56 Iowa 679 | Iowa | 1881
Lead Opinion
II. The sheriff’s deed executed upon the foreclosure sale vested plaintiff with the title of the land, and the right to all growing crops followed the title thus acquired. Downard v. Groff, 40 Iowa, 597.
This rule, we think, is not applicable to grain which has matured and is ready for the harvest. It then possesses the character of personal chattels, and is not to be regarded as a part of the realty. See 1 Schouler’s Personal Property, 125, 126; Bingham on Sales of Real Property, 180, 181.
This conclusion is well supported upon the following reasons: The grain being mature, the course of vegetation has ceased and the soil is no longer necessary for its existence. The connection between the grain and the ground has changed. The grain no longer demands nui'ture from the soil; the ground now performs no other office than affording a resting place for the grain — it has the same relations to the grain that the warehouse has to the threshed grain or the field has to the stacks of grain thereon. It will not be denied that when the grain is cut it ceases to be a pmrt of the realty. The act of cutting, it is true, aprpears to sever the straw from the land. But it is demanded by the condition of the grain. It is no longer growing; it is no longer living blades which require the nourishment of the soil for its existence and de
Suppose the defendant had cut a part of the seventy-two acres of grain in controversy; the grain so cut, it will not be denied, would not have passed to plaintiff. There is no valid reason why the act of cutting should change the property in the grain. The work required time and therefore plaintiff loses a part of his property. All of the grain is in the same condition, all ready for the reaper. The part cut is his property, while the part uncut belongs to the- land owner. We think the ownership of the grain should be determined by its condition, not by the act of cutting, which cannot be done as soon as it is demanded by its condition. We conclude that for the reason the grain was mature and was uncut because defendant has been unable to do the work, it cannot be regarded as part of the realty which passed with the deed to plaintiff’.
III. Counsel for defendant insist that as defendant was in the adverse jiossession of the land the action of replevin will not lie to recover the grain. We find it unnecessary to determine the question thus raised, as we hold that defendant’s right of property in the grain accrued when the grain matured, whether he did or did not hold adversely to the plaintiff after the sheriff’s deed was executed.
The judgment of the Circuit Court m%st be
Reversed.
Rehearing
on -rehearing.
A petition for rehearing was granted in this.case not because any member'of the court doubted the correctness of the principle involved in the opinion, but because the question as to when a crop ceases to be a part of the realty was not discussed in the original arguments of counsel.
The rule we adopt as applicable to the facts of this case is manifestly just. Dettman was warranted in the belief that, according to the seasons, and the course of nature, his grain would be harvested while he yet had the right to harvest it. So far as the ripening of the grain was involved it met his just expectations. *But by reason of unfavorable weather he was unable to sever it from the ground before the title passed to Hecht. Having sown in peace, and in a just belief that he could rightfully reap, we think he should have been permitted to do so. The former opinion is adhered to.