Appellants sued to recover damages for the death of their 12-year-old son who was killed when; in some unexplained manner, he came into contact with a bus owned and operated by respondent Los Angeles Transit Lines. The trial court made findings of fact which included a finding that the operator of the bus was not negligent at the time and place of the accidеnt, i.e., “. . . that at the said time and place the said bus . . . was operated in a careful and prudent manner ...”
Appellants concede the sufficiency of the evidence to support the quoted finding, but on their appeal from the judgment they contend that the trial court erred (1) in sustaining respondent’s objections to certain written interrogatories which appellants sеrved upon respondent for discovery purposes shortly before the date of trial; and (2) in denying appellants’ motions made during the trial seeking an examination of certain documents in possession of respondent’s counsel.
The main issue in this ease and the one to which counsel have directed the greater part of their arguments is simply this: did the trial court abuse its discretion in sustaining respondent’s objections to some 52 interrogatories which were served upon respondent only a few days before the date of trial ? It appears that the ruling of the trial court was based primarily upon the conclusion that appellants’ interrogatories' were untimely and tardy in that they were served at so late a date that respondent’s оbjections thereto came on regularly for hearing on the date previously set for the commencement of the trial.
The facts bearing upon the reasonableness of the ruling under discussion may be stated briefly. This action was commenced on November 2, 1956, nearly 10 months after the child’s death. Respondent’s answer was filed on December 21,1956. A pretrial hearing was held on September 25, 1957, and at the conclusion of this hearing the cause was set for trial on November 26, 1957. The pretrial conference order recited that the parties were ready for trial and made no reference to any discovery proceedings remaining to be taken except that arrangments would be made prior to November 1, *712 1957, for respondent to examine the bicycle which decedent was riding on the date of the accident. On November 26, 1957, both parties appeared in the master calendar department and announced “ready for trial,” but due to a congested calendar the court, on its own motion, ordered the trial continued to February 24, 1958.
Among the new discovery statutes enacted at the 1957 session of the Legislature, and made operative January 1, 1958, was Code of Civil Procedure, section 2030, providing that “ [a]ny party may serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served ...” The section further provides, among other things: “Within 10 days after service of interrogatories a party may serve written objections thereto together with а notice of hearing the objections at the earliest practicable time. Answers to interrogatories to which objection is made shall be deferred until the objections are determined.”
On February 5, 1958, appellants served upon respondent a set of 52 written interrogatories. Respondent’s objections to the interrogatories were filed on Monday, February 17, 1958, аnd were noticed for hearing on Monday, February 24, 1958, which was the date previously set for the commencement of the trial. It appears that compliance with the usual requirement of a five-day notice of hearing prevented an earlier hearing on the objections. Under then effective rules of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, all such matters were heаrd on specified days in Department 38.
On February 24, 1958, at 9 :15 a. m. the cause was called for trial in the Master Calendar department and both sides announced ready. The presiding judge transferred the cause to Department 64, the trial department in which Judge Weil presided. On the same morning the objections to the interrogatories came on for hearing in Department 38 before Judge Gumpert. Since the record indicates that the trial was commenced in Department 64 at 9 :45 a. m., we infer that the hearing on the objections in Department 38 was concluded between 9:15 and 9:45 a. m.
The interrogatories were quite comprehensive. They sought, among other things: (1) discovery of the names of any witnesses to the accident; (2) an examination of any statements made by such witnesses; (3) information concerning respondent’s rules for taking statements of witnesses, its procedures in making investigations and the date counsel was retained; (4) information concerning the results of respondent’s inves *713 tigation of the accident and whether photographs were taken; (5) information concerning any physical examination of the bus driver and any rеcords relating to the mechanical characteristics of the bus which figured in the accident.
The objections to the interrogatories were also quite extensive. The first objection went to all of the interrogatories and was made upon the ground that they were filed “. . . so late and so close to the date of trial (February 24, 1958) as to make the same improper and tardy and to constitute an undue interference with the orderly process and conduct of the Court and its calendar.” In addition, some 53 specific objections were interposed on various grounds including privilege, incompeteney, lack of relevancy or materiality, and infringement of constitutional guaranties against unreasonable searches.
Judge Gumpert sustained respondent’s objections to the entire set of interrogatories. According to a statement made by appellants’ counsel during the course of the trial, the ruling was based primarily upon the tardiness of the service of the interrogatories. However, the court expressed the view that respondent’s objections on the ground of privilege were valid аt least with respect to a number of the interrogatories. Appellants did not move for a continuance either in the Master Calendar Department or in the trial department.
In the light of the circumstances above recited, we hold that Judge Gumpert’s ruling constituted an entirely reasonable exercise of the discretion which the trial courts must exercise in the prоper control of discovery proceedings. Without reasonable judicial control, the instruments of discovery are susceptible to abuse and may be utilized for purposes of delay, annoyance and harassment. If a reasonable control is exercised, the salutary purposes of discovery will be served, abuses will be prevented and undue interference with orderly procedures will be avoided.
The decisions indicate that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the trial court may properly exercise its discretion in sustaining objections to interrogatories on the ground that they were served too late.
(United States
v. W.
E. O’Neil Const. Co.,
The federal practice of course is not controlling here. But it does illustrate the need for the discretionary power for which respondent argues, and “. . . our courts [are] free to consider those decisions for such persuasive value as their reasoning may have.”
(City & County of San Francisco
v.
Superior Court,
Under former Code of Civil Procedure, sеction 1000, which was superseded in 1957 by the new discovery statutes, the trial court was vested with a wide discretion to determine the conditions under which discovery and inspection of documents would be allowed. As stated in
Union Oil Co.
v.
Superior Court,
. An analogous situation is presented in the statutory requirement that proceedings be stayed until a nonresident plaintiff files a cost bond requested by defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1030.) That statute does not specify the time in which a requеst for cost bond must be filed, nor does it authorize the trial judge to reject the defendant’s request as untimely. But in
Straus
v.
Straus,
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the practical necessity for the exercise of a sound discretion in the proper judicial control of procedural machinery has long been recognized. (See
Hays
v.
Superior Court,
At the trial a Mrs. DeKorven was called as a witness for appellants. After she had testified to her observations relating to the circumstances of the accident, counsel for appellants elicited the information that a Mr. West, representing respondent’s insurer, had interviewed her and had made notes during the interview. Mrs. DeKorven testified that she *716 had never signed any statement, and that she did not know what Mr. West had written during their conversation. At this point appellants’ counsel requested that he be permitted to examine whatever writing Mr. West had prepared. Respondent opposed the request and the court denied it.
Appellants now argue that there was meager and conflicting evidence on the issue of negligence and “ [i]t may well be that such disclosure would lead plaintiffs to the discovery of sufficient evidence to establish defendant’s negligence.” However, Mrs. DeKorven was appellants’ witness and she testified fully as to her recollection of the accident. Even assuming that the investigator’s notes were subject to plaintiffs’ right of inspection
{cf. City & County of San Francisco
v.
Superior Court, supra,
Marshall Wiltgen, the driver of the bus, was called as a witness for the defense. . On cross-examination, Wiltgen testified that after the accident he had made a report pursuant to respondent’s rules. Appellants then moved to examine said statement to which motion respondent objected on the ground of privilege. Counsel stipulated that the court might determine the question of privilege on the basis of the affidavits which respondent had filed in support оf its objections to appellants’ interrogatories. These affidavits developed at considerable length the procedures followed by respondent and its insurance carrier, the Transit Casualty Company, in conducting investigations of accidents. They disclosed an agreement between respondent and its insurance carrier whereby the latter agreed tо defend respondent against claims and lawsuits arising from accidents and was given the right to make investigations for the purpose of enabling it to prepare defenses to such claims and suits. It was stated that the insurance contract required respondent to cooperate with the insurance carrier in securing witnesses, obtaining statements, etc. One of said affidavits сontained the following averments: “That all of the investigation with respect to this accident and the resulting litigation has been done by Transit Casualty Company. That *717 most of the investigation of this action was by Burke West, who is also an attorney at law. That, from experience, said Transit Company has learned that each accident in which an injury has been involved, is a potential lawsuit, for which reason Transit Casualty Company, in its investigation of accidents, including the securing of statements from witnesses, is motivated primarily by its desire to properly prepare a defense for possible litigation. For that reason, all witness statements are transmitted to attorneys for said Transit Casualty Company and are retained by the attorney who is selected to defend said litigation. The requirement that operators of busses and streetcars secure names and addresses of witnesses, where possible, has been adoptd by Transit Casualty Company in order that the above purpose may be fulfilled.”
It also appeared from the affidavits that the bus driver made-his report of the accident in triplicate. Two copies of the report went to respondent’s statistical department, and were destroyed after statistical data were taken therefrom. The third copy went to the attorneys for respondent's insurance carrier in accordance with the agreement above mentioned for use in preparing for the defense of litigation pending or in prospect.
The applicable rule by which the validity of the claim of privilege must be determined in such circumstances has been stated as follows in
Holm
v.
Superior Court, supra,
In the instant case there can be no question but that the affidavits set forth facts more than sufficient to support the trial court’s implied finding that respondent’s dominant purpose in obtaining and preserving the driver’s statement was that it might be transmitted as a communication to the attorneys designated by its insurance carrier for use in the
*718
performance of professional responsibilities in defending respondent against a potential claim.
(Holm
v.
Superior Court, supra,
Affirmed.
Fox, P. J., and Ashburn, J., concurred.
Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 22, 1959. Gibson, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
Notes
“In view of the wide discretion vested in trial judges to protect against abuse, as well as to enforce discovery, the significance of an able trial bench to sound and just judicial administration is further emphasized.” (Louisell, Discovery Today, 45 Cal.L.Rev. 486, 514.)