117 Mo. App. 546 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1905
Lead Opinion
Plaintiff is a judgment creditor of the Supreme Coucil, Knights of Equity of the World, an incorporated society organized, according to the avowal of its charter, to disseminate good principles, alleviate suffering and furnish fraternal insurance. Its active existence ceased in 1903 and since then it has had no meetings and done no business. Judgment was rendered against it in plaintiff’s favor on December 21, 1903, for over twelve hundred dollars, including the costs of the action. There was a payment on the judgment of one hundred and twenty-three dollars, but the balance still remains unpaid. An execution was issued for this balance and returned nulla bona, February 1, 1904, thus proving that the association is insolvent. After the return was made, the plaintiff instituted this action to enforce payment of her judgment out of assets of the association alleged to be in the hands of the defendants, who were in 1899, trustees of the association and its principal officers. At that time, the defendant Marshall held the chief office of supreme commander and the defendant Cunningham the second office of supreme vice commander. The two defendants dominated the board of trustees and, according to their own admissions, completely controlled the affairs of the society. On May 23, 1899, pursuant to an arrangement entered into previously, and for a pecuniary consideration received and retained by them, they turned over the control of the order to L. Dow Moore and his associates. That result was accomplished in this manner: The members of the board of trustees, at the instigation of the defendants, resigned in succession, and as soon as a vacancy was created by the resignation of one member, it was filled
The question regarding the right of a creditor of a corporation to sue a party for the recovery of corporate property fraudulently obtained by said party, is altogether distinct from the question of the creditor’s right to sue without first demanding of the company officials that they take action in the name of the company. As to the latter point, which .is dAvelt on in the briefs of counsel, we will say nothing; for it is not essential to our decision. Nor are Ave bound to ascertain whether the rule that creditors cannot expose a fraud practiced on their debtors, is applicable to the present cause. The decisive fact is that the plaintiff’s debt accrued after the occurrence of the breach of trust which constitutes the
One perceives that permitting a creditor to pursue property out of which a debtor has been cheated, would facilitate the collection of the debt. So would permitting a subsequent creditor to challenge previous transfers fraudulently made by the debtor. But this consideration has not induced the courts to accord the right of interference to such creditors; presumably because they did not extend credit in reliance on the property fraudulently parted with by, or withdrawn from, the debtor.
It is true that a better reason can be brought forward why a creditor of a corporation should be allowed to pursue property belonging to it in the hands of a party who procured the property by fraud, than can be given for allowing the creditor of an individual to do so; for an individual can always exercise his right to seek redress against a fraud; whereas a corporation may be under the control of directors or trustees, who are interested in taking no step to redress the wrong. This was the situation in the Graham case, and in the present one. That argument was pressed and overruled in the Graham case; and in disposing of it, the court said, among other things, that when a corporation becomes insolvent, a court of equity will take charge of it and collect its assets for the benefit of creditors.
The judgment is reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). — At first I concurred in the opinion of the court as expressed by the learned judge, but on motion for rebearing I became persuaded that the case does not fall within the influence of the principles so clearly and forcibly stated in the opinion of the court. I know that as a rule no good can come from dissenting opinions. The time consumed in their preparation might be more profitably occupied in disposing of cases not decided. Notwithstanding this fact, however, I cannot refrain from attempting to point out what seems to me a feature of this case which distinguishes it from the authorities cited and relied upon in the opinion of the court. With the statements of law in that opinion, I find no fault. It appears to me that those principles which are pertinent to a transaction voidable only are not pertinent to this transaction, which was wholly and absolutely void, so that in no sense could it have been ratified.
Now, in the first instance, it is well settled and the broad principle is, that whatever a director of a corporation acquires in virtue of his fiduciary relation by way of secret profit, or otherwise, except in open dealing with the company, such as directors in common with strangers may sometimes have, belongs not to- him but to the company, and it is said that nothing less than this satisfies the law. [Bent v. Priest, 10 Mo. App. 543-558; Sugden v. Crossland, 3 Sm. & Giff., 192; Bent v. Priest, 86 Mo. 475.] In the case last cited, our Supreme Court said:
“These cases are all quite clear to the effect that the trustee will not be allowed to make gain to himself, beyond his allowed compensation, by reason of his office and influence as.such trustee. By accepting the office the director undertakes to give his judgment _and influence to the interests of the corporation in all matters in which he represents or professes to represent it. That judgment and influence, of right, belongs to the corporation, and so does that which it produces, and the bonds
From these considerations it appears to me that the moneys or other secret profit which Marshall received by selling out his trust, belonged “not to him, but to the insurance company,” and therefore, it was competent for the plaintiff in this case, a judgment creditor of the insurance company, to garnish the same as assets of the insurance company. The transaction which Marshall had with Moore and out of which the assets arose, was-void as against public policy. The transaction being in fraud, with which all parties participating therein were contaminated, the law would not aid Moore to recover from Marshall the moneys or property he had paid him to vacate his office and turn the insurance company over to Mm, and had Moore refused to pay the same to Marshall, the law would not have aided Marshall to recover from Moore thereon. Therefore, as Moore had paid the amount- agreed upon to Marshall, the title thereto liad divested from Moore and had vested in the insurance company, for in a case of such an absolutely void transaction, no title could vest in Mar* shall no more than could the title of stolen property vest in the thief who stole it nor title vest in the grantee of a void deed. It seems to me that this feature of the case falls within the influence of the same principle which controls in cases of stolen goods, in wMch cases the law forbids the vesting of the title in the thief. The transaction between Marshall and Moore, by which there-came into being a profit, in virtue of Marshall’s office, being absolutely void as against public policy, the legal title to the profit could not have vested in Marshall, and it having divested from Moore, it was absolutely necessary for it to vest some place. As has been said: “A s nature abhors a vacuum,- so the commoru law abhors the absence of absolute ownership somewhere in property of whatever description.” [Cape Girardeau v. Harbinson, 58 Mo. 94.] And while I concur in the opinion that the-
Now the court lays stress upon the fact that plaintiff Avas a subsequent creditor, and applies to this case the principles which obtain in the case of a subsequent creditor, attempting to set aside a conveyance of the debtor’s property which has been obtained by fraud perpetrated upon the debtor. I am unable to appreciate how this principle is pertinent to this case: Indeed, it is true as a general proposition that a creditor Avill not be allowed to unravel the fraud perpetrated upon the debtor Avhen the debtor is innocent, inasmuch as such transactions are not void but are voidable only, and being such, they are capable of being disaffirmed or ratified by the debtor upon whom the fraud is perpetrated, and the creditor is precluded from unraveling the same upon the principle that the transaction being voidable only, the debtor himself may see fit to ratify it. Noav in this case, the creditor is not seeking to unravel the fraud perpetrated upon the debtor in a transaction that could be ratified and rendered valid by the debtor upon whom the fraud was perpetrated, but she is seeking to avail herself of the assets of her debtor, which were created and came into existence by virtue of the fraud committed, and which fraud is of such a nature as to render the transaction absolutely void and not voidable only. In no sense could the debtor ratify this transaction and render it valid, and therefore I am persuaded that she should not be denied relief upon the principle applied in cases of subsequent creditors seeking to unravel the debtor’s fraud. The court relies upon Graham v. Railway Company, 102 U. S. 148, as a precedent. Let us examine the case. It will be observed by reference to page 154 of the report, that the real question in decision was: “The question still remains whether, the debtor being unAvilling to disturb the transaction, subsequent creditors have such an interest that they can reach the
Now the case of Ready v. Smith, 170 Mo. 163, 70 S. W. 484, was that of a prior creditor seeking to subject the property to the satisfaction of his debt, out of which Ready alleged his debtor had been defrauded, and the Supreme Court denied the relief upon the same principle as in the Graham case, and said that as the transaction set out in the bill was not void, “at most it was voidable only;” (p. 173) that as it was competent for the debtor to ratify the same, the creditor had no right to complain. The same principle controls in each of those cases, as I understand them; and that is, that the subsequent creditor in one and the prior creditor in the other is precluded from relief, not on the ground that one is a subsequent and the other a prior creditor, although in the Graham case the fact of the plaintiff being a subsequent creditor was mentioned, but the relief is denied on the principle that the transactions which they sought to impeach were frauds perpetrated upon the debtor, and of which the debtor was innocent, and therefore they were capable of being disaffirmed or ratified, and that inasmuch as the debtor had made no move to disaffirm the same, the creditor would not be permitted to come in and do so. Now there is a marked distinction in the case of a transaction which is absolutely void as against
In Armstrong v. Tuttle, 34 Mo. 432, it is held that . when a party has taken possession of goods as trustee under a deed of trust which is void as to the creditors of the grantor, the party so taking possession becomes the debtor of the grantor under the void deed of trust to the amount of the goods, and may be garnished by the judgment creditor of the grantor. The principle of this case is an undoubted truism, that the deed being void, nothing could pass from the grantor to the trustee thereunder, and that if the trustee sold or retained the goods under such void deed if trust, he became the debtor of the grantor, in whom the title still resided, for the very sufficient reason that it was impossible for the title to pass from him by virtue of the void conveyance. It seems to me that this distinguishing feature between a void and a voidable transaction is the principle which should influence the judgment of the court in this case. In other words, I am of the opinion that a transaction, absolutely void, ought to be measured and ascertained by the principles applicable to void, as distinguished from voidable, transactions; that it ought not to be measured by the principles applicable to voidable transactions. On the other hand, that voidable transactions ought to be measured and ascertained by the principles applicable to voidable, as distinguished from absolutely void, transactions, and ought not to be measured by principles applicable to void transactions. Entertaining this view, I have found myself wholly unable to appreciate the pertinency of the principles applied by my very learned and esteemed associate to the case in judgment: Now this-transaction, void as it is against public policy, no reason exists that I can see, for applying the principles of the cases cited in the majority opinion to this, for they
Entertaining these views, with the very fullest measure of regard and esteem for my learned associates and their great learning and ability, I most respectfully dissent from the order overruling the motion for rehearing.