[¶ 1] Fred Hector appeals from a summary judgment dismissing his action against the City of Fargo for claims involving special assessments against his land. He argues the district court erred in granting Fargo summary judgment, because N.D.C.C. § 40-26-07 authorizes his action to judicially establish Fargo’s special assessments are void to the extent the assessments exceed Fargo’s actual costs of improvements and his claims are not barred by administrative res judicata. Res judicata precludes relitigation of claims that were raised, or could have been raised, in prior actions between the same parties and means a valid, existing final judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive with regard to claims raised or those that could have been raised in the prior action. We conclude N.D.C.C. §§ 40-26-01 and 40-26-07 authorize a court to review issues about a municipality’s special assessments in the context of the adequate legal remedy of an appeal and the issues raised by Hector in this
I
[¶ 2] In
Hector v. City of Fargo,
the total amount assessed for an improvement project was improperly calculated and should have been based on the City’s true costs for the project, the method used to determine the amount assessed against his property was improper, the [Special] Assessment Commission failed to comply with certain statutory requirements and the [Fargo] City Commission failed to properly review the [Special] Assessment Commission’s decision.
Hector, at ¶ 1. We concluded Hector failed to establish Fargo’s special assessments exceeded its true costs for the improvement project or Fargo converted federal funds for other uses, Fargo complied with the applicable statutory provisions for special assessments and the assessments did not improperly exceed the amount estimated in a resolution of necessity and an engineer’s report, Fargo did not improperly include certain costs in the total costs for the project, and Fargo’s special assessments against Hector’s land were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 24, 26, 28, 35, 37, 46, 49, 51, 54, 57, 58.
[¶ 3] On November 9, 2009, when Hector appealed the Fargo City Commissioners’ decision to the district court, he also brought this separate action against Fargo, alleging claims for statutory and equitable reassessment of the project benefits under N.D.C.C. § 40-26-07, fraud and deceit, violation of fiduciary duties, and denial of federal civil rights. Hector’s separate action was continued pending resolution of his appeal, and after our decision in the appeal, the district court granted Fargo’s motion for summary judgment, concluding his claims were previously decided (res judicata).
[¶ 4] A district court has original jurisdiction of causes, except as otherwise provided by law, and appellate jurisdiction as provided by law under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 8, and the issues in this appeal involve the scope of a district court’s jurisdiction over special assessments under N.D.C.C. § 40-26-07. Hector’s appeal from the judgment dismissing his action is timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const. art. VI, §§ 2 and 6, and N.D.C.C. § 28-27-01.
II
[¶ 5] Hector argues special assessments exceeding the costs of improvements are invalid to the extent of the excess under
Hector,
[¶ 6] The district court decided Hector’s action by summary judgment, which “ ‘is a procedural device for the prompt resolution of a controversy on the merits without a trial if there are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences that can reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law.’ ”
Schmitt v. MeritCare Health Sys.,
[¶ 7] The district court ruled Hector’s claims in this action were previously decided and thus barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In
Ungar v. North Dakota State Univ.,
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar courts from relit-igating claims and issues in order to promote the finality of judgments, which increases certainty, avoids multiple litigation, wasteful delay and expense, and ultimately conserves judicial resources. The applicability of res judicata or collateral estoppel is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal.
“Although collateral estoppel is a branch of the broader law of res judica-ta, the doctrines are not the same.” Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of claims that were raised, or could have been raised, in prior actions between the same parties or their privies. Thus, res judicata means a valid, existing final judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive with regard to claims raised, or those that could have been raised and determined, as to their parties and their privies in all other actions. Res judicata applies even if subsequent claims are based upon a different legal theory. Collateral estop-pel, or issue preclusion, forecloses reliti-gation of issues of either fact or law in a second action based on a different claim, which were necessarily litigated, or by logical and necessary implication must have been litigated, and decided in the prior action.
A
[¶ 8] The issues raised by Hector in this action and the effect of his prior appeal require us to consider the procedures for challenging special assessments, including the scope of a district court’s authority under N.D.C.C. § 40-26-07. Our analysis of those issues requires a brief description of the statutory procedures for imposing' special assessments, including statutes for judicial challenges.
[¶ 9] This Court has said the statutory scheme for special assessments for improvement districts creates two separate processes, with N.D.C.C. ch. 40-22 governing the creation of an improvement district and bidding projects and N.D.C.C. ch. 40-23 governing the individualized assessment of property for specific projects within the district.
Serenko v. City of Wilton,
Upon determining street improvements are necessary in a particular area, theCity creates an improvement district setting the boundaries of the project. N.D.C.C. §§ 40-22-08 and 40-22-09. The City then passes a resolution of necessity, which must be published in accordance with N.D.C.C. § 40-22-15. The project may not proceed if the owners of a majority of the property in the improvement district file written protests within thirty days. N.D.C.C. §§ 40-22-17 and 40-22-18. If less than a majority of landowners file protests, the City may secure bids on the project and let the contract. See N.D.C.C. §§ 40-22-18 to 40-22-36. The City’s special assessment commission then sets the assessments on individual properties within the improvement district, and publishes the assessment list and notice of hearing of objections. See N.D.C.C. §§ 40-23-07 to 40-23-10. Aggrieved parties are afforded a hearing before the special assessment commission to challenge their assessments, and may appeal to the City’s governing body. See N.D.C.C. §§ 40-23-11, 40-23-16.
Serenko, at ¶ 12. We considered the landowners’ challenge in the context of N.D.C.C. § 40-22-43, which authorizes an action to challenge defects and irregularities in proceedings governing the creation of an improvement district under N.D.C.C. ch. 40-22, and provides:
Defects and irregulaiities in any proceedings had or to be had under this chapter relating to municipal improvements by the special assessment method, when the proceedings are for a lawful purpose and are unaffected by fraud and do not violate any constitutional limitation or restriction, shall not invalidate such proceedings, and no action shall be commenced or maintained and no defense or counterclaim in any action shall be recognized in the courts of this state founded on any such defects or irregularities in such proceedings, unless commenced within thirty days of the adoption of the resolution of the governing board awarding the sale of warrants to finance the improvement.
We concluded, “[bjecause the landowners did not commence their action within the thirty-day time limit under N.D.C.C. § 40-22-43, their action based upon irregularities or defects under N.D.C.C. ch. 40-22 is barred.” Serenko, at ¶ 18. Under the language of N.D.C.C. § 40-22^3 and Serenko, an “action” in the courts of this state challenging defects and irregularities in any “proceedings” for the creation of an improvement district under N.D.C.C. ch. 40-22, “when the proceedings are for a lawful purpose and are unaffected by fraud and do not violate any constitutional limitation,” must be brought within thirty days of the adoption of a municipality’s resolution awarding the sale of warrants to finance the improvement.
[¶ 10] The statutory framework in N.D.C.C. ch. 40-23 for individualized assessments of property for an improvement district authorizes an aggrieved person to appeal a special assessment commission’s assessment to the municipality’s governing body. N.D.C.C. §§ 40-23-14 and 40-23-15. The municipality’s governing body shall hear and determine any appeals and objections and may increase or diminish any assessments as the governing body may deem just. N.D.C.C. §§ 40-23-15 and 40-23-16.
[¶ 11] Chapter 40-26, N.D.C.C., generally pertains to correction, reassessments, and fund deficiencies for special assessments and contemplates court involvement in certain circumstances.
See
N.D.C.C. §§ 40-26-01; 40-26-03; 40-26-04; 40-26-05; 40-26-06 and 40-26-07. Those statutes include language authorizing reassessments by ■ a municipality’s governing body if an assessment is refused, denied,
[¶ 12] When Hector brought this action in 2009, 1 N.D.C.C. § 40-26-01, provided:
The courts shall review the levy and apportionment of the special assessments in all actions and proceedings involving the validity or apportionment of any special assessment for local or special improvements. An appeal taken under this section must be in accordance with the procedure provided in section 28-34-01.
Additionally, N.D.C.C. § 40-26-07 provided:
The court shall determine the true and just amount which any property attempted to be specially assessed for a special improvement should pay to make the same uniform with other special assessments for the same purpose, whenever any action or proceeding shall be commenced and maintained before the court to prevent or restrain the collection of any special assessment or part thereof made or levied by the officers of any municipality for any purpose authorized by law, if such assessment shall be held to be void by reason of noncompliance with any provision of the laws of this state. The amount of the assessment as the same appears on the assessment list shall be prima facie evidence of the true and just amount, and judgment must be rendered and given therefor against the party liable for such special assessment without regard to the proceedings had for the levy thereof. The judgment shall be a lien upon the property upon which a special assessment shall have been levied, of the same force and effect as the lien of a special assessment, and the lien of such special judgment shall be enforced by the court in such action. No action for said purposes shall be maintained unless it is commenced within six months after the special assessment is approved.
[¶ 13] Hector’s primary argument in this case involves the scope of a district court’s authority under the language of N.D.C.C. § 40-26-07. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal.
Hector,
[¶ 15] Under our law, an “action” means “an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice, by which a party prosecutes another party for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense.” N.D.C.C. § 32-01-02.
See Ungar,
[¶ 16] Hector cites
Foss Methodist Church v. City of Wahpeton,
[¶ 17] Later, in
Soo Line R.R. Co. v. City of Wilton,
this court is bound by the rule that when there is substantial evidence to support the decision of the special assessment commission, which is shown not to be invalid as a result of fraud or mistake, or by some defect in the proceeding which would render the special assessment invalid, the decision of the special assessment commission as confirmed by the city governing body must be affirmed.
Id. at 79. This Court concluded there was substantial evidence to support the Wilton Special Assessment Commission’s decision, as approved by the Wilton City Commission, regarding benefits received by the property owner and the special assessments apportioned to the owner’s property. Id. at 83-84. This Court also concluded the property owner failed to establish any ground for equitable relief from the special assessments and sustained the assessments. Id. at 84.
[¶ 18] The deferential standard of judicial review described in
Soo Line,
[¶ 19] In
Shaw v. Burleigh Cnty.,
[¶ 20] In 1989, the legislature enacted N.D.C.C. § 28-34-01, which explicitly “governs [procedures for] any appeal provided by statute from the decision of a local governing body.” 1989 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 83, § 1. In conjunction -with that amendment, the legislature also amended N.D.C.C. § 40-26-01 to include the sentence stating “[a]n appeal taken under this section must be in accordance with the procedure provided in section 28-34-01.”
See
1989 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 83, § 15. The 1989 legislation resulted from a study by the legislature’s Interim Judiciary Committee after an initial study by this Court’s Court Services Administration Committee regarding review of decisions by local governing bodies in response to
Shaw,
[¶ 21] After enactment of the 1989 legislation, this Court has reviewed district court decisions reviewing special assessments in the context of appeals and actions.
See Hector,
[¶ 22] In
Shark Bros., Inc. v. Cass Cnty.,
Where the law provides an appeal from an order or determination of a board or commission whereby the correctness and validity of the order or decision may be reviewed the remedy so provided, if adequate, must be pursued and a party having the right of appeal may not disregard such remedy and obtain injunc-tive relief against the enforcement of the order or decision.
Id.
at 704 (quoting
Chester v. Einarson,
We do not favor or encourage, nor can we sustain, bifurcated self-induced or self-initiated procedures, one in the administrative process and one in the judicial process covering the same legal questions.
If such bifurcated procedures were encouraged or sustained, it would create duplication, and uncertainty, and waste manpower and money, with no appreciable result, and all without improving the administration of justice. If one side of a proceeding were permitted to proceed both in the administrative channels and the judicial channels at the same time the other side could also resort to the same procedure. The result would be endless confusion, which we can ill afford.
[¶ 23] This Court’s decision in
Shark Bros. Inc.,
[¶ 24] The language of N.D.C.C. § 40-26-07 says the “court shall determine the true and just amount” for special assessments “whenever any action or proceeding shall be commenced and maintained before the court to prevent or restrain the collection of any special assessment ..., if such assessment shall be held to be void by reason of noncompliance with any provision of the laws of this state.” Under the foregoing principles for separation of powers, exhaustion of remedies, adequacy of legal remedies, and res judicata, we construe N.D.C.C. § 40-26-07, in conjunction with N.D.C.C. § 40-26-01 and the other provisions of N.D.C.C. ch. 40-26 for judicial involvement, to mean proceedings in which an assessment is held void for noncompliance with the special assessment statutes in the context of an appeal from an assessment decision. Although the statutory language and time frames for bringing actions may not totally foreclose a separate statutory action involving special assessments under appropriate circumstances when an appeal may not be an adequate legal remedy, an appeal generally provides an adequate remedy for challenging special assessments, and a separate action for equitable relief will not lie for issues that were raised or could have been raised in the appeal.
See Amerada Hess,
B
[¶ 25] Hector claims administrative res judicata does not preclude his action, because Fargo’s real or actual construction costs, as certified by the City Auditor in 2009, could not be contested in his prior appeal and the assessments against his property were decided in a legislative proceeding, not in an adjudicative administrative proceeding.
[¶ 26] Administrative res judi-cata is the judicial doctrine of precluding redetermination of a matter previously decided applied to an administrative proceeding.
Cridland v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau,
[¶ 27] In
Hector,
[¶ 28] Here, Hector’s current claims are not raised in a subsequent administrative proceeding. Rather, he brought this separate judicial action when he appealed the Fargo City Commissioners’ decision approving the special assessments in the administrative proceeding and that appeal resulted in a final judgment affirmed by this Court. Administrative res judicata is not applicable to Hector’s subsequent legal action; rather, the issue is whether his separate action involves issues that were raised or could have been raised in the proceeding culminating in the prior judgment affirming the assessments.
See Ungar,
[¶ 29] Some of this Court’s decisions recognize fraud may vitiate assessment proceedings.
See Buehler,
Ill
[¶ 30] Hector also claims he has a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the proper application of federal highway funds and for the deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. He argues he is an intended beneficiary of the federal highway program and he has a private action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the appropriate credit of federal funds to the costs of the project. He claims Fargo assessed his land for construction costs paid with federal highway dollars, which deprived him of rights and privileges secured by federal highway laws. He asserts Fargo acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in violation of law when it assessed him for work paid through federal funds. He claims there is a further question of fact about whether he was denied equal protection by Fargo’s alleged failure to follow its own infrastructure funding policies for determining the assessments against his land.
A
[¶ 31] Hector has not cited any specific federal statutes or regulations violated by Fargo. In
Hector,
B
[¶ 82] Hector also argues Fargo violated his procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Hector,
[¶ 33] Moreover, in
Hector,
C
[¶ 34] Hector argues he was denied equal protection by Fargo’s failure to follow its infrastructive funding policy. “The equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions do not prohibit legislative classifications or require identical treatment of different groups of people.”
State v. Leppert,
We apply strict scrutiny to an inherently suspect classification or infringement of a fundamental right and strike down the challenged statutory classification “unless it is shown that the statute promotes a compelling governmental interest and that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose.” When an “important substantive right” is involved, we apply an intermediate standard of review which requires a “ ‘close correspondence between statutory classification and legislative goals.’ ” When no suspect class, fundamental right, or important substantive right is involved, we apply a rational basis standard and sustain the legislative classification unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.
Gauge v. Clerk of Burleigh Cnty. Dist. Court,
[¶ 35] Hector has not claimed he is a part of a classification requiring strict scrutiny or a close correspondence for purposes of equal protection analysis. Rather, he claims he was denied equal protection because he was singled out and assessed in an amount greater than Fargo’s costs. We have rejected Hector’s arguments about Fargo’s assessments exceeding its costs, and he has not provided any argument to suggest the assessments against his land do not satisfy review un
IV
[¶ 36] Hector claims there are questions of fact requiring resolution by a jury. This Court has recognized summary judgment may not be entirely compatible with court proceedings involving review of decisions by local governing bodies.
See Anderson,
V
[¶ 37] We have considered the remaining arguments raised by Hector and we conclude they are without merit or do not affect the outcome of our decision. We affirm the judgment dismissing Hector’s action.
[¶ 39] The Honorable WILLIAM W. McLEES, D.J., sitting in place of MARING, J., disqualified.
[¶ 40] The Honorable LISA FAIR McEVERS was not a member of the Court when this case was heard and did not participate in this decision.
Notes
. Sections 40-26-01 and 40-26-07, N.D.C.C., were amended in 2011 to add language for a district court to consider anew the determination of benefits and special assessments imposed for agricultural property. See 2011 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 297.