Heim v. ZONING BD. OF APPEALS OF TOWN OF NEW CANAAN

he is entitled sum, In we with the defendant that agree civilly commit- either to be released from treatment at a mental placed he was for treatment ted because period a total ex- facility (i) health under 54-56d for remand, the trial court months.18 On ceeding eighteen appro- determine which of those alternatives shall priate. and the case is remanded

The decision is reversed of the relief to which the defendant for a determination is entitled. justices

In the other concurred. opinion QUENTIN AL. BOARD OF HEIM ET v. ZONING THE OF

APPEALS OF TOWN ET AL. NEW CANAAN (SC 18088) Schaller, Norcott, Katz, Vertefeuille, Js. Zarella and assume, purposes present appeal, the defendant for express opinion incompetent trial. We no as to continues to be to stand (i) requires commitment the trial court to release or afford whether 54-56d subsequent competent proceedings trial is found to stand to a defendant who period eighteen limitation has that the statute’s month to a determination been exceeded. April officially September 2,

Argued released 2008* * super- court, opinion Following this has been reconsideration Appeals, Conn. 960 A.2d Board seded. See Heim (2008). P. Leydon,

Brenden for appellants (plaintiffs). Louis Ciccarello, appellee for the (named defendant). Sweeney, Michael P. whom, with on the brief, was E. Amy Souchuns, for appellees (intervening defendants).

Opinion VERTEFEUILLE, present J. The case arises from the decision of the defendant, named the zoning board of appeals (board) of the town of New Canaan (town), Quentin denying appeal the of plaintiffs, the Heim and Sandy Deasi, from the issuance of a zoning permit for operation a veterinary of clinic to the defendant Gen Three, LLC, which applied had for the permit on behalf of the intervening defendants, veterinarians Andrew Rappaport and Daniel plaintiffs Hochman.1 The appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying appeal their from the decision of the board. The issues presented appeal2 in this certified are whether the trial properly court veterinary concluded that: a (1) clinic “medical, constitutes a dental or similar health-ori- facility permitted by ented” as chapter 60, X, article (B) § the New Canaan zoning regulations; Three, LLC, applicant zoning permit, Gen for the awas defendant plaintiffs appeal board, appeal in the to the as well as in the to the trial court, participate appeal Accordingly, but did not in the in this court. we Rappaport, jointly refer to Hochman and the board as the defendants. Appellate petition The filed in the Court a for certification to appeal judgment from the §§ of the trial court. General Statutes 8-9 and 8- Appellate (o). Following grant certification, Court’s we transferred appeal pursuant (c) to this court to General Statutes 51-199 and Practice Book 65-1. permit to the attached illegal

and (2) to the they integral were not because were severable although permit.3 We conclude to issue the decision veterinary that a properly determined the trial court as a regulations zoning falls within the town’s clinic sev- improperly court facility, the trial “health-oriented” the issuance conditions and affirmed imposed ered the judgment we reverse the permit. Accordingly, the trial court. undisputed facts and following

The record reveals the history relevant to our resolution of procedural that are owns at 73 Grove appeal. Three, LLC, property Gen property, which (property). Street in New Canaan two-story land and a wood consists of 0.57 acres of frame is located within a business zone that building, Three, LLC, borders a residential Gen neighborhood. application permit an for a zoning submitted officer to allow the New Canaan enforcement operation veterinary property. of a clinic on the application proposed expansion no modification or any existing building, kind to the exterior only improvements ready space showed interior such as the installation clinic, for use as “cabinets, tables, exam etc.” placement and thereafter referred zoning The enforcement officer com- application planning zoning to the town and the concluded that the mission because he (commission) operation “were unclear as to whether regulations [the . . . .” allowed in the zone veterinary of a was clinic] on issue at and length commission discussed the The ultimately approved Gen occasion; one and more than permit, application zoning for Three, LLC’s procedur Three, application plaintiffs was LLC’s The also claim that Gen petition ally plaintiffs for this issue in their The did not raise defective. Court, however, appeal Appellate and the filed with the certification to appeal. beyond scope We decline of this certified issue therefore is it. address

determining that the establishment of a clinic acceptable was “an in [zjone use A if [b]usiness certain conditions are met.” The commission set forth two its decision relating minimizing noise.

The plaintiffs, property adjacent who own to Gen Three, property, LLC’s thereafter appealed to the board from the commission’s applica- decision approving public tion. The board held appeal two on the hearings plaintiffs’ and thereafter denied the appeal by unani- mous vote. The board did formally not on the agree reasons for its decision. plaintiffs appealed thereafter from the board’s

decision to the Superior pursuant Court to General Stat- utes 8-8 (b).4 Rappaport Hochman, and par- who had ticipated in appeal board, before the were allowed to intervene as appeal defendants to the trial court. hearing, After a the trial court affirmed the deci- sion of the board upholding the commission’s decision granting permit, part, that: concluding, veter- (1) inary clinic a permitted use in the A business zone because that zone allows health-oriented offices; and (2) the conditions although imposed permit on the were they invalid, also were not integral permit to the and could be severed. This certified appeal followed.

I improp- first claim that the trial court erly concluded that the town’s for the regulation provides (b) part: “Except provided General Statutes 8-8 in relevant as (d) (c), (r) 7-1471, in subsections of this section and sections 7-147and any person aggrieved by any board, including decision of a a decision to approve deny plan pursuant 8-3, may (g) a site to subsection of section appeal superior judicial take an to the court for the district in which the municipality is located. . . .” Any person any who owns land “within a radius of one hundred feet of portion aggrieved. of the land involved in the decision of the board” is (a) (1). undisputed plaintiffs satisfy § General Statutes 8-8 It is that both statutory requirement aggrievement. for “medical, dental or zone, permits A which business offices; New Canaan similar health-oriented” permitted operation 60, X, (B); c. art. 60-10.1 Regs., § specifically, More veterinary of a clinic the zone. “medical, dental or plaintiffs phrase maintain that the clearly specifically similar health-oriented” offices human not animals. beings, refers to the medical care of point chapter 60, IV, also article 60-§ which, 4.1 of the New Canaan (A) (8) zoning regulations, they that animal treatment facilities assert, establishes zones. compatible are not with residential response, phrase In the defendants contend that the facilities in “medical, dental or similar health-oriented” ambigu- of the town’s (B) zoning regulations dictionary ous. The board relies on the definitions of the terms “health” “similar,” and “orient” to demon- strate the broad of the words and their failure meaning to discriminate between human and animals. beings properly The defendants also assert that the trial court considered the board’s in making determination its deci- sion, properly and thus concluded that clin- ics fall within the or similar purview “medical, dental health-oriented” offices within the of 60-10.1 meaning of the town’s with (B) zoning regulations. agree the defendants. necessary additional our following facts proposed veterinary

resolution of this claim. The clinic called for hours operation limited and examinations only. an appointment Animals would be seen on outpatient only, basis and “after-hours emergencies Additionally, were to be referred elsewhere.” “no board- ing cages services would be available. Two grooming maintained inside the would be available on building recovering those nonroutine occasions when an animal procedure require overnight from a medical would an stay.” Rappa- This information evidenced intent

634 port small, style and Hochman to run a satellite veteri- nary clinic.5 by analysis plaintiffs’ our of the claim first begin review. “Under

addressing appropriate standard of review, have rec- our well established standard [w]e discretionary factual and ognized agency’s [a]n weight determinations are to be accorded considerable . . . present pure questions the courts. Cases that however, a standard of review law, invoke broader ordinarily whether, deciding light than is involved unreasonably, evidence, agency of the has acted . . . arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion. illegally . determined, therefore, We have . . deference interpretation statutory ... to an of a term agency’s is unwarranted when the construction of a statute . . . scrutiny previously subjected judicial has not been ... a time-tested inter- governmental agency’s [or to] . . . .” marks pretation (Internal quotation omitted.) Harpaz Transit, Inc., v. Laidlaw 102, 286 Conn. 108- 942 A.2d 396 109, (2008). present at issue in the case zoning regulation subjected previously judicial scrutiny.

has not been Moreover, applied the board did not indicate that it had interpretation a time-tested “Accord- regulation. we do not defer to the board’s construction and ingly, well plenary exercise review accordance with our Pasquar- statutory established rules of construction.” Shop Stop Cos., iello v. & 656, 663, 916 A.2d 281 Conn. 803 (2007). requires of this issue us to review the

“Resolution interpretation relevant town Because the regulations. review presents question law, a our regulations Appeals, Board 211 plenary.”6 is Graff 5 veterinary facility Rappaport operated larger and Hochman with board nearby ing grooming services in a town. brief, parties plaintiffs recognized in their and ail conceded at oral plenary. argument, of review for this issue is that the correct standard 652, A.2d (2006). recognize Conn. We also that the are local enact- “zoning regulations legislative . . . and, therefore, interpretation gov- ments their principles apply erned the same that to the Zoning construction of statutes.” Wood v. Board of Appeals, supra, possible, 258 Conn. 699. “Whenever will be construed so that language zoning regulations no clause is deemed superfluous, insignificant. void or . . . The must regulations inteipreted be so as to recon- provisions cile their and operative make them so far . possible. as . . When more than one construction is possible, adopt we the one that renders the enactment reject any effective and workable and might that lead quotation unreasonable bizarre results.” (Internal marks omitted.) Zoning Appeals, Board Graff supra, present 653. In the case, we will examine the of the at issue as language regulation well as extratex- tual sources to determine the meaning “health-ori- ented” facilities in 60-10.1 (B).7 § begin

We with the text of the regulation.8 town’s provide as a zoning regulations follows for business A purpose zone: “The provide of this district is to areas for single-purpose require and services which shopping acknowledge requires § General Statutes l-2z a threshold deter regulation ambiguous. mination whether the is In both their brief and at oral argument, language claimed that the of the ordinance is unambiguous “medical, clear and and that dental similar and health-ori only treating ented” offices includes those offices human health. We dis agree. regulation only It is not at all clear to us that the refers to human health. zoning regulations permissive, prohibi The New Canaan rather than tive, Specifically, regulations provide: building in nature. “No or structure erected, any any shall be altered or used nor land used for other than a purpose permitted by regulations or use these in the zone in which such building I, Regs., § or land is located.” New Canaan c. art. 60-1.4. require zoning regulations permitted Permissive uses which are “[t]he Any type spelled permitted each of zone are out. use that is not is automati cally Zoning Board, 597, 604, excluded.” Gordon v. 145 Conn. 145A.2d 746 Fuller, (1958); see also R. 9 Connecticut Practice Series: Land Use Law and 4.10,p. automatically (2d 1999) (“a § Practice Ed. use is excluded unless expressly permitted zoning regulations”). it services, . . . Automotive

on-site facilities. parking personal and professional drive-in and certain banking special-purpose trip a represent services which often . . .” New are also uses in this area. appropriate 60, X, (A). Canaan c. art. 60-10.1 Zoning Regs., § “[M]edi- shall be cal, dental or similar health-oriented offices Id., . . 60-10.1 permitted (Emphasis added.) (B). § . .” key (B) regulations, term anywhere explained is not defined or “health-oriented,” provides: 1-1 (a) in the General Statutes regulations. and statutes, phrases “In words the construction commonly approved shall be construed to the according phrases, words and and technical usage language; acquired peculiar appropriate and such as have and understood law, in the shall be construed meaning does not suffi- regulation “If a statute or accordingly.” to look to the ciently term, appropriate define a it is expressed term as in a common understanding Jim’s dictionary.” quotation omitted.) marks (Internal Vehicles, v. Motor Body Auto Commissioner of A.2d 305 The word “health” 794, 808, (2008). Conn. similarity in a number of is defined with substantial interpretation of dictionaries, each a broad embracing as the state or condition the term. “Health” is defined limited to the health of a organism-, of an it is not Heritage American person being. See, e.g., or a human Ed. Dictionary Language (4th 2000) of the English at a organism condition of an is overall (health “[t]he Dic- Third New International Webster’s given time”); or one “the condition of an tionary organism is (health nor- performs in which it its vital functions parts of its Dictionary Ed. Law mally (8th or Black’s properly”); sound or whole being is state of 2004) (health “[t]he “health- usage of soul”). mind or common body, to include the health appears therefore oriented” animals.9 correctly “[ujnder concurrence, that Zarella states In his Justice specific ejusdem a generis, or ordinance sets forth when a statute

doctrine of only provision zoning regulations of the town’s chapter specifically that mentions services precludes the estab- IV, (8), article 60-4.1 which (A) zones. In hospitals” of “animal in residential lishment in a present case, however, property is located zone, prohibi- not a residential and this zone, business parties None of the con- apply. tion therefore does not proposed veterinary tends clinic resembles or hospital. (A) (8) constitutes an animal Section of the town’s therefore sheds no zoning regulations meaning on the of “health-oriented.” light always must construe a of its regulation light purpose. See West Coalition Hartford Interfaith things, ‘general things enumeration of terms will be construed to embrace ” general specifically or same kind character as those enumerated.’ principle, that, On the basis Justice Zarella asserts terms because the “dental,” parlance, “medical” and common refer to services rendered to people, animals, not the term “similar health-oriented offices . . . also interpreted should be to refer to health-oriented facilities for humans.” (Internal quotation omitted.) Although acknowledge marks we doc- ejusdem statutory generis recognized principle construction, trine of is a application disagree finding we that its that the term “similar mandates health-oriented offices” should be limited to health-oriented facilities for Indeed, dictionary humans. our review of the definitions of the terms “medi- that, they “health,” cal” and “dental” indicates like the term are not limited people. to services rendered to Dictionary Heritage English Language (4th 2000) The American Ed. “of, study practice relating to, or of medicine” defines “medical” as diagnosing, treating, preventing and defines “medicine” as the “science of or body Similarly, damage Third disease and other to the or mind.” Webster’s Dictionary “of, to, relating or con- New International defines “medical” as physicians practice cerned with or with the of medicine often as distin- guished surgery,” as the “science and art from and defines “medicine” prevention, alleviation, dealing or with the maintenance of health and the cure of disease . . . .” The of “dental” also is not limited to humans. The American definition Dictionary Heritage English Language (4th 2000) Ed. defines “dental” to, “of, relating for the . . . .” Webster’s Third New Interna- as or teeth identically Dictionary relating to “dental” almost as “of or

tional defines dentistry . . . .” the teeth or ejusdem Applying generis health- to the term “similar the doctrine present regulation in case therefore does not oriented offices” in the veterinary preclude offices. Council, Town 498, 508, Conn. 636 A.2d 1342 (1994) statute . . . (“[a] interpreted should not be to thwart purpose” quotation its marks omitted]). [internal introductory purpose 60-10.1, outlined section § chapter 60, X, zoning regulations article of the town’s types contemplated clarifies the of businesses for the business A zone. The business A zone is intended to provide “single-purpose shopping areas for and services require which on-site facilities.” New Canaan parking Zoning 60, X, Appropriate c. art. Regs., (A). § uses in the business A zone include ser- “[automotive professional and certain and vices, drive-in banking personal represent special-pur- services which a often pose trip . . . .” veterinary Id. A (Emphasis added.) purpose. clinic is consistent with this stated First, veter- provide professional They prac- inarians are services. specialized titioners of medicine who hold medical supervised by and are licensed and the state degrees department 20-197, of health. See General Statutes §§ Second, 20-198 and 20-199. a visit to a veterinarian gen- erally is a because animals “single-purpose” generally admitted to shops, banks, not restaurants and other facilities, an appointment required and because is services, “special-purpose” obtain a it a veterinarian’s trip. Moreover, provides medical and den- veterinarian tal services for animals and therefore is similar to and with, professional personal consistent and services referred to in New Canaan regulation. See Regs., X, c. art. 60-10.1 (A). text, meaning purpose

Given the of 60-10.1 we conclude that zoning regulations, the town’s is a “simi- proposed present clinic case A permitted lar health-oriented” office in the business we that the trial court Accordingly, zone.10 conclude plaintiffs rely Appeals, App. 647, on Tanner v. Board 61 Mass. “medical, (2004), to dental and similar health- 813 N.E.2d 578 assert only humans, id., treating not animals. See oriented offices” include those ‘hospital,’ (“we interpretation of word think reasonable [the board’s] by-law, facility to describe a for the medical treatment of as used the veterinary clinic proposed that the properly determined permitted is a use that zone.

II improp- claim that the trial court plaintiffs The next erly imposed by per- the illegal severed the entirety mit, appeal rather than their its sustaining plaintiffs the board’s decision. The assert reversing apply appropriate to the test the trial court failed integral for whether conditions are determining illegal from, permit. and thus not severable More to, trial court specifically, the contend that the improperly failed to consider whether the commission permit imposed granted would have without conditions.

In response, the defendants claim that the trial court’s conclusion that the attached conditions were illegal automatically does not mean that the conditions are permit. point not severable from the The defendants imposed permit out that the conditions were on the in order to assuage neighboring property owners’ potential problems concerns about noise and other they related to a if clinic, and assert Three, LLC, Gen had imposition contested the conditions, it would have succeeded in obtaining permit without the conditions. with the agree plaintiffs. history procedural additional facts and following necessary our claim. to resolution of this When the approved Three, application

commission Gen LLC’s for special persons animáis”). plaintiff applied in Tanner but not for a already permit expand existing veterinary hospital. Importantly, his disputed “hospital,” parties meaning in Tanner and the of the term Appeals “hospitals” Court concluded that are “institutional Massachusetts people” ordinarily designed support based uses and serve the needs of present regulatory Id. In the on context and relevant Massachusetts statutes. “health,” case, dispute term, i.e., and different centers on a broader Tanner, therefore, inapposite. regulatory statutes and context. permit, imposed it two conditions on the zoning approved application. First, “[o]vemight boarding any animals on kind of routine is permitted basis not at Emergency location. or other boarding surgical patients only permitted.” Second, commission “[t]he require reserves the right additional modifications any future, specifically to the at time in the building including may additional as be needed soundproofing veterinary any so that the clinic use does not cause impact adverse or disturbance to surrounding property owners.” In its official letter, decision the commission proposed veterinary stated that it found the clinic to acceptable be “an use in the A [b]usiness [z]one if certain conditions are met.” (Emphasis added.) explained enforcement officer later to the board commission, the its making determination, had been with potential concerned for noise and other problems expressed by many people opposing appli- cation, so it “decided . . . that the [veterinary clinic] use would be allowed in ... the zone if certain condi- tions were met.” The of the two conditions was to goal protested vehemently “benefit the who had neighbors” against establishment of a clinic at the in question. very site The neighbors were concerned possibility about particularly, barking noise— with overnight so, imposition of the two con- —and “the . . ditions, commission was . to make the trying palatable whole more to the thing neighbors.” permit, In the conditions attached to the examining the trial court first looked to whether the commission authority had impose the conditions or whether imposition of the conditions was an ultra act.11 vires any The trial court stated that court fails to find “[t]he authorization within the for regulations allows such appeal, On none of the defendants claim that either condition was validly imposed. conditions to be attached to a zoning permit (as opposed special to a permit).”

The trial court then considered whether the illegal permit. were severable from the It concluded “ ” that the per- conditions were not to the ‘significant’ mit. In determination, its the trial court making consid- ered a “principal purpose” of the conditions, which it stated was “to address the concerns of numerous adjacent homeowners from the residential zone relating potential noise from barking dogs.” The trial court therefore concluded that the illegal conditions were not integral permit to the itself, and thus were severable permit. from the analysis our begin by of this claim forth setting appropriate

the standard of review. A question regard- ing severability of illegal conditions to a zoning permit is an issue of law; therefore, our ple- review is nary. See Parish St. v. Zoning Andrew’s Board of of Appeals, 155 Conn. 350, 353-55, 232 A.2d 916 (1967) (conducting plenary severability review of of invalid conditions to exception); see also Wood v. Zoning Board Appeals, supra, 258 Conn. 699 of (issue law of requires plenary review).

It is well established that a condition, which “[w]here was the chief factor in the of granting permit], is [a invalid, [permit] must fall . . . .” quota- (Internal tion marks omitted.) Vaszauskas v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 215 Conn. 66, 574 A.2d 212 (1990). “[T]he dispositive consideration is whether the [for court] condition was an ‘integral’ part authority’s of the zoning decision to grant [permit] and, so, if [permit], even if valid in all respects, other cannot upheld.” be Id.; see also Reid v. Zoning Appeals, Board 235 Conn. of 850, 858, 670 A.2d 1271 have held if (1996) (“[W]e a zoning board would have grant refused to a variance particular without a condition, the condition is an inte- condition is integral If an of the variance. part gral is also valid variance then an otherwise invalid, invalid.”). Appeals, supra, Board

In Vaszauskas that the trial court 62, this court concluded 215 Conn. invalid conditions determined that certain improperly variance granted from the could be severed an him to enlarge landowner to allow plaintiff a second and to excavate pond property on his existing board [zoning “The Specifically, this court stated: pond. Southbury appeals)], (board the town of appeals on the conducted hearings the several during that his intended plaintiff was told application, the removal of project would involve [more than] and that property of soil from his 300,000 yards cubic loads three and five truck require this would between period for a plaintiffs property, the per leaving hour circum- years. Under these between two and three of appeals’] deci- that the stances, we conclude [board only reached application was sion to the grant massive amount of itself that this after it had assured in plaintiffs property the be removed from soil would required by the town’s procedures with the accordance therefore, and, extraction applicable regulations soil of its decision ‘integral’ part was an that the condition board assume that the the variance. Wecannot grant to it had granted have the variance appeals] would [of if receipt imposed, it the that the condition been aware permit planning the temporary extraction from added.) (Emphasis not be commission, could fulfilled." requires in enunciated Vaszauskas Id., Thus, 67. the test improperly conditions when we encounter that, authority, we must determine by a imposed from an otherwise are severable the conditions whether “if the removal permit asking valid zoning value or effec- way destroy the would no condition permit. quotation tiveness” of the marks (Internal omit- Id., 66. ted.)

In present case, undisputed the given illegality of the two conditions attached to the issued zoning Vaszauskas, permit, ask, compliance we must with whether the commission would have refused to grant permit without the conditions, or whether it would have made the same permit decision upholding even if it had known that the conditions could not be satis- fied. In light of the opposition substantial neighborhood clinic, principally based on noise con- cerns, we cannot conclude that the commission would granted permit have if it had known that the condi- tions attached to it could not be satisfied. The wording approval commission’s reinforces our conclu- sion. The commission found the clinic to accept- be an only “¿/'certain able use conditions are met.” (Emphasis added.) therefore conclude that the conditions, which are both invalid and integral permit, not severable from permit. the remainder of the “Where a condition, which was the chief factor the granting permit], is invalid, [permit] fall . . must . .” [a (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vaszauskas Zon- ing Board Appeals, supra, 215 Conn. 66. Accordingly, we conclude that improperly the trial court severed the imposed permit on the and in turn improp- erly affirmed permit.12 the issuance of the to address their concerns. landowner, similar situation: “We note that this is an unusual ing landowner. reach the same conclusion today. Conn. especially decision is 12We cannot App. 171, where the necessary and not the prevailing help Nevertheless, illegal but n.5, party here point preserve 659 A.2d 746 conditions were Floch In v. to be we find that out the inherent invalidating bound, complains Planning integrity (1995), designed reversal of the commission’s situation, & irony Zoning Commission, Appellate to benefit the complain of this situation: originally where an illegal Court faced a process.” conditions, imposed abutting We ^[38] which the briefly upon two cases distinguish position their rely support in order to

defendants automatically a permit render conditions do not illegal recognize this court did Although and invalid. illegal Zoning Commis- in both DeBeradinis v. principle and Branha- sion, 187, (1994), 228 Conn. 635 A.2d 1220 Commission, Plaza, LLC v. Inland Wetlands ven analysis did not (1999), Conn. 740 A.2d 847 ultimately cases, In this court con- stop there. both were “an imposed because the conditions that, cluded commission’s essential and element integral [each] required reversal of decision . . . invalidation [their] Commis- the entire decision.” DeBeradinis v. Plaza, see also Branhaven LLC sion, supra, 203; Commission, supra, 285. The defen- Inland Wetlands misplaced. therefore is dants’ reliance of these cases and the case is remanded is reversed judgment judgment the trial court with direction to render plaintiffs’ appeal. sustaining KATZ,Js., concurred. opinion In this NORCOTT I concur in the ZARELLA, J., Although concurring. majority’s judgment, to reverse the trial court’s decision majority’s with the conclusion respectfully I disagree “medical, that the dental part I of its decision term 60, article chapter health-oriented offices” in or similar zoning regulations the New Canaan X, (B), veterinary facility. a Under the doctrine includes forth a statute or ordinance sets ejusdem when generis, terms will things, “general enumeration of specific general of the same things be construed to embrace enumerated.” specifically or character as those kind Hackett v. J.L.G. omitted.) marks quotation (Internal 940 A.2d 769 Properties, LLC, 498, 513-14, Conn. “health,” at the definition looking Rather than (2008). spe- appropriately look to majority should more “medical” and “den- cifically terms, is, enumerated clearly parlance, in common refer terms, tal.” These Thus, people, to services rendered to not animals. enumerated, “similar health-oriented of- general item interpreted should be to refer to health- fices,” also my experience, oriented facilities for humans. In by a physical requirements problems and the created veterinary office are different from those significantly Thus, suggest a medical office.1 I would that the contemplated never the inclusion of veteri- regulation nary phrase clinics in the “similar health-oriented of- people may fices.” on occasion bark at one Although another, this does not lead to the conclusion that the operation veterinary facility of a is of the kind same office, or character as a medical or dental or that a veterinary facility contemplated was within to be scope of the zoning regulation.

SCHALLER, J., I concurring. Although concur with majority the decision of the to and judg- reverse direct case, ment I with the rationale agree generally expressed join. in Justice Zarella’s I concurrence, which I separately emphasize key write that the term chapter 60, X, article 60-10.1 of the New Canaan (B), “ ” is not ‘health-oriented’ zoning regulations1 standing broadly alone, apply which can to animals as well as “ ” ‘similar health-oriented’ humans, but which, defendant, appeals The named board of of the town of New Canaan, apparently recognized granted these differences because it application Three, subject zoning permit LLC, of the defendant Gen to certain conditions, operation, including (1) (2) limited that it refer hours of would emergencies clinics, (3) after-hour to other that it would not have boarding grooming site, (4) facilities on that it would limit to two stays. require overnight the number of facilities for animals that The trial appropriately illegal, court determined that these were a determi majority agrees. nation with which the 1Chapter 60, X, zoning regulations (B), article of the New Canaan provides “medical, dental or similar health-oriented offices shall be permitted” in a business A zone.

my view, permitted restricts the uses to human health- if, as applications. (Emphasis added.) oriented Even majority opinion, its asserts footnote 9 of strictly terms “medical” and “dental” are not limited to purposes (although human health it would be unusual animal office for medical and/ dentistry), to refer to an for veterinary purposes certainly or dental offices not similar to human health care facilities common I parlance and believe that a reasonable understanding. indi- interpretation language regulation cates that it is restricted to health-oriented offices for Partnership the care of humans. See ATC v. Coats Consolidated, Inc., North America 537, 545, 284 Conn. statute, A.2d common (2007) (“[i]n construing and that a sense must be used courts must assume reasonable and rational result was intended” [internal quotation marks omitted]). INC. v. RICHARD BROWN, AND

BROWN BLUMENTHAL, ATTORNEY GENERAL ATTORNEY GENERAL BLUMENTHAL, RICHARD AND INC. BROWN, BROWN

(SC 17920) Palmer, VertefeuiUe, Schaller, Rogers, J., Zarella Js. C. and

Case Details

Case Name: Heim v. ZONING BD. OF APPEALS OF TOWN OF NEW CANAAN

Court Name: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Date Published: Sep 2, 2008

Citation: 953 A.2d 877

Docket Number: SC 18088

Court Abbreviation: Conn.