159 A.D. 33 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1913
Lead Opinion
On November 16, 1909, when the action of Meyer v. Schulte was commenced, the petitioner, Norbert Heinsheimer, was general counsel for the United States Restaurant and Realty Company under an annual retainer of $5,000, and prepared and conducted it together with various other matters under his contract as general counsel. On February 12, 1910, William F. McCombs was made general counsel for the said company in his place, but the petitioner was thereafter, retained as special counsel for the purpose of conducting the action, and' he prosecuted it to judgment. The judgment for $4,176.64 which he obtained against the defendant was appealed to the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals and affirmed in both courts. (148 App. Div. 892; 208 N. Y. 562.) On April 7, 1910, Anton H. Meyer qualified as assignee for the benefit of the creditors of the plaintiff, and later, while the appeal was pending in the Appellate Division, moved to be substituted as plaintiff and for the substitution of new counsel. The petitioner opposed the motions on the ground that he had á hen upon the papers and cause of action for a balance of $3,096.92 due and unpaid on account of the annual retainer of $5,000 up to February 12,1910, and a further lien for his services subsequently rendered as special counsel in obtaining the judgment. The motion was granted, and William F. McCombs was substituted as attorney for the plaintiff, “all without prejudice to said Norbert Heinsheimer, Esq., taking the steps which may be necessary to determine the existence of his lien herein, if any, and the value thereof.” The defendant has paid the amount of the judgment into court, pursuant to an order herein, and this motion is made to determine the lien of the petitioner thereon. Under section 475 of the Judiciary Law an attorney has a charging lien upon the cause of action or any judgment which may be obtained therein into whosesoever hands it may come for the value of his services. This is independent of and in addition to his common-law or retaining lien upon any property of his client which may come into his possession in the course of his employment. The retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of account between attorney and client and covers services rendered in other matters not connected with the property which
Dissenting Opinion
I am constrained to dissent from the affirmance of the order appealed from because I can see no principle upon which the attorney can have a charging Hen upon the judgment for the amount claimed to be due him upon his general retainer. That he is entitled to such a lien for the value of his services in procuring the judgment is not open to question, hut as to the amount which has accrued under his annual employment before the appointment of the receiver he stands on the same footing as any other creditor. True, if when his general employment terminated, he had had any of the bankrupt’s papers in his hands he might have claimed a possessory lien as to them and have held them until his claim was satisfied, but such a hen is incapable of foreclosure and never attached to anything not in actual possession of the attorney. In my opinion the order appealed from should be so modified as to provide only for the ascertainment of the value of the services - of the petitioner in the action which resulted in the judgment.
Laughlin, J., concurred.