184 A. 286 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1936
Argued March 10, 1936. The District Attorney of Delaware County, acting under the authority of section 410 of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Act, (Act of November 29, 1933, P.L. 15, Special Session 1933-34) as amended by the Act of July 18, 1935, P.L. 1246, on November 15, 1935 filed a petition in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Delaware County asking for the revocation of the restaurant license which had been granted and issued by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board to Michael Heffernan at Sixth and Morton Avenues, Chester, Pennsylvania, for alleged violation of the laws relating to liquor, malt liquor and brewed beverages on the licensed premises on July 12, 1935, by the unlawful sale and furnishing of such liquors to minors. The court granted a rule which was duly served on the licensee.
The respondent, Heffernan, thereupon filed a petition pursuant to the Act of March 5, 1925, P.L. 23, raising a preliminary question as to the jurisdiction of the court, *546 and averring that the said court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter or authority to revoke his license because, he alleged, he was at the time of the filing of the district attorney's petition operating his restaurant under a license issued by said Board on November 1, 1935, pursuant to the Amended Act of July 18, 1935, supra, and not under the license granted under the Act of November 29, 1933, supra, expiring December 31, 1935, which, he averred, had been superseded and terminated by the license issued under the Act of 1935, supra.
A rule was thereupon granted, to which the District Attorney made answer denying the averments of the petition and affirming the jurisdiction of the court of quarter sessions in the premises. The court, in an opinion by its learned President Judge, disposed of the preliminary question of jurisdiction thus raised by refusing the petition to dismiss the proceeding for want of jurisdiction. The respondent, Heffernan, within fifteen days thereafter took this appeal to this court, as required by the Act of 1925, P.L. 23.
The only question before us, therefore, is whether the court of quarter sessions has jurisdiction of the proceeding.
On this the Act of November 29, 1933, supra, as amended by the Act of July 18, 1935, supra, is explicit. It provides that after a license has been issued by the Board under the provisions of the Act, "upon petition of the Attorney General, the board, the district attorney of any county, or upon the petition of fifteen or more taxpayers, residents of the ward, borough or township where the place of business is located, the court of quarter sessions of the proper county, upon sufficient cause being shown or proof being made that the licensee holding a license . . . . . . has violated any of the laws of this Commonwealth relating to liquors, malt or brewed beverages, or alcohol or other alcoholic beverages, *547 may, upon due notice and proper hearing . . . . . . suspend or revoke the license issued under the provisions of this act," etc.
Jurisdiction to hear and act upon petitions for the revocation of a license issued by the Liquor Control Board under the provisions of the Act is thus expressly committed to the court of quarter sessions of the proper county; and by the `proper county' is meant the county wherein such licensed premises are located.
As the jurisdictional question is the only one raised by the present appeal we shall not discuss nor decide the interesting question on the merits which the appellant has injected into his brief and argument. Appellant has confused the question of the court's jurisdiction with the right or propriety of revoking the license in this particular case. The test of jurisdiction is whether the court has the power to enter on the inquiry; not whether it can, in the circumstances here present, legally revoke the license. The latter question may come up for determination following an adverse decision. "Jurisdiction is not dependent on . . . . . . [petitioner's] right to the relief demanded, the regularity of the proceedings or the correctness of the decision rendered", 15 C.J. 735. In construing the Act of 1925, supra, our Supreme Court said in Welser v. Ealer,
In Lackawanna County v. James,
In Nippon Ki-Ito Kaisha, Ltd. v. Ewing-Thomas Corp.,
And in Lewis v. Beatty,
In Hughes v. Hughes,
In Fudula's Petition,
Jurisdiction of the cause of action involved in this proceeding relates to the competency of the court below to hear, consider and determine controversies of the general class to which the case now presented for consideration belongs: Staryeu v. Midouhas,
The order is affirmed and the record is remitted to the court below, with directions that, following an opportunity to the respondent to file an answer on the merits, and a proper hearing upon due notice, the court shall dispose of the rule as to right and justice shall belong.
Costs on this appeal to be paid by appellant.