Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
465 A.2d 609
Pa.
1983
Check Treatment

*1 Mary Anne M. HECKENDORN Fred Plaintiffs, Heckendorn, Defendant-Appellant, CORPORATION, RAIL CONSOLIDATED Defendant, COMPANY, Additional EVANS PRODUCTS Defendant-Appellee. Company, Additional The Carnation Pennsylvania. Supreme Court 10, 1983. March Argued 15, 1983. Sept. Decided *2 for defendant- Eaton, Shissler, Harrisburg, David C. W.E. appellant. Heckendorn, et M. Irwin, Jr., Carlisle, for Fred

Harold S. ux. Evans Products Knauss, IV, Harrisburg, E.

Edward Co. Carlisle, for The Williams, Martson, Thomas J.

William F. Carnation Co. *3 FLAHERTY, C.J., NIX, LARSEN, ROBERTS,

Before jj. zappala, McDermott, hutchinson OF THE COURT OPINION ROBERTS, Justice. Chief whether, brought by on in an action appeal

At issue this tortfeasor, an a injured from liability, immune employer, although statutorily of for the purpose nonetheless be third joined by party negligence with the apportioning Both the trial court and the of the third party. for any as a defendant

Court held of Compen- barred section 303 of the Workers’ purpose by be af- and now Act. allowance of granted appeal sation We firm. Heckendorn,

In of Fred M. November filed a com- and his wife Company, Carnation appellee Rail Corpo- Consolidated plaint trespass against appellant Products Company alleging ration and Evans (Conrail) 1977, while in the course of his employment, on August bulk- injured falling had been struck and by Heckendorn Evans, loading as he was door, head manufactured by railroad boxcar owned appellant Conrail and leased to by Carnation. When Conrail as an attempted Carnation defendant, additional Carnation objections filed preliminary to the joinder. The Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County sustained the and the preliminary objections, Superi- or Court affirmed. 293 Pa.Super. 474, (1981). A.2d 674 This appeal allowance followed. by

Section 303 of the Workers’ Act provides:

“(a) The under shall be liability this act exclusive and in other to such place any liability and all employes, his legal representative, wife, husband or par- ents, next kin or dependents, entitled anyone otherwise any action law or otherwise account on or any death as defined in section injury 301(c)(1)and (2) 411(1)(2) P.S. or disease as defined occupational [77 ] in section 108 P.S. § [77 27.1]. In

(b) the event or death to is caused employe a third then his by party, such employe, legal representa- tive, or wife, husband kin, next of parents, dependents, and anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages by thereof, reason their action at law may bring such carrier, but his party, employer, insurance their n servants and agents, employes, on representatives acting their behalf or at their shall not be request liable to a for damages, contribution, or indemnity any action at law, otherwise, or unless for dam- such contributions or ages, be indemnity provid- shall expressly ed in a written contract entered into alleged to be liable to the prior date the occurrence *4 which gave rise to the action.” 5, Act of 263, December P.L. amended, No. as 77 P.S. 481 (Supp.1983).

In v. Jones Laughlin Tsarnas & Pa. Steel 488 Corp., 412 A.2d 1094(1980),this Court the sustained constitutional- of section ity 303(b) and concluded 303(b) that section was intended the by Legislature to the prohibit as an additional defendant in actions employee against third-party tort-feasors:

105 our law 303(b), permitted to the of Section passage “Prior in defendant as an additional of the employer the joinder on a tortfeasor party third a an by employee suit If it were over. liability or liability the basis of joint third party and the that the determined both employee the injury, for the responsible employee’s were but the full from the third recovery party, obtain a could or indemnity obtain contribution could also party statuto- of the the to the extent employer’s from Act. Compensation under the Workers’ ry liability [Cita- tions omitted.] to the general creates an 303(b) exception

Section section, a that from tortfeasors. Under joint contribution for an is in responsible, part, whose negligence the Work- protected suffered injury by employee by Act, not, brought by in the suit men’s Compensation may an addi- him, the as the otherwise seek tional defendant. the third may Nor though the even employer, contribution or from indemnity been the primary the own have negligence injury.” cause 1096. Bell v. 517-18,

488 Pa. at 412 A.2d at Koppers Co., (1978); Pa. 392 A.2d 1380 v. Carborun- Kelly 481 A.2d Arnold v. (1982); dum 307 453 624 Pa.Super. Borbonus, Hefferin Pa.Super. (1978); 257 390 A.2d 271 (1977).1 247 Stempkowski, Stempkowski, 1. set forth detail In Hefferin Court 303(b): legislative history present section of the enactment Compensation on State “The National Commission Workmen’s Congress report its and the President Laws submitted July, report for the 1972. The contained recommendations laws, compensation improvement and of of state workmen’s recommendations, essential the Commission. 19 were deemed immunity and R. and R. 2.19 address exclu- Recommendations 2.18 sivity employers actions when an from impaired disease. The or dies because of work-related or recognized result recommendations would its Commission employers and included the exclusive increased costs one the 19 essential recommendations. as Pennsylvania report background, With Commission through years Legislature a massive in the 1974 undertook Workmen’s Law Occu- overhaul of the State’s *5 106

Appellant 303(b) joinder concedes that section bars of an the of employer for but con- purpose establishing liability Act, tends the 28, that Act of Comparative Negligence April amended, 7102, P.L. as 42 No. Pa.C.S. which § was enacted to section 303(b), legisla- reflects a subsequent tive intent as permit an additional fact, defendant for the In apportioning fault. purpose the Act Comparative Negligence opposite reflects a precisely intent, one which is consistent with the entirely legislative grant immunity employers against actions tortfeasors. third-party

The Act that a Comparative Negligence provides plaintiff may recover his greater whenever is not damages negligence of the “defendants recov- than whom negligence the against ery is sought” that, allowed recovery is “[w]here defendant, more than one each shall be defendant liable for ... in the ratio of the amount of his causal to- the negligence amount causal attrib- uted to all whom defendants is allowed.” recovery 42 7102 Pa.C.S. (emphasis The Workers’ Com- supplied). § Act pensation provides that “[t]he under act this shall be exclusive” the and that pational which, among items, Disease Law the other caused aver- age weekly payment present per to was $60.00 rise from week to a per Legislature $187.00 week. It the intention of the to have Pennsylvania comply the Workmen’s Law with as many of the essential recommendations of the Commission possible. December, This culminated in with 1974 the enactment of S.B. wherein the intention the amendments to Section grant immunity 303 third-party was to total from this, accomplish Legislature adopted language actions. To in Longshoremen’s Compen- Section 5 of the and Harbor Workers’ Act, seq., employer granted sation 33 U.S.C. et where the is immunity subrogated total from actions and is also compensation the full extent of its workmen’s lien. This becomes right, statutory necessary it is not for to enter equitable plaintiff as an action as is the case in some other jurisdictions. lengthy thought The Federal law case and affirms the language of Section and it is with this mind Pennsylvania Legislature adopted present Section 303 lan- guage----” 368-69, at 372 at A.2d 87. Tsarnas Jones & Laughlin Corp., supra, Steel 488 Pa. at A.2d 10. contribu- damages, third party liable to a not be “shall ” *6 law, or otherwise.... action at indemnity any tion or 481 (Supp.1983). 77 P.S. § two that the concluded

The Court properly Superior read in full but “can be are reconcilable not only provisions 480-81, 439 A.2d at Pa.Super. 293 complete harmony.” and materia, 1 read in pari statutes must be 677. As related at Act provides Compensation and the Workers’ Pa.C.S. § nei can whom recovery is one against employer “[a]n ” at 439 ‘allowed,’ 293 Pa.Super. nor ther be ‘sought’ Negligence in the Comparative it is clear that A.2d at not an contemplate apportionment Act “the did legislature tortfeasors party one or more third between liability had) plaintiff’s be and whom (against recovery may nor sought neither be whom (against recovery may employer 307 Co., supra, allowed).” Id. Carborundum Kelly Jones v. also Pa.Super. at 453 A.2d at 627. See Co., (W.D.Pa.1981).2 515 559 F.Supp. Carborundum provide for the likewise do not Rules of Procedure 2. Our Civil plaintiff, in employer, or involuntary joinder either defendant of an third-party Rule employee against tortfeasor. by a an action an defendant permits as an additional which a defendant to him on the person liable over to “any alone liable or who be severally upon jointly or liable or of action declared ... cause 303(a) him,” clearly inapplicable. Under section thereon with the Workers’ Act, employer held liable cannot be an action, trespass and under injured employee in a common-law to an respect 303(b), liable to the is in no section 2252(a). Nor can an 2d § also tortfeasor. See Goodrich-Amram pursuant involuntary plaintiff defendant joined or be as an per- compulsory joinder certain permits to Rule which subject an action.” “having only joint matter of a interest sons correctly recently concluded: As the Court persons having compulsory joinder permits 2227 “Pa.R.C.P. subject whose joint of an action without interest in the matter substantively proceed. has An joinder the action cannot indispensable party to a common interest in and is not no direct law tort action commenced The in his party. employee third involuntary plaintiff compulsory joinder as an therefore, action, procedurally party is not employee’s authorized.” Kelly supra, A.2d at Carborundum 2227(a)(1). 2d § 629. See also Goodrich-Amram Thus, in a case where the factfinder determines that an injured total are employee’s $100,000, the negli gent is liable to the employee for the full amount of the a result in judgment, accord with the longstanding common-law that one principle joint tortfeasor’s immunity from does not relieve the other tortfeasor of full See Restatement liability. (Second) of Torts 880 (1979). § There is no that an possibility injured will recover an amount in excess of his damages, pursuant to 77 P.S. 671, “[wjhere the compensable is caused in whole § or the act part by or omission of a third party, shall be subrogated of the . .. such third to the extent of the compensation payable under (77 this article 411 et P.S. seq.) by employer.” [ ] Thus, if the *7 $20,000 has paid in workers’ already to compensation his employee, is entitled to $20,000 receive of the $100,000judgment, less a proportion ate share of “reasonable fees attorneys’ and other proper disbursements in incurred obtaining or in effect recovery ing settlement.” compromise Id.

The employer’s to statutory right subrogation may not be challenged by allegation that the was partially responsible for the Under the employee’s injury.3 terms of the Workers’ Act, whenever is in employee injured the course of the em employment, ployer pays compensation, regardless whether the employ er, the or a employee, was causally negligent. If of a tortfeasor is subsequently determined to have caused the “in injury whole or in part,” is entitled to recover the employee full amount of his from the tortfeasor, to subject the employer’s right to reimbursement for the workers’ compensation payments contrary 3. The dictum to the in Stark v. Posh Construction (1960), persuasive, is not as Stark was decided when permitted, of the at trial was still long Legislature’s triple before the decision in 1974 to the amount of compensation payable injured employees workers’ and at foreclose, through same time to 303(b), the enactment of section adjudication employer negligence employee injury. in all cases of supra. See note 1 made as a result of the The issue of injury. the negligence is as irrelevant at the subrogation stage as it is proceedings trial, and as it is in case every in which no injury in- third-party tortfeasor is volved.

The Workers’ Compensation Act demonstrates a clear legislative intent in cases where a other than the responsible whole or in for an part employee’s injury, recover full compensa tion for his from the negligent party, subject the employer’s subrogation, an action in through trespass, which the not be employer may involuntarily joined for any purpose. As the Court read Superior properly the Comparative Negligence Act to be consistent with this legislative intent, the order of the Court affirming the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, which sustained appellee Carnation’s preliminary objections to involuntary joinder, is affirmed.4

Order affirmed. LARSEN, J., this joins opinion part and files a concur- ring opinion.

LARSEN, Justice, concurring.

I with the majority except to out thaL point subroga- tion rights are always subject equitable principles. *8 v.

Bigley Parts, Auto Unity Inc., 262, 274, Pa. 436 A.2d 1172, 1178(1981); Dale v. Manufacturing Bressi, Co. 491 Pa. 493, 496, 421 653, A.2d 654 (1980). Thus, the employer’s subrogation is not automatic and some judicial proceeding must be had in order for the lack or degree fault to be established. See Tsarnas v. Jones & Appellant 4. also claims that the Act of December P.L. 481, amending 77 P.S. § section 303 of the Workers’ Act, is provide unconstitutional because the title of the act does not act, full notice of required III, contents Article Pennsylvania Section 3 of the Constitution. As this claim was not court, raised before Dilliplaine Lehigh Valley trial it waived. Trust (1974). 457 Pa. 322 A.2d 114 Pa. 412 A.2d 1094 Corporation, Steel

Laughlin J., (1980) (Larsen, concurring). DAVIS, A Juvenile.

In re Shane Harvey Appeal A. Annie S. MILLER Miller, Appellants, AND CHILDREN YOUTH BERKS COUNTY SERVICES, Appellee, Davis, Appellee. Shane Pennsylvania. Supreme Court of Argued 1983. May Sept. Decided 1983.