Heffernan v. SlapinHeffernan v. Slapin
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Cotter
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether an executor may utilize the hearing described in
The parties stipulated to the facts and those pertinent to this appeal are: The decedent, Bessie Miller Lyons, was a settlor of a trust dated September 6, 1968, involving certain real estate located in Norwalk; she died testate on February 17, 1973. In November of 1973, the executor of the decedent’s estate filed the Connecticut succession tax return (form S-l), reporting the previously noted trust as item 1 on schedule 10. In the column of schedule 10 designated as “Total Value at Date of Death,” the executor listed the value of the corpus of the trust as $549,300. In the adjacent column calling for concessions of tax-ability, the executor claimed the trust was not taxable. The tax commissioner objected to the executor’s claim of nontaxability but did not object to the executor’s valuation of the trust. After a hearing on the tax commissioner’s objection, the Nor-walk Probate Court entered a decree on May 21, 1975, holding the trust to be not taxable for Connecticut succession tax purposes. An appeal by the commissioner to the Superior Court, however, was sustained and the executor did not appeal the Superior Court’s decree holding the trust to be taxable.
On June 3, 1976, the plaintiff tax commissioner computed the Connecticut succession tax based on the succession tax return as filed and included the trust estate, found taxable by the Superior Court, at the value of $549,300 placed on it by the defendant executor. The trust was added to other con
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ceded taxable property to form a gross taxable estate of slightly over $1,000,000. On June 21,1976, the defendant filed an application under
I
The present case involves solely the interpretation of
*45 II
The defendant executor argues initially that, on its face, there is no limitation regarding the issues which may be heard in a hearing held pursuant to
Nonetheless, although words do not become ambiguous simply because lawyers or laymen contend for different meanings and courts do not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for it; see, e.g.,
Collins
v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
164 Conn. 369, 374, 321 A.2d 444; because the defendant contends that as a whole and as applied to the present facts the statutory scheme created by
A
Initially in support of his claim that
The succession tax return utilized was in conformity with the mandatory language of
B
In conformity with the initial language of
The defendant’s construction fails to take into account that
C
The defendant also contends that the 1978 alterations of
The statutory history is equally clear regarding the effect of the language of Public Acts 1978, No. 78-195. While presenting the bill which became Public Acts 1978, No. 78-195, Senator George Guidera stated: “[T]his bill would make several changes in the procedures relating to the payment of succession [taxes]; . . . and generally would make those procedures less restrictive.” 21 Sen. Proc., Pt. 6, 1978 Sess., p. 2442. See also 21 H. R. Proc., Pt. 5, 1978 Sess., pp. 2119-20.
5
The executor
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cannot take advantage of the change wrought by Public Act No. 78-195. See
D
The defendant’s final contention is that if he is denied a hearing on the question of valuation for succession tax purposes he will be denied constitutional due process. We fail to perceive what deprivation is involved in denying the defendant a hearing on a valuation which is designated as entirely for the defendant to determine as an initial matter. It is his own action of which the defendant complains, not the lack of opportunity to be heard created by statute. 6 Compare, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S. Ct. 780, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113.
*52 We have repeatedly stated that: “Where the language used by the legislature is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction by the courts and the statute will be applied as its words direct. Baston v. Ricci, 174 Conn. 522, 528, 391 A.2d 161 (1978); Johnson v. Personnel Appeal Board, 174 Conn. 519, 521-22, 391 A.2d 168 (1978); Clark v. Mulcahy, 162 Conn. 332, 338, 294 A.2d 504 (1972).” Muha v. United Oil Co., supra, 730-31. This was the procedure which the trial court followed.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
Tn 1973,
In 1973,
In 1973,
In 1973,
On the house floor, the sponsor of the bill enacted as Public Acts 1978, No. 78-195 stated in part: “The bill would provide that any item that affects the computation or determination of the tax can be raised at this final hearing provided that there has been no prior hearing in the Probate Court concerning that particular item. This is a desirable change since when the fiduciary receives the com *51 putation of the tax this is the first official word that he has as to the amount actually owed by the estate for succession tax purposes. This is the time when the fiduciary would review his file and determine whether the tax has been correctly computed in accordance with law. If he has any disagreement with the way the tax has been computed and cannot reach a satisfactory agreement with the Tax Commissioner’s office, then he should have the right within this fixed period of time to [go to] the Probate Court and have it decided before the tax becomes final. If the fiduciary has obtained any further information with respect to any estate asset such as an item being overvalued on the original return, or erroneous concession of taxability, or misdeduction, then all of these things should be able to be taken into consideration at this time so that the tax computed at this time would be accurate insofar as possible. This bill would allow for that flexibility.”
We note that