*1
(1965),
necessary
Today,
opinion,
has held
a
in my
this Court tells the
rights
required
court is
to define visitation
judges
indulge
district
of this state to
ain
detail
to make and
such
in
and
enforce
practice
this
Court condemned in
necessary
be
secure
regulations may
1970 Dey.
in
Cf.,
the observance of the court’s orders.
In my judgment,
disposition
Thurman,
v.
Thurman
by
magistrate
matter
court should be
(1952),
Dey
P.2d 810
remedy majority requires which the the dis- apply in case. judge
trict the instant judge
That district was reversed
Court. in Dey,
As stated “the record discloses parties
that the were sev- before surprising eral times and it is not P.2d 540 obviously judge patience rather lost RANCHES, parties ability with the their lack of and HECKMAN INC. agree among themselves as reasonable Co., corporations, Heckman Cattle rights.’’ inability visitation For their to so Plaintiffs-Appellants, themselves, agree among judge found contempt. them A unanimous court said Idaho, Dey: Commonwealth, By STATE Through We feel practice it better for the court DEPARTMENT OF specifically written order to delineate in PUBLIC LANDS and the State Board of detail what are reasonable visitation and Commissioners, Land Gordon C. Tromb- rights. custodial We approve do not ley, Commissioner, Land Defend- methodology used trial court ants-Respondents. suggesting parties purge could No. 12316. contempt themselves of the order en- tering into an them- agreement among Supreme Court of Idaho. selves controlling custodial and visita- rights. might tion While such appear Jan. 1979. salutary to have a very surface practical resolving dispute, effect in
obviously in this case did not. stated, jurisdiction
As hereinabove
the trial court over child custodial and rights a continuing
visitation one and be
should exercised the court in such specificity may
detail and of order as be
necessary carry out the intent * * * practice court. utilizing
a minor child as a shuttlecock to perpetu- quarrel
ate a between former husband we strongly
and wife one cannot too is, however, practice It
condemn. with judges
which district can and should deal
strongly forthrightly. Their orders
should, necessary, when be clear and con- they
cise should not be slow in exer-
cising contempt powers their to enforce
their orders. *2 Dee, Jr., William J. MacGregor,
W. C. plaintiffs-appellants. Grangeville, lease Kidwell, entered into a riverbed Wayne Atty. Gen., L. missioners I. Ursula Highways Kettlewell, Gen., Department Atty. Boise, with the State Asst. for de- from the gravel of sand and fendants-respondents. for the removal Pursuant to bed Salmon River. McFADDEN, Justice. lease, from materials were removed rip-rap in 1974. disputed area *3 This is an quiet action to title land Whitebird, near Idaho. disputed The area Plaintiffs-appellants Ranches Heckman encompasses approximately 12 acres land Inc. and Heckman Ranches Co. initiated the located between the mainstream the 1974, present 7, action on March to recover survey eastern meander line of the Salmon damages for removing rip-rap the materials River, and includes a secondary or overflow and to title quiet disputed property.1 to the (See channel of the river. exhib- annexed Appellant Heckman Ranches Inc. owns it). primary The issue on appeal the three lots fractional on the eastern side of location of the natural or high adjacent the River disputed Salmon to the water mark of the Salmon River in relation property that were created as result of the disputed area. The district survey the meandered of the eastern bank ordinary high established the natural or of the Appellants disputed river. utilize the river, quieted water mark of the title area as a heifer calving ground during the accordingly plaintiffs and ordered the early spring Ap- before water runoff. property. judgment fence the The pellants allege boundary the part district court is affirmed in re- beyond their extends lots westward the me- part. versed in ander line to the “natural or along Lands both sides of the Salmon River, water mark” of the Salmon surveyed in River were 1893and the course they allege is near the mainstream of the of the river was meandered meander river. original sur- government lines drawn the The district court entered its memoran- veyor The in 1893. eastern meander fact, opinion, findings dum conclusions river, disputed portion the law and a decree the establishing however, significant is a distance from the water the mark of Salmon river approximates mainstream of the quieting property. River and title the secondary the eastern bank of the over- court’s findings district and conclusions flow is east channel. This overflow channel are summarized in part relevant as follows: of the mainstream and with main- the river; the River is a navigable Salmon the stream the When dispute. encircles land in “island” area was in in 1890 existence when the channel is with filled water from statehood; Idaho admitted whenev- runoff, during spring high- mainstream er the flow River at Salmon ground er appears above channel as an stream gauging Whitebird station exceeds controlling government “island.” The sur- 39,300 second, per feet cubic water flows in vey of this of the river was made secondary channel through “island” June, 1893, during spring high run- area; on based waterflow measurements at disputed off. The described surveyor gauging the Whitebird stream station for unsurveyed area as an “island” within years, 15 past flows sec- mainstream of the Salmon River. an 31.7 ondary average days per channel defendants-respondents In 1968 State area year; noted as an “island” Board of Com- Idaho and the Land surveyor in 1893 is not an legally island as title, quiet Following pre-trial hearing, ruling 1. action to since the in favor of damages pursuant respondent damages issue moots the issue of court severed 42(b) only judgment owner- is final. I.R.C.P. and determined only appeal ship thus involves issue. This 796 134, Matthews, (1927); P. 406 255 Idaho
defined because water does not continuous-
1, 136
25 Idaho
channel;
Ramey,
&
v.
ly
A. B. Moss Bro.
secondary
flow in the
the “is-
Baslington,
v.
(1913); Ulbright
land” area was
included in the
P.
539,
Lat
(1911); Scott v.
patent
dence.
Appellants, however, maintain that
Generally speaking, A.
inundation
“agricultural purposes” includes the raising
by—that
good
of land
has
stand well of livestock. Since the disputed land has
perennial plants for a
established
short
by appellants
been utilized
as a heifer calv
harmed,
period of time
be
wouldn’t
but
ground,
ing
appellants argue that
subjected
might
where the same land
be
above the line established by the district
through
to severe water action
the force
court as the natural or ordinary high water
current,
through
wind or
then
the mark is suitable for “agricultural purposes.”
deprived
soil could be
of its value for Although this court has judicially construed
agriculture.
agricultural pursuits in
contexts,
other
“ag
purposes”
ricultural
as used in I.C.
58-
§
testimony,
on this
Based
104(9) previously has never been defined.
reasonably
could find that
The natural or ordinary high water mark of
by Mr.
as the natural
established
Scribner
a river refers
impressed
to a line
on the soil
water mark
the river on
by the action of the water and contemplates
Plaintiff’s Exhibit No.
and Defendant’s
vegetation
test
an aid in determining
No. 51 was “the line which
Exhibit
context,
its location.
In this
whether the
impresses
by covering
on the soil
soil is valuable for agricultural purposes
periods
for sufficient
the soil of
refers to the existence of vegetation and
destroy
agri
its value for
suitability
soil’s
for raising agricultural
purposes.”
58-104(9).
I.C.
cultural
§
crops. Whether cattle could roam on the
holding is
upon
The court’s
based
soil does not aid in determining the location
particular
present-
facts and circumstances
of the natural or ordinary high water mark.
compo-
ed in this case. Because of the soil’s
Appellant’s argument
rejected
is therefore
extremely
sition and
erosive action
portion
and this
opin
district court’s
portion
of the Salmon Riv-
ion is affirmed.
er,
only
land inundated for
a small
*7
to
year
was held
be below the natu-
II.
ral
or
mark
topographical
Given different
river.
fea-
Appellants
they
next maintain that
tures,
composition or less
soil
erosive water
the disputed prop
have established title to
may
action the result
have been otherwise.
However,
possession.
its
erty
adverse
in
however,
appeal,
The issue on
is whether
opinion,
memorandum
the district
ex
court
the demarcation
appellants
allege
pressly stated that
did not
portion
of this
river
water mark
property
theory
title to the
on the
of ad
presented.
the evidence
supported
fact,
possession.
appellants object
verse
The evidence introduced below indicated
testimony concerning
to
adverse
ed at trial
and water erosion had been
that inundation
claiming
were
possession
they
because
not
enough
deprive
in this area
possession.
severe
property by
to the
adverse
title
destroy
use
soil of its
will not be con
Issues not raised below
In an area where
agricultural purposes.
appeal,
this court on
sidered
undergoing
legal
a
detriment
entails
tive
theory upon
to the
will be held
parties
by Idaho law.
not sanctioned
to the lower
presented
was
the case
236, 506
Baugh, 95 Idaho
Dunn v.
court.
Although
judgment
City
v.
of Lewi-
(1973); Willows
absolutely
appel-
that
require
P.2d 463
not
court did
(1969);
cattle,
require
P.2d 120
it did
ston,
in their
93 Idaho
lants fence
lease
alternatively obtain a
Havens,
appellants
444 P.2d that
v.
Williams
in
they chose not
fence
property
if
Carter,
(1968); Frasier
However,
trial court made
their cattle.
(1968). This issue
APPENDIX BISTLINE, Justice, specially concurring. point been careful to out that the holding of the Court here “is based upon particular concurring opinion am I facts and circumstances presented in this the trial Court, am not convinced that but I case.” rationale of opinion today is the line of ordi- determined properly *9 that, testimony from Scribner, the Mr. of has water. Justice McFadden high nary this caveat: statute “Provided that reasonably could find that district court the this definition shall not be construed so as “was by Mr. Scribner line established the the water, change property to or vested affect ordinary and thus high line of the either state of or of sup- rights the of the Idaho judgment of is evi- by competent and substantial or Id. riparian property littoral owners.” ported dence.” is employed Depart- Mr. Scribner Lands and is chief of the Bureau of ment of out, points him, opinion ably according To Navigable As Court’s Waters. a visual observation con- task, from Mr. Scribner title testimony, quiet falls the his thought line he' of ordi- cluded rivers, involving lands Idaho’s actions be, applied and then high should nary water making vege- “the determination of the of vegetation a test to sub- theory of his own tation, line and where where the water is theory, his he applying In did stantiate it. ownership, it is in relation to our we think at point which seek to establish the not ownership.” the state’s vegetation entirely ceased be- terrestrial view, testimony improper was my inundation, of but differentiated cause predi- not have served a valid and should of amongst species the various terrestrial cate which to base determination of upon and below his vegetation growing above But, high of water. it was ordinary the line conclusion of location of preconceived objection, without and the trial received ordinary high line water. Counsel in con- be to be error court cannot said objected when Mr. Heckman’s Scribner for it, utilizing it as the basis of sidering fact identify (plaintiff’s exhibit asked to an was his decision. 123) listing was which various No. Mr. testified that he started Scribner vegetation which he species “collected statutory line of with that definition of high ordinary and water- natural high in his ordinary water effort to estab- pointed properly Counsel out that line.” witness, Scribner, boundary lish the river-side the Heckman assuming was Mr. water, line of This was included as a property. definition location amendment, that was precisely location issue part and the 1967 Sess. court was called upon trial which 236(9), 58-104, ch. to I.C. which § Laws did sustain the The court ob- resolve. powers and duties declares the of the State assuming that Mr. the court Scrib- jection, Board, that placed Land Board in su- up testimony “will so his connect ner pervision disposition or use of land in meaning has some Short here waters navigable the beds of “to the natu- later, objection renewed, was minutes ral water mark.” Id. Shortly after that again overruled. readily seen that Mr. Scrib- itWhile opinion was asked for his as to Mr. Scribner position required him to as- official ner’s plants below his grow what lake and riv- the boundaries certain water, testimony received 58-104(9) placed I.C. under which § erbeds objection. without jurisdiction of the supervisory Board, Mr. have felt Scribner should Land purpose For the limited statute respect the caveat of that sec- obligated involved, “natural forth, and, rather than devise tion set above line “to be the which the defined mark” type-of-vegetation interpretation of his own impresses covering on the soil section, he have given should due re- deprive periods soil sufficient statutory defini- agri- gard its value for to the source vegetation destroy its SS-HM^),1 Im- not show I.C. record does that he was purposes.” tion. The § cultural there mediately the definition follows after from whence definition came. informed presses containing complete covering text of the sentence on the soil 1. The it for sufficient periods reads: “The term ‘natural or or- the definition the soil of its dinary high destroy agricultural used be purposes.” mark’ as herein shall value for 58-104(9) (emphasis added). the water im- I.C. § defined be
803 to decision law rather legislature used in have been directed The definition body, with that but originate did botany guide attempt 1964 as his in his than to definition, from this Court’s adopted was extent of the domain determine the property rights riparian of which the one empowered Land Board became been both vested owners have or littoral of as a result the 1967 amend- to administer legis- The many years. however, for chose, determined apply and ment. He knowledgeable was quite obviously seeking lature statutory definition out distinc- Court, quarter over a of a what (which of have seemed reasonable may tions Lynch, in Driesbach v. 71 century ago, said vegetation of him) types might to which as 506, 446, 501, (1951), 234 448 P.2d belonging as the line of be classified water, the Court held that natural or where belong- and which as “[t]he high water mark is that line which legislature that line. The con- ing above impresses on the soil covering power on the no such State Land ferred periods sufficient the soil it for Board, admonished to and in fact the con- vegetation destroys its value for years 60 it has been trary. For over well- purposes.” agricultural accepted in Idaho that understood useable, vegetation test is in the agreed that case, the Court that mark, clearly of a discernible water absence the trial court deci- substantiated evidence any vegeta- terrestrial it is the absence of point reference to sion, with “both determining been the tion which has factor. ordinary high water line and or Close attention is also directed to Mr. to the absence reference with wherein, testimony in addition Scribner’s of land below the parcel each upon growing accuracy placement of his basing the ordinary high as the found line water, emphasized he (emphasis . . .” Id. add- (which the land he considered below ed). water) was the line of unsui- realized, may not have legislature agricultural purposes. again Here table for however, definition adopt- that the which it premised upon his conclusions were his own origin even earlier than had its Dreis- ed statute, interpretation of the and for land years ago, Almost 60 in Raide v. bach. qualify opinion in his as suitable for Dollar, (1921), P. 203 469 agricultural it purposes, would have to be rule, stated that same adopting first Court or, capable crops, of cultivation for at a Supreme the Missouri Court’s hold- it from minimum, utility “hay ground have Light- ex rel. Citizens’ Electric ing in State quality pasture relatively high land.” For Longfellow, Power Co. 169 Mo. ing & my part, I am unable to see that Mr. Scrib- (1902). Whether 374 or not the 69 S.W. ner, behalf anyone on of the state of knew that Court’s rule dated legislature Idaho, any way justified is in impressing legislature had well back statutory and court onto the definitions the law in Idaho been mind that had land must be of pasture “relatively many years; the caveat for settled land, Pasture land is high quality.” pasture clearly legislative shows amendment pasture it is nonetheless even property rights of recognition riparian a low though quality, perhaps it be of had owners become vested and littoral pasture If it will very quality. low any way not become unsettled should animal, agricultural purpose. such is an placing State Land Board in reason fortiori, pasture it will not And a even one lake and river beds. In other charge vegetation. it sustains animal unless not, words, amendment did nor did Concluding, suggest I also that the trial to, any change make whatever in purport premised court decision in all likelihood is existing law earlier declared in Raide upon faulty definition the line of ordi- in Driesbach. op- Just the reaffirmed nary high opin- water. In the Court’s lead this case. posite ion, Justice McFadden observes that so, Scribner, Mr. being as Director court here held that “land trial inundated Such Waters, Navigable year should only Bureau a small *11 decision, as I read the it is parently, and below the natural or ordinary wholly to the sparsity vege- attributable of river.” water mark of the That it was high tation, types and the of vegetation as testi- year inundated for a small of the so fied to by Mr. Scribner. As a matter of immediately gives concern that such river law, records, under those it would seem that not, above, well the ordinary level is but is the secondary channel is part not a of the high The Salmon water. is not a River, of bed the Salmon but is a channel river, the record little-known and here ade- cut has been and continued the vicinity ques- shows that in the quately great spring runoffs, annual and it is clear- tion, In the spring it is fast river. annual ly great these flood waters rushing down- river, it is a torrential white-water run-offs ward which have moved boulders and many the rivers in as are of Idaho which carried away much loose soil. spring late annually fed in the and early are when the winter snows rapidly summer The language Ninth Circuit Court gallons melt into billions of water. Oth- Appeals a true statement of the law rivers, such as the and er Snake Portneuf in apparently should be repeated as a here Idaho, Kootenai southeastern caution particular case affirmed Boundary County, rise over- dramatically, today not be taken as establishing the law: banks, flowing their but these do not have For purposes of this appeal it is suffi- Salmon, as does the rapid descent cient appellants’ to state that theory is not the resultant hence do have force which founded on the mistaken assumption that the area in question. has in the Salmon spring (suf- annual floods of the river fered prior to the advent of Hoover high a time of all rivers is with There Dam), which covered valley from time water. The low time bluff, bluff to “ordinary constituted its spring the late high water” and that valley, from reg- fed summer, rivers are when early bluff, bluff to thus constituted the bed of upper at snows melting by the ularly By floods, river. eliminating these In those time of the mountains. elevations contend, appellants the Hoover Dam comes the time there gone, and are snows an change caused avulsive in the flow of time at the same Almost waters. lowof the river so that the United States as mountains, but come on snows new riparian owner did not take title to the does not melt. the snow change, and seasons flood plain. ordinary The time of water is not to Appellants’ definition of “ordinary high spring confused with the annual flood be water mark” is unsound. The District waters, however. These are times when concluded, Court and we agree: melts, turns and much warm snow weather “The ordinary water mark of a drastically, taking maybe rivers rise and the physical river is a natural characteristic peak, and 2 weeks so weeks placed upon the lands by the action of receding returns the river to recede. there, placed river. It is and the high water. its line implies, name from flow river and does not extend to the mind, that in it should be With noted that peak flow or' flood stage so as to in- years, the evidence showed in 2 here overflow on the plain, clude flood nor is peak flood waters did 1966 and stages confined the lowest secondary even enter the channel. not river flow.” years, waters of last 15 the Salmon with holdings This is in accord only aver- secondary channel an were Supreme Court. days put, the per year of 31 age —otherwise United Claridge, States v. 416 F.2d dry 11 months years in those channel (1969) omitted) (citations added). (emphasis about every This is the normal 12. out stage, in flood that the rivers are time how easy to understand
it is secondary channel to be could find Ap- water.
