214 Wis. 230 | Wis. | 1934
In disposing of motions made after verdict the trial court said:
“If this court was sitting as a jury and to decide the facts in this case, I do not believe I would have decided this case as the jury decided it. However, that is not a test of the efficacy of the verdict as returned by a jury. This verdict is not against physical facts or any undisputed situation and is not against all the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from disputed situations.”
After a careful examination of the record, we concur in the opinion expressed by the trial court. The evidence as disclosed by the numerous photographs, maps, and the testimony of witnesses who arrived upon the scene shortly after the accident is such, as would have sustained a finding by the jury that Hein was guilty of negligence; on the other hand, the verdict of the jury is supported by his testimony, which while subject to criticism is not incredible. It cannot be said upon the record as a matter of law that Hein, the truck driver, was negligent as to lookout, control, and turning his truck to the left of the center of the road as he did. The verdict cannot be set aside even if it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. It must be sustained if there is credible evidence to support it.
On behalf of the • plaintiff Wiechmann it is urged very strongly that her interests were prejudiced by the consolidation of the various actions for trial because first, the issues
It is also contended that the instruction with respect to the right of Hein to turn to his left in the face of an emergency was not as explicit as it should have been. The court gave the correct instruction in language clearly understandable and applicable to the facts, therefore it cannot be
On behalf of the plaintiffs Huber and Weichmann, in addition to the matters already considered, it is further urged that Hein was guilty of negligence as a matter of law in failing to drive at a speed at which he could stop within half of the range of his vision as required by sec. 85.40 (5), Stats. With respect to the negligence of Hein, the court instructed the jury:
“Another statute with reference to speed is that in traversing curves and grades where the operator does not have a clear view of approaching traffic upon the highway, the speed of such vehicle shall not be greater than that which will permit him to stop his vehicle within one-half the range of his vision.”
Upon this and other instructions relating to speed, the jury found that Hein was not guilty of negligence as to speed. There are many factors in the situation in this case which must be taken into consideration. Hein testifies, although he testified at the inquest differently, that he saw the Huber car when it was one hundred feet away. Where he saw the car does not measure the limit of his vision nor does the statute require him to stop. The evidence in this case does not present a situation which is at all parallel to that found in Mader v. Boehm, 213 Wis. 55, 250 N. W. 854. Proof that Hein did not stop is not proof that he was traveling at a speed which did not permit him to stop his vehicle within half the range of his vision. Hein may well have assumed for some instant of time at least that Huber would turn his vehicle to his own or southerly side of the highway. What it was his duty to do and what he did do under the circumstances were clearly for the jury. We find no reversible error.
By the Court. — The judgment in each of the cases is affirmed. .