76 Neb. 831 | Neb. | 1906
In March, 1903, Mrs. Ida M. Heim received $1,652.42 from her father’s estate. The amount was sent her in a draft drawn by the Citizens State Bank of Keithburg, Illinois, on the Continental National Bank of Chicago. The testimony discloses that Mr., and Mrs. Heim, who reside on a farm near Dawson, intended to build a new dwelling house that season, and they concluded to deposit the money in some bank where it would draw interest as a time deposit for six months, and where it would be immediately available for use when they commenced their build
Samuelson was called as a witness for the defendant, hut, before giving his version of the occurrence, it might be well to state that Mrs.. Heim had testified that she had never been in the Humboldt bank, and both Mrs. Heim and her husband testified that on the day of the transaction .she visited her husband’s mother and was there when Mr. Heim returned from Humboldt. His story of the transaction is as follows: “Q, Now, you may go on and tell the jury what took place at that time — what conversation took place between you and him at that time? A. It puts me in rather an embarrassing situation, for the reason Mrs. Heim testified she was not in the bank that day. Q. Go on and tell.which one of them did this business.. Give your version of it. A. Mr. and Mrs. Heim were both in the hank that day. Q. Now, who transacted that business with you, Mr. or Mrs. Heim? A. Mrs. Heim. Q. What conversation took place between you and Mrs. Heim leading up to this paper that Judge Broady introduced in evidence, the time check? A. Mrs. Heim and Mr. Heim came into the bank on the 13th day of March, 1903, and Mrs. Heim stepped up to the counter and asked what interest we would pay on money, or ‘what interest will you pay on money,’ and I asked her how much she wanted to leave, and she said about $1,600. I asked her how long a time she wanted to leave it, and she said about six months. Q. What did you tell her? A. I said to her the bank was paying 3 per cent, interest, but that I would pay her 4 per cent. Q.
It-is strenuously insisted by the bank that the transaction was one between Mrs.. Heim and Samuelson; that ' e bank never received the money; that it was a loan made to Samuelson individually and for which the bank cannot be held liable. If we place the evidence of Mr. Heim and Mr. Samuelson side by side, and read the statement of each relating to what transpired in the bank, no- express words used by the parties could make it clearer that Heim wished to deposit this money with the bank, and that Samuelson so. understood it. Whether it was Mr. or Mrs. Heim who visited the bank, the purpose was to make a deposit, and not a personal loan to Samuelson. For nearly 20 years he had been president of the defendant bank. It is probably true that during this time he was engaged in many private transactions in which the bank had no interest, and it may be true that he borrowed money on his own account from outside parties, but the question asked him concerning this particular deposit was what interest the bank was paying on deposits, which was a clear indication that the customer wished to deal with the bank, and not with him in his individual capacity. The fact that he replied, “The bank is paying 3 per cent.., but I will pay you 4 per cent.,” could leave but one impression upon the mind of a customer who came for the purpose of making the deposit there, viz., that the bank would make an exception in his favor and that 4
Section 341 of our code is peculiarly applicable to the facts here slioAvn. It' provides: “When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he had reason to suppose the other understood it.” Again, this case seems to be ruled by Patterson v. First Nat. Bank, 73 Neb. 384. Ziegler v. First Nat. Bank, 93 Pa. St. 393, is a case in point. We cannot do better than to quote the language of Judge Paxton in that case:
“When the plaintiff took his' money to the First National Bank of Allentown, and handed it to the cashier for deposit, the bank became responsible therefor. The cashier was the executive officer of the bank, and authorized by the very nature of his office to receive money on deposit. After receiving it, no trick or fraud on his part, by means of Avhich the money was passed over to Blumer & Co., a*836 firm in which the bank officers were largely interested, and appeared to have had the control, conld absolve the bank from its liability. No class of men have the confidence of the people to a greater extent than bank officers. Dépositors do not deal Avith' them at arm’s length, and can be imposed upon with the greatest ease by such officials. It would be monstrous to allow them to take advantage of the ignorant and unwary, by reason of their position and the confidence which it inspires. It was doubtless a misfortune to this bank to have unworthy officials, if such should prove to be the case. It certainly was unwise to permit its chief officers to occupy a dual position with divided interests, but the consequences resulting therefrom cannot be visited upon those who dealt in good faith with the bank.”
Coleman v. First Nat. Bank, 53 N. Y. 388, is also directly in point. In that case the plaintiff handed a sum of money to defendant’s teller in defendant’s banking office and over its counter, stating he desired to leave it on deposit Avith the bank. The teller gave him a certificate Avhich Avas in form an acknowledgment that plaintiff had deposited the money with S. R. VanCampen and contained a personal obligation on the part of the latter to repay the amount. VanCampen Avas the bank president. The certificate was signed by him, but not in his official capacity. The bank was not named in it, and there Avas nothing-on its face indicating that the money was deposited Avith the bank or that it assumed any obligation in respect' thereto. Plaintiff did not read the certificate Avhen he received it. In an action to recover the amount of the deposit, it was held that the plaintiff was not precluded by the certificate; that the doctrine of constructive notice of its contents from the fact of possession thereof did not apply, and that it was a question of fact for a jury whether the deposit was with the defendant or VanCampen.
In the case we are considering it is not entirely clear that the bank did not in fact get the benefit of this money. It is true that Samuelson testifies that he deposited the
We recommend an affirmance of the judgment.
By the Court: For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.