Lead Opinion
Opinion
The present case arises from the decision of the named defendant, the zoning board of appeals (board) of the town of New Canaan (town), denying the appeal of the plaintiffs, Quentin Heim and Sandy Deasi, from the issuance of a zoning permit for the operation of a veterinary clinic to the defendant Gen Three, LLC, which had applied for the permit on behalf of the intervening defendants, veterinarians Andrew Rappaport and Daniel Hochman.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history that are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Gen Three, LLC, owns property at 73 Grove Street in New Canaan (property). The property, which consists of 0.57 acres of land and a two-story wood frame building, is located within a business zone that borders a residential neighborhood. Gen Three, LLC, submitted an application for a zoning permit to the New Canaan zoning еnforcement officer to allow the operation of a veterinary clinic on the property. The
The zoning enforcement officer thereafter referred the application to the town planning and zoning commission (commission) because he concluded that the regulations “were unclear as to whether [the operation of a veterinary clinic] was allowed in the zone . . . .” The commission discussed the issue at length on more than one occasion, and ultimately approved Gen Three, LLC’s application for the zoning permit, determining that the establishment of a veterinary clinic was “an acceptable use in the [b]usiness [z]one A if certain conditions are met.” The commission set forth two conditions in its decision relating to minimizing noise.
The plaintiffs, who own property adjacent to Gen Three, LLC’s property, thereafter appealed to the board from the commission’s decision approving the application. The board held two public hearings on the appeal and thereafter denied the plaintiffs’ appeal by unanimous vote. The board did not agree formally on the reasons for its decision.
The plaintiffs thereafter appealed from the board’s decision to the Superior Court pursuаnt to General Statutes § 8-8 (b).
The plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the town’s zoning regulation for the business zone A, which permits “medical, dental or similar health-oriented” offices; New Canaan Zoning Regs., c. 60, art. X, § 60-10.1 (B); permitted the operation of a veterinary clinic in the zone. More specifically, the plaintiffs maintain that the phrase “medical, dental or similar health-oriented” offiсes clearly and specifically refers to the medical care of human beings, not animals. The plaintiffs also point to chapter 60, article IV, § 60-4.1 (A) (8) of the New Canaan zoning regulations, which, they assert, establishes that animal treatment facilities are not compatible with residential zones.
In response, the defendants contend that the phrase “medical, dental or similar health-oriented” facilities in § 60-10.1 (B) of the town’s zoning regulations is ambiguous. The board relies on the dictionary definitions of the terms “similar,” “health” and “oriеnt” to demonstrate the broad meaning of the words and their
The following additional facts are necessary to our resolution of this claim. The proposed veterinary clinic called for limited hours of operation and examinations by appointment only. Animals would be seen on an outpatient basis only, and “after-hours emergencies were to be referred elsewhere.” Additionally, “no boarding or grooming services would be available. Two cages maintained inside the building would be available on those nonroutine occasions when an animal recovering from a medical procedure would require an overnight stay.” This information evidenced the intent of Rappaport аnd Hochman to run a small, satellite style veterinary clinic.
We begin our analysis of the plaintiffs’ claim by first addressing the appropriate standard of review. “Under our well established standard of review, [w]e have recognized that [a]n agency’s factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts. . . . Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has аcted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. . . . We have determined, therefore, that . . . deference ... to an agency’s interpretation of a statutoiy term is unwarranted when the construction of a statute . . . has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] ... a governmental agency’s time-tested interpretation . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc.,
The zoning regulation at issue in the present case has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny. Moreover, the board did not indicate thаt it had applied a time-tested interpretation of the regulation. “Accordingly, we do not defer to the board’s construction and exercise plenary review in accordance with our well established rules of statutory construction.” Pasquariello v. Stop & Shop Cos.,
“Resolution of this issue requires us to review the relevant town regulations. Because the interpretation of the regulations presents a question of law, our review is plenary.”
We begin with the text of the regulation.
The key term in § 60-10.1 (B) of the regulations, “health-oriented,” is not defined or explained anywhere in the regulations. General Statutes § 1-1 (a) provides: “In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly.” “If a statute or regulation does not sufficiently define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jim’s Auto Body v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
We always must construe a regulation in light of its purpose. See West Hartford Interfaith Coalition v. Town Council,
Given the text, meaning and purpose of § 60-10.1 of the town’s zoning regulations, we conclude that the proposed veterinary clinic in the present case is a “similar health-oriented” office permitted in the business A zone.
Because we have concluded that a veterinary clinic is a permitted use as of right in the business zone A, we further determine that the defendants are entitled to a zoning permit as a matter of right without reference to the conditions imposed by the board. In Abbadessa v. Board of Zoning Appeals,
As in Abbadessa, Gen Three, LLC, in the present case “acted reasonably when [it] sought approval from the official whose duty it is to enforce the ordinance.” Id. The zoning enforcement officer then referred the application to the commission because of uncertainty as to the interpretation of the regulation at issue. When the commission determined that a veterinary clinic constitutes a use permitted by the regulations in the business A zone, it then lacked authority to impose any conditions on the issuance of the permit. The veterinary clinic became a permitted use as a matter of right. “If an application conforms to the standards set forth in the regulations, the enforcement officer has no discretion and must issue the certificate.” Langer v. Planning & Zoning Commission,
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion NORCOTT and KATZ, Js., concurred.
Notes
Gen Three, LLC, the applicant for the zoning permit, was a defendant in the plaintiffs appeal to the board, as well as in the appeal to the trial court, but did not participate in the appeal in this court. Accordingly, we refer to Rappaport, Hochman and the board collectively as the defendants.
The plaintiffs filed in the Appellate Court a petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the triаl court. General Statutes §§ 8-9 and 8-8 (o). Following the Appellate Court’s grant of certification, we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
The plaintiffs also present a second issue in this certified appeal: whether the trial court properly concluded that the illegal conditions attached to the permit were severable because they were not integral to the decision to issue the permit. Because we conclude that а veterinary clinic constitutes a “medical, dental or similar health-oriented” facility and is thus a permitted use under the regulations as a matter of right, our resolution of the first issue is dispositive of this case. We therefore do not address the second issue.
Additionally, the plaintiffs claim that Gen Three, LLC’s application was procedurally defective. The plaintiffs did not raise this issue in their petition for certification to appeal filed with the Appellate Court, however, and this issue therefore is beyond the scopе of this certified appeal. We decline to address it.
General Statutes § 8-8 (b) provides in relevant part: “Except as provided in subsections (c), (d) and (r) of this section and sections 7-147 and 7-147i, any person aggrieved by any decision of a board, including a decision to approve or deny a site plan pursuant to subsection (g) of section 8-3, may take an appeal to the superior court for the judicial district in which the municipality is located. ...”
Any person who owns land “within a radius of one hundred feet of any portiоn of the land involved in the decision of the board” is aggrieved. General Statutes § 8-8 (a) (1). It is undisputed that both plaintiffs satisfy this statutory requirement for aggrievement.
Rappaport and Hochman operated a larger veterinary facility with boarding and grooming services in a nearby town.
The plaintiffs recognized in their brief, and all parties conceded at oral argument, that the correct standard of review for this issue is plenary.
We acknowledge that General Statutes § l-2z requires a threshold determination whether the regulation is ambiguous. In both their brief and at oral argument, the plaintiffs claimed that the language of § 60-10.1 (B) of the regulations is clear and unambiguous and that “medical, dental or similar health-oriented” offices include only those offices treating human health. We disagree. It is not at all clear to us that the regulation refers only to human health.
The New Canaan zoning regulations are permissive, rather than prohibitive, in nature. Specifically, the regulations provide: “No building or structure shall be erected, altered or used nor any land used fоr any other than a purpose or use permitted by these regulations in the zone in which such building or land is located.” New Canaan Zoning Regs., c. 60, art. I, § 60-1.4. Permissive zoning regulations require that “[t]he uses which are permitted in each type of zone are spelled out. Any use that is not permitted is automatically excluded.” Gordon v. Zoning Board,
In his dissent, Justice Zarella correctly states (hat “[u]nder the doctrine of ejusdem generis, when a statute . . . sets forth a specific enumeration of things, ‘general terms will be construed to embrace things of the same general kind or character as those specifically enumerated.’ ” On the basis of this principle, Justice Zarella asserts that, because the terms “medical” and “dental,” in common parlance, refer to services rendered to people, not animals, the term “similar health-oriented offices . . . also should be interpreted to refer to health-oriented facilities for humans.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Although we acknowledge that the doctrine of ejusdem generis is a recognized principle of statutory construction, we disagree that its application mandates a finding that the term “similar health-oriented offices” should be limited to health-oriented facilities for humans. Indeed, our review of the dictionary definitions of the terms “medical” and “dental” indicates that, like the term “health,” they are not limited to services rendered to people.
Thе American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th Ed. 2000) defines “medical” as “of, or relating to, the study or practice of medicine” and defines “medicine” as the “science of diagnosing, treating or preventing disease and other damage to body or mind.” Similarly, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “medical” as “of, relating to, or concerned with physicians or with the practice of medicine often as distinguished from surgery,” and defines “medicine” as the “science and art dealing with the maintenance of heаlth and the prevention, alleviation, or care of disease . . . ."
The definition of “dental” also is not limited to humans. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th Ed. 2000) defines “dental” as “of, or relating to, or for the teeth . . . .” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “dental” almost identically as “of, or relating to, the teeth or dentistry . . . .”
Applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis to the term “similar health-oriented offices” in the regulation in the present case therefore does not preclude veterinary offices.
The plaintiffs rely on Tanner v. Board of Appeals, 61 Mass. App. 647,
After the publication of our initial decision in Heim v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. Because I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the term “medical, dental or similar health-oriented offices” in chapter 60, article X, § 60-10.1 (B), of the New Canaan zoning regulations includes a veterinary facility, I dissent. Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, when a statute or ordinance sets forth a specific enumeration of things, “general terms will be construed to embrace things of the same general kind or character as those specifically enumerated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hackett v. J.L.G. Properties, LLC,
The named defendant, the zoning board of appeals of the town of New Canaan, apparently recognized these differences because it granted the zoning permit application of the defendant Gen Three, LLC, subject to certain conditions, including (1) limited hours of operation, (2) that it would refer after-hour emergencies to other veterinary clinics, (3) that it would not have boarding or grooming facilities on site, and (4) that it would limit to two the number of facilities for animals that require overnight stays. The trial court appropriately determined that these conditions were illegal.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the phrase “medical, dental or similar health-оriented” offices in chapter 60, article X, § 60-10.1 (B) of the New Canaan zoning regulations includes a veterinary facility. Although I agree generally with the rationale expressed in Justice Zarella’s dissent, I write separately to emphasize that the key term in the regulation is not “ ‘health-oriented’ ” standing alone, which can apply broadly to animals as well as humans, but “ ‘similar health-oriented’ ” which, in my view, restricts the permitted uses to human health-oriented applications. (Emphasis added.) Even if, as the majority asserts in footnote 9 of its opinion, the terms “medical” and “dental” are not strictly limited to human health purposes (although it would be unusual to
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.