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Heddan v. Dirkswager
336 N.W.2d 54
Minn.
1983
Check Treatment

*1 Inc., 281 N.W.2d Aggregate, Sand in- insurer cannot seek

(Minn.1979). An incurred insured for costs from its

demnity acts independent apart defending its contract.

from the part. reversed in part,

Affirmed HEDDAN, al., Appellants, et

E.Milo

v. DIRKSWAGER, et K.

Kenneth

al., Respondents, HEDDAN, Appellant,

E.Milo SOPSIC,

John Commissioner Respondent.

Safety, CX-82-1645, C3-83-198.

Nos. of Minnesota.

Supreme Court 1, 1983. 18, 1983. Aug. Denied

Rehearing

Nichols, & Carruthers Kruger, Starks Raster, appel- Minneapolis, James H. lants. *2 Gen., III, petition mitted a Humphrey, Atty. generally denying

Hubert H. each of Gen., revocation, of Fabel, and the elements but Deputy Atty. Thomas L. asserted Jr., privilege against his Coleman, self-incrimination and Sp. Atty. Asst. Norman B. give refused to a statement fill out and Gen., Paul, for respondents. St. form sign by Depart- distributed ment of Public for Safety obtaining review. 27,1982, July On the Commissioner of Pub- Safety lic sent informing notice Heddan SCOTT, Justice. him he that found sufficient basis to sustain is a of appeal This consolidation two low the revocation. First, rulings. appeal er court this is an August 16, 1982, judi- On Heddan a had of judgment Ramsey from the order for cial review a hearing before municipal County District Court the consti upholding referee. Counsel for Heddan moved dis- of the new license tutionality prehearing miss the revocation on grounds order that proceedings revocation the judicial review as to be by heard a court Second, also consolidated referee and that the proceedings violated appeal for review is an from an order aof his rights. Fifth Amendment The motion three-judge panel affirming an order of was denied. The revocation of Heddan’s municipal court the case Milo E. Hed driving privileges was sustained at that dan v. Safety Commissioner of Public which time. upheld Heddan’s license revocation. Hed 8, 1982, July On Lundberg Paul William sought dan review before this discretionary by' Minneapolis police was stopped officers appeal court and his was consolidated with subsequently charged and with DWI and appeal Ramsey County from the Dis blood having a alcohol of .10 concentration trict We Court. affirm. or more. He to a Breathalyzer submitted declaratory judgment action chal- test which revealed a .10 blood alcohol con- lenges constitutionality of Minnesota’s that given tent. At time he was notice a license be- prehearing revocation statute on and order revocation of his driver’s half parties: Lundberg, of three Paul W. license. notice and order also carried Heddan, Craig Milo E. S. Miller. with a permit it driver’s valid temporary for a seven-day period. applied 9, 1982, Lundberg E. July On Milo Heddan was for was July issued a limited license on stopped Hennepin County charged judicial 1982. He filed his for with having DWI and a blood alcohol con- and administrative on July .10 He centration of or more. submitted to a Breathalyzer which revealed a blood Lundberg appeared re- for administrative alcohol content .22. At time he was view a August before driver evaluator on given a and order his notice petition 1982. He a generally submitted driver’s license. The notice and order also each denying of the elements of the revoca- carried it a temporary permit with driver’s tion, but privilege against asserted his self- valid seven-day period. July for a On give incrimination and refused to state- a applied Heddan for and received a ment fill sign out and the form distribut- Department limited license from the ed of Public Safety for Safety. permit- Public His limited license obtaining Lundberg repre- review. was ted him drive from hours of 8 a.m. counsel, argued sented a who .10 week, through p.m. Monday six per reading inherently was defective. On or through Saturday. August 15,1982, about Commissioner Safety Lundberg sent notice that he 21, 1982, On also his July Heddan filed found sufficient basis to sustain the revoca- request for review and administra- tion. tive he appeared review. On that date with part August 4, 1982, counsel before driver evaluator as Lundberg reapplied On his license, review. Heddan sub- and received limited as the one earlier, appeared July Miller before a obtained

he had and was due to for administrative review 30-day period driver evaluator was for was, day, the same He expire August. and was counsel. His coun- represented permitted license which a limited reissued argued Minneapolis sel Police De- 7 a.m. the hours of him drive between partment’s 21-point failure to use the BCA *3 through Friday. Monday p.m. and 5 checklist was a fatal defect in the revoca- tion. 19, 1982, judicial a August On Lundberg in the was scheduled

hearing request After Miller filed his for adminis- requested time the state a case. At that Department trative review the of Public the September to as continuance Safety attempted to obtain from the Minne- Breathalyzer op- and test arresting officer apolis Department copies Police of the im- objection, Over erator were unavailable. plied advisory, notice and order of continuance, the but granted the referee license. Al- temporary and Safety of Public Department ordered the report a was for- though police incident Lundberg’s driving privileges full reinstate Public Department Safety, warded to 19,1982, pending the hear- August effective these other documents were not. The docu- was then resched- ing. judicial hearing Minneapolis by ments were located Po- 30, 1982. After September uled to Department August lice which rescind- Lundberg’s revocation was hearing request was 15 from the for adminis- reasoned that the closeness ed. The referee However, they trative review. were not with the failure of reading, together Department received until after the to follow the Bureau of Criminal police 15-day period elapsed. had (BCA) steps recommended Apprehension 13,1982, August driving privi- On Miller’s interference, frequency dictated avoid radio leges were reinstated as a result the driver. He therefore held favor of findings of the administrative review. The meet its burden of the state failed to Safety order of the Commissioner of Public of the evidence proof by preponderance a revoking driving privileges Miller’s was was accurate and relia- that the test result Department overruled because the of Public ble. Safety had not received from the Minneap- 15, 1982, Craig Miller July On Sheridan Department olis Police information or re- stopped by Minneapolis police was ports sufficient to sustain the'review within having with DWI and a blood alco- charged 15-day required period. time hol of .10 or more. He sub- concentration test, Breathalyzer which re- mitted to a Implied Overview of the Consent Law alcohol content of .16. At

vealed a blood he was a notice and order given time question presented by appeal license. The of revocation of his driver’s (1982), whether which Minn.Stat. § temporary notice and order carried with it a suspension mandates of a driver’s license permit seven-day period. driver’s valid for a because of a a refusal take chemical test 26,1982, requested On Miller adminis- alcohol for concentration or failure of a judicial trative and review. He submitted a chemical by registering test an alcohol con- petition each of the ele- generally denying more, centration of .10 or is violative of due revocation, asserted his ments of the but process privilege against or the self-incrimi- and re- privilege against self-incrimination nation. fill give fused to a statement or out The elements of an consent viola- form distributed tion are clearly defined the statute: obtaining review. He Safety for consent; conditions; Implied Subd. applied also for a limited license. Miller (a) type Any per- election as to was a limited license because he was denied drives, operates physical son who inis employed at that time. Present em- control of a motor vehicle within this prerequisite obtaining is a for a ployment consents, subject provisions state to the limited license. 169.121, driver given 30-day this section section to a was temporary license breath, blood, chemical of his with the test notice revocation. Minn.Stat. 169.123, 5a determining urine for the subd. The driver purpose then had the presence right appeal or a the license of alcohol controlled sub- revoca- tion by requesting judicial hearing. stance. The test shall be administered at If the driver appeal, did he was issued a tem- peace direction of officer. test porary license until a final when determination on required person an revocation was made. probable officer has reasonable subd. 5a If appeal no grounds person was to believe driv- requested, was the revocation became effec- ing, or in operating, physical control of a tive period. at the of the 30-day end motor vehicle in violation of section 169.- 121 and one the following conditions This system resulted in approximately exist: has lawfully been one review out of every *4 placed under arrest for violation of sec- three implied consent reported. violations 169.121, tion anor ordinance in conformi- During 33,000 the approximately of therewith; ty (2) or the has been implied reported, consent violations there involved in a motor vehicle accident or 10,500 were approximately requests for ju- resulting collision in property damage, 10,500 dicial review. Out of requests these death; personal or injury, per- or review, for 326 drivers were able to avoid son has to take the screening refused test license revocation. 169.121, provided by for section subdivi- During legislative the 1982 session Minn. 6; sion screening test was Stat. 169.123 was in § amended order to administered and recorded an alcohol con- reduce the lapse time an implied between centration of or more. No action consent and imposition violation of may against be taken the person for de- license revocation. The delayed old law all test, a clining to take direct blood if of- 30 days revocations for from the notice of fered, unless an alternative test was of- just revocation. The new law provides fered. days. 169.123, Minn.Stat. subds. and 5a § 169.123, 2(a) (1982) (em- Minn.Stat. subd. § (1982). old law enabled additional de- added). phasis lay aby request judicial for review. The The statute on to goes require when provide new amendments filing that “[t]he requesting peace officer must of the petition shall not stay revocation of notify the driver of a consequences 169.123, or denial.” Minn.Stat. subd. 5c § to or not decision test test. Minn.Stat. (1982). 169.123, 2(b) (1982). subd. § removing While the opportunity for

A final proce- element lengthy delay, 1982 amendments simul- peace dure is that a officer afford must taneously system created a more efficient driver a opportunity reasonable consult obtaining for review of the revocation or- counsel before to test or not opting test. der. The amendments for provided two requirement was by This established this distinct avenues review: administrative State, Prideaux Commissioner of review the Safety, of Public Safety, judicial 310 Minn. 247 N.W.2d and municipal review a county (1976). court. revocations the im- The administrative Administrative under review mechanism is entirely new. The plied days provides consent law are 90 for test fail- statute as fol- ures and 6 for test lows: months refusals. Minn. 169.123, (1982). The law Stat. subd. § Administrative At any review. time

designed encourage taking of tests during a period imposed suspected remove and certifiable a person may request this section drunken drivers from road. Under the in writing a review of the order of revo- prior effect to July public cation the commissioner safe- review, conducting the com- an administrative receiving request ty. Upon officer considers shall review the the review information designee his missioner or all relevant re- upon provided by which the order driver and order, evidence agen- law enforcement ports provided other material infor- based, was reports cies. The review officer his find- to the attention brought mation days to the driver within ings whether commissioner, determine report findings the or- for review. The includes exists to sustain cause sufficient receiving each element of the offense. Within 30 days der. Within report days following receipt shall of the notice and request the commissioner person may petition of his review. The order revocation a writing the results judicial for review. in this is not the court Minn.Stat. provided review subdivision 169.123, provisions (1982). case subd. 5c This subject to the contested § procedure pursuing act in sec- while administrative review. the administrative done tions 14.01 to 14.70. judicial provision, review as amended availability of administrative re- 1982, requires hearing that a be conduct- shall have view for an order of revocation date,” and in practicable ed “at the earliest availability judicial upon no effect filing no event later than 60 after the under this section. review. petition Minn.Stat. 169.123, subd. 5b subd. 6 Judicial district an informal review provision contemplates implement administrators are directed to remedy ob- procedure designed which is through efficient schedul- *5 procedure speedy, is vious errors. ing and the transfer of cases within their days, 15 and it promising a result within expedite hearings. districts to Court ad- process accords a certain measure due in the ministrators 10 Minnesota subjects revocation orders. scheduling sys- districts have established a judi- consent implied whereby tem for cases administrative review requesting Drivers review will with- normally cial be had from re- are asked to fill out an administrative days following filing in 10 to 40 setting pertaining view form forth facts petition. is not valid. Drivers why the revocation form, have it sign are asked to then raise the issues on Appellants following notarized, it to the commission- and submit appeal: paragraph of the form er. Each numbered (1) the prehearing Whether license revo- implied consent sets forth an element provisions of cation 169.123 § solicits the driver’s version of

violation and (1982) process guaran- violate due of law as to that element. pertaining the facts teed the United States and Minnesota Administrative reviews are conducted Constitutions. employees civil known as “driver service Whether 169.123 Minn.Stat. § All in this analysts.” employees safety persons to incriminate themselves compels past experience have with classification priv- in violation of their Fifth Amendment license revocation. governing laws and rules ilege against self-incrimination. They undergone training have also ad- process imposes 1. Procedural due legal princi- review and in the ministrative governmental constraints decisions in this area. ples deprive “liberty” which individuals of to the written for In addition meaning interests within the “property” review, for may appear drivers Due Process Fifth Clause of the day review on business Fourteenth Amendments of the United scheduled times regularly Paul or St. I, 7, Constitution and Article States Section throughout the state. Counsel locations the Minnesota Constitution. driver, there although with the may appear is an subpoenaing important proper- or cross- A license to drive provisions are no Burson, ty interest. Bell v. 535, 402 examining witnesses. U.S.

59 539, 1586, 1589, 90 involved a class action challenge 29 L.Ed.2d to the Mas- 91 S.Ct. dispute (1971). system. The state does sachusetts are interests appellants’ property licenses system Massachusetts is similar to the new rather, it subject process protection; to due system respects, Minnesota in most but dis- existing procedures, as concludes that tinguishable some. discussed, provide process all the previously Massachusetts, The license revocation in constitutionally is due before a driver Minnesota, is only unlike for test refusals. can of his license. deprived upon report revocation is based from has Supreme The United States Court peace officer to the state licensing agen- consistently hearing held that some form of takes cy, upon immediate effect is- required finally is before an individual is suance. v. deprived property interest. Wolff The post-revocation McDonnell, 539, 557-558, U.S. S.Ct. Massachusetts, Minnesota, like provides 2963, 2975-2976, (1974). 41 L.Ed.2d 935 multiple levels of review. The first is an proc- The fundamental of due appearance before the Registrar of Motor opportunity ess is the to be heard “at a Vehicles. Massachusetts Gen.Laws Ann. meaningful meaningful time and in a man- 90, (West 24(l)(g) 1975). appear- ch. Manzo, 545, ner.” Armstrong v. 380 U.S. is immediately ance available and a decision 14 L.Ed.2d 62 is available apparently days. within to 10 is flexible and calls process “[D]ue 7-8, 2615-2616, n. 99 S.Ct. at for such as the procedural protections par- appeal provided n. 5. An to a more Morrissey ticular situation demands.” body formal administrative known as the Brewer, Appeal. Board of The Massachusetts stat- 33 L.Ed.2d 484 ute does not specify how soon this hearing The resolution of the issue of wheth must be held or when a decision must be procedures provided er the under Minn. Ann., rendered. Massachusetts Gen.Laws (1982) are constitutionally Stat. (West 1975). ch. 28§ govern sufficient requires analysis *6 The Supreme United States Court exam- private mental and interests that are af ined the implied sys- Massachusetts consent In Eldridge, fected. Mathews v. 424 U.S. process analysis tem under the due used in 319, 335, 96 47 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 18 Eldridge, Mathews v. supra. Montrym The (1976), Supreme the stated that Court iden court “that the compelling concluded inter- specific proce tification of the dictates of in highway safety justifies est the Common- process requires dural due the consideration making summary suspension wealth in a of three distinct factors: ' pending effective the outcome of the First, interest will private be prompt postsuspension hearing available.” action; second, by affected the official 443 99 at 2621. A compari- U.S. S.Ct. deprivation the risk of an erroneous of son of the Minnesota and Massachusetts through procedures such interest prehearing systems employing used, value, probable and the if of any, factors Eldridge shows that the Minne- procedural additional or substitute safe- significantly distinguish- sota is not guards; finally, the Government’s in- able from that of Massachusetts. terest, the function involved including and the fiscal and administrative burdens by The three factors the Mon- employed proce- the additional or substitute (1) court were: trym weight nature and dural would entail. private by interest affected the offi- Supreme challenged; (2) The United States Court faced cial action the likelihood of process question presented by the due inter- deprivation private erroneous prehearing implied proce- consent license revoca- est involved as a consequence used; (3) Mackey Montrym, tion in v. 99 dures the state interests used, (1979). Montrym summary procedures as by L.Ed.2d served during administrative and fiscal burden the second half well as the of the revocation proce- period that would result from substitute for one whose license has been re- will examine the sought. dures We Minne- voked twice within 5 The years. licenses sys- generally employment sota and Massachusetts are limited to use for these factors. or alcohol using purposes. tems each of rehabilitation The availability hardship relief in Minnesota private A. The interest and the lack thereof Massachusetts are significant favoring factors the Minnesota here is the private interest affected system. granted same license to Montrym, as vehicle, operate particular- or more motor weighing The final factor in the affected posses- interest in continued ly, the driver’s private interest under the Montrym analy- pending license sion and use of the the availability prompt post-revoca- sis is hearing. outcome of a The court Dixon tion review. In Minnesota and Massachu- Love, v. 431 U.S. setts post-revocation review is available in (1977), recognized this interest L.Ed.2d two forms. Informal administrative review one, particularly light as a substantial is available immediately both states. In the fact the state will be unable to each state it is employee conducted an any personal make a driver whole for incon- licensing the state A agency. may driver hardship venience and economic suffered by represented by counsel under both proce- reason of an erroneous suspension. dures, Massachusetts, but in unlike Minne- sota, witnesses testify and be cross-ex- Montrym indicated that amined. In Massachusetts the decision is weight given private actual interest de- usually available in one or days, two but no (1) the pends upon three factors: duration later than 10 after the hearing. In revocation; the availability Minnesota, the decision is issued no later relief; hardship availability than 15 days after a written for a prompt post-revocation review. 443 review of revocation. Minn.Stat. 11-12, at 2617-2618. 99 S.Ct. 169.123, subd. 5b Supreme upheld Court United States A complete more formal and review is of driver’s prehearing revocations licenses also available in both states. In Minnesota and the Illinois case of Montrym Dixon that review is conducted Love, municipal or supra. Montrym suspension In court, district subd. 6 period was for a maximum of 90 days. (1982), while in Massachusetts it is conducts suspension Love the could be for as as long an ed administrative board of (or more). appeal. year one The Minnesota revoca- In Massachusetts there is no statutory tion falls those re- between of Massachusetts quirement on the timeliness of hearing. and Illinois: 6 months for test refusals and *7 plaintiff days Montrym for test had a hearing failures. This factor does scheduled before the distinguish Montrym Appeal this case from Board of Love, days which upheld prehearing revocations. after revocation. In Minnesota Minn. 169.123, Stat. subd. requires that system Minnesota hearing be conducted at “the practi- earliest provisions hardship contains relief una- date, cable and in any event no later than vailable Massachusetts statute. following filing petition of the In Minnesota a driver automatically re- for review.” The differences between the 7-day temporary ceives a license at the time systems Massachusetts and Minnesota 169.123, of revocation. Minn.Stat. subd. post-revocation review do not appear to fa- addition, 5a In the Minnesota stat- vor either to any constitutionally provides ute for the issuing of limited li- significant degree. whose censes drivers licenses have been revoked under certain conditions. A limit- analysis of the three factors which ed license generally is available immediate- the Montrym significant court considered ly upon application by a first offender and weighing private interest leads us to that, interest in although the conclusion In both Minnesota and Massachusetts a one, a driver’s license is a substantial driver’s license is revoked in cases where a revocation, length availability peace officer had probable cause to believe and, prompt post-revocation person relief most im- operating had been a motor vehi- portantly, availability hardship relief cle while under the influence of alcohol and more private result interest of no refused to submit to chemical weight in Montrym. testing. than that The Montrym court did not regard

the risk of erroneous deprivation signifi- as cases, cant in these deprivation stating: B. Risk of erroneous risk of erroneous observation or [T]he second factor considered the Mon- misrepresentation deliberate facts trym analysis prehearing for a license revo- the reporting officer in the ordinary case cation is the of an dep- likelihood erroneous seems insubstantial. private rivation of the interest involved. describing this factor Montrym 443 U.S. at

stated: However, Minnesota also revokes the And, although aspect Eidridge license of a driver who test, fails a chemical test further requires an assessment of the while Massachusetts does not. Appellants reliability procedures relative used strongly assert the risk of erroneous procedures sought, and the substitute deprivation of a license to drive due to the Due Process Clause has never been con- possibilities “infinite for error” inherent strued to require procedures testing for blood alcohol concentration is guard against depri- used to an erroneous the most significant difference in the Min- protectible “property” vation of a or “lib- nesota systems. and Massachusetts Appel- interest erty" comprehensive be so as to particularly lants challenge the reliability

preclude any possibility of error. The Breathalyzer testing, which is the test simply Due Process Clause does not man- given most cases. Minn.Stat. § date that governmental all decisionmak- 2 (1982). subd. ing comply with standards that assure This court has previously considered the perfect, error-free determinations. reliability Breathalyzer testing. In State Inmates, Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Quinn, 289 Minn. 182 N.W.2d supra, at 7 [442 1] [99 (1971), we stated: Thus, though even our legal tradi- 2103]. It generally held that the alcoholic tion regards adversary process as the content of the blood be reliably de- best means of ascetaining truth and mini- termined by such a and testimony of mizing error, the risk “ordinary the reading obtained upon properly con- principle” prior established our deci- ducted test may be admitted without an- sions is that less than “something an evi- tecedent expert testimony that the read- dentiary hearing prior is sufficient to ad- ing is a trustworthy index of alcohol in verse administrative action.” Dixon v. the blood. Love, supra at 113 S.Ct. at [431 U.S.] [97 (Citations omitted.) And, when prompt postdepriva- 1728]. tion review is available for correction of Three experts testified for the state as to error, we generally have the accuracy and reliability of the Breatha- required no more predepri- than that the lyzer test. Mr. Richard Prouty, Chief Fo- *8 procedures vation designed used be to rensic Toxicologist, Office of Medical Ex- provide a reasonably reliable basis for aminer, Oklahoma, State noted that: concluding that justifying facts Breathalyzer and its various models [T]he official responsible gov- action are as a are and have been internationally accept- ernmental official warrants them to be. ed recognized and as a reliable evidentia- at (emphasis S.Ct. at 2618 ry device for determining blood alcohol added). content. Berkom, Laboratory

Mr. Lowell Van BCA is greater tion under the Minnesota statute Director, law, stated: than under Massachusetts it is not to such a degree as to alter the balance struck Breathalyzer use of the Model

[T]he Supreme Montrym. Court in and in accordance with this Breath- 900A alyzer operational 21-step checklist proce- public The C. interest served by pre- dure accurate and scien- provide highly hearing revocation. tifically acceptable analy- result of breath The third and final factor Montrym from sis for alcohol. for determining the constitutionality pre- Neese, Mr. Phillip supervisor L. hearing implied consent revocations is the chemical testing Minneapolis unit for the public interest at stake. Montrym Department, Police noted that “the Breath- public court considered two interests: instrument, alyzer was an accurate but that public keeping interest high- roads and readings slightly were lower than blood ways safe, public and the interest in avoid- added.) tests.” (Emphasis ing fiscal and administrative burdens which September On Smith & Wesson are disproportionate nature of the Corporation, the manufacturer private being interest revoked and 900A, Breathalyzer Models 900 and which risk of erroneous revocation. are the exclusive breath-testing apparatus- public interest in preserving the safe- Minnesota, es in issued an to all advisory ty of our roadways great is of importance. its customers concerning frequency radio Montrym As the court in noted: (RFI). advisory interference informed We have traditionally accorded the states Smith & Wesson’s customers that “continu- great leeway in adopting proce- summary ing investigation suggests early now protect public dures to health and safety. series of breath testing instruments surely States have at least as affected in an much inter- unpredictable manner est frequencies removing various drunken power levels.” drivers from advisory highways was a culmination of substan- their summarily as in seizing tial testing by Smith & Wesson and an drugs mislabeled or destroying spoiled independent party. third foodstuffs. [Citations omitted.] The Commonwealth’s public interest Belin, At trial product manager Mr. Herb safety is substantially served in several Wesson, & testified that the Smith Model ways by the summary suspension of those RFI, susceptible was not testing who refuse to take a breath-analysis test by the BCA confirmed this. Belin further First, upon arrest. the very existence testified that their investigation failed to summary show sanction of the problem anything “due to other statute than the RF serves as a generated by contrived fields deterrent to drunken driving. Second, our own equipment provides at our own demand.” it strong inducement to The BCA has field-tested all take Breathalyzers the breath-analysis test and thus in Minnesota for RFI. Each every effectuates the Commonwealth’s interest Breathalyzer presently operation in Min- obtaining reliable and relevant evi- nesota has been field-tested and certified dence for use in subsequent criminal pro- not to be RFI in affected the location in Third, ceedings. in promptly removing which it operating. road, such drivers from the the summary sanction of the statute contributes to the

The trial court found that: safety public highways. testing Breath in Minnesota at certified 17-18, locations in accordance pro- with the BCA 2620-2621. tocol, highest merits the confidence and linking Statistics drunken driving with remains a reliable and accurate means of tragedy death and injury our measuring alcohol concentration. nation’s highways abound. Forst Lowry, The trial court’s finding clearly is not erro- the Safety Program Coordinator for the neous. depriva- While the risk of erroneous Minnesota of Public Safety, *9 I, in drivers that 1981 52% of the States Constitution and Article testified Section had a con- killed in Minnesota blood alcohol of the Minnesota Constitution. The trial of .10 or more drivers centration and 62%of court determined that “the availability of some measurable concen- killed had alcohol expeditious judi- administrative timely over tration. It estimated that in 1980 cial review the system the devised be- persons were killed in Minnesota of Public Safety Commissioner re- does not eco- cause of drunken drivers and direct sult in plaintiff’s a violation of a Fifth nomic amounted to approximately $114 loss privilege against Amendment self-incrimi- million. nation.” determined, that the Montrym case, In any DWI the defendant faces and automatic summary character penalties two types separate pro- in two sanction the suspension available under ceedings: (1) penalties criminal under Minn. statute is to deter- Massachusetts critical Stat. 169.121 and civil license revoca- § ring making drunken drivers and the state’s tion under Minn.Stat. 169.123. Under safer. 443 at highways U.S. at 99 S.Ct. 169.123 the driver’s license is prehearing system 2621. The to a prior hearing. revoked may driver also to ease fiscal helps and administrative request then administrative or re- judicial burdens, a second area of interest. public view of revocation. has the The driver Montrym As the court stated: high to incentive review immediate- presuspension hearing A would substan- or her ly already since his license has been in tially pub- undermine the state interest Meanwhile, pleads revoked. if the driver safety by significant giving lic drivers the guilty to criminal will charges, he breath-analysis to refuse the incentive seeking be license revocation while review presuspension hearing test and demand a charges the pending. criminal are State- dilatory Moreover, incen- as a tactic. to the in ments made administrator delay arising availability tive to from the review administrative or to the court presuspension hearing gener- would law, are not immunized sharp ate a increase in the number of may be against and thus used driver impose hearings sought and therefore fact, the later case. criminal the form fiscal and bur- substantial which a driver must submit order den on Commonwealth. Dixon v. attain administrative review states that Love, U.S., 1728], at 114 [97 given in information the form used at 2621. Attorney related court Appellants action. Spannaus General Warren at trial testified puts contend in an driver legisla- that his office had estimated for the position untenable where he must choose ture annual savings approximate- overall testifying during between revo- license $320,000 ly pre- under the new hearing and risking cation the later use of hearing revocation. testimony case, in the or re- criminal out, fusing testify forgoing right statistics and thus point As the cited above pose fully litigate drunken a severe threat to the license revocation. drivers Minne- safety health and citizens of There doubt that have appellants is no compelling highway sota. The interest right assert their Fifth Amendment safety justifies the of Minnesota in State privilege against self-incrimination in either making pending a revocation effective judicial hearing the administrative or if it prompt post-suspension outcome “reasonably apprehend[ed]” can be that the hearing. against statements could be used them a Water- Appellants prosecution. Murphy next criminal contend Commission, front pen 84 S.Ct. imposes Minn.Stat. § alty exercising privilege on them for their 12 L.Ed.2d 678 That is self-incrimination, thereby us, vio against question Ap- not the before however. Fifth Amendment which pellants handicap lates the to the United contend *10 n 4 placed they under if assert Amendment

they telling would be a defend- violation — a constitutional violation. privilege is testify not, ant at trial to under an —does is, therefore, before this court question view, compel extreme the defendant under procedure whether Minn.Stat. incriminate himself. He could submit to appellants’ burdens impermissibly accusation, testify self or falsely (risking rights. exercise of their Fifth Amendment perjury) or to testify (risking decline con- - Neville, v. tempt). South Dakota U.S. But the long recog- Court has -, 916, (1983), 103 74 L.Ed.2d 748 S.Ct. prevents nized that the Fifth Amendment Amendment fendant held that the admission into evidence Amendment against himself in order to invoke his Fifth not compelled tion.1 The court held that the refusal was In discussing stated: defendant’s refusal alcohol the United pelled Amendment has held use of ‘physical lege.” directing directly erted States, 1574, As privilege against 48 L.Ed.2d test does not offend his Fifth we stated must be 425 U.S. This coercion from the constitutional that no States right against privilege, repeatedly and, therefore, is limited to prohibiting criminal ease to be a witness person asserting requirement or moral Supreme 391, 39] to submit compelled (1976), Fisher v. United self-incrimination. compulsion’ “shall be com- [96 Court self-incrimina- Neville court “[T]he that to a blood Murphy S.Ct. the Fifth protected language recently the de- testify comes Court privi- 1569, aof ex- inevitably compulsion inherent sanctions is “the essence of coerced testi- mony.”). Similarly, Schmerber cautioned the state from use of sion.” U.S. immunity violative of religious L.Ed.2d “cruel trilemma” on the defendant. See U.S. erred alternative was to submit to a test so painful, dangerous, a witness 1292, 1297, v. Arizona, Portash, the Fifth [757] 9,n. 52, testimony Schmerber 678] v. Waterfront 55 at 16 L.Ed.2d 59 L.Ed.2d 16 L.Ed.2d person 440 384 U.S. (1964). 765, [84 testify Amendment forcing U.S. obtained when the a grant n. 9 S.Ct. would [v. See beliefs, 450, 908]. or face contempt 501] in custodial 694] [86 or Commission, California], also 1594, 1596, prefer S.Ct. 459 severe, choice of this Cf. Miranda that almost New legislative [86 [99 “confes- bar the (telling (unless Jersey or so prof- S.Ct. S.Ct. sur- 378 at 12 roundings dispelled, is Const., no statement against himself.” U.S. Arndt. 5 added). truly product choice). And of free (emphasis as Professor Levy history privi- concluded his of the ——, (footnote - U.S. 103 S.Ct. at 922 lege, compulsion element of or in- “[t]he omitted). always voluntariness was an ingredient The court concluded that: and, existed, right before the right course, We recognize, of the choice protests against incriminating inter- to submit or refuse to take a blood-alco- rogatories.” Levy, Origins W. hol test will easy not be an or pleasant Fifth Amendment 328 one for a suspect make. But the crimi- Here, the directly compel state did not process nal often requires suspects and respondent to refuse gave for it defendants to make difficult choices. him the submitting choice of to the test See, Ohio, e.g., Crampton v. course, decided refusing. Of the fact with government California, McGautha v. gives a defendant suspect a “choice” always 1470-1472, does not resolve the 213-217 [91 compulsion inquiry. The classic Fifth L.Ed.2d 711] presence It should noted that after of alcohol or a controlled substance. 2(5), subd. procedure Willis, allows for the Prior is discussed in State v. admission into evidence of a defendant’s refus- (Minn. 1983). 332 N.W.2d 180 determining al to take a chemical test for - -, at 923. Al- “secured by laws,” the Constitution and *11 though appellants in the case at bar therefore they cognizable have no claims choice, were faced with such a difficult McCollan, 1983. Baker v. § level compul- choice does not rise to the L.Ed.2d 433 necessary sion in order to constitute a Fifth Affirmed. Amendment violation. contention that Appellants’ YETKA, Justice (concurring specially). 169.123 violates their privilege against § result, While I concur in the I find it

self-incrimination is primarily upon based unnecessary to decide that the information person their claim that a seeking adminis requested in pre-administrative trative review must complete sign form is not violative of the privilege against Department form distributed self-incrimination. The form is not autho- Safety “Request Public entitled for Admin rized I by statute and would hold that Implied istrative Review of Consent Revo requested, information if given, is not usa- Completion cation.” of the form is not ble in a criminal proceeding. Such hold- required by statute. 169.- See Minn.Stat. § ing would make the hearing Department subd. 5b. The of Public meaningful more open because the Safety require does not its form be likely driver would be more to tell his com- completed in order to obtain administrative plete story, thus resulting fewer court- review. parties None to this action contested cases. completed signed Safety form and each had an admin WAHL, Justice (concurring specially). istrative review of his license revocation. join I the concurrence of Justice YETKA. fact, appellant driving privileges Miller’s were reinstated as a result of his adminis Furthermore, hearing.

trative review

state has the burden of each ele proving

ment of the consent violation in

order to sustain the license revocation. significant

This factor has been considered determining whether a is com pelled to testify. See United States v. U.S. Minnesota, Respondent, STATE of Currency, (6th Cir.), 626 F.2d 11 cert. de nied, 993, 101 449 U.S. 66 L.Ed.2d Gary NURMI, Appellant. M. record this case is devoid of No. C4-82-832. appellants’ being compelled evidence of give evidence in incriminating order to ob- Supreme Court of Minnesota. tain review of their license revocations. need Appellants merely request review and

indicate a basis for They reversal. need

provide no other information to have their

challenge heard. The trial court was cor-

rect in its determination that Minn.Stat. compel persons 169.123 does not to in-

criminate themselves in violation of their

federal and state constitutional privilege

against self-incrimination. have

Finally, appellants satisfy failed to U.S.C. 1983’s threshold deprived plaintiff right

Case Details

Case Name: Heddan v. Dirkswager
Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota
Date Published: Jul 1, 1983
Citation: 336 N.W.2d 54
Docket Number: CX-82-1645, C3-83-198
Court Abbreviation: Minn.
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