*1 Mop- (See Yick Wo v. legislation settled is invalid. that such Cong ; kins, 118 30 L.Ed. Yu U.S. S.Ct. 220] 1059].) Eng Trinidad, L.Ed 271 U.S. S.Ct. my judge right grant- opinion, In trial the learned judg- peremptory and the ing petitioner a writ mandate ment be affirmed. should therefore
Gibson, J., Traynor, J., concurred. C. Bank. A. No. Oct. 1947.]
[L. al., Appellants, L.A. HEIMANN et v. CITY OF GUSTAVE ANGELES, Respondent. LOS *2 Delory Appellants. F. E. H. John Poole and *3 City Attorney, Reiehe, Assist- Ray Chesebro, L. Charles F. Deputy City Attorney, Green, and Arthur William ant Attorney, Respondent. for judgment awarding appeal from a
SHENK, J.Plaintiffs property by damage reason of compensation for to their real street, from an order a viaduct in the and the construction of they They that to a striking bill. claim are entitled their cost larger award. abutting parcels property owned of real plaintiffs city July year that Angeles. In of the filed Street,
First whereby part of their land was proceeding a condemnation (Los Savage, widening of street for the taken the They superior court). full com- in received No. 320308 the damages taken for the remainder pensation for the land and to by reason the severance. of part in 1932. As a widening accomplished was
The future duplication of effort the event of to project, eliminate Street, and viaduct in First foundations of a construction underground. structures were built These stanchions were up point 2 feet the surface of the street. carried to a or below paved them, They then covered the street was were over they so on the that visible surface.
Plans for construction the viaduct were under considera- city tion the in 1938 and 1939. Actual construction work September, 1940, project was commenced and the was com- pleted October, about per- The construction work was Progress formed the federal Works Administration city. parcels plaintiffs’ prop- contract with the One erty partially fronts on the viaduct the other so. No city plaintiffs offer of the to made taking damage or building land their reason viaduct, plaintiffs statutory and demand form was denied. damages
This action for alleged followed. It was wrongful city, resulting temporary acts of the perma- damage plaintiffs’ nent I, were violative of article Constitution, section it prayed plaintiffs and was compensated $34,500. be therefor the sum of jury
Trial before a awarding resulted in a plain- verdict damages tiffs $800, in the sum judgment for that amount was entered their appeal plain- favor. On this question sufficiency tiffs do not support evidence represents the award merely insofar as it item damage in the decrease market properties subsequent value to the commencement of the construction work on the viaduct They in 1940. contend that court erroneously excluded prejudice, erroneously evidence to their charged jury, in striking committed error out their bill. appeal cost presented agreed on an which, statement perti- so far as here nent, following: shows the parties trial stipulated, among
On the things, other plaintiffs liable to “for whatever presence of said viaduct in the street occurs causes plaintiffs.” the said real expert Thereafter wit- *4 by gave nesses were called both opinions sides and their con- cerning the decrease the reasonable market value of the by properties building caused the occurring the viaduct and subsequent to the commencement of construction work testimony This forms award, $800 the basis of the range figures given is within the by the the witnesses and slightly above the amount experts. fixed defendant’s plaintiffs expert While and their witnesses were on the stand them, questions to which de- propounded certain to were objected upon ground fendant that the evidence offered incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial; not within the was and foundation had been laid ease; remote; issue of the too that no viaduct, prove city to but tend to that the had constructed contrary that on indicated that the viaduct had the evidence Progress of the been constructed Works Administration city and that was therefore not liable United States any during taking plaintiffs’ or of the the course use complaint allegations of construction. Pursuant to the substantially plaintiffs sought in evidence to introduce following: viaduct in fact (1) Proof that the construction of the 1940; in that there was commenced or continued no cessation of the work but that the construction up completion that there to of the viaduct in Proof 1942; (2) period 1932 likewise continued over the use, taking damaging properties and loss paving plaintiffs in that after the over of the foundations properties were real unable to sell their or to interest estate selling them; proposed dealers in construction any opportunity “killed” at the mar make a sale reasonable value, ket price all; (3) prices paid or at Proof of neighboring properties; and other condemnors for (a) damage Proof of the amount of due to loss use of (4) properties foundations reason of the construction of the in 1932; (b) damage the amount of due to loss of use from completion commencement of construction in 1940 (c) damage the amount of of use of an due to loss because delay performance unreasonable of months work; (d) damage actual construction the amount of due taking loss of use because of a continuous and construction 8-year from 1932 October, lapse with an which did not constitute a work; (e) cessation of the construction rock, earth, amount of due to loss of use reason of gravel placed adjacent plaintiffs’ property, on and sawmills, sheds, like, and to the erection of and the and the equipment maintenance of materials and in the con used October, struction September, work between (to proof city objected ground this offer on the implements no evidence that the materials and placed grounds by contrary on the it but on the the evidence *5 in in the street front they placed that were to show tended Progress Administration and properties Works the any alleged for such city responsible in the was nowise that taking (f) the amount of properties.); the or use of closing of properties the of use of reason due to loss the September, 1940, during period from abutting them the streets city evidence the also November, to which about at (5) Proof interest the objected grounds; on aforesaid the per reasonable market value of legal rate of 7 cent in properties paving over the foundations from the time 1931 or 1932 the amount of interest at October, and properties the same rate on the market value reasonable during loss of the construction for use period September, October, 1940, to proof
This entire line of offered was excluded the trial However, plaintiffs permitted city court. were examine the engineer bridge designed design, who stated that he viaduct; that in 1940 and construction started that the foundations which had been laid 1932 were used enlarged; during but were that the course of the construction bridge supervisors pay there were no city on the that roll; city laboratory was used to some extent to test materials and was city there at all times inspector at least one in the field at work; the site of the that being poured while concrete was was inspector more than job; one on the city and that the survey made plan design made bridge. The witness further stated that he believed that at times roadways entirely were traffic, only closed but he went to the site that occasionally; any he did not remember stock piles or material viaduct, either end of the whether structures plaintiffs’ were built on properties, but that a large quantity of material was adjoining stored an street, although enough there was roadway unobstructed left for the passing traffic; that tool sheds were also erected in the streets. A engineer civil city, who had employ its years,
about appeared also plaintiffs. witness He testified bridge plans that the general were drawn under his direction but that supervise he did not the construction; that supervision was done Progress the Works Administration; city that the inspectors had job on the who saw to it the work was done in accordance plans specifica- inspected tions and it in way the same private as a contractor’s being accepted city pass inspection before
job; that it had to job surveyors city had on the city; addition paving some work. crews have done maintenance charge inspection of the via- city inspector who had testified that the construction completion the time its duct at employees Progress Administration work and Works supervision but that the work not under his or direction re- cases forms were inspection; his one or two *6 pass inspection; in prior pouring to the of cement order built changed after was not general plan of the structure that the design was down, the false work originally it laid but shop, saw- changed times; that he saw a blacksmith’s several saw “some material mill, piled in the streets and and material piled vacant lots.” on only its three to the witness stand
Defendant called produced the cause was expert appraisers. the evidence so On jury, with the result aforesaid. submitted plaintiffs their cost bill. Defendant judgment filed After ground judgment was such it on the that the moved to strike court, by municipal been rendered as could have (Code by plaintiffs Civ. therefore not recoverable costs were granted. Proc., 1032). The motion was § proceeding in long that in a emi It has been the rule seeking should be re domain, party condemnation nent only costs, proper all costs of quired pay his own but good in The reason for land incurred faith. the owner of the (1893), Francisco v. Collins stated in the case of San the rule is page 262 P. 98 Cal. [33 56]: “ pay portion require in this case to To the defendants necessarily the trial of the issues costs incidental to of their plaintiff any part costs of the would part, or on their jury, a sum just compensation awarded reduce prop ... As the equal paid them for such costs. to that it compensation paid, and as erty taken until the cannot be duty ascertaining ascertained, paid until it is cannot be seeking necessarily party to con cast the amount is expenses pay should all the property, and he demn Any casts this burden process. law which attach to the should, opinion, in be held to be unconstitutional our the owner Edmands, 188 also Yolo etc. Water Co. and void.” See [205 Lumber etc. 445]; Oakland v. Coast 344 P. Cal Pacific 259]; 1917E San Co., 332 P. Ann.Cas. 172 Cal. [156 1021]; 540 Stevinson, 165 Joaquin Irr. Co. v. etc. p. Cal.Jur. § condemnor, by a brought is not one proceeding Here the compensation seek the owners action wherein but is an taking and for the 14 of the Constitution I, section article just com- use without public for a properties damaging of their In both into court. paid made or having pensation first in each in the same result is forms of action invasion of his for the compensation receives property owner result is arriving at the only procedure rights; property P.2d Bicciardi, Cal.2d (People different 799]). reason owner the
In cases instituted stronger than recovery is even allowing him costs case of former, of an offer instead cases, for in condemnation condemn, wrongful has been a suit to permission without private damaging of taking and him, consequence compensate first effort to owner or litigation. initiate the forced to has been of which the owner recovery him, his would be against be assessed If costs should be to that extent amount and he would diminished he is compensation to which full measure of deprived of the (Collier Dist., Irr. 213 Cal. justly entitled. v. Merced 790].) superior domain lies eminent Jurisdiction *7 Proc., 1243), discretion conferred (Code and the court Civ. § 1255), taxing (Code Proc., is upon that court costs Civ. § by I, 14 of the limited article section Constitution held to be (San p. 262, Collins, supra, 98 at and other Francisco Cal. Similarly, present, like the cited). actions eases above provision must be held to be a limitation constitutional requirement 1032 of section of the Code Civil Procedure plaintiff judgment when the is that the not recover costs by municipal have been rendered a court. The one which could granting motion to the cost bill order strike was therefore erroneous. properly permit plaintiffs
The trial court refused to by damage introduce evidence of suffered reason of the con pavement struction of the foundations under the in 1932 and the claimed continuation of that construction without cessation Admittedly, plaintiffs fully until 1942. compensated any taking damage properties by of or to their suffered reason widening in 1932 street and the construction of improvement proposed (Code Proc., in the manner Civ. 1248). If damage by there was a further element of reason §
754 placing pavement, foundations under the recovery
occurred 1932 and of the item should then have sought. been At the present time of the commencement of the action the long statute limitations had against since run any such claim.
The assertion that the construction continued from until 1942 is undisputed shown evidence to be without foundation in original plan fact. The contemplated pos- sibility of erection of bridge. a steel constructed, As the viaduct was of concrete and the old enlarged foundations were to ac- commodate it. respect With plaintiffs to this structure state in opening their City Engineer’s brief: “The officewas ordered City prepare plans Council to duly and the same were parties July considered all 6, 1938, from August 23, approved.” when the same were This statement of itself sufficiently negatives plaintiffs’ claim of construction work continuing year from the possibility
The mere threat or
of construction of a
public work is not
actionable.
a
involving
case
a contem
plated
possible
or future
change
grade
(Eachus v. Los
Angeles
Ry.
Co.,
pp.
etc.
at
621-622
The trial court refused to allow witnesses for plaintiffs testify on direct prices paid examination neighboring property. Although question admissibility of such evidence on direct examination is one which there is a division of authority, this state is committed to the rule of nonadmissibility, reaffirmed in the late case of Cole, Cal.2d “ page 928], following language: [I]t competent party for either in a proceeding condemnation put in paid by evidence the amount a condemning party to adjacent the owners of lands. ...” question A vexing presented more the contention *8 plaintiffs they of permitted should have been to introduce alleged evidence of various elements of temporary period suffered over the 1940-1942 of work, construction as distinguished permanent depreciation from the in the market viaduct property value caused the existence of made. These claimed elements $800 for which award was delay alleged unreasonable temporary damage from an arise work, performance of construction of months in the period to the alleged of 1940-1942 an use over the due loss piling earth, rock, and other materials the streets structures, sheds, sawmills, the erection of and other rubbish near accumulation waste materials and on and closing of plaintiffs’ premises, partial obstruction and streets, and the like. question temporary
On the elements damage, problem a text writer'discussed the as “Ob- follows: viously, question the determination of a to whether temporary property rights interference with a tak- constitutes ing or damaging statutory within guaran- constitutional and dependent ties is on particular facts case and the jurisdiction question in which presented. general permits recovery only law depre- a permanently ciated, injured taken, or making public improve- ments. mere improvement fact that the for a renders time the use ‘taking,’ more inconvenient is not a physical being no invasion of the real estate of private a ordinarily owner. And it is held that municipality a is not damages consequent liable for performance on duty of its keep repair, its pave repave streets them, and to build, repair, and bridges, rebuild (18 etc.” Am.Jur. § pp. 769, see, also, C.J.S., 113, p. 924-926, and cases § cited; 1918E, pp. 993, L.RA. 995.) unduly
It would delay hinder and prevent or even the con- public improvements struction of compensable every to hold item of inconvenience or interference attendant upon the ownership private real property presence because of the machinery, materials, supplies necessary public for the placed work which have been on adjacent streets im- provement. But it does unnecessary not follow an temporary substantial interference with property rights such though an temporary actual right posses- invasion of the private property sion of during place construction should take without redress. An example of an actionable temporary injury to property
right found
the case
Superior
of Jacobsen Court, 192
Cal. 319
756
ing, purpose taking measurements, for the testing rock and by soil boring excavation, formations and etc., was held to constitute an unlawful property rights invasion of the landowner, compensable provision. constitutional (p. 328) This said attempt argue court : “It is idle to entry, occupation, disturbance, such and destruction of the properties petitioners of these would not constitute such an rights interference with their exclusive possession, to the occu- pation, use, enjoyment respective and of their holdings as taking would damaging amount to a and thereof to the extent during period entry upon of such said lands and of the operations corporation thereon.” pf hand,
On the other the construction public improve may many noncompensable ment Generally involve factors. it ‘‘ damage has been said: The for which is to be damage property itself, made is to the and does not include infringement personal a mere of the owner’s pleasure or enjoyment. Merely rendering private property less desirable purposes, causing personal for annoyance certain or even or use, discomfort its will not damage constitute the contem plated by constitution; (Eachus ...” v. Los Ry. Co., 103 supra, etc. Cal. City Beckham v. Stockton, Cal.App.2d 487, 64 502-503 296].) P.2d [149 It is not clear whether the trial court’s exclusion of evidence was based its conclusion that the claimed elements of temporary damage nonactionable, or its conclusion performed by that since the construction work was the Works Progress Administration, could not be held liable any taking property during or use of the the construction period. In ruling either case the was erroneus. The fact performed Progress that the work was the Works Adminis necessarily city. tration does not exonerate the public improvement Where a has been constructed and private property damaged public has been taken or for a use it is immaterial that the work of construction have been public agency done a contractor. The authorizing the work party provision is the to be held liable under the constitutional damage resulting power. from the If exercise of its public according plans specifica work is constructed agency public upon completion tions such furnished fix accepted it, liability. (Tyler this is sufficient to County, 240]; 109 626 P. 10 Tehama Cal. Cal.Jur. [42 p. 438, 127.) Or, (Veterans’ as said a recent case § Welfare
757 Cal.App.2d 818, 832 Oakland, Board v. P.2d 1000]) plans specifications follows : “If the contractor agency, public furnished results adjacent property, agency public and not the contractor (Marine Co., P. liable. Mun. W. Dist. v. Peninsula Cal. App.2d 647, ; see, also, De Baker v. Southern 404] Co., Cal. Railway p. 237].)
Am.St.Rep. plans Whether the contractor followed the specifications not, or plaintiffs’ rights if constitutional have *10 adversely they compensation affected are entitled to from public agency authorizing supervising the work.” (See, also, City Alhambra, 42, Newman v. 179 45 Cal. [175 P. 414]; Blauth, 782, ; Perkins v. 163 789 Cal. P. [127 50] Angeles, 829, Eachus v. 130 492 80 Cal. P. [62 Am.St.Rep. ; Railway Co., De Baker v. Southern Cal. 147] 257, 610, Am.St.Rep. 106 284 237]; 46 P. Marin Mun. [39 Cal.App.2d W. Co., Dist. v. Peninsula 34 P. 652 [94 P.2d 404]; Dist., Cal.App.2d 348, Hume v. Irr. 21 354 Fresno 483]; P.2d Currie, Northwestern Pac. R. R. Co. v. 100 [69 Cal.App. 175 1057].) [279 settled
The statement does not show the basis ruling court’s proffered exclusion or whether the evidence sufficiently tended support plaintiffs’ claims. was The offer apparently general objection and defendant’s was sustained to proof line of sought entire being to be introduced. This so, it be cannot held offer was insufficient or that a specific more prerequisite offer appeal. was a to review on (Lawless Calaway, v. 24 ; Cal.2d P.2d To 604] Tomaier, maier ; Cal.2d P.2d Cami 905] netti Co., Mut. Ins. Cal.2d Pacific Life 741].) general proof
The might offer was to submit tend to injury. establish some elements actionable court should have entertained such of this evidence tended as alleged show temporary alleged whether injury; within contemplation plans speci was public improvement fications for the or whether it consisted private of act of Progress the Works Administration so separated any purpose improvement public from as not damaging private public constitute use; also whether injury the elements of so ac shown were tionable. such a made, Had record been either the admis sion of upon evidence or specific its exclusion proof, offers just compensation for all issue of elements of actionable jury submitted
injury could then have been instructions, propriety proper and the of its verdict as well rulings of the court’s could as the correctness instructions appeal. employed, The method been determined have practically proof, precluded plaintiffs of a blanket exclusion appeal right a determination on of their procuring from temporary injury. damages for prove plaintiffs were able to a substantial Whether the impairment property rights of their dur- temporary actionable period allegations under the of their ing the construction question. They per- should have been complaint is beside attempt out to make their case so that the court mitted to specific proof from a offer of could rule from the evidence damage. actionable elements of asserted good they reason that are Plaintiffs contend legal damages rate on the amount of to interest at the entitled computed that such interest should be from suffered merely injury inflicted and not from the time of time entry judgment. allowable in jurisdictions, interest condemna
In most theory supports on the same the award of costs tion cases is, part just interest is allowable cases, those required paid the Constitution to be (96 A.L.R., taken cases collected in note owner *11 only In 1304). 111 A.L.R. this is pp. 150-206; state there not majority recognition reasoning rule and of the of Adams, supports (Metropolitan supra, it Water Dist. v. 16 citing pp. 681, seq., States, et v. Cal.2d at United Danforth Air 261 5; States, 102 F.2d Line R. Co. v. United Seaboard 354, 664]; L.Ed. 299, 306 S.Ct. 67 Jacobs v. U.S. United [43 26, States, 13, 142]), 290 16-17 S.Ct. 78 L.Ed. but U.S. [54 provision by that if is also a statute the condemnor is possession prior court order to put in the conclusion of the compensation damages litigation, the awarded shall draw order (Code Proc., lawful interest from the date of the Civ. 1249). See, also, Angeles Hansen, Los Flood v. Co. Control § 314, 734]; City 316 Cal.App.2d 48 P.2d [119 of 524 Aitken, Cal.App.2d 32 10 377]; v. Cal.Jur. 64, p. § Metropolitan case, supra, (16
In the Water District Cal.2d p. 681), quoting Air said, at it is from Line R. Seaboard Co. 299, p. 306): States, supra (261 U.S. “It ob- United is
759 right just compensation to cannot be that the owner’s vious statutory upon provisions. . . The depend to state . re- made compre- ‘just compensation’ paid quirement that shall be is specific all to and includes elements and no command hensive necessary equivalent include is when interest or its interest compensation. also, part See, such ...” is a Shoshone States, 244, 299 496 81 Tribe v. U.S. S.Ct. United 360], L.Ed. cases there cited. property
In actions instituted owner there prior much reason as condemnation cases to allow interest judgment right possession where the owner has infringed. He litigation and, has been forced to initiate interest, deprived he denied full if that extent says measure of to which the he is Constitution justly entitled.
The no holdings authorities are means uniform their regard to the time from which interest com should be puted. (See Am.Jur., pp. seq., seq.; et 912 et § C.J.S., 176, pp. 1056-1059; A.L.R., pp. supra, 150-206; § 111 A.L.R. Domain, on 742, pp. Lewis Eminent § 1319-1326.) But if the compensated owner is be full amount to justly which he is entitled, it seems apparent as to a taking the same rule should obtain as in eases, condemnation and as a damaging prop erty, interest should run from the date damage is inflicted or at least from Taylor the commencement of suit. As said Bay Ry. Co., St. Mich. N.W. 449]: ‘‘Complaint is jury made the instruction to the to add in terest from the date the commencement of The au suit. thorities upon subject. are uniform this The old rule undoubtedly was interest could not be allowed unliquidated damages, and, in tort, damages actions of are of unliquidated. course tendency been, of courts has how ever, to set aside, adopt this rule one, more reasonable injury property, cases of jury that the first must deter mine the sustained, actual and allow interest ” (Citing sum from its date. cases.) County Dallas (Tex.Civ.App), v. Barr 231 S.W. 456, an action under provision the constitutional to recover damaging property, for a the court said: “Interest be *12 damages. allowed as It proper, think, case, we in this from calculate it the injury, date from the judgment. date The fact that the amount claimed at unliquidated not affect the filing snit was does time of part damages kind interest this
right to recover ” also, Donaghey cases.) See, Lincoln, (Citing of action. 407], Ark. 1042 S.W. by any alleged prejudiced error in the Plaintiffs were not dealing police charge jury. instructions Certain unnecessary, but were mere sur- power seem to have plusage. cause judgment is reversed and the is remanded expressed. proceedings
further consistent with the views herein J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., J., Gibson, Spence, C. concurred.
CARTER, J. judgment in the I concur of reversal but majority agree holding opinion with the in the cannot action, prop- in an sales eminent domain evidence of of similar erty vicinity issue is not admissible on the value involved therein. my my expressed proposition
I have
views on this
dis-
Cole,
28 Cal.2d
sent
subject
T
928],
but
to be said on
there is more
give
requires
majority
further con-
believe
court to
squarely contrary
the matter. The rule stated is
sideration to
my
statutory
(I pointed
this
that out in
law
state.
case,
propose to demonstrate the
dissent in the Cole
but now
statement.)
Legis-
In 1937, inescapable truth
the above
Civil Procedure.
lature
section 1872 to the Code of
added
embodying
before stated
a new section
a matter never
It is
expert
statutory
an
wit-
law,
in the
and reads: "Whenever
examination,
may, upon direct
be
gives
opinion,
his
he
ness
may
he
be
opinion,.and
such
the reasons for
asked
state
fully
by opposing counsel.” The ex-
thereon
cross-examined
opinion of
may give the reasons for his
value.
pert witness
are in truth and
fact based
If
reasons
some of his
he
neighborhood, how can
property in the
sales of similar
?
give
1872 That
them
section
possibly be forbidden
his
scope, nature or character of
puts no
on the
limit
section
they may
reasons,
be.
may give his
whatever
He
reasons.
(sales
prop-
reasons
similar
How, then,
some of his
and others admitted?
community)
excluded
erty be
however,
considerations,
the authorities
those
from
Aside
based
of other sales were
rule of exclusion
that announced
*13
proposition
on the
expert
that
the
valuation witness could
give
opinion
the reasons
his value
on direct examina
for
tion.
one
subject
state,
of the first cases on the
in this
it
“But,
opinions
is said:
qualified
while the
of witnesses thus
knowledge
subject
competent
their
testimony,
of the
are
they
cannot,
examination,
the direct
be allowed to tes
tify
particular
transactions,
as to
such as sales
adjoining
of
lands, how much has
and
been offered
refused
adjoining
for
quality
of
location,
ques
lands
like
and
or for the
in
land
tion,
any
or
part
thereof, or
much
company
how
the
have
compelled
pay
in other and like cases—notwithstand
ing
may
those transactions
constitute the source
their
of
knowledge.” (Central Pac.
Pearson,
R. R. Co. v.
Cal.
262.)
(Emphasis added.)
Willett,
It
said in
is
Clark v.
544:
opinions
may
“While the
of such witnesses
mainly
be
experience
founded
their observation and
cases,
in
they
other like
it well
cannot,
settled that
on the
examination,
questioned
direct
be
particular
as to
instances.
reason
might
this rule is obvious.
witnesses
of
Different
opinions
have
might
theories. Their
be
different
founded
upon the observance
and
several
distinct
instances.
of
If
one, they may
allowed
adduce
opposite
adduce all. The
party
have
legal right
would
particular
to controvert each
yet
ease mentioned
witnesses,
be
unable
avail
right
himself of
inability
because of his
anticipate
cases
and prepare
investigation.” (Em
mentioned
their
phasis added.)
It is said in De
v. Town
Freitas
Suisun
City,
170 Cal.
“By preliminary ques
P.
:
553]
tions
examiner
relating
should elicit the facts
to the
qualifications of
witnesses,
example,
that he has seen
land,
and examined the
or
something
that he knows
its
character and
condition,
market
in
values
land
that
vicinity, if
established,
such values have' been
or the values
similarly situated,
of land
the like.
may, thereupon,
He
give
be
opinion
respective
asked to
his
its
values
without
question.
the use of the water in
From such evidence
jury
the court or
can
the amount of
estimate
caused
they
deprivation
water,
if
find
shall
produced
is such and
it
defendant’s tunnel. The
weight
testimony
will,
course,
of such witness
de
pend upon
knowledge
he shows
his answers
preliminary questions
He should
and on cross-examination.
regarding specific
not be
examination
asked
facts
)
(Emphasis
chief.”
This court
stated
Estate
added.
Ross,
171 Cal.
party calling
: “The
1138]
give
opinion
may
a witness to
on
qualify
his
value
him
showing
familiarity
his
property
with the
and with other
neighborhood,
in the
experience
his
business,
in the
familiarity with the
his
state
the market and with sales
vicinity,
of similar
other facts tend
knowledge
subject
ing
capacity
to show his
give
opinion
an
thereon. But while
knows
he
sales
fact
the prices
elicited,
prices
made and
obtained
be
any particular
given
admissible, except
instance are not
stated,
opposing party,
on the cross-examination of
if
he
*14
inquiry.” (Emphasis added.)
fit make the
The thought
sees
give
expert
gen
in all
is that
can
expressed
those cases
opinion,
specific
but not
reasons.
eral reasons
his
There
and this court should
is no such limitation
section
adoption
it.
none into
To do so
to make the
read
Ana
wholly
gesture.
v. Mar
a
idle
Such cases Santa
section
Spring Valley
v.
224];
W. W. Drink
Cal. 538
P.
lin, 99
[34
Obispo
681]; City
Luis
house, 92 Cal.
P.
San
[28
City
An
;
P.
Los
Brizzolara, 100
1083]
merely
737],
follow the
Hughes,
Schauer, J., Novem- denied rehearing was petition for Respondent’s ber