HEATHER YOUNG, DEL HOLLAND, and BLAKE HENDRICKSON, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, vs. THE IOWA CITY COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT; CHRIS LYNCH, Individually and in His Capacity as President of the Board of Directors and Director; LaTASHA DeLOACH, Individually and in Her Capacity as Director of the Iowa City Community School District; BRIAN KIRSCHLING, Individually and in His Capacity as Director of the Iowa City Community School District; and PAUL ROESLER, Individually and in His Capacity as Director of the Iowa City Community School District, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
No. 18–1427
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
Filed October 18, 2019
Sean McPartland, Judge.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Sean McPartland, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal, and defendants cross-appeal, from portions of a district court order granting a summary judgment in plaintiffs’ action for injunctive relief and damages arising from defendants’ decision not to submit to the county election commissioner plaintiffs’ ballot proposal regarding the demolition of a local elementary school. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Gregg Geerdes, Iowa City, for appellants/cross-appellees.
Andrew J. Bracken, Kristy M. Latta, and Emily A. Kolbe of Ahlers & Cooney, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees/cross-appellants.
In this case, we consider a series of claims arising out of the refusal of the Iowa City Community School District (school district or Board) to authorize the placement of a ballot issue at an election to be held on September 12, 2017, after a petition bearing over 2000 signatures had been timely filed with the Board. The ballot measure would have asked the voters whether they approved the demolition of Hoover Elementary School and the use of the proceeds for school district purposes.
After the Board refused to direct the county auditor to place the matter on the ballot in the upcoming election, the plaintiffs filed suit in district court. The plaintiffs sought a writ of certiorari, a writ of mandamus, injunctive relief, and damages against the school district and individual board members who voted against placing the measure on the ballot. The defendants answered and filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory relief.
The district court entered an injunction directing the defendants to place the matter on the ballot. Because absentee ballots had already been issued, the district court directed that the matter be placed on the next general election ballot following September 12. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims for damages and any other relief.
The plaintiffs appealed. The plaintiffs seek reversal of the district court order declining to award damages for alleged violations of the United States Constitution.
The defendants cross-appealed. In their cross-appeal, the defendants claim that the district court erred in determining that, under state law, the school district was required to place the ballot measure supported by the petitioners on the ballot.
For the reasons expressed below, we conclude that the district court erred in granting the plaintiffs injunctive relief. We conclude that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on all claims. As a result, we affirm in part, and reverse in part, the order of the district court. We remand the case to the district court for dismissal.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
A. Factual Background. In 2013, the board of directors of the Iowa City Community School District adopted a “Facilities Master Plan” (FMP). The demolition of Hoover Elementary School and the construction of a structure to become part of Iowa City High School on the former Hoover Elementary site was part of the FMP.
The school district sought voter approval of a $191 million bond issue to finance the execution of the FMP. The election was set for September 12, 2017. The school district intended to keep Hoover Elementary School open through the 2018–2019 school year after which it would be closed, the building demolished, and the site used for other purposes by Iowa City High School.
Shall the Iowa City Community School District . . . demolish the building known as Hoover Elementary School . . . after the 2018-2019 school year, with the proceeds of any resulting salvage to be applied as specified in
Iowa Code section 297.22(b) ?
Prior to receipt of the petition, the school district sought the advice of counsel regarding the legality of the proposed ballot measure. In a letter dated June 22, 2017, the Board‘s counsel advised that the question the petitioners sought to place on the ballot was not “authorized by law” under
After receipt of the petition on June 29, the Board requested a supplemental and expanded opinion from counsel, which was provided in a letter dated July 6, 2017. The July 6 opinion repeated the legislative history cited in the original June 22 opinion but further cited definitions of dispose and disposition found in Merriam Webster Law Dictionary and Black‘s Law Dictionary as having the common denominator of “the transfer of ownership and control of property to another person or entity.”
Further, the July 6 legal opinion noted that under
Regarding proposed next steps for the Board, the July 6 legal opinion stated that it was “not wholly clear” how the Board should proceed with the petition and recommended that the Board reject the petition as not “authorized by law,” notify the county commissioner of elections of the filing of the petition and the Board‘s action, and direct that the measure not be on the ballot in September. In the alternative, the legal opinion stated that a member of the Board could file an objection to the petition under
After receiving the advice of counsel, the Board voted against placing the plaintiffs’ narrow question on the September 12 ballot.
B. Proceedings Before District Court.
1. The plaintiffs’ petition and the defendants’ answer and counterclaim. On July 17, 2017, the plaintiffs brought an action in district court seeking a writ of certiorari, a writ of mandamus, temporary and permanent injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs also prayed for damages,
The plaintiffs amended their petition on September 8 to include a claim for damages under
2. Issuance of temporary injunction. The district court held a hearing on the plaintiffs’ application for temporary injunction on August 24, 2017. The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that they had established a likelihood of success on the merits, that the right to vote was threatened by the Board‘s actions and inactions, and that the balance of harms favored the entry of a temporary injunction placing the matter on the September 12 ballot and enjoining the defendants from demolishing Hoover until the referendum is held. The plaintiffs further asked that all early ballots filed for the September 12 ballot be invalidated as they did not present the ballot measure sought by the plaintiffs. The defendants responded that there was little likelihood that the plaintiffs would prevail on the merits, that they lacked standing to bring the action, that no right of action existed under applicable statutes, and that the public would be harmed if the Board was not allowed to conduct its business as planned.
On September 6, 2017, the district court entered its order on the temporary injunction matter. At the outset, the district court found that the plaintiffs had standing to seek enforcement of applicable statutes and that the plaintiffs had a private right of action to enforce them. The district court further concluded that the Board was legally constrained in its challenge to the petition by its failure to file an objection under
Turning to the question of whether a temporary injunction should be granted, the district court found that the plaintiffs demonstrated substantial injury or damages would result if an injunction was not granted. The district court granted the plaintiffs a temporary injunction requiring the Board to direct the Johnson County Commissioner of Elections to place the plaintiffs’ ballot measure before the voters at the next regular election. Further, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ request to invalidate early ballots cast in connection with the September 12, 2017 election; to place the referendum on the September 12 ballot; or, in the alternative, to schedule a special election on the matter. Additionally, the district court declined to enter an injunction preventing the Board from demolishing Hoover, noting that there were no immediate plans to do so. Following the district court‘s temporary injunction, the voters in Johnson County approved the FMP at the September 2017 general election.
3. Ruling on motions for summary judgment. The parties filed comprehensive competing motions for summary judgment. In their summary judgment papers, the
In turn, the defendants filed a generally mirror-image motion seeking summary judgment in the defendants favor on all issues raised by the plaintiffs. In addition, the defendants sought rulings from the district court that (a) the plaintiffs lack standing to litigate; (b) the plaintiffs do not have a private right of action under
After a hearing, the district court entered an order on the motions for summary judgment on April 26, 2018. At the outset, the district court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to the remedy already provided under Iowa election law directing the Board to place the matter on the next general election ballot but denied any relief beyond that already ordered. As part of its order, the district court repeated its earlier conclusion that the term “disposition” within the scope of
The district court denied the plaintiffs summary judgment on their
The district court also considered the question of whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law because they were not acting outside the clearly established scope of their discretionary authority.
4. Additional ruling of the district court. In its ruling on the motions for summary judgment, the district court asked the parties to make written submissions to the court regarding whether any issues remain open for resolution now and identifying what specific issues remain going forward for trial. The plaintiffs responded that the district court should make the injunction permanent and exonerate the cash bond posted by the plaintiffs, clarify its ruling regarding the impact of a no vote on the Board, and award the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and the costs of the action. The defendants responded that no further issues remained for trial and the case could be closed. In response, the district court released the bond but denied further relief.
5. Appeals. The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal of all adverse rulings. The defendants cross-appealed.
II. Standard of Review.
We review rulings on motions for summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Winger Contracting Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 926 N.W.2d 526, 535 (Iowa 2019); Morris v. Steffes Grp., Inc., 924 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Iowa 2019). Where constitutional issues are involved, however, review is de novo. Weizberg v. City of Des Moines, 923 N.W.2d 200, 211 (Iowa 2018); Rolfe State Bank v. Gunderson, 794 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Iowa 2011).
III. Discussion.
A. Meaning of “Disposition” Under Iowa Code Section 278.1.
1. Introduction. A threshold issue in this litigation is whether the district court was required to instruct the county auditor to place the plaintiffs’ question raised in its petition on the November 2017 general election ballot. Two key provisions in the Iowa Code are controlling.
The voters at the regular election shall have the power to []
. . . .
. . . direct the sale, lease, or other disposition of any schoolhouse or school site . . . and the application to be made of the proceeds thereof.
There is no dispute that the petition presented by the plaintiffs in this case has the requisite number of signatures. The
2. Preservation of statutory interpretation question in the district court. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants failed to preserve in the district court the question of whether a demolition is a disposition under
The plaintiffs also assert that the defendants are not entitled to relief because they failed to file objections to the petition with the objections committee or failed to bring a declaratory action in district court after the plaintiffs presented their petition. See Berent v. City of Iowa City, 738 N.W.2d 193, 197–201 (Iowa 2007). This procedural question—akin to an exhaustion requirement—is separately considered in division III.B below.
3. Positions of the parties. The plaintiffs maintain that the term “other disposition” includes demolition of an existing school building. The plaintiffs point to Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary, which states that “disposition” includes “the act or the power of disposing” and “dispose of” means “to get rid of, throw away, discard.” According to the plaintiffs, disposition in
The plaintiffs further note that under
The plaintiffs additionally assert that the school district is inconsistent in its treatment of the term “other disposition” (and “dispose of“) in related statutes. The plaintiffs claim that the school district interprets the term “dispose of” in
Finally, the plaintiffs assert that to the extent the statute is ambiguous, it should be liberally interpreted to promote citizen access to the ballot. In support of their argument, the plaintiffs cite Devine v. Wonderlich, 268 N.W.2d 620 (Iowa 1978) (en banc). In Devine, this court emphasized the fundamental nature of the right to vote in elections for officeholders such as county supervisor. Id. at 623.
In contrast, the defendants claim that the demolition of a building is not an “other disposition” of property under
The defendants do not shy away from a battle of dictionaries. The defendants point out that the Merriam Webster Law Dictionary defines “disposition” as “transfer to the care or possession of another” and “dispose of” as “to transfer to the control or ownership of another.” Further, the defendants note that Black‘s Law Dictionary defines “disposition” as “[the] act of disposing; transferring to the care or possession of another” and “dispose of” as “to alienate or direct the ownership of property, as disposition by will . . . to exercise finally, in any manner, one‘s power of control over; to pass into control of someone else; to alienate, relinquish, part with, or get rid of; to put out of the way; to finish with; to bargain away.”
The defendants further note that the Iowa legislature in 2008 enacted legislation providing a definition of “other disposition” and “dispose of” for purposes of
The defendants note that the Board has broad and exclusive power to determine the location of a schoolhouse under
Finally, the defendants assert that
4. Discussion. If a statute is unambiguous, we look no further than the express language of the statute. See State v. Howse, 875 N.W.2d 684, 691 (Iowa 2016); State v. Tesch, 704 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Iowa 2005). If the statute is ambiguous, however, we use a variety of methods, including traditional tools of statutory construction, to determine the meaning of the statute. State v. Doe, 903 N.W.2d 347, 351 (Iowa 2017); State v. Nall, 894 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2017).
A statute is ambiguous if “reasonable minds could differ or be uncertain as to the meaning of a statute.” Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 1995); see also State v. McIver, 858 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa 2015). Further, we have stated that “[w]ords are often chameleons, drawing their color from the context in which they are found.” Rolfe State Bank, 794 N.W.2d at 564. Ambiguity may arise not only from words themselves but “from the general scope and meaning of a statute when all its provisions are examined.” Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1996).
Upon our review of
We do not find a number of the arguments advanced by the parties regarding this question to be very persuasive. For example, we do not find that the amendments to
If this definition remained in the Code today, this litigation would not have arisen. But in 2009, the legislature repealed the changes made in 2008, including the definition of dispose and disposition that specifically included demolition. 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 10, §§ 1–4 (codified at
While the school district argues that the repeal demonstrates that the legislature intended to exclude demolition, we think this conclusion does not necessarily follow. The legislature certainly decided that it was unsatisfied with the changes enacted in 2008, but the changes in 2008, however, included an expansion of the power of school boards and a limitation on the power of voters in connection with disposition of all manner of school property. The legislature apparently decided to return the
We also do not believe the scope of the statute authorizing voter referenda should be broadly construed in favor of voters is a helpful or persuasive concept. The plaintiffs rely upon Devine, 268 N.W.2d 620. Devine involved the elections of representatives in our government, a process that the Supreme Court has identified as essential to our democracy. Id. at 623; see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S. Ct. 526, 535 (1964) (“No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.“). The Devine case dealt with regulation of the election process itself, namely, how challenged ballots should be treated in an election contest. Id. at 624. In that context, we emphasized that statutes regulating the process of election of representatives of government should be “construed liberally in favor of giving effect to the voter‘s choice.” Id. at 623.
We do not in any way retreat from Devine. But the context of this case before us is different. Here, we are not dealing with regulation of the voting process in an election of our governmental representatives. Instead, we are trying to divine the boundary between the power our legislature has allocated to the voters on the one hand and school boards on the other.
While democratic values may be promoted in referenda, the school board is comprised of democratically elected officials empowered to conduct the school district‘s business through the deliberative process.
Both the actions of the voters through the referendum process and decisions of elected officials in a deliberative setting have been established by the legislature and are entitled to respect. We are not inclined to expansively read the power of the voters at the expense of the deliberative processes of the elected school board through a rule of construction. We think a straight up interpretation of the applicable statutes is a better approach than one that puts a thumb on the scale in favor of the voters acting through referenda. After all, the voters have elected the school board members too.
Upon our review of the applicable statutes and briefings of the parties, we conclude that the defendants have the better argument. The precise unit of language to be examined is not “disposition” or even “other disposition,” but rather “sale, lease, or other disposition.”
Further, as argued by the defendants, the provision of the statute also authorizes the voters to direct “the application to be made of the proceeds thereof.”
Another factor that tips us toward the position of the defendants is the definitions found in the Merriam Webster Law Dictionary and Black‘s Law Dictionary. These sources, of course, are designed to be used in a legal context, but that is hardly a disqualifying notion when the key issue is whether the power to direct disposition of certain property rests with the school district or the voters.
These legal definitions are consistent, for example, with the Uniform Probate Code, which generally provides personal representatives and conservators with the authority “acquire or dispose of an asset” but under a separate section authorizes trustees and personal representatives to “raze . . . buildings.” See
We recognize that Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary, cited by the plaintiffs, is a widely used dictionary. But it often contains multiple definitions. This case is no exception. One of the definitions for disposition in this dictionary is “the transfer of property from one to another (as by gift, barter, or sale, or by will).” Disposition, Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary (unabr. ed. 2002).
We also note that the Board is vested with nondelegable authority under the Iowa Code to determine the site of schools. See Kinney, 133 Iowa at 96, 104, 110 N.W. at 283, 286; James v. Gettinger, 123 Iowa 199, 203, 98 N.W. 723, 724 (Iowa 1904). Here, the Board has determined that the site of an elementary school, Hoover Elementary, should be changed, that the current Hoover facility be demolished at its current site, and that the Hoover site should be repurposed and used in connection with the development of Iowa City High. In our view, while the voters under
We are also influenced by the apparent purpose of the statute. The parties have not provided, nor have we found, pertinent legislative history for the original statutory language. Yet, from the language and structure of
Finally, we address arguments to the contrary raised by the plaintiffs. We do not think the use of the terms “schoolhouse” and “school site” in
We also do not see our approach as inconsistent with
For all of the above reasons, we conclude that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the question of whether a “disposition” included demolition of a building without the transfer of property to a third party.
B. Procedural Mechanisms Related to Challenges to the Referendum Process.
1. Introduction. Even assuming that the term “other disposition” does not include demolition, the question arises as to whether the school district is nonetheless prohibited from refusing to direct the county auditor to place the matter on the ballot. The petition in this case had the requisite number of signatures, addresses, and dates under
In considering these issues, the parties dispute the meaning and applicability of this court‘s ruling in Berent, 738 N.W.2d 193. Berent involved the intersection of three statutes:
The objections committee in Berent sustained at least one objection to each proposed charter amendment. Id. One was found to be misleading, and two others were found to be “legally insufficient” because the substance of the proposals did not deal with general structure of governance and thus were not the proper subject for a city charter. Id. at 198–99. The district court found that the objections committee had exceeded its authority. Id. at 199. The city appealed. Id.
We affirmed. We noted that under
We then considered whether the city could launch a preelection challenge to the substantive legality of the proposed charter amendments. Id. at 201. In concluding that it could launch such an action, we noted that the city had a pecuniary interest in avoiding the cost of a special election. Id. at 202–03. We also determined that the question of the validity of the proposed charter amendments was ripe for judicial resolution. Id. at 203–06. On the merits, we concluded that two of the proposed charter amendments were inconsistent with Iowa law, and as a result, the city was under no obligation to place the questions on the ballot. Id. at 206–13. One of the proposals, however, was not substantively invalid and the voters were entitled to be heard on the question. Id. at 210–13.
2. Positions of the parties. Relying upon Berent, the plaintiffs contend that once a referendum petition is timely filed with the requisite number of signatures, addresses and dates under
The defendants find Berent inapposite. They focus our attention on the language of
3. Discussion. In deciding whether the defendants have failed to preserve their claim under Berent, the starting point is examination of the statutes involved.
The language in
As a result, we conclude that Berent does not control in the very different statutory environment presented by
IV. Conclusion.
We conclude that the demolition of a school building is not a disposition under
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.