195 Mo. 104 | Mo. | 1906
— This action was commenced in the circuit court of Johnson county on June 30, 1900, and defendant was duly served with process on that date. At the November term, 1900, the plaintiff filed an amended petition which is in substance as follows: That the defendant is a railroad corporation, operating a line of railway from the town of Knob Noster in Johnson. county to tbe city of St. Louis, and was on the 22nd of January, 1900, a common carrier of passengers for hire, between the points above named, and on that date, for a valuable consideration received by it, received plaintiff into one of its said cars, to-wit, a caboose, in a freight train called a stock train, and undertook to carry him safely from Knob Noster to St. Louis. It is then alleged “That defendant disregarded its duty to so carry plaintiff, and by its agents, servants and employees at or near the town of LaMonte, while plaintiff was in said caboose and moving toward the rear end thereof and while said train and car were moving slowly, negligently and unskillfully mismanaged and operated said train and car, and engine, and carelessly and negligently, and with great and unusual and unnecessary
The answers consist: first, of a general denial; and, secondly, as follows: ‘ ‘ The plaintiff herein at the time and place of the alleged accident, was not upon defendant’s train as a passenger, and had no legal right to be thereon; that said defendant was not guilty of any negligence in respect to any legal duty which it owed plaintiff; that said plaintiff was injured, if at all, by reason of his own gross negligence and recklessness in moving about upon defendant’s train while it was in motion without any reason or justification therefor.” Third, “That said plaintiff was guilty of gross negligence, not only contributing to, but directly causing his own injury, in that he was unnecessarily, negligently, and carelessly standing up or moving about in defendant’s caboose while the train was in motion, and by reason of such negligence, recklessness and carelessness sustained the injury, if any, complained of, without the fault or negligence of said defendant.”
The reply admits that the plaintiff was injured in the caboose of the defendant, and denied each and every other allegation contained in the answer.
The cause was tried at the November term, 1902, and a verdict returned for the plaintiff' for five thous- and dollars, and a. judgment was rendered accordingly. Motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were
The evidence tends to establish the following facts:
The plaintiff, Mr. Hedrick, resided, at the time of the accident, near Knob Noster in Johnson county; he was fifty-three years old. On the 20th of January, 1900, he started from Knob Noster with a car-load of hogs, belonging to Hanna Bros., on what is known as a stock pass. He took passage in the caboose attached to a freight train, bound from Knob Noster to St. .Louis. There was no other passenger in the caboose but himself. The usual traincrew were in and out of the caboose from time to time until they reached LaMonte, a station east of Knob Noster, and near the western line of Pettis county. This train stopped at LaMonte to take in another carload of stock belonging to Hanna Bros. The plaintiff testified that he was requested by Hanna Bros, to look after a load of hogs when he got there. Mr. Jefferson Hanna was at LaMonte and had purchased a load of hogs from Mr. Oglesby, and he testified that Hanna Bros, gave a man by the name of Fowler a pass for the load of hogs taken on at LaMonte, and that he was loading the hogs into a car at LaMonte when this train arrived there, and Mr. Oglesby testified that he was assisting Mr. Hanna in loáding the car at LaMonte, and from their evidence it would seem plain that plaintiff had nothing to do with the loading of the hogs at LaMonte; that they were practically loaded on the car when plaintiff reached LaMonte on the train that day.
Plaintiff’s account of what took place at LaMonte was that after the train got to LaMonte it was in a manner. stopped; two of the trainmen had already left the caboose, and the plaintiff got up and started to the rear end of the car, and there was a jump, he did not know what happened, but thought the train had collided, and for a moment or two he did not know what had happen
On cross-examination, witness identified the livestock contract between the railroad company and Hanna Bros., which provided that plaintiff should be in charge of the carload of stock as the agent of Hanna Bros. The 9th provision of the contract provides “'that the person or persons in charge of live stock carried by this contract shall remain in the caboose car attached to the train while the same is in motion, and whenever such person shall leave the caboose car or pass over or along the cars or tracks, he shall do so at his own risk of personal injury from every cause whatever, and the said railroad company shall not be required to stop or start its trains or caboose cars from depots or platforms, or to furnish lights for the accommodations or safety of such person.” Plaintiff testified further that there were from twenty to twenty-three or twenty-four cars in the train. Plaintiff was asked if he did not know prior to the time of this accident that it was more dangerous to be moving about when the train was in motion than to sit down, and
The testimony on behalf of the plaintiff tended to show that the car which was being loaded with hogs at LaMonte was four or five cars east of the caboose, and that the caboose stopped west of the depot, and a part of the train was then east of the depot; these cars averaged from thirty to thirty-six feet in length; that the train was stopped at LaMonte to take in a carload of hogs at that point. In regard to the stopping of the train, Mr. J. D. Hanna testified that he had had many years experience in buying and shipping stock, as well as riding on freight trains, and testified that he was at LaMonte when the freight train on which plaintiff was riding arrived, and was loading a car of' hogs to go on the same train. He testified that “the train stopped rather sudden there at that time, I thought. ’ ’
W. H. Oglesby for the plaintiff also testified: “I noticed a very sudden stop in the train that arrived at that time; it was an unusual stop for the freight train to make.”
The circuit court over the objection of the defendant permitted witnesses Hanna and Oglesby to testify that after they were through loading their car of hogs, and after the train had stopped, they went to another car in said train and found the hogs therein piled up
Hanna testified that after the train stopped, the plaintiff came down to where they were loading the •car at LaMonte, but when he got there, he was nearly through loading the hogs. There was nothing .to 'indicate that plaintiff was injured in any way when he came to where he was loading the hogs, and he spoke to him, but he did not notice anything the matter with him. Oglesby also testified that plaintiff came up where they were loading the hogs and he spoke to him, but did not notice anything the matter with him, nor anything to indicate that he had sustained an injury, and that plaintiff made no complaint that he had been injured.
After the carload of hogs at LaMonte were put in the train, the plaintiff continued his journey to St. Louis, on that same train. At Sedalia, he got into another caboose. He testified that he stayed with the hogs and remained in St. Louis around the stockyards from Monday until Thursday night. He was not examined by any doctor while in St. Louis, and did not take any medicine for his injuries. It was some two or three weeks after his return home before he said anything to a doctor about it, probably a month. Dr; Rains was his family physician. Dr. Rains examined him something like a month or six weeks after the accident happened. He had been his family physician before that and afterwards. He had him subpoenaed as a witness in this case, and the doctor was in attendance upon the trial, but was not introduced as a. witness by the plaintiff.
Dr. Shy testified that sometime in the summer of
Ur. Schofield also testified on behalf of plaintiff that aside from his complaints there was very little open to observation from which he could say plaintiff was suffering from the injury; that he had never read in any medical work of an accident where this muscle had been injured by a jerk; that he discovered no indications of a blow in his examination of the plaintiff; so far as the pain was concerned, he had to depend entirely upon the patient, and that the conditions which are found could have been produced by rheumatism or some other disease of the muscle.
Other facts may be noted in the discussion of the propositions argued by the respective counsel.
I. The relative duties and obligations which arise when a "railroad company receives passengers for hire
In Wait v. Railroad, 165 Mo. 612, it is said: “It seems now to be well-settled law here, as elsewhere, that where a railroad company carries passengers for hire on its freight trains, ‘ it must exercise the same degree of care as is required in the operation of its regular passenger trains, the difference only being that the passenger submits himself to the inconvenience and danger necessarily attending that mode of conveyance.’ ” [Vide cases cited, by Brace, P. J., in support of this proposition, 165 Mo. l. c. 621.] In that ease this court adopted the law as announced in Railroad v. Arnol, 144 Ill. 261, as follows: ‘‘ ‘Persons taking passage upon freight trains, or in a caboose or car attached to a freight train, cannot expect, or require the conveniences or all of the safeguards against danger that they may demand upon trains devoted to passenger service, and are accordingly held to have accepted the accommodation provided by the company, subject to all the ordinary inconveniences, delays and hazards incident to such trains, when inade up and equipped in the ordinary manner of making up and equipping such trains, and managed with proper care and skill. . . . But if a railway company consents to carry passengers for hire by such trains, the general rule of its responsibility for their safe carriage is not otherwise relaxed. Prom the composition of such a train and the appliances necessarily used in its efficient operation, there cannot, in the nature of things, be the same immunity from peril in traveling by freight trains, as there is by passenger trains, but the same degree of care can be exercised in the operation of each. The result in respect to the safety of the passenger may be wholly different, because of the inherent hazards incident to the opera
In this case the testimony of the plaintiff himself
In the last case it is aptly observed that it is a matter of common knowledge that jolting and jarring are incident to the operation of freight trains, and therefore negligence cannot be inferred from the mere fact that an injury was suffered from a jar occasioned by the stopping of such a train. In that case the plaintiff and her companions described the accident as being produced by a “very hard jolt,” and “a backward jolt,” “very hard or rather a hard jar, or rather a severe jolt,” and it was ruled upon that evidence that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. And in Erwin v. Railroad, 94 Mo. App. l. c. 297, Judge Bland, speaking for the same court, said: “When the fact that there is more or less jerking and jolting incident to the operation of a freight train — a matter of common knowledge — is taken into view, negligence cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the plaintiff was injured by a jar occasioned by the stopping of the train. [Carvin v. St. Louis, 151 Mo. 334; Wait v. Railroad, 165 Mo. 612.] The rule of res ipsa loquitur can only be applied where there is something which, if unexplained, tends to show
In Guffey v. Railroad, 53 Mo. App. 466, the testimony of the several witnesses described the jar or jars which occurred in practically the same language as that used by the plaintiff in the case at bar, except that neither Hanna nor Oglesby described the stop to be as sudden or severe as that described by the witnesses in the Guffey case, or in the Portuchek case, and speaking of this Judge Smith says: “We do not think these expressions of the witnesses are of any value whatever, or stated so much as a scintilla of evidence.” All of these expressions amount to mere conclusions or opinions of the witnesses. Neither the plaintiff nor Hanna nor Oglesby undertook to describe
If the plaintiff can recover on the facts elicited on the trial of this case, it must he upon the one proposition that the jar or jerk caused by the train stopping was ipso facto negligence. We know of no case that would justify us in so holding. The jar was the natural result of the stopping of a long train of freight cars, and the giving out of the slack. When it is considered that it is a matter of common knowledge that in the movement of trains there is more or less jolting and jerking incident to the starting and the stopping of the train, and that, so far, human skill and ingenuity has not been able to prevent this entirely, it cannot be said as a matter of law that negligence can be predicated upon the mere fact that the jolt or jerk results from the stopping of a long freight train. It is well settled that negligence cannot be presumed when nothing is done out of the usual course of business, unless the course, is improper. There is nothing in this record to indicate that there was any act of omission or commission not usually incident to the constant moving of heavy freight trains under the control and management of skillful and careful employees. We are not unmindful of the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant jerked or knocked or bumped the train with unusual, unnecessary and extraordinary force against the caboose, but we are clearly of the opinion that in the light of the uniform expressions of this court and of the several appellate courts, the evidence in this case was wholly insufficient to establish any such unusual and extraordinary jarring and jerking.
In our opinion the basic fact upon which a recovery must rest in this case, to-wit, the negligence of the defendant, was not established either by the positive testimony of the witnesses or by any presumption of negligence arising out of the facts developed, and it results that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover,