shall have no right, title or interest in and to the House or any of Fran’s Separate Property contained herein. Further, with*900 respect to the House, the parties agree as follows:
(a) If a petition for dissolution of marriage is filed by either of the parties hereto after the date the parties are married, upon the entry of an order dissolving the marriage of the parties, Fran shall pay to Rudy a sum equal to one-half of all principal payments and any capital improvements made with respect to the House between the date of the marriage of the parties and the date on which a petition for dissolution of marriage was filed.
In the proceedings below, the parties agreed that the antenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable.
In the final judgment оf dissolution, the trial court assigned the wife’s premarital home an equity value of $285,000 at the time of the marriage in 1996. The trial court found that the home’s equity value had appreciated in the amount of $272,813 to have an equity value of $557,813 at the time of the dissolution.
On cross-appeal, the wife asserts that the trial court misinterpreted the terms of the antenuptial agreement and that pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the husband was only entitled to credit for one-half of the costs of capital improvements and one-half of the principle mortgage payments mаde during the marriage.
A trial court’s interpretation of an antenuptial agreement “ ⅝ reviewed de novo, as such agreements are governed by the law of contracts.’ ” Murley v. Wiedemann,
[3] Additionally, the trial court erred in its finding regarding the premarital value of the wife’s premarital home, as argued by the husband on appeal. The undisputed testimony was that the home was worth $341,000 when the parties married, but the trial court found that the home was worth $375,000 at the time of the
B. The Genessee rental property
The trial court awarded the husband the Genessee rental property, valued at $103,898.69. On appeal, the husband argues that the trial court failed to make findings regarding the mortgage debt on the property that he paid off during the dissolution proceedings. The wife responds that even though the husband would be entitled to credit for the amount of debt he satisfied by paying off the mortgage, he failed to produce any evidence to show the source of the funds he used to pay off the debt.
While it is undisputed that there was a marital mortgage on this property, there was conflicting evidence regarding the balance of the mortgage when it was paid off by the husband. The wife’s accоuntant testified at trial that according to the wife’s financial affidavit, the Genessee rental property had a mortgage in the amount of $60,000 at the time the wife filed for divorce. The wife acknowledged that the husband paid off the debt and that he would be entitled to credit, depending on the source of the funds he used to pay off the debt. The husband testified that he рaid off the $60,000 loan. Regarding the funds he used, he testified to the following:
A. I paid off the indebtedness by borrowing the money from my uncle. I used part of the money that was repaid from the Bustamante loan....
[[Image here]]
Q. How much money did you borrow from your uncle to pay off the foreclosure?
A. I had, I think, 27,000 or 17,000 or whatever the difference was from the Bustamante loan2 to get to the 60 I had to borrow....
The husband did not producе any documentation to support his assertion that he paid off the loan with nonmarital funds. In addition, his financial affidavit listed the Genessee rental property mortgage as having a $36,000 balance. The record further indicates that when the parties fell behind on their payments on the loan, the wife’s father bought the note and filed suit to foreclose the mortgage. The assignment of the note to the wife’s father indicates that the principal amount of the note was $40,000.
Although this property was distributed to the husband in the final judgment as part of the equitable distribution plan, the marital mortgage debt on this property that was satisfied by the husband was not credited to the husband or mentioned in the final judgment. Section 61.075, Florida Statutes (2009), requires a trial judge tо identify all marital assets and liabilities as defined therein, value them, and distribute them equitably between the parties. A trial court’s failure to include all marital assets or debts in an equitable distribution plan violates section 61.075 and requires reversal. See Wolf v. Wolf, 979 So.2d
C. $75,000 paid to the pool business
In the final judgment, the trial court found that the parties had loaned $75,000 to the pool business. The trial court awarded the husband the pool business as a nonmarital asset, “with the exception of the one-half of the $75,000 investment ($37,500) that shall be made payable back to the [wjife.” On appeal, the husband contends that the trial court erred in including this amount in the equitable distribution plan because the evidence showed that after the parties paid the money to the pool business, the parties used the money to pay for business and personal expenses.
On this issue, the wife, who is an accountant, testified that when the partiеs refinanced the marital home in 1999, they put $75,000 of the loan proceeds into the pool business to pay business debts and some of their personal expenses associated with “the pool improvements” to the marital property adjacent to the wife’s premarital home. The evidence demonstrates that both parties jointly depleted thе $75,000, and the trial court erred in treating it as a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. The wife testified that this money was loaned to the company and claimed that it was a receivable marital asset. But there was no loan document, written promise, or any other indication that the company had any legal obligation to repay that money. The evidence demonstrated, and the trial court found, that the business employed both parties, paid both parties’ salaries, and paid “for many of the couple’s personal and household expenses during the marriage.” See Mobley v. Mobley,
D. Mercantile Bank savings account
On cross-appeal, the wife argues that the trial court erred in including the $48,933 Mercantile Bank savings account in the equitable distribution plan and in assigning it to the wife because the funds in the account were spent on family expensеs during the litigation. See Mobley,
E. Attorneys’fees
The trial court ordered the husband to pay 100% of the wife’s reasonable attorneys’ fees, totaling $210,810, as a sanction for his misconduct in the underlying litigation.
In Pietras v. Pietras,
We note that the misconduct of the husband in this case is obvious, and we affirm the trial court’s finding in that regard.
III. Conclusion
In conclusion, we reverse the equitablе distribution plan in the final judgment of dissolution as outlined above, and we remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. On remand, the trial court may make any necessary adjustments to the equitable distribution plan. We also reverse the final judgments as they relate to attorneys’ fees and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We аffirm the final judgments in all other respects.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.
Notes
. This valuation does not include the adjacent property, which the trial court referred to as the pool property. The trial court found that the pool property was worth $255,060.
. There was some evidence that the parties had made two loans to someone named Bus-tamante but "they were received and paid during the marriage and split equally between the parties.”
. We note that the trial court found that the husband himself, and not the husband’s counsel, engaged in litigation misconduct. We also note that the husband’s appellate counsel did not represent him in the litigation below.
. The trial court found the following:
This is a four[-]year[-]old dissolution case with a history of contempt and sanctions against the [hjusband, who has willfully and repeatedly stalled litigation throughout the course of these proceedings; the [h]us-band has been forced to comply with mandatory discovery and disclosure by court order on several occasions (in addition to having repeatedly been found in contempt regarding his support obligations). Because of this well[-]documented history, the Court finds that the [w]ife is entitled to attomey[']s fees for this action, payable in full by the [h]usband, as a sanction for his behavior in litigation.