Heimann v. National Elevator Industry Pension Fund

knowledge defense.1 The the common effect, a fact opinion, in makes majority ciga- the addictive nature of

finding that knowledge. The most

rettes is common part finding it is that it is a fact

amazing Supreme both the Court

with which Texas Companies disagree.

and the Tobacco happened

Whatever to Federalism? HEIMANN,

Louis D. Plaintiff-

Appellant,

v.

The NATIONAL ELEVATOR INDUS- FUND,

TRY and The PENSION Na- Industry Elevator Health Bene-

tional Plan,

fit Defendants. Heimann, Jr., D.

Louis and Lou

Heimann, Plaintiffs-

Appellants,

International Union of Elevator

Constructors, Burkett, and Ken

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-50165. Appeals, States Court of

United

Fifth Circuit.

Aug. fact, legislature's 1. The Texas consideration and 1950's. it be read to indicate rejection of an amendment that would have majority legislature that the of the Texas preserved products liability claim for an early yet 1990's did not understand that began smoking individual who as a minor Second, tobacco was addictive. the Texas justify majority's does not decision to sub- Court, legislative Supreme speaking after the judgment stitute it's pressed by for the law of Texas ex- 82.004(a) parameters debate over the First, proposed Grinnell. instructive, majority specifically that the finds only amendment indicates that the author of rejected majority's conclusion that both recognized the amendment the addictive general health haz- the addictiveness and the properties of tobacco in 1992. This sheds no knowledge ards of tobacco were common light question on the of whether tobacco's the 1950's. knowledge addictiveness was common in the law claims complaint states federal their granted upon which relief 1132) (29 §§ U.S.C. (29 1140). We affirm the district state of the Heimanns’ court’s dismissal preemption, but claims because of law tort entirely their suit the dismissal of reverse petition their states actionable because claims, and remand federal ERISA pro- further district court for case to the ceedings. HIS-

I. AND PROCEDURAL FACTS TORY Heimann, plaintiff appel- Louis D. lant, industry employed in the elevator approximately years and was the International Union of Ele- member of (“IUEC”). During his vator Constructors Mr. Heimann con- years employment, Industry Elevator tributed to the National Fund and the National Elevator Pension (“Plans”). Plan Industry Health Benefit gov- that Plans are undisputed It is the par- by Mr. Heimann is a erned ERISA. Austin, TX, Westbrook, Joseph Robert beneficiary is a ticipant and Mrs. Heimann Plaintiffs-Appellants. retirement, plans. Upon of the Mr. Heim- Tedrow, O’Donoghue & O’Do- Sally M. from began pension ann to receive benefits DC, for International noghue, Washington, the Pension Fund and also obtained bene- Burk- Union of Elevator Constructors the Health Benefit Plan. The fits from ett. specifically that benefits will provide Plans in suspended engages if the retiree be employ- “disqualifying work defined as ment.” GARZA, M. alleged by

Before EMILIO the facts as the Heim- Under DENNIS, Heimann, Judges. anns, Circuit while STEWART in March Mr. Plans, from the was receiving benefits DENNIS, Judge: Circuit University of an by hired Texas as wife, job fall inspector. Heim- does not Heimann and his Lou elevator Louis ann, disqualifying of their within the Plans’ definition of appeal from the dismissal taking job, Before Mr. upon employment. a claim which case for failure to state representatives of Fed.R.Civ.P. Heimann conferred with granted relief 12(b)(6). that it did not the district the Plans and was assured They contend that employment. Employee disqualifying constitute deciding court erred in that the Nevertheless, IUEC, its busi- Security through Act of 1974 Retirement Income (“ERISA”) Burkett, intentionally and preempted agent, their Texas state ness Ken maliciously misrepresented to the Plans interference with law claims for tortious in engaging disqualify- that infliction of emo- Heimann contract and intentional The IUEC’s actions ing employment. if the state Aternatively, tional distress. suspend Mr. Heim- they argue that caused the Plans to preempted, law claims are and terminate the 51 L.Ed.2d 376 pension (standing).” benefits ann’s (internal omitted); benefits. quotations Heimanns’ health Steel Co. Environment, Citizens For A Better sued the Plans federal The Heimanns 1003, 1012, U.S. 140 L.Ed.2d wrongful termination of benefits court for (1998) (quoting Arizonans /”). (“Heimann for Official The Heimanns later Arizona, 43, 70, English v. in Texas court brought suit state (1997)) 1055, 137 (quot- S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 170 in- and Mr. Burkett for intentional IUEC ing v. Williamsport Bender Area School and tortious fliction of emotional distress Dist., S.Ct. (“Heimann with contract interference (1986)). L.Ed.2d 501 II”). and Mr. Burkett removed IUEC II to federal court on the basis Heimann “[A]ny civil brought action that the Heimanns’ state law causes of State court which the district courts of by preempted action were ERISA. Short- original jurisdic the United States have removal, I and Heim- ly after Heimann tion, may be removed defendant II ann were consolidated. defendants, court the district of the IUEC Burkett moved the district United for the States district and division Heimann’s state law court to dismiss the embracing place where such action is grounds they on the that were claims 1441(a). pending.” 28 U.S.C. The dis preempted by and for failure to trict original jurisdiction courts have over an claim under state actionable ERISA. cases; is, question” “federal those adopted The court the recommendations of Constitution, “arising eases magistrate judge and issued “Order laws, or treaties the United States.” 28 Judgment” Partial Heim- dismissing § 1331. It is that a well settled preemption ann II because of and failure cause of action arises under federal law claim, jurisdiction to state but retained only plaintiffs well-pleaded when the com I. over Heimann plaint Gully raises issues of federal law. plain- The district court dismissed the Bank, v. First National U.S. I, concluding tiffs’ claims Heimann (1936); 81 L.Ed. 70 Louisville & wrongfully did the Plans not act R. Mottley, Nashville Co. v. terminating Heimanns’ benefits. Sub- (1908). 42, 53 L.Ed. S.Ct. parties sequently, settled the claims in I. involved Heimann The Heimanns oft-cited, confused, yet often One appealed from the court’s Rule district well-pleaded complaint corollary to the 12(b)(6) dismissal of their claims “developed in law ... is doctrine the case and Mr. Burkett in Heimann II. IUEC may preempt that Congress completely so particular complaint a area that civil II. ERISA COMPLETE PREEMP- raising this select of claims is neces group TION JURISDICTION in sarily Metropolitan federal character.” 58, “[Ejvery appellate Taylor, federal court has Insurance Co. v. 481 U.S. Life (1987). 63, 1542, special ‘satisfy only obligation itself 107 S.Ct. 95 L.Ed.2d 55 out, jurisdiction, recently pointed that of the this court of its own but also As has review,’ in distinguishing in a under even confusion arises between lower courts cause though parties prepared “complete preemption” are to concede described 237, Maurer, 244, Metropolitan it. v. which creates federal Mitchell 293 U.S. (1934). 162, jurisdiction and the more common 55 S.Ct. 79 L.Ed. 338 Juidice removal Vail, 327, 331-332, ordinary preemption does not.1 See 430 U.S. which However, cussing preemption court in McClelland utilized the term under 514. This opinion, ordinary preemption analyzing preemption purposes of the term ordi- this Thus, encompass any nary preemption term 514 of ERISA. we will also will under preemption in- ordinary preemption dis- used to describe under utilize the term GronwalDt, 507, U.S. 106 S.Ct. 90 L.Ed.2d 979 McClelland v. (1986)). (5th Cir.1998). Ordinarily, pre the term federal Supreme noted, As the Court has claims emption ordinary preemption, refers to Labor-Management Relations plaintiffs which is a federal defense to the ("LMRA") long qualified Act of 1947 have by express suit and arise either statu complete preemption. Metropolitan tory term or a direct conflict between Life, 63-64, 481 U.S. at 107 S.Ct. 1542 operation of federal and state law. ("For years, singled this Court has out Being defense, appear it does not on the pre-empted by § claims 301 of the LMRA well-pleaded complaint, and, thus, face of a special treatment.") (citing Gully for such does not authorize removal to a federal Bank, supra.) (citing v. First National By way contrast, court. Id. at 516. Corp. Lodge Avco v. Aero No. complete preemption jurisdictional is 88 S.Ct. 20 L.Ed.2d 126 nature rather than an affirmative defense (1968)) (quoting Franchise Tax Board of Id., to a claim under state law. see also Trust, Cal. v. Const. Laborers Vacation Plans, Inc., Cites v. NYLCare Health 1, 23, 103 S.Ct. 77 L.Ed.2d (5th Cir.1999). such, F.3d 332 As it autho (1983) ("The necessary ground of deci rizes removal to federal court even if the preemptive [in Avco] sion was that complaint artfully pleaded to include powerful displace force of 301 is so as to solely state law claims for relief or if the entirely any state cause of action `for viola initially solely federal issue is raised as a employer tion of contracts between an Regions defense. See Rivet v. Bank of organization.' Any a labor such suit is Louisiana, purely law, a creature of federal notwith (1998). 139 L.Ed.2d 912 standing pro the fact that state law would Historically, the doctrine of com vide a cause of action in the absence of .plete preemption narrowly ap has been (footnote omitted))). § 301." plied. general, to demonstrate that In Franchise Tax Board the Court held complete preemption justi there has been preemption fying jurisdiction that ERISA federal removal over an more, purely claim, peti without does not meet this standard otherwise state law and thus does not convert a state claim tioner must show the statute contains a arising provision into an action under federal law civil enforcement that creates a (i.e., ordinary preemption). replaces pro it is mere Id. cause of action that both analogous 25-27, sug tects the area of state law at gested, however, 103 S.Ct. 2841. That Court specific jurisdictional grant that a state action that there is a only preempted by the federal courts for enforcement of the was not ERI5A under right Congressional 514, scope § there is a clear but that also came "within the brought 502(a) provi § [the intent that claims under the feder of civil enforcement ERISA[,]" might al law be removable. Aaron v. National sion] of fall within the Board, Avco rule. Franchise Tax 463 Union Fire Insurance 876 F.2d 1157 24-25, (5th Cir.1989). "ap U.S. at 103 S.Ct. 2841. In Metro This test should be plied circumscription politan Life, 64, 1542, with to avoid difficult 481 U.S. at 107 S.Ct. relations", opportunity issues of federal-state and ac the Court had to address a which, cordingly claim "unlike the state tax collection few federal statutes can meet Board, exacting suit in Franchise Tax is within the such an standard. Id. at 1161 (citing Jersey Parell, scope 502(a)." doing, § United Banks v. 783 of In so the Court 360, (3rd Cir.), noted that: F.2d 368 cert. denied 476 cluding, to, preemp- preemp- tion. but not limited conflict

tion, express preemption and field therefore, jurisdictional Congress. of the sub- It language ‘arise[s] under [T]he States,’ ... civil the laws ... of the section of ERISA’s enforcement United 1331, § § closely parallels that of 301 is removable to federal provisions 502(f) by court the Id. says: defendants[.]” LMRA. Section of the courts of the “The district United Subsequently, Supreme the Court clari- jurisdiction, have without States shall in holdings fied its Franchise Tax Board respect controversy to the amount in Metropolitan Ingersoll-Rand in Life citizenship parties, of the or the McClendon, Company v. provided the relief for in sub- grant (1990), S.Ct. L.Ed.2d a case (a) section in ac- section this taken by by not removal but certiorari 1132(f). § tion.” 29 U.S.C. from Supreme the Texas Court. Inger- 301(a) soll-Rand held that LMRA, preempted, by ERISA §Cf. of the 29 U.S.C. 185(a). ordinary express both and conflict preemp- § tion, plaintiff employee’s the state law 65,107 Id. at S.Ct. wrongful claim discharge allega- based on The further reasoned that the Court employer tions that his took the adverse that the similar presumption language purpose action for the of interfering with the two labor law statutes had a similar rights his pension plan. under his The fully by meaning legis- confirmed employee Court stated that McLel- history civil lative of ERISA’s enforcement land’s Texas cause of action conflicts di- provisions. regard, ob- this Court rectly with an ERISA cause of action be- served that: cause it squarely “falls within the ambit Report on de- Conference ERISA protects § ... plan which provisions the civil enforcement scribing participants from termination motivated 502(a) § says: employer’s prevent pension desire to respect to suits to enforce “[W]ith 142-143, vesting.” from Id. at plan under the or to 478. plan recover benefits under the which however, in Significantly, adverting to application I do not involve of the title 502(a) complete preemption effect of provisions, they may brought be violations of Court recalled only U.S. district courts but also Dedeaux, that in Pilot Ins. Co. competent jurisdiction. State courts of S.Ct. 95 L.Ed.2d Ml such actions Federal or State (1987), “explained Congress it that had are to regarded arising courts as 502(a) intended to be the exclusive rem- under the laws of the United States in ERISA, edy rights guaranteed similar fashion to those brought provided by § including ] those ... 510[ Labor-Management section 301 of the pre-emptive ‘the force of [and] Act H.R.Cong. Relations of 1947.’ was modeled on exclusive (1974) (em- 93-1280, Rep. p. No. remedy provided by 301 of added).” phasis Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at [LMRA].’” 65-66,107 Id. at S.Ct. 1542. (quoting citing S.Ct. 478 reasons, 54-55, Life, For these Pilot at Court concluded 1549). “Congress clearly has manifested an further clarified that in The Court 64-67, intent to make causes of action the at 107 Metropolitan Life, within 1542, scope provisions drawn “the again of the civil enforcement of S.Ct. it had on 502(a) 502(a) court[;]” § § § parallel removable to federal Id. between and 301” to 66, 1542, suit, pre-emptive at “that effect of and that “this conclude the 502(a) § though purports only complete it to law was so that an ERISA raise state 502(a) claims, § pro- in necessarily pre-emption [under ] federal character defense by clearly virtue of the manifested intent a sufficient basis for removal of a vides 1) complaint the Heimanns’ not- whether federal forum to the

cause of action against the defen- im- causes of action limitation states the traditional withstanding 510, §§ 502 and complaint’ dants under ERISA ‘well-pleaded the posed by 145, 1140, and §§ at 1132 and Ingersoll-Rand, rule.” rejected then 478. The Court S.Ct. 2) state law causes the Heimanns’ whether distinguish, attempt court’s the Texas con- tortious interference with of action for McClendon’s purposes, preemption for infliction of emotional tract and intentional from claim discharge claim wrongful and Mr. Burkett IUEC distress benefits, only is stating “[n]ot pension by ERISA. preempted are 502(a) vindicat- remedy for § the exclusive but there is no 510-protected rights, ing § REVIEW OF IV.STANDARD 502(a)’s limiting language §in basis an the dismissal of review We which seek only those actions ERISA 12(b)(6) de Federal Rules action under ” at Id. ‘pension benefits.’ Corp., Trust Carney v. Resolution novo. Ingersollr-Rand in 478. Thus the Court (5th Cir.1994). In review 19 F.3d complete that it was the clearly indicated 12(b)(6) dismissal, court appellate an ing a civil enforcement preemption under the action of the trial court may uphold the 502(a), they § in were provisions of that it that no relief could be “only appears if LMRA, § the on 301 of modeled of facts that could granted under set provisions of ordinary preemption the allegations.” with the proved consistent a cause of justify § removal of that Ins. v. Reliance Standard Barrientos 502(a) § to the the ambit of action within (5th Cir.1990) 1115, 1116 at S.Ct. 478. courts. Id. federal Rouge Bldg. & Const. (.quoting Baton Circuit, exercis- Con panels of this Council AFL-CIO Previous Trades Jacobs (5th caution, structors, Inc., two-step have used Cir. ing great 502(a) 1986)). § § under both 514 and analysis analysis. complete preemption

their noted, UNDER ERISA V. CIVIL ACTIONS as had been McClelland the court § AND 510 that both ordi- Ingersoll-Rand, case preemption pres- were nary complete Burkett, that Mr. allege The Heimanns McClelland, 155 F.3d at 515-517. ent. IUEC, intentionally and acting for the given uncommon “deliber- This is not justification incorrectly informed without ordinary ately expansive” nature of engaged plans Mr. Heimann was that always which almost en- preemption will employment;” “disqualifying preempted by 502 as claims compass maliciously with was made report false See, Life, Pilot at e.g., well. to harm the Heimanns evil intent conclude, for Because we 107 S.Ct. 1549. their interfering with benefits that un- assigned, hereinafter the reasons plans; wrongful and that this under the two-step analysis Heimanns’ der the plans caused the proximately interference scope action fall within causes of pension and the Heimanns’ to terminate 502(a), proper §§ removal was plaintiffs’ allegations health benefits. corollary “complete preemption” that these actions interfered also indicate “well-pleaded complaint rule.” to the plan right Mr. with Hermann’s Hence, the district we are satisfied employ- engage non-disqualifying jurisdiction this case and that had court ment. as this court does well. by setting forth begin analysis our We provisions of ERISA: the relevant III.ISSUES pro- 29 U.S.C. are: vides: presented by appeal The issues this protected

§ Interference with 1140. rights (e) Jurisdiction any person

It shall be unlawful for to (1) Except for actions under subsection fine, suspend, discharge, expel, disci- (a)(1)(B) section, of this the district pline, partici- or discriminate a courts of the United States shall have pant beneficiary or for exercising any jurisdiction exclusive of civil actions un- to which he right is entitled under the der this subchapter brought by Sec- provisions of an employee plan, benefit retary or by participant, beneficiary, title, this 3001 [29 section U.S.C. fiduciary, any person or referred to in 1201], § or the Welfare Pension 101(f)(l)[29 section U.S.C. § Act [29 Plans Disclosure 301 et U.S.C. 1021(f)(1)].... § seq.], purpose interfering or of (f) controversy; Amount citizen- any with the right attainment of to ship parties of which participant may such enti- become The courts of district the United title, plan, tled under the this or the jurisdiction, States shall have without Welfare Pension Plans Disclosure respect to the amount in controversy or Act.... provisions The of section citizenship of parties, to grant § shall be applicable [29 1132] (a) provided the relief for in subsection the enforcement of this section. of in any this section action. § ERISA 502 is the civil en- statute’s § 29 U.S.C. defines section, forcement mechanism. That in “employee plan” “plan,” benefit or “em- pertinent part, as set forth in 29 U.S.C. ployee organization,” “employer,” “employ- 1132(a)(1)(B), 1132(a)(3), ee,” “participant,” “beneficiary,” and “per- 1132(e), provides: son” as follows: Civil enforcement § 1002. Definitions (a) purposes For empowered subchapter: this bring Persons a civ- il action

A brought— civil action (3) “employee The plan” term benefit or

(1) by participant beneficiary'— or “plan” an employee means welfare bene- plan fit employee pension or an benefit plan or a which is both an plan employee plan welfare benefit and an employee (B) to recover benefits due to him pension plan. under the plan, terms of his to enforce “employee organization” term rights plan, his under the terms of the means any any organiza- labor union or clarify or to his to future bene- tion of kind ... any employees which plan; fits under the terms of the

participate pur- and which exists for the pose, in in part, whole or with dealing employers concerning employee ben- plan, efit or other matters incidental (3)by participant, or fidu- beneficiary, employment relationships; or em- any (A) ciary enjoin any practice act or ployees’ beneficiary orga- association any provision which violates of this sub- purpose nized for the whole or in (B) chapter plan, or the terms of the or part, establishing plan. such a appropriate to obtain other equitable re- (i) (ii) lief to redress such “employer” violations of The term means any provisions subchap- person acting directly employer, enforce this as an plan; ter or the terms of the indirectly in the interest of an em- ERISA, and that the terms employee throughout bene- to an ployer, in relation of purposes for all include the Heimanns a or associa- group and includes plan; fit v. Hewitt Asso the statute. See Mertens employer an acting for employers tion of ciates, 113 S.Ct. capacity. in such (1993). 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (6) any in- “employee” means The term employer. employed by an dividual reason, the de For same (7) any means “participant” Burkett, fendants, The term Mr. are the IUEC and employee of an em- employee or former provision each of “persons” purposes of member or former mem- ployer, any facts, or alleged the statute. Under organization, who is employee association, ber of an “unincorporated an IUEC is to receive a ben- may eligible or become association, employee organization” and or employee from an bene- any type of efit under the statute. “person” therefore is a such employees covers of plan 1002(9). fit which is within Mr. Burkett included organiza- of such employer or members “person” because he is an the definition of tion, may eligi- be or whose beneficiaries Furthermore, it is undis “individual.” Id. benefit. ble to receive such a business puted that Mr. Burkett was acting and was (8) agent of the IUEC “beneficiary” per- means a The term employment for scope and course of his participant, by a or designated son he committed the acts that the union when employee plan, an benefit the terms of allege were unlawful under the Heimanns or become entitled to who is plans. ERISA and the thereunder. an indi- “person” The term means Scope A. ERISA Civil Enforcement venture, vidual, joint corpo- partnership, Provisions ration, joint-stock company, mutual 502(a)(3), 29 Section trust, estate, unincorporated company, 1132(a)(3) “six third ERISA’s association, —the organization, employee or pro civil carefully integrated enforcement organization. visions,” Mutual In Massachusetts undisputed It that Mr. Heimann is a is Russell, Company surance plans of the as defined “participant” (1985)— 3085, L.Ed.2d 96 1002(7). employee He both a former is fiducia participant, beneficiary, allows a or of a employer and a former member “(A) enjoin any civil action ry bring who is eli- employee organization union or any provision which practice act or violates plans from the gible to receive benefits subchapter plan, of the of this or the terms employees of his former em- that cover (B) appropriate equitable re or to obtain ployer members of his former union. (i) (ii) violations or lief redress such (In fact, plans present in the involved subchapter any provisions enforce of this by IUEC and Na- negotiated case were plan[.]” or terms of the Unlike four of Inc., a Industry, Elevator multi-em- tional 502(a)(3) subsections, § § 502’s six is not ployer including unit Mr. bargaining types on of defen specific focused areas infer, employer. We Heimann’s former at Varity Corp., dants. See therefore, sponsor is a of the IUEC Supreme Court 116 S.Ct. 1065. As plans.) undisputed It is also that Mrs. 502(a)(3) out, § pointed “create[] “beneficiary” Heimann ‘catchalls,’ protect two the interests [to 1002(8) designated by she because participants providing and beneficiaries] plans byor the terms of the her husband ‘any’ stat ‘appropriate equitable relief for and is entitled to benefits thereunder. violation[,]” whereas the others ad utory evils, “i.e., “par particular the first

It follows that the terms dress informa “beneficiary” (wrongful denial of benefits and ticipant” must tion), re- meaning (fiduciary obligations the second deemed to have same

505 that, plan’s integrity), the financial the We conclude lated to the al (civ- (tax facts, leged and the sixth the registration), provi fourth defendants violated Further, § penalties).” il Id. “these ‘catch- sions of both 510 of ERISA and the net, a provisions safety offering Although Supreme all’ act as Plans. the Court has equitable injuries interpreted relief for not appropriate the term “discriminate § against” ERISA, § caused violations that 502 does the context of 510 of remedy.” it adequately elsewhere Id. As has construed the same words the well, legislative history the describes these provisions antiretaliation of other federal provisions essence, as intended to meaning, enforcement statutes as to retali ‘“provide Secretary partici- both the ate economically against. See Robinson v. pant 337, 342, 345, with broad beneficiaries remedies Shell Oil 117 U.S. 843, (1997) (Section redressing 808, for or preventing violations of S.Ct. 136 L.Ed.2d ” Rep. 704(a) (citing Id. S. No. 93- of Title Rights [ERISA][.]’ VII the CM Act 127, (1973, 621; 1964, 2000e-(a)); p. Leg. § Hist. H.R. 42 U.S.C. NLRB v. Rep. 2364)). 93-533, 17, Scrivener, 117, 121-122, at 2 Leg. No. Hist. 405 U.S. 92 S.Ct. 798, (1972) (Section 8(a)(4) 31 L.Ed.2d 79 ERISA, 510 of Section U.S.C. Act, of the National Labor Relations 1140, § it “any person” makes unlawful for 158(a)(4)); § U.S.C. Mitchell v. Robert De against participant to “discriminate” or Inc., 288, Jewelry, Mario 361 U.S. 292- (1) beneficiary exercising any right “for (1960) 80 S.Ct. 4 L.Ed.2d 323 plan, which he is entitled” under (Section 15(a)(3) of Fair Labor Stan ERISA, or the Welfare and Pension Plans 215(a)(3)); § dards Act of 29 U.S.C. § Act seq.], [29 Disclosure U.S.C. 301 et or Mertens, at 113 S.Ct. Cf. (2) purpose of with “interfering” for the (“And though we have never inter any right the attainment of to which such preted precise phrase appropri ‘other participant may become entitled under the equitable ate relief 502 of [in ERISA] plan or such laws. The Heimanns have set language we have construed the similar allegations forth under which most of the Rights Title VII of the Civil Act of 1964 necessary facts to state a claim for relief (before amendments) ‘any its 1991 other — viz., unquestionably proved, could be equitable appro relief the court deems as (1) they “participant” are a and a “benefi- ” priate,’ 2000e-5(g) pre U.S.C. —to ciary” plan; an who have puni clude compensatory “awards for or intentionally maliciously injured been damages.”) tive justification by “per- without cause or IUEC, provision son”—the Mr. Heimann’s former The antiretaliation of Section 704(a), employee union or organization Rights and its Title VII of the Civil Act of Burkett, individual; employee, Mr. an employer makes it unlawful “for employ- because of the Heimanns’ “exercise of against discriminate of his they which rights applicants employment” were entitled” under ees or who ERISA, i.e., plans rights their to have either availed themselves of Title benefits, plan pension protections receive and health VII’s others in or assisted so 2000-e(a). right engage doing. as well as Mr. Heimann’s Robin- (without son, in non-disqualifying employment Supreme to de- Court was asked interference). unjustifiable only “employees,” gen- cide whether the term as 704(a), question uine remaining employ- is whether used includes former amounted, ees, alleged petitioner may un- bring defendants’ conduct such suit against employer post-em- der to unlawful discrimination his former (i) ployment in retalia- allegedly Heimanns either because of actions taken plans petitioner’s having charge the exercise of their tion for filed (ii) ERISA; Opportunity purpose Equal Employment or for the of inter- with the Robinson, fering rights. with their attainment of at such Commission. 339- complaints re- example, Title VII —for held that The Court 843. 117 S.Ct. discriminatory termination. garding §in as ‘employees,’ used term “the it to whether VII, ambiguous as of Title Robinson, at being more It employees. former includes case, only it is not present In the Ti- context of with the broader consistent the broader context with consistent more of purpose primary and the tle VII primary purpose of the ERISA and of employees 704(a), hold that former § we by the 510, explicitly required § but also 704(a)’s coverage.” § included within are in “person” and “participant” of definitions The Court’s 346, 117 S.Ct. Id. at 1002(7) (9), we that former that hold § and the term refusing to construe reasoning in from protected are employee-participants excluding former narrowly as “employees” un former by their retaliation economic protec- the antiretaliation employees from and their organizations employee or ions 704(a) applicable is Title VII § of tion of § under 510 for exercis employers former we, of whether question the by analogy to plans, under the rights their ing case, former present exclude in the and other laws. from antiretaliation employee-participants al- if, as the Heimanns Consequently, employee exclude unions protection and mali- intentionally and the defendants lege, amenability for eco- from organizations the against economically ciously retaliated employee- former nomic retaliation of their exercise of Heimanns because The ERISA. 510 of under participants ERISA, the and plans the rights under stated: Court against” the defendants “discriminated EEOC, former of According to exclusion in § 510 viola- unlawfully under Heimanns of protection the employees from To read plans and ERISA. tion of the effective- the undermine would the term “discriminate use of 510’s allowing the threat byVII way require ness of Title us in other would against” to deter meaning retaliation than post-employment a different the term give to complain- consistently from as- of discrimination has Supreme victims Court EEOC, per- previously enact- provide construing and would it in signed to ing likeli- all employers provisions. to fire em- ed antiretaliation verse incentive Supreme hood, on Congress relied bring Title VII might ployees who federal an- interpretations of other and Court’s States claims. Brief United en- drafting in and provisions tiretaliation Amici Curiae EEOC as 18-21. good see no ERISA. We acting 510 of persuasive carry arguments Those the term “discriminate reason to read their given their coherence force present in stat- eccentrically against” purpose of consistency primary with a develop a courts to authority of ute. “The maintaining provisions, antiretaliation ERISA, see common lawf ‘federal statutory remedial unfettered access 110,109 948, Firestone, at S.Ct. 489 U.S. Scrivener, NLRB v. mechanisms. Cf. text of authority to revise the not the 121-122, 800- 92 S.Ct. 405 U.S. Mertens, at 508 U.S. statute.” (1972) (National Labor L.Ed.2d 79 S.Ct. 2063. Act); v. Robert De- Mitchell Relations Inc., 288, 292- in Mer Jewelry, Supreme Court Mario 332, 335-36, 4 L.Ed.2d 323 that we must fol precepts tens announced S.Ct. Act). (Fair applying ERISA. construing Labor Standards low (l)“[L]anguage used maintains of them are: quite persuasively Two EEOC ... be should purpose portion this statute destructive of one it would be meaning as the the same for an em provision deemed have the antiretaliation in the stat used elsewhere impu language same to retaliate with ployer to able a stat- ute!,]”; “[V]ague notions class of acts nity against an entire purpose’ inadequate are ... recognized ute’s ‘basic and the court that the most regarding common, overcome the words of its text only pqssible, but at- specific issue under consideration. Id. tack on those through would be (citing at Pension Ben- employment relationship. Notably, Guaranty Corporation Corp., v. LTV West, report quoted committee efit 633, 646-647, 621 F.2d at evinced Congress’s de- (1990)). L.Ed.2d is especially This protect sire for 510 to pension rights ERISA, legislation true with such as expectations from “economic sanc- enormously complex and detailed statute tions”—a description broad not limited disputes resolved innumerable be- sphere to the of employment. powerful competing tween interests —not also, Id. at 800. See Clark v. Resistoflex potential plaintiffs. all favor of Id. at (5th Cir.1988) (“Re- 854 F.2d 261-262, (citing 113 S.Ct. 2063 Pilot points sistoflex to the Sixth Circuit’s state- Dedeaux, Insurance v. Company Butler, ment in v.West 41, 54-56, 107 S.Ct. 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (6th Cir.1980), that legislative history ‘[t]he (1987)).” §[of 510 of that ERISA] reveals the [stat- Accordingly, we do not find determina- prohibitions ute’s] primarily were aimed at helpful tive or the flawed but frequently preventing unscrupulous employers from Butler, quoted2 dicta of v.West discharging or harassing their employees (6th Cir.1980), legisla- that ERISA’s in keep order to them obtaining from vest- history tive indicates “that the [§ 510] pension ed rights.’ pas- As we read this prohibitions primarily were aimed at pre- however, sage, qualifying the word ‘pri- venting unscrupulous employers from dis- marily’ leaves room for a construction that charging harassing or employees their in protection extends section 510 to vested keep obtaining order to them from vested well.”) employees as pension rights[,]” id. at and “that In our own review of the ERISA discrimination, § to violate must af- historical materials we found nothing to fect the employment, individual’s relation- suggest Congress protect that intended to ship way.” some substantial Id. at 245- pension the and welfare benefits of active Recently, 246. the Sixth Circuit in Mattei employees (6th Cir.1997) any strenuously more than Mattei, that v. 126 F.3d 794 re- Instead, of retirees. Congress’s aim to considered and limited the v.West Butler safeguard statute, equally rights partici dicta to the of all confines of the holding 1002(7)’s antiretaliatory pants, by that the which in protection of 510 definition is not to shielding only employees restricted active cludes former and former union members, employees from economic sanctions. As legislative is as evident the Mattei court observed: history it as is ERISA’s statement of its viz., policy, protect “to ... the interests of

[I]n the [West] court’s statement participants in employee plans benefit and “Congress designed primarily beneficiaries, their by requiring the disclo protect employment relationship,” reporting participants sure and “primarily” use of the word and neces- that, sarily view, beneficiaries of financial and other infor means the court’s ..., by mation Congress establishing intended that the statute standards of conduct, beyond employ- responsibility, obligation sometimes reach and relationship. employee plans, ment fiduciaries of overarching benefit goal remedies, protect rights by providing appropriate of the statute was to sanctions, employee plan, conferred ready access to the Federal See, (1995); Shore, e.g., Kaupp 2. v. Auto-Body Haberem Vascular Sur McGath v. North Plan, Inc., (7th 1993); geons Ltd. Deeming Pension 7 F.3d 665 Cir. Defined Benefit (3d Cir.1994), denied, Standard, Inc., (7th F.3d 1491 cert. American 905 F.2d 1124 1990). L.Ed.2d Cir. Mertens, 1001(b). See, e.g., 508 U.S. at courts." S. REP. No. 93-127, (1973) (describing at 35 Senate provisions version of enforcement as in Pleading Requirements B. of s~502 "provide Secretary tended to both the participants argue that, and beneficiaries with broad Defendants even con redressing preventing struing petition liberally, remedies for vio the Heimanns' it [ERISA]"); allege lations of H.R. REP. No. 93- fails to facts from which a reason (describing able trier of fact could find or infer that at 17 House version in terms). purpose specifically identical ERISA's basic the defendants intended to re strengthen improve protec is "to taliate the Heimanns for their ex participants rights tions and interests of and ben ercise of the Plans or to employee pension eficiaries of and welfare interfere with of their under the plans." Rap, also, disagree. S. No. 93-127. See Plans. We Under ERISA 95-533, stating plaintiffs required prove by H.R. REP. No. are "primary purpose protec preponderance of the bill is the of the evidence that pension rights[.]" specifically tion individual defendants intended to commit purposes, plain provisions ERISA's basic words and acts which violated the legislative history, require reading plan. See, e.g., of ERISA or the terms of the 502(a)(3) provides par Co., §~ 510 and all Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield ticipants beneficiaries, including (9th Cir.1989) (employee and for must employees, members, prove employer's specific mer former union intent to retali remedy employee's rights and retirees with a for economic ate for exercise of under participants' plan), denied, retaliation because of and cert. pension plan (1990); beneficiaries' exercise of 112 L.Ed.2d 28 Clark v. Resis rights. Varity Corp., Unidynamics Corp., Cf. 516 U.S. at toflex Div. of (employee prove specific 116 S.Ct. 1065. F.2d at 770 must employee's pension intent to interfere with accept Even if we could West v. rights); G'roup, Inc., Dister v. Continental primary purpose Butler `s notion of the (2d Cir.1988) (section plausible interpretation part § 510 as a prove specific 510 claimant must intent to legislative history, of the the West court's engage activity prohibited by section leap to the conclusion that 510 makes 510). discrimination those who exercise rights only complaint, unlawful when it af In their the Heimanns ongoing employment relationship alleged (1) fects an that: Mr. Heimann "made con support legis tributions to The National Elevator Indus is without in the text or the history try (`Pension Fund'), lative of ERISA. To read 510 to Pension Fund and protection Industry exclude retirees from its would The National Elevator Health (`Health Plan')"; (2) require give "participant" Benefit Plan Benefit either that we meaning "Louis Heimann retired from Otis Eleva different 510 than in 1002(7) Company January [and][a]t and elsewhere in ERISA or that tor 1992 ... judicially retirees, i.e., began paying pen we exclude former that time Pension Fund employees, rights, information, sion benefits to Louis Heimann and Health from all remedies and access to court afforded oth providing Benefit Plan continued medical Heimanns"; participants by and dental insurance to the er ERISA. We cannot do because, Supreme (3) employment by either as the Court has "Louis Heimann's admonished, authority University inspec courts lack to revise of Texas as an elevator give disqualifying the text of the statute and should tor does not constitute em ployment"; (4) "Burkett, capacity language portion in his as used in one of a statute Representative meaning language Business of Local the same as the same has when used elsewhere in the statute. agent IUEC, therefore as the and on his behalf, own communicated to the Plans the specific intent to interfere with the that Louis Heimann was engaged in dis- Heimanns’ benefits and Mr. Heimanris qualifying employment and therefore right engage non-disqualifying em- caused the Plans to suspend pension his ployment; IUEC and Burkett’s action benefits and terminate medical and dental unjust caused the termination of these (5) coverage Heimanns”; insurance for the rights. This is sufficient to state a claim “This communication with the Plans consti- under ERISA. tuted interference with the contract be-

tween Plans”; the Heimanns Federal Rules of Civil Proce “In interfering with the contract between 8(e) 8(a)(2), 8(f) dure state that techni the Heimanns and the Plans IUEC and cal forms of pleading are not required, that Burkett willfully acted intentionally, pleadings ought to be liberally construed and with disregard a reckless for the so as to do justice, substantial and most rights Heimanns”; of the proxi- “As a important all, they substitute the re mate result of the interference with the quirement of “a plain short and statement Heimann’s [sic] contractual of the claim showing that the pleader is Burkett, Plans by IUEC and the Plans entitled to relief’ formula, for the technical suspended pension plan payments such as “facts constituting a cause of ac which it making to Louis Heimann tion,” which typified the preexisting codes. and terminated the medical and dental in- Wright supra, (2d § 1202 at 68 Miller, & surance coverage being provided to the ed.1990). Hence, complaint is not sub Heimanns.” ject to prejudice dismissal with unless it Federal Rule of 9(b), Civil Procedure appears with certainty that no relief can be pertaining matters, pleading special pro granted set of facts that can be vides, pertinent part, “[m]alice, in proved in support of its allegations. Id. at tent, knowledge, and other condition of (citing Fernandez-Montes v. Allied mind of person may be averred general Assoc., (5th Pilots 987 F.2d Cir.1993)); ly.” See v. Barrientos Reliance Standard U.S. v. Dist., Uvalde Indep. Consol. Sch. Co., (5th Ins. Cir.1990); 911 F.2d 1115 Life (5th cir.1980). 625 F.2d 547 The use of the Belli v. Daily Inc., Orlando Newspapers, “specific term intent” or other ter (5th Cir.1967); 389 F.2d D’Alles- minology is not sacramental or necessary Bechtol, (5th sandro v. 104 F.2d 845 Cir. to pleading of a cause of action under 1939). recognizes The rule the unworka 502(a). The Supreme Court has held bility and undesirability of requiring speci that state causes of action may square fall ficity pleading mind; a condition of de ly §§ within the ambit of ERISA scribing state of mind with exactitude and even when the pur state action inherently difficult and would lead to com ports to only assert a remedy available plexity prolixity in pleadings. under state law using only state law theo Wright & AbthüR R. Miller, ChaRles A. ries and terminology. Metropolitan See § 1301 Federal Procedure, Practice Company Insurance v. Taylor, supra (2d ed.1990). at 674 and Ingersoll-Rand Company McClen From the above alleged facts in the com- don, supra. plaint, it can reasonably be inferred that The petition’s Heimanns’ protected allegation had Heimanns rights under facts plans; also entitle bring Mr. them to a civil Heimann exercised his

right action for plan declaratory under the engage judgment clarify to non- employment; and enforce their disqualifying rights under IUEC and the terms of Burkett falsely plan. Consequently, informed Plans that the Heimanns are Mr. engaging Heimann was in disqualify- to bring entitled a civil under action ing employment; 502(a)(1)(B) IUEC and Burkett had purposes. for those Co., may brought Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil 312 U.S. A civil action be (1941)); by participant beneficiary 61 S.Ct. 85 L.Ed. 826 Aetna or 502(a)(1)(B) Haworth, "to recover benefits due him Life Ins. Co. v. plan, (1937); under the terms of his to enforce his S.Ct. 81 L.Ed. 617 Tennessee Coal, rights plan, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. under the terms of the or to 123, etc., (5th Cir.1943) clarify rights 137 F.2d 176 aff'd his to future benefits under plan[J" purpose 88 L.Ed. 949 the terms of the The 502(a)(1)(B) provide (1944). complaint is to the means The must disclose "a participant beneficiary may legal right, relation, status,

which a or en or interest rights any by plaintiff dispute force his plan-created to benefits and other claimed over which a rights. with the defendant has arisen." 5 WRIGHT Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., (3d MILLER,supra, (citing Paper Cir. & at 287 Car 1995). example, For an ERISA welfare riers Union No. 450 v. Pulitzer Pub. plan participant may (8th Cir.1962)); seek declara 309 F.2d 716 see also Ara- tory judgment clarify rights lac, Corp. America, his Inc. v. Hat plan. (3rd Cir.1948). Declaratory Judg Cam arda v. Pan American The Airways, F.Supp. procedural providing World (E.D.N.Y.1997). 299 ment Act is a statute remedy an additional in which the federal already jurisdiction, courts have Declaratory Judgment Act given interpretation. should be a liberal provides that, exceptions with not here Tennessee Coal Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda pertinent, controversy "in a case of actual 123, supra, Local No. 137 F.2d at 179. jurisdiction any within its court of the States, upon filing appro United of an complaint The Heimanns' dis priate pleading, may declare the they legal rights pen closes that have legal par other relations of interested plans, sion and health benefits under the ty seeking declaration, such whether or right and that Mr. Heimann has the sought." not further relief is or could be engage non-disqualifying employment necessary 28 U.S.C. 2201. Further being without threatened or harmed with proper declaratory judg relief based on a wife; loss of benefits for himself and his granted, ment after reasonable dispute that a has arisen with the defen hearing, against any notice and adverse employment dants over whether party rights whose have been determined engage "disqualifying which he wishes to by declaratory judgment. 28 U.S.C. employment" plan under the and whether § 2202. Under the Act a court has the pursue employment Mr. Heimann can such power, upon subsequent petition, a to impairing rights without his and his wife's grant declaratory coercive or further relief plans; to benefits under the that the de declaratory judg in connection with a final already acted, fendants have once and ment theretofore entered. Shumaker v. again, deprive act to him and his wife of Exploration Co., F.Supp. Utex plans deprive benefits from the and to him (D.Utah 1957); Hampshire Univ. of New right plan pursue of his under the such April, (1975). 115 N.H. 347 A.2d 446 non-disqualifying employment. Thus, the "Proceedings complaint requisites the De Heimanns' fulfills the 502(a)(1)(B) claratory Judgment governed by §of of ERISA and the De Act are claratory Judgment stating pleading ap Act for a cause the same standards that are declaratory clarifying plied of action for relief in other federal civil actions." 5 enforcing rights plans, MILLER,supra, § and their under the WRIGHT& 1238 at 285 (footnotes citing authorities). viz., legal rights omitted The under the terms of the plans by plaintiffs plaintiff allege "justiciable claimed over which a must contro dispute versy" has arisen with the defendants. in order to state a claim for declar adopting Declaratory Judgment Act, atory (citing Maryland it relief. Id. Cas. Congress' prevent Cir.1977); Thompson Co., intent to avoidable v. Allstate Ins. (5th Cir.1973) ("[A] damages being by person 476 F.2d mo from incurred rights, tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim who is not certain of his and to early adjudication granted appears afford him an of his should not be `unless it rights waiting adversary certainty plaintiff without until his that the would be enti injurious any takes action him. See 5 tled to no relief under set of facts MILLER,.supra, proven support WRIGHT& at 288. It is which could be of his Congress "); evident that was of the same claim.' cf Carter v. South Central 502(a)(1)(B), giv- Bell, (5th Cir.1990). § mind when it enacted See ing every participant beneficiary 54(c) ("[E]very also FED.R.CIV.P. final right bring clarify judgment grant a civil action to shall the relief to which rights party enforce his under the terms of the in whose favor it is rendered is plan. alleged declaratory entitled, party Under the facts even if the has not demand judgment granted party's pleadings.") can and should be clari- ed such relief in the fying enforcing rights Accordingly, the Heimanns' we hold that the Heimanns' engage claim, falling specifically request under the Plans to benefits and to while non-disqualifying employment. equitable relief, is otherwise sufficient to early adjudica- Heimanns are entitled to show entitlement to such relief.3 risking tion of these without further by VI. ERISA ORDINARY PREEMP- retaliation or interference the defen- 502(a) dants. TION UNDER 514 and comprehensive argu ERISA is a In addition to their main designed protect ment that the Heimanns failed to state a statute "to . . . the in participants relief, terests of . . . and . . . benefi claim for the defendants contend by establishing that the Heimanns' suit must be dismissed ciaries ... standards of conduct, responsibility, obligation they specify particular because type did not providing ap equitable they fiduciaries ... and ... relief to which are propriate ready However, remedies .. . and access entitled. Federal Rule of Civil Varity Corp., 8(a) requires only to the Federal courts." Procedure "a short and (citing plain showing U.S. at 116 S.Ct. 1065 statement of the claim 2(b), 1001(b)). pleader 29 U.S.C. See also is entitled to relief." See Doss Lines, 85, 90, Shaw v. Delta Air v. South Central Bell Tel. (1983). (5th Cir.1987) ("[D]ismissal 103 S.Ct. 77 L.Ed.2d 490 n. 3 ERISA, proper. Section 29 U.S.C. was not The court stated that it 1144(a), specifically provides plain dismissed those claims because the supersede requested legal ERISA "shall and all tiff had relief rather than they may equitable State laws insofar as now or relief authorized Title However, improper any employee VII. demand of an hereafter plan... relate to benefit remedy party's pleading (Emphasis added). is not fatal to a if ." The Su preme the statement of the claim is otherwise Court has "endeavored with some regularity interpret apply sufficient to show entitlement to a differ and the `un relief.") (discussing helpful pre-emption pro ent form of Hilde text' of ERISA's Honeywell Inc., 179, brand v. 622 F.2d 181 vision." Cal. Div. of Labor Standards (5th Cir.1980)); Southpark Square Dillingham Constr., N.A., Ltd. v. Enforcement v. Inc., 832, City Jackson, 338, (5th 519 U.S. 117 S.Ct. 136 of 341 n. 2 argues cause the Heimanns did not need to amend 3. The dissent that because the Heim- request petition they anns did not initial citing Light leave to amend in their their stated a cause of action under ERISAbased due to the fact that have brief, they appeal, waivedthe issue on allegations. Doss, v. Blue Crossand Blue Shield of on their factual See 834 Ala., Inc., 1247, (5th (citing Hildebrand, 1248 n. 2 F.2d at 424 622 F.2d at 181). 1986). Light inapposite, however, Cir. is be- 512 are action causes of state Heimanns’ (1997). cases Court’s The 791 L.Ed.2d directly they conflict pre because preempted ERISA’s acknowledged that

have Inger- of action.5 cause expansive,” an ERISA “clearly with is provision emption 142, 478. sweep,” S.Ct. soll-Rand., at 111 “expansive 498 U.S. scope,” “a broad has action, expan worded,” “deliberately causes to ERISA respect “broadly With is its breadth.” that has noted sive,” “conspicuous Supreme and Court “ ‘ omitted). ef (Citations Court’s may fairly be or it is clear Id. “[w]hen a two-part inquiry: a a yielded which State have activities forts that the assumed employee benefit by to a covered protected” relates law are regulate purports (1) 514(a) it has if plan purposes for the feder regard ERISA “due § 510 of such reference to with a connection jurisdic that state requires al enactment ’” provid insight Id. Additional plan. 145, 111 S.Ct. Id. at yield.” must tion in John observation the Court’s by ed Mag Norge Div. Lingle v. (quoting Bank, v. Harris Insurance Hancock 409, 8, 399, n. Inc., Chef, 486 U.S. ic 517, 114 S.Ct. 510 U.S. (1988)). 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. no “we discern L.Ed.2d because we conclude that Accordingly, Congress, believing that basis for solid upon claims stated have the Heimanns ERISA, intended funda designed it when granted under relief which preemption traditional mentally to alter 502(a) with their 510 that conflict §§ analysis.”4 law for tor- Texas action under causes of Obviously preemption inten- with contract interference tious See, e.g., limits. without its § 514 is not distress, such infliction of emotional tional Agency & Lanier Collection Mackey v. preempted action causes of are law state Inc., Service, 486 U.S. ERISA. (1988); Fort 100 L.Ed.2d 836 Halifax 1, 107 S.Ct. Coyne, Packing Co. CONCLUSION VII. (1987). in the However 96 L.Ed.2d affirm assigned, we the reasons For case, we Ingersoll-Rand, as present appellants’ of the dismissal court’s district law finding the state difficulty have no dis- claims, but law tort reverse state “the preempted because of action causes appellants’ of the trict court’s dismissal a critical plan is pension existence of §§ under ERISA causes of action under state establishing liability” factor for further this and remand case at Ingersoll-Rand, law. proceedings. PART, REVERSED IN if AFFIRMED Also, even Ingersoll-Rand, inas AND REMANDED. IN PART express preemption, no had there been course, and, ordinary con- Constr., pre-emption, at Dillingham 4. See also J„ (1997)(Scalia, with pre-emption.... S.Ct. at flict J., concurring): Ginsburg, extent it actu- preempted to the law is 5. State pre-emp- of the “relate to” clause ... [t]he law; is, meant, when it federal ally to set conflicts with is forth provision tion identify comply with state pre-emption, impossible rather both but test for ordinary pre-emp- field in which stands as the field the state law or where federal law regu- field of laws applies-namely, tion accomplishment of the full to the an obstacle plants] lating "employee See, described Congress. objectives of and purposes 1003(a) and ex- title of this Growers, section Inc. v. e.g., & Avocado Florida Lime title,” 1003(b) of this empt section 132, 142-143, Paul, S.Ct. of|[o]ur 1144(a). new view [In U.S.C. Davidowitz, (1963); Hines v. L.Ed.2d preemption ... set approach to ERISA 85 L.Ed. 581 U.S. Co. v. Mut. Life Ins. Hancock forth in John (1941); Corp., 464 v. Kerr-McGee Silkwood it Sav. Bank ... accurate- and Harris Trust 78 L.Ed.2d jurispru- ly our current describes (1984). apply ordinary field say that we dence to GARZA, EMILIO M. Judge, Circuit IUEC and Burkett subsequently filed a concurring part and dissenting part: motion to dismiss the Heimanns’ claims as preempted by ERISA. The Magistrate The majority decides that the Employee Judge, to whom the referred, motion was Retirement Security Income Act of 1974 recommended dismissal. The Heimanns (“ERISA”) completely preempts the claims objected. At the end of objections, their (“the of Louis and Lou Heimann Heim- stated, they “If the Court the opinion anns”) and that the Heimanns allege facts ... [we] should specifically plead a legally sufficient to state a claim under claim ..., under [ERISA] then ... [we] ERISA. I agree with the first holding, request leave to filed an Amended Com- disagree but with the second one. Accord- plaint in this matter.” The district court ingly, concur part I in part. dissent agreed with the Magistrate Judge, and

granted the motion to dismiss. In doing so, it I failed to act on the Heimanns’ re- quest for leave to amend their pleading. The Heimanns sued the International “Although Plaintiffs’ to motion remand Union of (“IUEC”) Elevator Constructors ..., was denied Plaintiffs have not sought Burkett, and Ken Represen- Business leave of Court to amend complaint their to tative for Local IUEC No. in Texas add a claim under 502(a),” ERISA section court. petition, their they averred that it mistakenly stated. The Heimanns time- their benefits from The National Elevator ly appealed. Industry (“Plan”) Health Benefit Plan Louis Heimanns’ benefits from The Na- II tional Elevator Industry Pension Fund The Heimanns first challenge the denial (“Fund”) were discontinued after Burkett of their motion to remand lack of juris- misrepresented to the Plan and the Fund diction, arguing that ERISA does not that Louis Heimann was engaged in dis- preempt their claims. We review the dis- qualifying employment.1 Based on this trict court’s refusal remand de novo. contention, the charged Heimanns IUEC See Gronwaldt, McClelland v. and Burkett with intentional infliction of 507, (5th Cir.1998). emotional distress tortious interfer- District courts possess jurisdiction over ence with a contract. actions removed from state court in IUEC and Burkett removed the case to clude one more state-law claims com court, federal district alleging that ERISA pletely preempted by ERISA. See Giles and the Labor Management Relations Act v. Plans, Inc., NYLCare Health (“LMRA”) preempted the Heimanns’ 332, (5th Cir.1999). 336-37 ERISA com claims.2 The responded Heimanns with a pletely preempts state-law claims that fall motion to jurisdiction. remand for lack of within its express preemption provi The district court motion, denied sion, find- 1144(a) (section see ing ERISA to preempt the claims.3 514(a)),4and its civil enforcement provi career, During 1. his Louis Heimann and his and the Fund. The Heimanns later settled employers, Otis Company Elevator and Mont- with the Plan and the Fund. gomery Company, Elevator “each [had] made contributions to the Plan and the Fund in 3. The expressed district court opinion no on provisions accordance with of the applicable the LMRA's effect on the claims. Agreements Standard which were in effect time, from time to nego- which had been 4. Section declares (subject that ERISA tiated IUEC an National Industry, Elevator exceptions inapplicable several here) "su- Inc., multi-employer bargaining unit.” persedes any and all State laws insofar as removal, Following they against action IUEC now or hereafter relate em- and Burkett ployee was consolidated with plan” subject an action regulation un- that the Heimanns had (“ERISA filed the Plan der plan”). ERISA 29 U.S.C.

514 party a third that 502(a)).5 alleging (section law claim 1132(a) sion, see id. an of benefits the denial The caused McClelland, at 517-19. 155 F.3d See ordinary pre subject to is ordinarily plan ERISA complaint well-pleaded plaintiffs the fall within claims also The emption). a state-law or not whether determines provision civil enforcement complete ERISA’s scope for criteria the two meets claim alleged an for relief they n. 11. seek at 512 in that id. See preemption.6 due of benefits wrongful denial majority the Heim- that the agree I with U.S.C. 29 plans. See ERISA complete test satisfy our claims anns’ 1132(a)(1)(B). the district Accordingly, come within claims The preemption. the denying in Heimanns’ not did err court provision. preemption express ERISA’s jurisdiction.8 of for lack to remand motion must de them, fact-finder the To resolve IUEC, the (1) or not whether cide: the Burkett, Plan and Ill notified the

through in engaged was Louis Heimann Fund that the district dispute also Heimanns or whether employment; disqualifying as their claims of dismissal court’s in dis engaged was Heimann not Louis a dis- review ERISA. We preempted (3) whether employment; qualifying de novo. a claim failure to state missal discontinued the Fund the Plan and or not Indep. Sch. v. Dallas rel. Doe Doe ex See IUEC, through Burk- the because benefits Cir.1998). (5th 211, Dist., 215 153 F.3d Louis Heimann ett, them told complaint a states or not whether deciding employment.7 disqualifying engaged relief, its we consider claim for a valid bound intricately are these issues Because to favorable light the most allegations and administra interpretation with the up every doubt and resolve plaintiffs the the claims relate plan, tion of an A & M v. Texas Lowrey favor. their See subject are therefore plan, and an ERISA Cir.1997). (5th 242, Univ., 247 F.3d 117 v. Hubbard preemption. See ordinary the majority that with the Ass’n, disagree I 42 F.3d & Blue Shield Cross Blue for re- valid claims stated Cir.1995) have (5th Heimanns (holding that state- 942, 946 (ERISA 55 95 L.Ed.2d such, 1144(a). that ERISA it establishes § overrides, As case). things, state-law among other that "are intri- raising issues factual claims interpretation and up the cately allegations with in the bound Heimanns’ on the 7. Based plan.” Hubbard an ERISA and the of the Plan I petition, administration conclude 942, Shield, 946 F.3d plans, 42 see 29 Cross & Blue v. Blue are ERISA Fund Cir.1995). usually (5th 1002(1)-(3) characterize kinds of (defining Courts different arising under section preemption Kenney Con type of Roland Parson plans); v. ERISA tracting defensive, conflict, ordinary pre- 1254, or 1257-59 as Corp., F.3d Royal v. Maccabees (D.C.Cir.1994) (deciding Butero not emption. See whether or Life Cir.1999); (11th Co., "pension of definition plan Ins. meets ERISA’s Plans, F.3d Ins. v. NYLCareHealth v. Continental plan”); Giles Hansen Cir.1999). Cir.1991) (5th (5th (deciding 976-78 F.2d defini plan ERISA’s meets whether (cid:127) plan”), "employee welfare of ex- tion that there “note[d] previously 5. We have Fund participant Heimann Louis ambiguity in the caselaw as ists some (defin 1002(7) Plan, see 29 U.S.C. complete preemption is scope of whether ais Lou Heimann ing "participant”), and falling within only to those claims limited 1002(8) (de Plan, §id. beneficiary see complete 502(a)(1)(B), or whether section "beneficiary”). fining falling encompasses claims preemption all 502(a).” McClel scope section within Gronwaldt, pro- 517 n. majority, v. I no reason land (5th see 8. Unlike the Cir.1998). affirming the ground for vide additional lack to remand for motion of the denial Boggs, 520 U.S. Boggs v. jurisdiction. See well-pleaded com- 6. For discussion L.Ed.2d S.Ct. rule, Metropolitan Insurance plaint see (1997). 58, 63, 107 Taylor, Company lief. IUEC Burkett sought dismissal claim.”). for failure to However, state a of the Heimanns’ subject claims as to ordi the Heimanns have chosen not to make the nary preemption after the court district district court’s inaction on their motion for decided not to remand. Having already leave to amend an appeal.9 issue on Faced found the claims to come within ERISA’s with situation, this we must let the dis- express preemption provision in determin missal Light stand. See v. Blue Cross & ing that complete preemption provided a Ala., Blue Inc., Shield 790 F.2d of jurisdictional removal, basis for the district (5th Cir.1986) 1248 n. 2 (affirming grant of court granted the motion to dismiss. This summary judgment on subject claims to disposition was entirely proper. See Bute ordinary preemption) (refusing to consider ro v. Royal Maccabees Ins. plaintiffs’ argument that the district (11th Cir.1999) (ERISA F.3d court erred in failing to allow case) them to (affirming the district court’s finding amend their complaint to jurisdiction state a claim based on complete preemp (with tion subsequent ERISA because the argument dismissal leave refile) plaintiffs of the not subject claims as raised in plaintiffs’ brief). initial ordinary preemption) (citing McClelland Gronwaldt, (5th v. Cir. IV 1998), proposition that “[i]f the plaintiffs [i.e., claims are superpreempted I conclude that the district court was completely preempted], then they are also correct only not in refusing to remand for defensively preempted”). lack jurisdiction, but also in subsequent- appreciate I that affirming the dismissal ly dismissing the state-law compris- claims of the claims seems harsh in light of the ing this action. Heimanns’ motion for leave to amend their pleading to allege Accordingly, I ERISA claim. in part See concur and dissent JAMES F. part. JORDEN ET AL., HANDBOOK on (2d ERISA Litigation 2.07[A] ed. (“If

Supp.1999) [ordinary preemption is]

raised by dismiss, a motion to counsel

should anticipate plaintiff that the may be

afforded one or opportunities more

amend complaint, including oppor-

tunity to redraft factual allegations and to

add a ERISA.”); claim relief under see

also Griggs Hinds Junior College, 563 (5th Cir.1977)

F.2d curiam) (per

(“Granting leave to amend is especially

appropriate, this, such cases as when

the trial court has dismissed the complaint

9. The majority holds express Heimanns do preemption provision, as the Heim- not need amend petition because their done, anns have does not have the effect of pleads legally facts sufficient to state claim transforming the state-law claims ERISA into support ERISA. In of this determina claims. It has the extinguishing effect tion, it longstanding cites the rule com 1144(a); state-law claims. See 29 U.S.C. plaint need correctly categorize legal the see also James F. Jorden et al., Handbook on claims, giving ories only rise to the but must (2d Litigation 2.03 ed. Supp.1999) allege upon facts granted which relief can be (“The legislative history behind [ERISA’s ex- to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to press preemption provision] ... makes it Rathborne, state a claim. See Rathborne v. Congress clear that supplant intended to all (5th 1982). 8n. Cir. That regulation state employee plans rule inapplicable Pleading here. facts that system.”). with a uniform bring one's state-law claims within ERISA’s

Case Details

Case Name: Heimann v. National Elevator Industry Pension Fund

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Date Published: Aug 30, 1999

Citation: 187 F.3d 493

Docket Number: 97-50165

Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.