*1 HEALTH HECKLER, SECRETARY OF AND HUMAN v. DAY et SERVICES al. Argued
No. May 82-1371. December 1983 Decided *2 Attorney argued McGrath the cause for Assistant General petitioner. him on the briefs were Solicitor General With Deputy Kneedler, Edwin Getter, S. Solicitor General Lee, F. and John Cordes. respondents. Munzing argued the cause
Richard H. Henry A. brief was Freedman.* With him on the opinion of the Court. delivered the Powell Justice validity injunction presented question is- is the requires class that the Secre- of a statewide sued behalf adjudicate tary all future of Health and Human Services Security disability disputed II of the claims under Title Social §401 seq., according judicially estab- et 42 U. S. C. Act, pay in all cases of interim benefits deadlines and lished noncompliance those deadlines. with
h-H (Act) passed Act m 1935. was Title II of the Social §401 Among seq. S. et amended, as U. C. 49 Stat. payment things, provides insur- for the other it the Alliance of affirmance were filed for urging *Briefs of amici curiae Sweeny Security Disability Recipients by et Eileen P. and al. Milstein; by Frederick A. 0. City for the of New York Bonnie M. Jr., Schwarz, Koemer. and Leonard
anee benefits to those whose them from prevents §423.1 42 U. pursuing gainful employment. Dis- C. benefits also are under ability payable Supplemental (SSI) Income program established Title XVI of Act, Stat. as amended, U. S. C. 1381. The administered under II disability programs Titles and XVI Richard- “are of a size and extent difficult to comprehend.” son v. Perales, U. S. Approximately two million disability claims were filed under these two Titles in fiscal year 320,000 1983.2 Over of these claims must be heard some 800 administrative law each To judges year.3 facilitate the orderly sympathetic administration of the disability program II, Title
have an unusually established protective four-step process *3 for the review and adjudication disputed claims. a First, state agency determines whether the claimant has a disabil- ity and disability the date the or 42 began ceased.4 S.U. C. (1983). § 20 421(a); § CFR 404.1503 if the Second, claimant is determination, dissatisfied with that he recon- may request novo sideration of the determination. de This a involves reconsideration of the disability claim by state agency, 1 423(d)(1) “disability” Section defines as: 1 (A)inability engage any gainful in activity by substantial reason of any medically physical determinable or impairment mental can which be expected to result in expected death or which has or lasted can be to last for a period continuous of not less than 12 months.”
Any disability payable paid § benefits under 423 are out of the Federal Disability Fund, by Insurance Trust which payroll is funded 42 taxes. 401(b). § U. S. C. 2 Administration, Report 1983Annual to Congress 43-44 Dept, Services, U. S. of Health and Human Hearings Ap Office of and 1983) (hereinafter peals, Key (May Workload Indicators Key Work Indicators). load May 1983, In average pending per number of cases judge administrative Id., law stood 221. at record at 1. The state authority acts under the and Secretary. of the control 421(a). See U. C.S. §§404.907- evidentiary hearing. in a full some cases stage, may at this submitted evidence 404.921. Additional agency. by request order ofthe or either on the ofthe claimant reconsideration receives an adverse if the claimant Third, evidentiary by to an statute determination, he is entitled by hearing Law an Administrative review and to a de novo §§404.929- (ALJ). §405(b); Judge 20 CFR 42 U. S. C. (1983). Finally, is dissatisfied with if the claimant 404.961 Ap- appeal may an he take ALJ, of the decision peals Department and Human Serv- of Health Council (HHS).5 steps §§404.967-404.983. exhaust These four ices may he Thereafter, remedies. the claimant’s administrative judicial C. court. U. S. in federal district seek review §405(g). declaratory sought plaintiffs
In the named action, this class steps delays injunctive two encountered relief from Day initiated Leon was and three The action above. disability were terminated benefits November 1978after his obtaining delays in a reconsider- and he suffered substantial securing an ALJ.6 before ation and in determination delays, suffering intervened Amedie Maurais After similar certified a District Court 14, 1979, action.7 On June consisting statewide of: class seeking present to se-
“All residents future Vermont following who, cure Social benefits that no initial the defendant determination *4 5 Appeals New to the Council. may material evidence be submitted deter then will reverse the ALJ’s Council reviews all the evidence and “contrary weight of mination to the if it that the determination is finds 404.970(b) (1983). § currently the evidence 20 in the record.” CFR 6Day days reconsideration determination. was forced to for a wait 167 hearing request. days his hearing He received a 173 after before the ALJ App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a-14a. after his determination days
7 Maurais waited for a reconsideration 215 given hearing before disability He was benefits were terminated. Id., at 14a. days hearing request. after his ALJ experience delay exists, an unreasonable in the schedul- ing of and/or issuance decisions in reconsiderations hearings.” App. and fair to Pet. for 12a, Cert. n. 1. argued delays Plaintiffs the before District Court that the they experienced statutory right had violated their under 42 405(b) (1976 V) Supp. hearing U. S. ed., C. to a within a parties reasonable time.8 Both the submitted case the summary judgment. District on for Court motions On the undisputed basis of the the evidence, District Court held that, as all claimants for Title II benefits Ver- delays request hearing mont, of more than 90 from a for hearing before an ALJ to itself were unreasonable.9 It granted partial summary judgment plaintiff class on that issue December 1979.
After the submission of evidence, additional the District summary judgment concerning Court considered for motions delays process. reasonableness the reconsideration undisputed. The additional evidence also was It consisted of randomly factual summaries selected cases by Secretary. submitted The District Court noted that support positions parties. They the “summaries of both process consuming show the reconsideration is often time provides That any section that after unfavorable determination of dis ability, claimant, request, shall be entitled to “reasonable notice and opportunity respect with to such decision.” The evidence submitted the Government showed 57% of the hearings requested January in Vermont after 1978 were scheduled within days, a range delays varying with between two nine months. Id., rejected at 15a. The Secretary’s District Court claim that the de lays necessary protect were quality to ensure decisions the limited “[wjhile resources Security program. It held that the SSA reducing average length has made admirable strides in delay experi years ago, enced claimants a few we . . [believe] . that is not SSA forcing warranted in lengthy claimants to endure such delays without benefits, Id., puts administrative.appeals while it its process in order.” at 17a-18a. *5 replete They process
complex. with show that the is also unexplained processed delay; requests with com- other are dispatch.” App. In for 25a. 27 of mendable to Pet. Cert. longer than cases, the 77 reconsideration determinations took days. In these concluded each of the District Court delays inefficiencies the were caused justified by “necessary steps in the reconsider- were not survey, process.” Id., at 28a. the basis this ation On delays a of more than that, rule, Court concluded as District days making were un- reconsideration determinations statutory rights.10 In and violated the claimant’s reasonable granted summary judgment August 1981, the District Court respondents aspect for the reconsideration of the case. on injunction an In November District Court issued [the directed favor of statewide class that “ordered and processing Secretary] to and issue conclude reconsideration days requests for within reconsideration determinations injunction also reconsideration made claimants.”11 The required provide within 90 after ALJs to statutory deter express requirement There is no that reconsideration rea within a time. Court be conducted reasonable The District minations however, was soned, that because reconsideration determination prerequisite” hearing, “[unreason to an administrative “administrative statutory duty procedures trench delays the reconsideration able Id., That reason a reasonable time.” at 27a. provide hearing a within challenged here. ing is not 90-day from exempted
11 Theorder
reconsideration determinations
following
in the
circumstances:
deadline
“(a)
new medical
reports
The claimant offers new medical evidence or
determination;
since his initial
treatment
“(b)
examination when
agrees
undergo
The claimant
consultative
defendant;
suggested by
is
one
by failing
“(e)
delay
pro-
representative causes
his
The claimant or
reconsideration;
information
vide
needed
delay; or,
“(d)
requests a
representative
his
claimant or
“(e)
aggrieved
delay
way
other
attributable
claim-
in some
Id.,
representative.”
his
at 33a.
ant or
*6
request
Finally,
payment
is made
claimants.12
it ordered
any
of interim benefits to
claimant who
not
a
did
receive
days
reconsideration determination or
within 180
request
the
for reconsideration or
did
who
not receive hear-
a
ing
hearing request.13
within 90
The
Court
Appeals for the
affirmed
Second Circuit
the District Court’s
challenged delays
determination that the
violated the statute
upheld
Day
the District Court’s remedial order.
v.
(1982).
granted
Schweiker,
“(a) representative delay by The claimant or his failing pro- causes adjudication; vide information needed for “(b) representative requests delay; The claimant or his “(c) representative The claimant his appear or fails to for the scheduled hearing[;]
“(d) delay way The is in some other attributable to claimant or his representative.” Id,., at 34a. 13 Becausethe Court held challenged delays District that the violated
§405(b), plaintiffs’ delays it did not that reach claims violated the their process rights Administrative Procedure Act or due under the Four teenth Amendment. 14We note at the outset that the jurisdiction District Court had to con respondents’ statutory sider 405(g). § claim under 42 U. S. C. There are § two prerequisites 405(g)jurisdiction. Eldridge, Mathews v. 424 U. S. (1976); Salfi, Weinberger v. U. S. 763-767 jurisdictional requirement nonwaivable a claim that for benefits shall have presented Secretary jurisdictional been has been met here. The re quirement that administrative remedies be exhausted In is waivable. case, present Secretary challenged sufficiency has not respond ents’ efforts to interpret exhaust administrative remedies. We this to be requirement a waiver 405(g). § the exhaustion under Salfi, swpra, at See 767. delays Congress, fully in reso- of the serious aware
clear that impose deadlines on has declined claims, lution of Accordingly, process. we vacate the the administrative judgment below.
II challenge here the determination not does 405(b) requires to be held administrative challenge the Dis- Nor does she time. a reasonable within delays encountered that the trict determination Court’s require- Day plaintiffs Maurais violated the cases of *7 injunction im- argues that that a statewide ment.15 She judicially prescribed for all future poses on HHS deadlines contrary congressional disability intent is determinations equitable power. She of the court’s constitutes an abuse and argues appro- injunction if is even the in alternative that requiring payment in priate, interim benefits the order primar- Secretary noncompliance looks not. The is cases arguments. history support ily legislative both A repeat- Congress correctly points Secretary that out The long delays with edly associated made aware of has been repeatedly disputed has and claims resolution suggestions rejected expressly that manda- considered problem.16 imposed ar~ tory that She to cure deadlines be dispute the District Court’s we understand the Nor do statutory vi studied evidenced sample cases it that the determination requirement. of the reasonableness olations 1973, the me year In development. fiscal delays are not a recent disposition was 174 posthearing hearing request time between dian high year in 1976 at 288 fiscal processing time reached days. The mean (November 1978), action was filed District Court days. At the time this 1. days. Key Indicators Workload processing time was 151 the mean admirable observed, [Secretary] has made “the District Court As the delay experienced claimants average length of reducing the strides 9, supra. n. years ago.” See few expressly gues Congress has balanced the need that for against timely disability the need to determinations ensure heavy escalating quality face of in the decisions work- agency striking resources. limited In loads and bal- argues, legislative history the relevant ance, the Congress to date has also shows that determined that manda- adjudication tory disputed disability deadlines primary with inconsistent claims are achievement the Act’s objectives, injunction and that District Court’s statewide legislative flatly contradicts determination. We find persuasive. argument this timely
Congressional disputed concern over resolution of began early under Title II claims at least as as inspired congressional has 1975.17 It almost annual debate consistency since that time.18 with which expressed concern over this issue matched its consistent impose Secretary mandatory on the refusal to deadlines for disputed disability resolution of claims.
In the House Social Subcommittee held delays disputed resolving encountered in spon- claims,19 and 60 Members of the House imposing statutory step sored a bill deadlines for each *8 17 Delays Security See Appeals: Social Hearings before the Subcommit on Security tee Social of the Ways House Committee Means, on and 94th (1975) (hereinafter Cong., 1st Sess. Hearings). 1975 18 See, g., e. Disability Program: Insurance Hearings Public before the on Subcommittee Social of the Ways House Committee on and Means, Sess., Cong., 94th (1976); 2d 341-343 Administrative Law Judges, HEW Positions, Executive Level Salary Adjustment and for Director of Management Office of Budget: Hearings and before the Subcommittee on Employee Ethics and Utilization of the House Committee Post on Office Service, Civil Cong., Sess., and 95th 10-11, (1977); 1st 16-17 Disability Insurance Program Hearings before the on Subcommittee —1978: Security of Ways the House Means, Committee on Cong., and 95th 2d Sess., (1978). 15-17, 97-99 19See 1975 Hearings.
113 administrative review of claims.20 disputed SSA Expres- sions of concern were voiced in both the Senate and House over the of 103,000 some cases “huge backlog awaiting before an hearing” 94-550, (1975); ALJ. No. 3 Rep. p. (1975).21 accord H. R. 1-2 94-679, No. Rep. pp. Despite concern, this the Staff of the House Subcommittee advised deadlines because of the against statutory “adverse potential effect on the and of quality uniformity disability adjudication which is somewhat of already suspect.” Staff the Sub- committee on Social House Committee Ways Means, Appeals Process: Areas of Possible Admin- 1-2 istrative or 94th 1st Legislative Action, Sess., Cong., (Comm. 1975).22 Print and refused to Congress agreed impose statutory deadlines on the Secretary.
Bills deadlines have been proposing statutory proposed almost since over annually 1975,23and concern congressional has remained delay problem high. For example, directed the recom- report submit of realistic dead- mending establishment appropriate lines for It ordered resolution of SSA claims. disputed (1975). 5276, proposed Cong.,
20 H.R. 94th 1st That bill the fol Sess. eligibility; lowing days days deadlines: 90 for an of initial determination determination; days hearing request for a reconsideration from posthearing decision; Appeals days and 120 for a decision Council. 21By 1975, backlog 111,169 year cases, the end of fiscal was a of there processing hearing request posthearing mean time of 262 from Key decision. Workload Indicators 1. expressed throughout The concern the House was that man datory already deadlines would worsen the situation overburdened staff, thereby jeopardizing See, quality g., decisions. e. Hearings (“Equally important speed cases, processing as is the (“Heavier quality adjudication”); id., question of at 17 work loads production place and efforts to increase individual ALJ more strain on the adjudication”). quality 12466, (1976); 5151, Cong., 95th Cong.,
23 SeeH. R. 94th 2d H. R. Sess. (1978); (1977); H. R. 96th Cong., 1st Sess. H. R. 95th 2d Sess. Cong., Cong., (1979); 1st H. R. 97th 1st Sess. *9 Sess. doing expe- in so to consider “both the need for processing ditious of claims for benefits and the need to as- thoroughly sure that all such claims will be considered and accurately L. 96-265, determined.” Pub. §308, 458, Stat. §401. following Report note plained S. The U. C. Senate ex- “Congress that then could evaluate the recommenda- consistency empha- for tions with the elements it wishes to year.” Rep. size if and, needed, take further action next (1979).24 p. report 96-408, No. submitted a suggesting days October deadlines of 150 for re- hearing consideration determinations and 165 from posthearing subject exceptions. decision, both to certain Dept, Report U. S. of Health Human Services, and to Con- gress, Implementation of Section 96-265, Public Law (Oct. 1980). p. Secretary, however, cautioned Congress budget burgeoning and staff limitations and “mitigate against Department meeting [sic] workloads proposed objectives every its time limitation instance.” receiving Secretary’s report, Congress Id., at 2. Since impose mandatory Secretary, has'refused to on the deadlines promulgate or to direct her them herself.
Certainly Congress mandatory the concern that dead jeopardize quality uniformity lines would and prevailed decisions has over considerations timeliness. In subject, its most recent comment on the the House Commit 24In requesting Secretary, recommendations from Congress faced opposition from press those statutory who continued to for deadlines. See Disability Legislation: Hearings Insurance before the Subcommittee on Ways Means, House Committee on Cong., 96th (1979) (statement Sess., 1st Sweeney of Dennis M. and Laura W. S. etc.) (“[T]he Macklin on Center, behalf of the problem Administrative Law delays system in the Social been before repeatedly years. point, number of ... At this is well HEW problems aware in this area. . . respectfully [W]e . submit this is not the delay time to study problem. provision further A in this bill suggesting study from . . . HEW can be read as an invitation fur delay ther cleaning up hearing process getting rid of the unreason unnecessary delays”). able and
115 disapproved mandatory Ways expressly on and Means tee ju disagreement hearing with recent and indicated deadlines Criticizing imposing such time restrictions. dicial decisions Secretary Blankenship HEW, No. C75- in v. the decision of (WD 0185L(A) 1976), imposed judi Ky., May 6, which had Secretary cially prescribed on the deadlines payment in interim the of nonc the benefits event ordered reported: ompliance,25 the Committee “[The] that a claimant Committee believes is timely appeal, hearing and decision on his entitled to a recognizes it the time needed before well- but also that disability hearing can decision reasoned and sound widely case-by-case may vary .. . on a basis. made adjudication Establishing the time limits for strict every result in incorrect determinations be- case could to . . . cause time not available reach well-reasoned was Rep. H. R. No. 97-588, decisions in difficult cases.” (1982).26 pp. 19-20 original opinion re unpublished District memorandum The Court’s days. comply hearing request within 90 Secretary the to with a
quired
the
reversed that order
re
Appeals
Sixth Circuit
The Court
promulgating mandatory
Secretary
regulations
to issue
manded for
(1978).
HEW,
Secretary
Legislation by Congress fully in enacted 1980 1982 and is repeated rejection proposals consistent the with of for man- datory by Congress qual- deadlines with efforts to ensure Post, courts specific 127, more n. (quoting direction.’” at 8 White v. 1977), cert. Mathews, (1978)). 852, denied, 559 (CA2 F. 861 435 2d U. 908 S. A Report 1981 Committee Staff that quality recommended should no longer be promptness: for sacrificed “Back in 1975, gave lip quality, worrying primarily [the SSA] service about processing . . backlog. time and case . “Beginning 1978, in the examined in depth Subcommittee some two agencies State Jersey York and New were expediting cases —New —which
at the expense of quality with the tacit Regional consent of in SSA’s Office New York. operations Their fully have still not . recovered. . . One the of recommendations made the Social . Administration. . was that adjudicators (1) State goal adjudication ‘should be that reminded of quality precedence (2) takes expeditious over that of processing and that adjudicators necessary should use whatever time to secure essential ” medical evidence.’ Staff of Subcommittee on of the House Committee Ways Means, Disability Status of the Insurance Program, (Comm. 97th Cong., 1981). Sess., 1st 12-13 Print 27 suggestion The dissent’s prohibit only that meant to nation wide and not statewide unpersuasive. history deadlines is legislative suggests no Moreover, injunctive distinction between two. im orders posing varying deadlines from State express to State would defeat the con gressional goal (1979). of uniformity. Rep. 96-408, See pp. S. No. 52-56
117 adjudication. ity uniformity agency In Con- 1980, 405(b) § require every gress initial deter- amended easily ineligibility contain an understandable mination for de- evidence and the reasons discussion L. 96-265, 94 Stat. U. S. C. termination. Pub. §421(i) 405(b). § Congress added to re- time, At the same continuing eligibility quire tri-annual assessment a recipients L. 96-265, Pub. 94 Stat. benefits. 421(i). Congress also included the 460, 42 S. C. U. requirement at review a amendments eligibility made state of all determinations least 65% any year agencies L. 96-265, after 1982. Pub. fiscal (3).28 §§421(c)(2), Before U. C. Stat. Secretary majority of state determinations had reviewed the required growing A a of course. workload as matter practice sample this review abandon Rep. agency H. R. determinations. 5% of the state requiring p. amendment, 96-100, No. substantially higher percentage of state review of *12 presumably disability on will have effect determinations, timely disputed of claims.29 resolution January Congress provided Finally, that effective in 1983 granted previously dis- that an initial determination 1, 1984, ability not entitles claimant be terminated benefits should to a full evi- reconsideration, but a de novo review on to dentiary hearing 97-455, L. 96 Stat. as well. Pub. 405(b)(2). changes impose § addi- All these will of U. S. C. Secretary heavily staff. and her burdened on the tional duties mandatory continuing Congress’ light concern that of In quality its timeliness, and deadlines would subordinate agency quality determinations, ensure the of recent efforts to Secretary to review deter authorized 1980 amendments also The 421(c)(1). § 42 U. S. C. motion. ineligibility her own minations suggests Congress that was history of this amendment legislative The disputed claims expediting resolution of emphasis on that concerned undue uniformity quality loss decisions. had in a marked resulted 96-408, g., See, Rep. pp. 52-56 e. No. hardly contemplated it could have that courts should have authority impose very repeatedly deadlines it has rejected.30
C Congress Persuasive evidence the intention of also is found the it distinction has made between the resolution old-age SSI claims for and survivor benefits and claims SSI 405(b), governing eligibility benefits. Section § 1383(c)(1),governing determinations under Title II, and eli- gibility virtually XVI, determinations under Title are identi- require In cal. the event of adverse determinations, both provide claimants with notice “reasonable opportunity hearing.” disputed In for a case SSI 1383(c)(2) requires posthearing claims, however, decision except hearing request, within 90 of the in the case of disputed disability provision things claims. This makes two (i) Congress clear: will establish deadlines when it (ii) appropriate; Congress deems them has determined inappropriate subject disputed disability it is claims to mandatory deadlines.31
Ill quite apart The also contends that from the congressional rejection mandatory deadlines discussed unduly upon above, the District Court’s order intruded suggestion made legislative dissent history this “has post, us,” little relevance to the task before at legis mistaken. history opinion lative set forth in this demonstrates far simple more than congressional inaction in the acknowledged face of delays; explicitly it rejected shows that repeated mandatory demands for dead rarely lines. We see expression as clear an congressional intent. early As as Congress recognized old-age the difference between *13 disability claims: process “The' making disability significantly different determinations is from the process. retirement and survivors In the dis- insurance claims ability process^] State vocational im- agencies are involved rehabilitation portantly cases[,] making lengthy decision[,] of the and in borderline development required.” extensive of facts of is often a medical nature (1967). 744, Rep. Cong., Sess., S. No. 90th 1st 107 Congress granted with
discretion adopt which has procedures adjudication rules and for the of claims. Campbell, (1983); See Heckler v. 461 U. Gray (1981); Panthers, Schweiker v. 453 U. S. 43-44 Francis, v. Batterton 432 U. S. We need not reach contention, however, this broader because of re peated congressional rejection imposition mandatory of the adjudication disability disputed deadlines on light Congress, claims.32 In of the unmistakable intention of judicial perva it would be unwarranted intrusion into this sively regulated injunctions area for federal courts to issue imposing respect deadlines with to future claims.33 Accordingly, judgment Ap we vacate of the Court of peals, proceedings and remand the case for further consistent opinion.34 with this
It is so ordered. mandatory Congress’ unequivocal In view of determination that dead inappropriate, repeated dissenting opinion lines are references in the injunctive simply at the “reasonableness” of the order issue here are irrele 121-122, 1, 132-133, post, at n. vant. See 134-135. The dissent states tailored,” injunction “carefully that the at issue is that the assumes Post, difficultycomplying would have no with it. at 120. Even assumption correct, hardly suggests if this were it that this Court should Congress mandatory disregard the considered determination of that dead inappropriate. are lines nothing opinionprecludes proper in this use of We make clear 405(b). remedy injunctive relief to individual violations of Our decision whether, unequivocally question this case is limited to the view contrary, appropriate it for a clear intent of to the is nevertheless prescribe mandatory respect adjudi with federal court to deadlines the Act. understand that cation of claims under Title II of We delays may by long were that well have caused the courts below moved justify periods deprivations. imposing serious But this does not absolute applicable Congress repeatedly all claims—limitations that of limitations to enact. declined requiring payment of interim benefits The District Court’s order injunction. we have noncompliance conditioned on with the Because was invalid, injunction propriety we need not address the held that the requiring payment interim part of the District Court’s order benefits.
Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens join, dissenting. importance
This case determines an issue of vital to the So- Security Administration, cial to disabled Vermont residents, By failing ground opinion federal courts. its the majority factual hand, record of case at has discarded remedy a balanced crafted effectuate a federal statute. intruding clumsily pervasively regulated Far from into a meaningful, area, at ante, 119, District Court fashioned a carefully remedy tailored statewide that mandated feasible, expeditious hearings, reconsideration determinations and Secretary that did not cause extra cost to the or reallocation to Vermont of resources from other States, and that did not statutory goals quality accuracy harm other such as remedy decisionmaking. expressly Because that is not or impliedly prohibited by or statute, Constitution and is judgment not an abuse of I would discretion, affirm the Appeals. Court of
I
A majority opinion As the clear, makes the District Court’s declaratory judgment plaintiff that the class is entitled to re- Secretary lief not at issue. The concedes that 42 U. S. C. 405(b) compels provide her to claimants a on dis- puted disability determinations within a reasonable time. (CA2 g., 1977), e. v. Cf., Mathews, White 559 F. 2d Secretary denied, cert. 435 U. S. 908 does not contest the District Court’s conclusion that, because under Secretary’s regulations hearing preceded by must be determination, reconsideration ante, see at 106-107, such completed must reconsiderations also within a reasonable undisputed primarily time. The by factual record, submitted Secretary supports herself, the District Court’s declaratory judgment that the had to fulfill failed statutory duty provide representatives her the class and a portion large plaintiff class reconsideration determina- periods reasonable time. While tions within challenges she not chal- relief, classwide plaintiff lenged certification of class. the District Court’s *15 remedy equitable is to therefore, limited the Our review, by by of Court affirmed the Court District crafted the Appeals.
B validity of the District Court’s A fair assessment requires view content and the record on a clear of its order In brief, that the District Court ordered it based. which was plaintiff disability the class—Vermont claimants a of member applicants have been terminated for and new benefits whose requests initial entitlements —who review by Secretary the that he is or she not disabled determination Secretary’s days the reconsideration within must receive request for If the is ad- or review. reconsideration of his her requests hearing, hearing claimant a the the must verse and days request. However, the both held within subject exceptions tolling which limits are to have these time Secretary provide hearing the does not a within If effect. required provide interim limits, benefits, she is to time the ultimately may recoup if the not claimant is found she which to benefits.1 to be entitled triggers requirement three that in of one of events the The occurrence not deci paid: Secretary the does issue a reconsideration
terim benefits be Secretary days request; hearing the fails to hold a within within 180 sion claimant) prior request of a for days any delay attributable to the (plus request hearing; Secretary the fails followed a for a to reconsideration App. Pet. for request. to Cert. 34a-35a. hold a within option Secretary retains the under the District Court’s conditional The periods, within the established time or to either to conduct review order thus recoupable payments. operating The is not under the initiate comply limits, contempt with the threat of actions failure time remedy consequently minimally intrusive. the day-to-day operations Nor District intruded into has the Court requested accepted plan agency. The District Court drafted Secretary App. Title implement the order. 196-200. Vermont II See District careful that Court was to ensure its order had repercussions no outside State of Vermont. certi- was II fied class limited to Vermont Title claimants. The by Congress stated that the resources allocated process hearing requests in that State were resources she job.2 to do needed There was no evidence before the enforcing statutory right court Vermont claimants’ timely hearings require would to reallocate her resources to the detriment of claimants in other States.3 compliance prescribed
The District ordered Court with the only reviewing responses time limits after extensive to in- terrogatories, Secretary acknowledged which not comply was she able to with but limits, those that it was policy supported her stated to do so.4 The record also *16 exceptions court’s decision to craft nine limits. to those time Secretary argued process required The that the review some flexibility, specified variety a of circumstances which delay completing scheduling hearing a a reconsideration or justified. remedy was its District Court tailored to ac- Secretary’s If commodate each of the a submissions. claim- reports ant offers new medical new medical evidence, treat- requests claimants’ for reviews adverse initial determinations of disabil- ity flagged by are with a cover that the dates which
ing complex race them to evaluate claims a against reviewing simply the clock. The order we are does speak decisionmaking; interprets not to it and enforces right timely hearing. claimant’s to a In sum, the District order was based on an exten- Court’s operation program sive record of the actual by Secretary, plaintiff the State of Vermont the and the and experience attempting to class members’ assert their stat- 124
utory right timely hearings. to The order mirrored the Sec- retary’s policy holding stated within of a request, policy capable implementing she was without excep- additional resources. The District Court created nine mandatory exceptions directly to the limits, tions time linked Secretary’s responsibility to make accurate determina- disability. placed tions And the order no time limit on the rendering understanding of decisions. With this clearer granted by ques- relief Court, District we turn to the equitable remedy by precluded tion whether such law.
I—I I—I
A contrary In the of a absence clear command to the from Congress, equitable power federal courts have in- issue junctions they jurisdiction. over cases which have Porter Holding v. Co., Warner 328 U. S. This expressly rejected arguments judicial Court that the provision review pass Act not “does encom- power equitable imple- direct the statute be through procedures mented than other those authorized Secretary,” injunctive and that class relief is not available §405(g). under U. S. C. ano v. Yamasaki, Calif (1979). Although Congress n. U. S. has del- egated power authority to “full to make regulations procedures,” rules and and to establish §405(a), require- U. C. discretion is limited procedures ment that be consistent with the Social necessary appropriate carry provisions. or Act, out its may require comply Ibid. Courts with the precluded by statute. A federal court is not thus statute ordering injunctive from when relief the record in a case supports plaintiffs the conclusions that the are entitled to irreparable relief and that the likelihood of harm renders an remedy inadequate. available at law
125 B opinion in is that an The of the Court’s dominant rationale past regard Congress during the decade conclusive debate ing establishing nationwide time limits on the wisdom of clearly Secretary’s disability applications evinces of review remedy Legislature’s hostility statewide ordered the by postenactment legislative his The the District Court. majority tory emphasized by has little and the history any legislative If us. relevance to the task before statutory provi history helpful, were of the it would be right of adverse sion to review that first accorded claimants opportunity a hear . . . determinations and a “reasonable ing.” Aug. 1368.5 666, §201, 53 Stat. 10, 1939, Act ch. years. provision intact for 45 That has remained 205(b) § Although re- various has amended spects repeatedly reenacted occasions, it has seven “right change hearing” provision limitation,6 or to a without past a full aware- decade with has done so over the delays enjoining as con- ness unreasonable that courts were 5 205(b) supports re sparse, generally § but legislative history hearing” provision spondents’ embodying “right to a position. The bill objectives principles was strengthen and extend the intended “to (1939). Sess., 728, Rep. Cong., 76th 1st Security Social H. R. No. Act.” timely implementation the Act believed charged with provision performed.” of the task hearings to be “the essence Board, Adopted Security Federal Basic Provisions Security Agency, Social (1940), Hearing Review of Claims Security Social for the Board Procedure, reprinted in Administrative Attorney Committee on General’s 10, 77th Agencies, Doc. No. Administrative in Government Procedure Cong., Sess., 3, 1st Board stated that pt. p. The Social Id., request. all at 45. should be held within 30 1,1956, Aug. 809, 108(a), 518; Aug. Act of 28,1950, § Act of ch. Stat. 89-97, 880, 30, 1965, 831; July § L. Pub. L. Pub. Act of Stat. 308(d)(9), 94-202, §4, 379; 2, 1976, 89 Stat. 79 Stat. Act of Pub. L. Jan. 305(a), 457; 1136; 9,1980, 96-265, § Act of Jan. Act of June L. 94 Stat. Pub. 12,1983, 2499; 97-455, § Pub. L. Amendments 96 Stat. 309(i)(l), Ill, 98-21, 301(d)(1), 117. §§ Pub. L. 97 Stat. *19 trary statutory purpose rights and violative of the by persons Security on conferred disabled the Social Act. acknowledgment weight. This affirmative action deserves and Lynch, Pierce, Smith, Merrill Fenner Cf. & Inc. v. Curran, (1982); University 456 U. S. 379-382 v. 353, Cannon Chi- of (1979); cago, 441 U. S. 696-698 Lorillard v. Pons, 434 postenactment legislative U. S. 580-581 history simply support does not the conclusionreached majority Congress’ remedy delay because failure itself to problem judicial responses. be cannot read to exclude Con- gress long of been aware efforts several federal courts compel Secretary to her to accelerate review adverse disability any and determinations,7 has not taken action to judicial curtail such innovation.8
7
(Conference
g.,
e.
See,
(1980)
96-944, p.
R.
Rep.
H.
Conf.
No.
59
Report accompanying
Security Disability
Social
Amendments of
noting without criticism that in the
statutory
absence of a
time limit on
adjudication
claims,
several District
imposed
Courts had
such limits at
level).
hearing
in
presented
Cases which federal
delays by
courts
with unreasonable
Harris,
deadlines include Sharpe v.
imposed
have
Congress’ might discussion and inaction be in if, relevant rejecting statutory remedy, Congress rejected also the ex- problem. any emerges post- istence of the If theme from the legislative history, delay enactment however, it is that Security imposition with inconsistent the Social Act, having their Rep. 97-648, p. benefits reinstated an ALJ.” S. No. 6 (1982). Although passed 1984, as an interim expiring measure in June Congress 98th has moved make continuation permanent. of benefits Security Disability The Social 1984, 3755, Reform Benefits Act H. R. §223(g), Cong., (1984), passed 98th 2d Sess. has the House and has been read twice in the Senate. See for Security also Brief the Alliance of Social Disability Recipients et al. Amici Curiae. as
129 Congress repeatedly sug- deadlines would be consistent.9 Secretary gested to the that she formulate standards and re- feasibility port Congress of time back to on limits.10 The Secretary repeatedly assured that administrative steps hearing delays acceptable to an level.11 would reduce
9 Secretary adopted mandatory pursuant time limits to her Had the rule- facing challenge bringing making authority, and was now rather than one, citing legislative history I that she would this same have no doubt Congress thought with proposition for the that time limits consistent Security Campbell, Heckler v. 461 458 In Act. Cf. U. S. Social upheld Secretary’s reliance on medical-vocational Campbell, the Court Security provide guidelines, noting amending that the Social Act to since 1954, Congress repeatedly suggested that the for benefits in Sec retary adopt defining evaluating disability. for “While rules the criteria intent, they original congressional indi these sources do not establish regulations guide Congresses perceived cate that later such as the Id., at n. 10. The same lines would be consistent with the statute.” present are in the case. inferences available to Court §308, 10 See, g., 96-265, following note e. Pub. L. 94 Stat. Disability re Security 401. The Amendments of 1980 U. S. C. Social report Congress “recommending the establish quired the governing on claims for appropriate ment of time limitations decisions Security tak[ing] II Act. . . into account under title of the Social benefits processing. to assure that all expeditious the need for . . and need both accurately thoroughly considered and determined.” such claims will be (1975) See, 94-679, (relying agency’s esti g., Rep. p. e. H. R. No. on 3,000 hearing backlog by cases bill could reduce mate that a limited reform adjudicated days”); in months cases can be within 90 a month “so that (1975) 94-550, (same); Delays Security Appeals, Rep. p. 3 Social No. on of the House Committee Hearings before Subcommittee (1975) (assurances Sess., Means, Cong., of SSA Ways and 94th 1st brought backlog could be under control and Cardwell that Commissioner 1977). request within 90 June scheduled litigating challenges given to de- similar assurances 531; Harris, 2d, See, g., Sharpe v. 621 F. at lays process. in the review e. (Conn. 1976), aff’d, Mathews, Supp. 434 F. 1256-1257 White v. (CA2 Administration, 1977); Crosby supra, v. Social F. 2d 852 case, Secretary opposed plaintiffs’ motion present In the at 1282. liability part ground summary judgment on the issue of on the deadlines, setting 90-day hearing ready regulations she was issue App. to Pet. for 18a-19a. therefore abstain. Cert. the court should *22 pressure, Secretary published court In under fact, albeit Register proposed setting in Federal in 1980, rules na- process, limits on the review tionwide time and in 1981char- [time rules revised as “realistic acterized limits], which we expect plan and for which achieve, we to to be held account- as “time limits which can and should able,” be achieved in adjudicatory system operation currently of the as it ex- “significantly greater without resources” ists,” or “decreases accuracy.”12 in decisional independent Congress’ for several sum,
In reasons, reluc- tance to establish nationwide time limits within which the Secretary disputed disability must resolve claims does not support Congress disapproves the inference that the exercise equitable power courts federal of their to ensure that dis- ability particular jurisdictions deprived claimants are not statutory any aspect post- of their entitlements. If of the 205(b) § legislative history Security enactment of the Social on Subcommittee Social of the Ways House Committee on Means, Disability of the Program, Status Insurance Cong., Sess., 97th 1st (Comm. 1981) (hereinafter Print) Print 45-46 (response 1981 Comm. Pickle). Commissioner Rep. Driver to proposed rulemaking 90-day set a limit hearings, subject exceptions very to simi exceptions lar to the nine present case, required hearing days decisions issue within 30 hearing after a is held and the record closed. Reg. 45 Fed. 12838-12839 Reporting Congress later, 10 months days recommended 150 application from for reconsideration decision, days request and 165 from for a issuing decision, experience that, because nationwide, had indicated pro could days only vide within 90 cases, about 70% of the and issue decisions within 30 in about 80% of the Dept, cases. U. S. of Health Services, and Human Report Congress, Implementation of Section (Oct. 21, 1980), Public Law 96-265 reprinted in Print, 1981 Comm. at 43. Congress might Whether have affirmatively acted but for the Secre- tary’s conjecture, assurances is a matter for but it is as valid an inference majority’s as the Congress’ inference failure to enact nationwide dead- lines, or to order the pursuant to do so rulemaking to her author- ity, rejection 205(b) is an affirmative proposition that a claimant’s right timely hearing to a should be through promulgation effectuated time limits. *23 directly problem Act bears on the us, before it is the fact that repeatedly provision reenacted the with ordering awareness that the courts had been comply necessary prevent with time limits when unrea- delays providing hearings. sonable reconsiderations and majority’s There is thus no basis for the conclusion that equitable remedy by ordered the District Court in this case is by implication. barred
Ill remedy Because the District Court’s is barred neither explicit statutory by implication, nor restriction, it should upheld be unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. The abuse-of-discretion standard is not in this toothless context. against “engraft- We have cautioned the lower federal courts ing proper procedures agencies upon their own notions of en- by Congress.” trusted with substantive functions Vermont Corp. Yankee Nuclear Power v. Natural Resources Defense (1978). Congress Council, Inc., U. S. has man- disputed disability dated determinations, but has implementation hearing process committed of the review and Secretary. agree I that the has substantial discretion, with which the courts should not interfere, determining comply statutory obligations. her how to with general judicial principles
These deference to dis- devising procedures legislatively cretion in objectives to achieve defined pragmatic
are reinforced some considerations. Excepting, of course, those cases where denial of benefits process, agree rises to the level of violations of due I would problem delay may susceptible at times not be judicial example, solution. For when crowded adminis- directly congressional trative dockets are linked to limited appropriations personnel, may and lack solution Congress. Similarly, delays lie in the hands of when are di- rectly accuracy adjudicatory linked to the fairness and process example, delays when result from the need to —for gather additional medical evidence relevant to the core issue disability only agency charged determining with dis- — ability may within the terms of the statute to alleviate able problem. Secretary’s hand, theOn other discretion cannot be boundless, courts must determine whether her actions are sufficient to effectuate individual entitlements cre- by Congress. many quite appro- ated Therefore, situations judicial priately example, call for intervention. For when a processing *24 standard for similar cases can be established from agency’s delays lengthy beyond own records, that norm may dilatory agency response indicate a inconsistent with the statutory provide timely hearing. to directive a claimant a Similarly, agency’s specific if the records disclose inefficien- inactivity relationship cies or that bear no definable to re- source constraints or the making, to need ensure accurate decision- deferring agency’s in
courts would be remiss to unreasonably dilatory processing requests of claimants’ for review. present supports
The record in the case the conclusionthat remedy respond the District Court tailored its to causes of delay properly susceptible judicial scrutiny that are solution. District The Court considered record evidence of agency’s processing disability hearing standard for re- quests. Secretary 90-day figure offered the as her es- policy scheduling hearings. tablished for Prior to the Dis- provided hearings order, trict Court’s she in within that time range delay. 57% of the cases, with a 2- to 9-month App. Secretary to Pet. for Cert. 15a. Yet did not com- plain prevented complying that she was from her own with contrary, policy because of lack of resources. To the she proper complement stated that had she of ALJs needed disability hearings to conduct II Title in Vermont.13 There- hypothesized categories four reasons not schedul ing hearings days: within 90 cooperation lack of claimant providing in nec essary information; delay in response from medical sources cited relief, no record evi- the District Court ordered
fore, when difficulty suggested would have that the dence complying. delays turned its attention District Court
When rep- process, on 77 in it based its order the reconsideration Secretary. provided by the case summaries resentative Secretary’s disposition Again, in less own standard was accepted description days. her The court than time-consuming” process, “complex reconsideration existing encompasses record a de novo review of the which necessary any supplemental there- evidence. The court locating folder, the claim a “reasonable time for fore allowed forwarding obtaining appropriate agency, and as- it to the generating sessing Id., at notices.” evidence, and additional reconsideration took 29a. In each of the 27 cases which “periods days, longer un- the court found however, than 90 necessary steps delay, directly explained not attributable process.” at 28a. It further Id., reconsideration delays explained in the case sum- that, found “when the if could all, not of the cases subtracted, most, maries are Ibid, days.” (emphasis completed have within been *25 original). arbitrary imposing deadline on an embat- from
Thus, far by adopted agency, first to the standard the court looked tled statutory obligation pro- meeting agency its to the itself for timely hearings of the resources within the constraints vide rejected explicitly the re- it. the court Further, available to delays beyond specific spondents’ number contentions that passage days and that the mere statute, violated the plaintiff extraordinary sought by justified the relief time the travel; and claimant; logistical scheduling problems due to distant medical obtaining complex specialized in agency assistance to claimants 23, 24, App. development. Interrogatories Nos. 52. The Answers to delays Secretary any of these reasons caused in provided no evidence that hearings. scheduling representatives’ the class App. question class. Rather, 99-100. the court framed the delays.14 as the reasonableness of the The court’s demands parties 3-year period produce to the over a suffi- record presented15 question cient to answer the its reluc- evinces procedure proper agency tance to substitute sense of its own Secretary. for that of the remedy similarly sensitivity
The court’s its reflects special administering difficulties of the massive Secu- rity system, challenges Secretary and to the faces meeting goals accuracy prompt- the administrative (1979). By ness. Cf. Boles, v. U. S. Califano exempting from its order circumstances which the gather reports, needed to evidence and medical the court re- sponded Secretary’s concern that she not be forced to accuracy providing expeditious sacrifice for the sake of more hearings. By exempting circumstances which the claim- cooperate process ant failed to in the or contributed to the delay, Secretary’s the court accommodated the concern
14 Midwaythrough litigation, the court found the record “devoid of information concerning why delays plain the reasons occurred. tiffs have recognized will delay that there when the times either re quested by recipients provide to enable them to additional information or is caused the recipients’ cooperate failure Secretary’s with the re quests. Similarly, acknowledged delays may have been the result of staffing. clear, increased case-load or insufficient It is then, that the record respect is inconclusive with to the reasonableness of delays. And since the delays prime reasonableness of the ques is the tion court, before the summary judgment the motions for be denied.” must Memorandum July Decision of App. Only 99-100. after contin ued discovery did the delays beyond court rule that were unreason App. able. to Pet. for Cert. 28a-29a. 15In response plaintiffs’ request third interrogatories, seeking data by Judge Holden, demanded chose to submit ran domly selected reconsideration selected from cases her a total *26 of 453 performed 1, reconsiderations 1977, January between and October 31, 1980. Interrogatories, 30, Defendant’s Answers Third Mar. App. 105-149, 193-195. flexibility required degree in the best permitted of the
she be agency. And, as the as well of the claimants interests Secretary’s con- significant to the accommodation course, its order is in the court’s for accurate determinations cern opposed decisionmaking, to the exemption as of the total process. information-gathering, no time limit what- There is of deci- placed and issuance deliberations on ALJs’ soever to ensure to deliberate time have sufficient sions. ALJs exami- consultative to schedule new decisions, accurate required. if evidence nations additional injunction Finally, consequences are a further the the interpretation of the court’s reasonableness indication of the statutory Yamasaki, ano v. mandate. Cf. Calif During in- in which the 28 months at 697. S.,U. met the stand- junction effect, has been of re- allocation without additional case, one ard all but impact subsequent elsewhere adverse sources system. Security Brief for II claims Title Social Respondents Arg. This record 33, 51. n. Tr. of Oral 32; slightest injunction had the suggests has not both that management Secretary’s impact nationwide on the injunction process, has had the and that review rights enforcing disabled Vermonters’ effect desired hearings. timely Secretary’s practical manifestly remedy attentive to
A abuse of dis- policy held to be an not be should concerns delay applied order District Court’s cretion. foreseeable “direct and not to be the as fact that was found implementation of the consequenc[e]... conscientious 33. Given the ad- Brief for Petitioner Act.” initial determina- 21.3% of the evidence record ditional meaning within not disabled was that a claimant tions reconsideration to be Act were found the Social were reversed at decisions and 56.2% of the erroneous, responded properly hearing stage, App'. the court *27 of urgency unreasonable claim- special enjoining barriers to receipt ants’ of benefits mandated by Congress.16
I—l > In the relief m summary, ordered this case was founded three correct First, respon- a federal has a premises. court sibility to enforce the to a right hearing granted expressly the Social Act. The Act hear- that such a requires timely. Second, be the mere ing times length processing does not constitute an basis classwide adequate injunctive relief, for the delay may be attributable to reasons related to the to Secretary’s mandate make as well as expe- accurate ditious within disability determinations the constraints at resources her if disposal. However, delay the causes are unrelated to the adjudicative process, delay is unrea- Third, sonable. the unreasonableness of is of delay magni- significance fied when the record establishes that more than half of the Vermont claimants who their pursue right administrative are found to have been disabled and entitled to the denied payments initially by the Secre- a definition, disabled tary. By person has been unable “to any substantial gainful engage activity,” U. C. 423(d)(1)(A) (emphasis supplied), deprivation income works that cannot hardships adequately be compensated by significance place
16 The we on the tempered reversal rate must be appeals process fact that permits administrative addi introduction of stage. Therefore, tional evidence of at each a denial stage at well status one could have been “correct” based on the evidence Eldridge, Mathews v. available to the Cf. decisionmaker. 424 U. S. (1976). Nonetheless, 346-347 the fact of disabled remains that hundreds grave hardship they Vermonters endure not because do receive entitle delayed during process. obliga ments review has an The Government rightful program. tion to the beneficiaries of its insurance Members plaintiff workers, paying Security system class were once into the Social required years for the number of to earn entitlement income when dis abling keeps or workplace. illness accident them from the following delayed in his or payments decision
retroactive irreparable harm in the face of Therefore, her favor. statutory right re- plaintiff has established class, which injunctive may properly relief, order court lief, a federal present properly case. in the did so *28 I dissent. sheet notes reconsider- held, easy hearings permits ations and any should be recordkeeping of applicable exceptions that toll the time limits. 2 16, 17, Interrogatories Defendant’s Answer Nos. App. (averring to Judges that three are Administrative Law needed to conduct Title II dis State). ability hearings in three assigned Vermont and have been to the Secretary agrees she has been able fulfill obligation to her to provide timely - hearings by as defined the District Court. the Dis- Since injunction first effect, trict Court’s went into been able comply case, to with the hearing timetable in all but one and she has done so transferring any without personnel or resources into other Vermont. Arg. 33, Tr. of Oral 51. Interrogatories, 19, 24, Defendant’s App. Answer to (agen Nos. cy’s policy established is to conduct request). within agrees undergo determination, ment since the initial to a suggests, consultative examination when the so delay by failing provide causes a the information needed nondisability, the initial determination of or reconsider delay, otherwise causes District Court ordered 90-day request limit on the time from a reconsideration App. to issuance of the notice of the result be tolled. Secretary urged Pet. for Cert. 33a. Because the that it was delay, frequently in the interest to court also claimant’s delay any period requested tolled the time limit for representative. Similarly, the claimant or his Ibid. 90-day District Court tolled the limit on the time from a hearing provision hearing request for a to the of a when representative provide the claimant or his either fails to (ALJ) Judge information needed Law the Administrative delay, adjudication, requests appear fails to for delay. hearing, scheduled causes at 34a. Id., or otherwise Finally, remedy Secretary’s pertains statu- tory obligation provide hearings within a time. reasonable places Secretary’s The order no time limit on the issuance although plaintiffs, relying decisions, on the Social Act, the Administrative Procedure 5 U. C. Act, 555(b),(e), 706(1), §§ Constitution, and the included their request plea for relief a that “a decision be rendered App. By repeated promptly” hearing. after a 24. refer- its processing majority time, ences to decisions and overall implies that the ALJs, District Court tied the hands of forc-