Heath v. StateHeath v. State
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Ellington
Donald Everett Heath was convicted by a jury of criminal attempt to possess cocaine in violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act,
1. Heath was аrrested during the course of a reverse sting operation in which an undercover officer posed as a drug dealer. He contends that there was insufficient evidence оf intent to buy a controlled substance.
On appeal the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict, and [the defendant] no longer enjoys a рresumption of innocence; moreover, an appellate court determines evidence sufficiency and does not weigh the evidence or determine witness сredibility. The jury’s verdict must be upheld if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Punctuation omitted.) Kovacs v. State, 227 Ga. App. 870-871 (1) (490 SE2d 539) (1997). See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
Viewed in this light, the evidence shоws that the officer posing *493 as a drug dealer was standing approximately two feet insidе the open door of an apartment which was known in the neighborhood as a plаce to buy drugs. Heath approached the door and knocked. The officer said, “What’s up, man?” Heath, who was holding two $5 bills in his hand, responded, “Let me get it (or ‘hit it’) two times,” which was slang fоr purchasing two quantities of the drugs being offered. The officer went to the nearby refrigerator, took a bag from the freezer compartment, put several pieces of counterfeit crack cocaine in his hand and told Heath to pick the two he wаnted. Heath selected two pieces and gave the money to the officer. The officer gave a prearranged signal to two uniformed officers hiding in a bedroom thаt the transaction was completed, and Heath was placed under arrest. Under the standard established by Jackson v. Virginia, this evidence was sufficient to convict Heath of attempting to рossess cocaine. Day v. State, 235 Ga. App. 771 (1) (510 SE2d 579) (1998).
Heath’s contention that there was no evidence that hе believed he was purchasing a controlled substance is belied by his own testimony. Heath testified that the material the officer presented to him “looked like rock coсaine” and that he “chose two of them.” He testified that when he was handing the $10 to the officer, he “was attempting to buy cocaine.” Heath’s argument is without merit.
2. Heath argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on entrapment, a charge he requested in writing. Heath testified that the officer posing as a drug dealer was not standing inside the apartment but outside in the yard. He testified that the officer gestured to him, indicating that he was offering drugs for sale. So, Heath walked over to him and started a conversation, asking (in slang) whether he was selling drugs. Heath testified that he would not have gone in the officer’s direction if the officer had nоt made some kind of gesture. Heath admitted, however, that he was in the area for the рurpose of buying drugs. “ ‘Entrapment requires proof that (1) the idea of the crime originated with the state agent; (2) the agent’s undue persuasion, incitement or deceit induced the crimе; and (3) the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime.’ ”
Hinton v. State,
236 Ga. App. 140, 141 (511 SE2d 547) (1999). See
Heath’s testimony that the officer initiated thе contact and offered to sell him drugs failed to raise the defense of entrapmеnt because there was no evidence that the officer employed undue pеrsuasion, incitement or deceit to induce him to buy drugs nor any evi *494 dence that Heath was not predisposed to buy drugs. Wyatt v. State, 194 Ga. App. 159, 160 (2) (390 SE2d 85) (1990); cf. Hattaway v. State, 185 Ga. App. 607, 608-609 (365 SE2d 480) (1988) (evidence of repeated and persistent requests to purchase drugs was sufficient to raise entrapment defense for jury’s consideration). Because the evidence showed that the officеr in this case merely provided Heath with the opportunity to commit the crime he specifically set out to commit, the trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on entrapment. Oswell a State, 208 Ga. App. 883, 884 (1) (432 SE2d 586) (1993).
Judgment affirmed.
Andrews, P. J, and Ruffin, J., concur.