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Heath Township v. Sall
502 N.W.2d 627
Mich.
1993
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*1 442 Mich HEATH TOWNSHIP v SALL (Calendar 3). 12,1993 Argued January No. Decided Docket 92479. No. 22, June 1993. Allegan Township brought Court Heath an action in the Circuit Sail, against Joyce enjoin from Gerald W. and to them Sail constructing park ground a mobile home that the land on zoning only single-family had reverted residential following zoning grant a referendum on board’s prior request multiple- the defendants’ to rezone the land court, Corsiglia, J., family George a residential. The R. issued injunction allowing preliminary enjoining occupancy, but con- permanent injunction at the risk. sub- struction defendants’ A granted sequently a was after the to establish defendants failed Murphy, P.J., prior Appeals, nonconforming The use. Court JJ., Sawyer, in an Holbrook, Jr., and D. E. and reversed curiam, opinion finding by per that sufficient action taken was change the defendants the character of the land while park permitted a as to construction of mobile home so rights nonconforming grant prior use of vested and to create a 126375). (Docket park property a as mobile home No. township appeals. opinion joined Justice Mallett, an Justice Chief Levin, Cavanagh, Brickley, Boyle, and Justices Supreme Court held: requisite change prove tangible The defendants failed to prior in use. establish particular property 1. Use of that does conform to lawfully date of restrictions but that existed before effective permitted use. the restriction as a use, property engage To such must in work establish owner preparation for an use of the substantial character actual premises materially objectively changes the land established, subsequently nonconforming use itself. Once reasonable, restriction, although not divest enacted will right. owner of the vested point date is A restriction’s enactment the critical determining nonconforming use this when a vests. In 1986, 2, February October construction between disapproving multiple-family the date the referendum Opinion of the Court use, germane. Because the defendants’ activities residential substantial, during period, aggregate, were not cognizable preexisting nonconforming legally use was not estab- lished. *2 requisite 3. The defendants also failed to obtain the mobile building permit A or mobile home

home before referendum. however; permit rights, alone does not confer vested actual begin. An of whether construction construction must evaluation necessarily subjective vary is substantial is and will from case to case.

Reversed and remanded. Griffin, concurring part Riley, joined by in Justice Justice dissenting part, petition and stated that the for a referen- 5.2963(12) pursuant dum to MCL subse- zoning designation granted quent to the defen- reversal of precluded property expectations dants the establishment of the good nonconforming necessary faith to constitute a use. To by permitting hold otherwise would eviscerate the statute developers requirements by quickly engaging to circumvent its nonconforming construction sufficient to establish before a referendum be held. purpose nonconforming protect of the use doctrine is to expectations imposi- property prior user and to avoid of a hardship property. tion of on owners of When parcel property, presumed the owner is to under- rezones petition might thirty days that a filed within stand reversing township’s lead to a referendum decision. could that the In this because the defendants understood favora- subject zoning designation granted ble were was revocation, nonconforming They use could be established. no possibility quick continuously revision in were aware of the petition impending and the because referendum, and, requisite good faith for a thus lacked the nonconforming use could vest until use. No expired petition thirty-day petition period had if no after the filed, petition until if a was filed. was after a referendum (1991) App 716; 478 NW2d 678 reversed. Sparks, (by Thomsen, Bauckham, P.C. Rolfe & Lohrstorfer), plaintiff. K. for the John John A. Watts for the defendants. granted to determine J. We leave

Mallett., Opinion of the Court prior noncon- established whether defendants forming home their as mobile use of passage rejecting park of a referendum before Ap- rezoning proposal. The Court of defendants’ peals affirmatively. defen- We hold that answered change prove requisite tangible dants failed in the to establish a use.

i Joyce pur 1985, Sail defendants Gerald approximately 16 acres of land chased Township building a mobile intention purchase park property.1 date, on the On the home the zone) (single-family land zoned R-2 residential parks home within which mobile were permitted. however, On October *3 township granted request to defendants’ board (multiple-family to resi rezone the R-3 dential). Subsequently, opposed residents, to the change, petitioned for a the referendum 5.2963(12).2 pursuant 125.282; MCL MSA price ($53,500) purchase Defendants contended that the $26,000 ing. They Township R-3 zone. tion to so restrictions. Detroit anticipated the rezon- more the land was without than worth willing pay price the excessive the Heath were because plan property to a future land use showed the be within Note, however, purchase that the an inten- give particular purpose to use it does not the owner for employ plat subsequently in violation of a enacted the Wixom, 673, 685; City Edison Co v 382 Mich (1969). 172 NW2d 382 5.2963(12) pertinent part: provides, ordinance, following days passage of the Within 30 the township petition requesting . filed . . be with the clerk part the the of an of an ordinance to submission ordinance residing portion township in the of the outside electors villages approval. Upon the limits of cities and for their petition, part passed an ordinance or of an ordinance rejected township shall not invalidated unless it is board registered portion

by majority located voters voting villages township of cities and outside limits Opinion of the Court February 2, 1987, residents voted local On single-family original property to its return during However, time classification. residential referendum, and the the board’s vote between preparing approximately spent $18,000 defendants devel- The work included construction. the site for procuring plans, oping sev- detailed excavating permits for future eral plumbing, local drilling pipe, purchasing a water sewer installing constructing wellhouse, four test well, wells, removing topsoil, excavating roads, clear- for survey. obtaining topographical ing trees, ap referendum, defendants filed an Before park plication home state for a mobile with the application was returned with Their initial license. April request 1987, In for additional information. a defendants resubmitted unfavorable application after the July, 1987, referendum vote. late plaintiff orally notified defendants and the state park home it intended to issue a mobile that permit point, At this defen to the defendants. August began further construction.4 On dants township a letter to defendants wrote constructing insisting they stop the mobile park. refused, the After defendants home injunctive relief. filed an action enjoined Allegan occupancy, Circuit Court construction "at their but allowed from Relying Co, Inc v on Gackler Land risk.” own Twp, Springs 562; 398 NW2d Yankee supplies regular reasonable election which thereon at the next time for ballots, any special printing proper or at notices and purpose. election called for that *4 not inform the state of the that defendants did Plaintiff contends state, outcome, i.e., they the or at least remained misled referendum silent when forthcoming. they should have been spent August February an defendants Between construct, realty $15,000 equip prepare, the for use additional park. home as a mobile op the Court held that defendants’ (1986), the trial court insufficient referendum were the

actions before a that did not establish operations preliminary the court Accordingly, use. nonconforming prior controlled, and the referendum opined park home as mobile that use of on Ultimately, ordinance. violate would granted 8, 1990, trial court February injunction. permanent trial court’s Appeals reversed The Court decision, stating: bar, agree In the case at we changing toward they took sufficient action

that the character ted zoning permit- of the land while park on the of a mobile home rights grant the defendants vested parcel so as to prop- nonconforming use of the prior and create a park before the electorate’s home erty as mobile Specifically, zoning to R-2. decision to return plans survey and site preparation while would not be clearing of trees and debris and the use, prior to create a sufficient prepara- beyond mere conduct went defendants’ tion for installed additional excavated mobile tion constitutes They change property. in use well, drilled four a commercial water wellhouse, wells, test constructed roads for the the construction of ac- park. satisfied that home We are change land tangible goes beyond and construction excavation mere the non- preliminary operations to establish 716, 719-720; 478 App conforming use. [191 (1991).] NW2d the Court Township appeals Plaintiff Heath rights vested granting defendants decision Appeals create a sufficient park. home We reverse. a mobile *5 Sall v Opinion of the Court

II nonconforming in prior is a vested use A property particular does not con the use of protected zoning be restrictions, but form to regula zoning lawfully before it existed cause City Warren, 387 of v date. Dusdal tion’s effective (1972). In other 354, 359-360; 196 NW2d Mich before that existed words, lawful use it is a the zon after restriction, ing regulation’s continues and therefore Generally, to establish enactment. nonconforming prior must use, owner a engage done character’ of a 'substantial

in "work preparation by way use of the for an actual Twp Beardslee, premises.” Bloomfield (1957). a nonconform Once 296, 307; 84 NW2d subsequently ing established, enacted use is although reasonable, will restriction, right. of the vested owner divest nonconforming prior supra. use is Thus, Dusdal, principle zoning’s general exception an to certain localit should be confined certain uses ies.5 recently the standard examined

This Court establishing Gackler, su- approximately plaintiff platted pra. There, consisting fifty- plat twenty of a 103-acre acres prefabri- zoning permitted mobile, lots. The four cated approved township homes. After and site-built implemented plat, restrictions were partially- uses has been law of The common 5.2961(16X1) provides pertinent 125.216(1); codified. part: existing premise zoning and lawful at . . . The lawful use of a ordinance, an or in case of

the time of enactment ordinance, the amend- then at the time of of an amendment ment, although not conform that use does continued provisions or amendment. ordinance Opinion of the Court excluding lots from twelve lakefront mobile homes Later, enacted a the site. on ordinance restricting homes to mobile mobile single-wide parks. time, mo- At eleven home bile homes occupied The town- restricted lots. permit ship mobile the ordinance amended "dwelling” any meeting the definition homes zoning *6 or modular site-built where classification permitted. single-family The effect residences were single-wide mobile was to exclude of the ordinance plaintiff’s the met lots unless homes from challenges, dwelling. Among other definition plaintiff nonconforming that he established a contended single-wide mobile use as home plat, constructing surveying plat by road, grading completing erecting monuments, and exca- installing homes. work, eleven mobile and vation plaintiff holding to establish a that the failed nonconforming use, we stated a 'substantial character’ must be work of "there actual use of preparation for an by way done Beardslee, 349 Twp premises.” Bloomfield (1957). 296, 307; The actual use 84 NW2d 537 Mich apparent nonconforming must be which is land, change in the as tangible manifested prop- Contemplated by opposed to intended or erty owner. operations regard, preliminary In this land, and ordering plans, surveying the such the buildings are insufficient removal of old nonconforming use. omitted.] establish [Citations little or a whether a in each case is not The test lot has been past zoning upon the spent in reliance " rather, classifications, but, there has 'whether change in the itself tangible land any been ” excavation and construction.’ [Id. 574-575.] legal facts, Applying we to the standards these improvements only made held the lots because single-wide equally mobile suitable v Sale Opinion of the Court dwellings, they did not conventional homes and character which a substantial "work of constitute plat apparent as a an actual use makes plat.” single-wide Thus, Id. at mobile home cognizable use, legally constitute prepara- beyond mere nature of a substantial work change objectively materially must tion itself. land is the enactment date restriction’s determining point nonconform when a

critical ing Advertising, Algoma Dingeman Inc v use vests. (1974).6 Twp, Con 89; NW2d regulation’s undertaken after struction determining inapposite whether enactment property changed tangibly the land. To hold owner encourage noncompliance with otherwise would import disparage regulation and effect case, defendants In the instant of a referendum.7 early 13, 1986, that a as October understood as *7 likely. possible, fact, In less if not referendum petitions they later, knew that month than one being referendum. to initiate a circulated were proceed Nonetheless, defendants decided proposed home their mobile the construction of park. February that the 2, learned defendants On returning passed, to its referendum Accordingly, original con R-2 classification. and between October struction February 2, 1987, invali the date the referendum 6 394, 396-397; Lansing Dawley, 225 City 247 Mich NW v See also (1929). community vesting cer- propriety policy residents they regulation regarding powers matters about which of local tain unique questioned. of their deeply Because interested cannot be are knowledge involvement, competent judge citizens be more authority. any v Battle Creek See Stadle matters than central such (1956). 64, 70; Twp, 346 Mich 77 NW2d 442 Mich Opinion op the Court zoning, germane the current the R-3

dated inquiry. posit they a vested established Defendants park

nonconforming February survey, installing drilling before as a mobile home (1) obtaining topographical 2, 1987, (3) (5) (2) removing topsoil, clearing trees and (4) excavating roads, wells, four test (6) building well, and a commercial water independent each examination of An a wellhouse. activity necessary. survey8 obtaining topographical First, example property preparatory insufficient of an is a classic supra, operation. fact, Gackler, In "surveying expressly the land” as denounced we preliminary City operation. In of Lans Id. at 575. ing Dawley, 394, 397; 225 NW (1929), nothing did "[defendant] this Court stated He went no character. substantial survey plans and cause farther than to order to be made preliminary work was of the lot. This to erect not sufficient to create vested building.” Second, of this under the facts pre removing topsoil clearing are also trees and supra, liminary Gackler, we also ventures. buildings” as an insuffi of old listed "the removal Clearing activity. preparatory Id. at cient removing topsoil no more substantial are trees and removing permanent such as structures than buildings. result, work do not constitute As a character.” of a "substantial rely of four Third, on the installation 4, 1986. Because the sole on November test wells purpose test wells was to determine of these appropriate an flow to locate direction of water nothing sewage system,9 .place more for a enduring, they preliminary in nature. are also any adja- survey ground topographical elevations and indicates A property. on or near the cent structures *8 regarding hearing, testified defendant Gerald Sail At a show cause purpose of the test wells: Sall op the Court in furtherance Fourth, contend that topsoil they roadway construction, removed subgrade 19-20, deposited on November sand regarding helpful testimony road- 1986. The expert way who of a defense was that on the site. worked

Well, strip topsoil got to you’ve first that subgrade and sand off for a you then gravel goes level the on, blacktop it. you then later on unfamiliarity road- with admitted Because of our greatly way construction, have benefited we would necessary regarding testimony from further roadway. completion steps of a residential assistance, determine it is difficult to Without putting removing topsoil a sand down whether Now, you Q. you ’86 had some that in the fall of also testified you you that wanted to that done and testified test wells were flow; any reasons were there other find out about the water you area? do a test well for that that would A. Not that I can think of. ' Q. you and it was shown If had done a test well bad, going quality affected ahead would that have water project? quality, not to test the water A. These test wells were find way flows so that we could which the water are to test the sewage system. the location for similarly expert testified: A defense Now, generally have Q. wells and we talked about we have installed, were four test wells were from Mr. Sail that heard your direction? those installed Yes, installed to determine four monitor wells A. those were survey preliminary hydrologic to determine do kind of a —to property; ground that is used on the water flow the direction away going to flow the water is the direction that to determine keep sewage disposal system, so that we can from to other system not be detrimental in an area which will supply properties wells. or water *9 442 ' Opinion of the Court subgrade charac- of.a "substantial work constitute expert’s testi- Nevertheless, the defense as ter.” mony implies, permanent very least, assume, that a we gravel, grade, requires such road asphalt shell, or concrete. like a durable outer and yet com- Therefore, had not defendants because conclusive the more cumbersome menced stages construction, road excavation work their prior insufficiently constitute a substantial was nonconforming use. rely

Fifth, on the construction deep well five-inch, commercial water 184-foot purpose of the well 1986. The October about quality quantity of the to determine the wells, However, the four test unlike water. site’s to eventu well was intended the commercial water permanent park’s ally the mobile home serve as Finally, a concrete defendants built source.10 water eight November, foot 1986. The block wellhouse entirely high self- insulated and structure was Although testimony indicate, did not so contained. wellhouse, construction of of the sound because permanent intended for that it was we assume perpetual Thus, nature use. intended because commercial water future use of both the tentatively wellhouse, conclude we well and that they may of a "substantial constitute work changed tangibly the land. that character” Michigan that there must be is clear case law preliminary preparation beyond It use. establish present property, present state of the 2, 1987, February the wellhouse noted that on It should be plumbing, surely adequate plumbing. it Had it contained contained no determining sufficiently to be considered substantial would whether without Nevertheless, even use was established. reluctantly necessary plumbing, conclude that we enough consid- to be the wellhouse was substantial construction of ered. Opinion op the Court put property use, to a future that intention to This examination of defen must be the criterion. the commercial activities indicates dants’ perti individually are water well and wellhouse light activities, nent. Neither of these requires, park total construction a mobile home sufficiently satisfy burd substantial defendants’ A review of the record evinces that defen en.11 proving have not the burden of dants borne *10 of a character” toward construc work "substantial park predated the referen tion of a mobile home election. dum aggre

Additionally, activities, in the defendants’ supra, gate, Gackler, In are not substantial. plaintiff Court held that failed to establish a prior nonconforming despite fully a con graded road, monuments, structed erected plats, of eleven excavated and installation mobile Comparatively, in homes. the instant topsoil deposited a sand defendants removed subgrade, complete construction, but did not soil, and cleared trees and removed but did not grade fully property; and, or excavate the unlike occupied Gackler, on the there were no trailers property. Clearly, the construction undertaken in than that in the Gackler was more substantial present However, in case. this Court Gackler re recognize use.12Accord fused to analysis ingly, on basis of an individual Gackler, find that activities and we defendants’ determinative, Gackler, Although expended the amount is not see $18,000 supra, spent approximately of an defendants estimated $46,000 $64,000 required occupancy. would before The additional have electricity, sewage system, gas, telephone, spent providing on been water, among other services. present Admittedly, Gackler differs from the case. Unlike Gack- ler, plat, of a mobile home the instant case concerns the construction Nonetheless, development platted we find not of a subdivision. Gackler instructive. 442 Opinion of the Court cognizable legally establish a

defendants failed to preexisting use.

IV failed to commence con Defendants character,” of a failed struction "substantial permit the referend to um.13 As a mobile home before obtain applied previously noted, for defendants permit home in 1986. Because a mobile December application’s deficiencies, it was returned to April information. defendants additional application with defendants resubmitted informing authorities of referen out dum. state

Ultimately, July 1987, months after five passed, home commis referendum the mobile building permit. granted verbal sion Under Michigan building permit, law,14a or case operations, counterpart, permit to commence its procuring important an factor "vested significance right.”15 permit is embodied Dingeman, supra: city permit issues a valid Once applicant, applicant every has reason and an *11 19.855(13) (now 125.2313; 13MCL MSA renumbered 19.855[113]) provides: (1) park person A construct a home shall not mobile permit park obtaining without mobile home issued seasonal department. by the (2) permit may begin upon granting Construction to department. construct 14 385; (1991); Twp, v 475 NW2d 37 See Bevan Brandon Detroit, 276; Realty Corp Mich 118 Interstate v 368 NW2d Franchise Lowell, (1962); 242; City v 118 232 De Mull Mich NW2d 258 (1962). 15 building permit pertinent obtaining right. a vested to A is permit required imply to conduct intend to that a initial do not We fact, permits local In the defendants obtained various construction. after the referendum. Opinion op the Court dealings. rely to thereon his business not when Permits are issued local authorities permit contemplated the issued conflicts with use for which the ordinance. local average change, Should these ordinances permit, if holder of such a the presume After even he had notice of ordinance, change necessarily not would applied him. the new ordinance all, possession he has within his an official authorizing community document of the local him proceed contemplated project. his permit While it is true that the issuance of a give rights itself will ing thereof, vested to a nonconform- thereof, possession use to the holder thereon, give and substantial reliance will rights. such [Id. 98-99.] building This Court further examined recently Bevan v permits vis-á-vis uses (1991). Brandon 385; Twp, NW2d building permits We stated that have "[w]here for, applied issued, been but have not been vested rights acquired, are not though significant even sums have been expended by applicant.” Id. at 402. Finally, building or mobile home permit alone does not rights.” confer "vested Ac- supra. tual construction Dawley, begin. must v comprehensive We cannot state a formula precisely what activities are substan sufficiently eclipse prior nonconforming tial use thresh It question susceptible precise old. is not a An quantitative measurements. evaluation whether is substantial is "necessarily subjective and varies from case to case.”16 specific under facts demonstrated record, we hold that defendants did not establish a 1980). (WD Potter, 1059,1072 Mich, Beasley Supp F *12 Riley, J. by

prior nonconforming February 2, 1987. use before construction was not of a "substantial char Their permit.17 acter,” nor a mobile home did obtain Accordingly, and to the we reverse remand Appeals issues Court of determination previously not resolved. C.J.,

Cavanagh, Levin, Brickley, and and JJ., J. Boyle, Mallett, concurred with (concurring part dissenting J. and Riley, part).

i agree majority no I with the noncon- While forming con- use was established defendants’ struction, I also hold that defendants did would nonconforming possess not the citi- because petition municipality, by zens reversing zoning designation pursuant to MCL 5.2963(12), precluded the 125.282; MSA establish- good property expectations faith ment of nonconforming necessary To constitute a use. otherwise would eviscerate the statute hold permitting developers require- its to circumvent by quickly engaging suffi- ments cient referendum construction use before a to establish pursuant to the act be held.

ii A Michigan, use doctrine by developers encourage Today’s holding read should arbitrary completion. Important percentage of frantic race toward an factors to be considered are whether developer permit, obtained developer further what and when the was knew what necessary project. complete *13 449 Opinion by Riley, J. permits a citizen to utilize in property contradic tion of a zoning ordinance if the property utilized for purpose before the enactment of Warren, ordinance. Dusdal v City of 387 Mich 354, (1972). 359-360; 196 778 NW2d The citizens of Heath Township, through referendum, certainly possessed the right to reject zoning ordinance question, "but this right was subject to vested interests . . . .” City Lansing v Daw property ley, 394, (1929).1 247 396; Mich 225 NW 500 This must be so because the revocation of a " 'ordinance requiring immediate cessation of a nonconforming use may be held to be unconstitu tional because it brings deprivation about a rights out of proportion to the public benefit obtained ....”’ Co, Gackler Land Inc v Yankee Springs Twp, 562, 427 574; Mich 398 (1986), NW2d 393 Older, Austin v quoting 283 (1938).2 676; Mich 278 727 NW However, because the existence of nonconform ing uses goals undermines of zoning legislation —i.e., the uniform utilization of land promote economic development, maintenance of property values, and high standards of living3 —the 1 Dusdal, supra See also at 359-360. McQuillin, (rev Municipal Corporations See also 8A ed, 3d 25.180, (citations omitted). Supp), p Cum § 3 Uses of comprehensive land which do not conform to the community ordinances of the have been a source of legislators planners concern to since the first such ordi- city nance was enacted of New York. These nonconform- ing uses limit the effectiveness of land-use controls and share responsibility blight for the which has infected some urban Municipal attorneys, planners, areas. urban and law review agree commentators cess of the imperil uses the suc- plan community injure values. [1 Anderson, 3d, Zoning, 6.02, p American Law of § Citations omitted.] 442 Riley, J. fact, recog Court has

strictly construed.4 gradual public policy the aim of nized that Central uses. South elimination Improvement Shores, v St Clair Ass’n (1957).5 158; NW2d of non- the doctrine

Michigan has codified 125.216(1); conforming uses 5.2961(16)(1), which mandates: building and of of a or structure

The lawful use existing and premise lawful land or a [sic] ordinance, the time the case of an amendment the time of the enactment ordinance, then at of an *14 amendment, may be continued provi conform with the although that use does not amendment.[6] zoning of the ordinance sions municipali- of decisions zoning are the Not the of by ties modified doctrine 5.2963(12) uses, mandates a MSA MCL decisions: popular upon check those following petition passage of the days 30 the Within ordinance, signed by number of registered residing in the qualified and voters township the outside the limits of cities portion of villages equal to not less of the total than 8% governor, for all candidates the vote cast last gover- preceding general election at which Supreme widely shared The Court of Maine enunciated ["]Nonconforming it said: uses are thorn' the view when longer perpetuated any proper zoning of and should not be side necessary. policy of is to abolish nonconform- than ing justice permit.” [Anderson, speedily n 3 uses as as will 6.07, 465-466, pp quoting Sprague, supra, 219 A2d Windham § (Me, 1966).] 552-553 McQuillin, jurisdictions 8A of concur. See n The consensus Anderson, 6.07, 25.183, 22; supra, pp supra, p n 3 464-465. § § 5.2933(1). 125.583a; also 6 See Riley, J. elected, township nor was the be filed with township requesting clerk the of an submission part ordinance or residing limits of cities and Upon part shall of an ordinance to electors portion township in the outside

villages approval. for their petition, an ordinance or passed by of an board ordinance it rejected not be invalidated until majority registered .... voters Through popular the mechanism referen dum, Legislature placed has resolution in unincorporated municipal decisions areas people.7 the will of the The referen directly " dum, therefore, should respect 'entitled not be abridged by processes withdrawal from [its] ” of matter with which intended to deal.’ is] [it Twp, Stadle v Battle Creek 64, 69; (1956), NW2d 329 quoting McQuillin, Municipal (rev ed), 16.48, Corporations p 3d §

B At issue in the instant case is the con ancient tention the protection between individuals’ rights society’s power regulate property. More concisely, presents case rights interaction between individuals’ *15 protected the nonconforming use and by doctrine the to citizenry’s unpopular reverse Although decisions. evoking questions monumental involving governm the fundamental basis of our 7 64, 69; (1956), Twp, Creek Stadle v Battle 346 Mich 77 329 NW2d (rev quoting ed), 16.48, McQuillin, Municipal p Corporations 5 § 3d (" recognized 241 initiative and referendum are instruments '[t]he as government, widely great ”); of democratic used and of Lan value’ (1973) phear Twp, 645; Antwerp App v 214 66 NW2d (the "provides unincorporated statute of the inhabitants areas the accept proposed say reject final to or whether ordinance for lands”). unincorporated township 442 Mich by Riley, J. was a

ent,8 very narrow: specific inquiry the within the either created 125.282; MSA of MCL period thirty-day petition 5.2963(12), petition after the the before referendum? use doctrine purpose

The expectations to the protect hardship the imposition upon of user avoid Owens, Penning of property. owners (1954). Hence, 355, 365; NW2d 5.2963(12) ex preclude such should rezones when pectations because to under presumed of the owner is parcel filed within petition might thirty that a stand reversing the that lead to a referendum days could pre from this township’s apart Even decision. recog the case the sumption, majority in instant early as nizes that "defendants understood 13, 1986, possible, referendum was October fact, later, one month if not less than likely. petitions being were circulated to they knew that Hence, Ante at 441. defen initiate referendum.” zoning desig the understood that favorable dants impression, Although the basic issue faced this a case of first struggle simply the historical between Court is individual lemma was another version of Indeed, liberty rule in America. di- and democratic Founding expressly recognized the time of our Fathers. major protection property rights one of the The of individual undergirding adoption the Hamil- the federal constitution. forces ton, Kramnick, (England: Penguin Papers, ed No The Federalist Books, 1788]) (noting [originally published in at 90 motivated, part, protect rights property). constitution was Yet, government, republican guided by form of the establishment a was also paramount drafting majority, of. our the will of fundamental at 39-40, Madison, Papers, supra Nos law. Federalist republican (noting on 254-265 that the constitution was founded recognized principles). the fundamental issue: "To James Madison good rights against danger public private secure faction, spirit preserve . . time to and the . and at the same of form of great object popular government, is then which our Id., Fortunately, struggle inquiries are No 10 at directed.” the inherent non- the instant case is resolved limitations conforming use doctrine. *16 Opinion by Riley, J. subject expecta any revocation, nation was to possessed maintaining tion that defendants zoning merely thinking. desired was wishful No nonconforming use, therefore, could be established continuously because defendants were aware of quick possibility revision in be petition impend cause of the and the ing Harding Zoning Ap referendum. Cf. v Bd of peals, (1975); 73, 87; 159 W Va 219 SE2d 324 State City Re-Lu, Kenner, ex rel Inc v 284 So 2d (La App, 1973).9 Harding, supra In developers at right by the court held that were not deprived building permit of a vested the revocation of a following appeal, though they begun an even had construction in permit: reliance on the issued appellants anyone knew or should have known that aggrieved by appeal by Zoning Appeals a decision the Board of could appellants writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court. The appeal yet were well forward with go aware of the taken and chose to two-apartment the construction to convert their

building apartments. Appellants proceeded into four . . . peril incurring expenditures their own in reliance on the challenged permit. course, In the during instant defendants did not act an however, appeal; administrative did act while on notice that 5.2963(12) quickly could be utilized to reverse the township’s zoning designation. essence, permits the statute appeal zoning decisions; hence, citizens of a their officials’ reasoning Harding dispositive. Likewise, rejected developer’s attempt Kenner the court apply equitable estoppel prohibit municipality enforcing from newly enacted developer ordinance. The claimed that he had upon assurance, relied an enacted, official’s before the ordinance was it designation. would not affect his The court found his unjustified: reliance proposed [H]e aware that a new ordinance had been knew, was under consideration certainly .... He or reason- ably known, should have might the new ordinance might adopted proposed not be quite possible and that it was adopted it changes would be after which could include deletion provision [preserving zoning designation]. the favored [Id. at 868.] Similarly, defendants knew or should have known that a referen- 442 Mich Riley,. J. possess a noncon did not

Similarly, *17 faith good the they lacked forming use because "It is to avoid finding. only for such necessary generally except zoning ordinances injustice that Mu McQuillin, uses.” 8A existing (rev ed), 25.183, p 22 3d nicipal Corporations § omitted). (citations Hence, upon official "[rjeliance will not establish nonconform conduct [upon relies ing unless the landowner use Anderson, 1 American good faith.” conduct] omitted). (citations 3d, 6.13, p 478 Zoning, Law of § faith, however, seriously un finding good A pro "of a a landowner is on notice dermined if . . . .” Id. change zoning in the ordinance at posed Indeed, lacking if requisite good faith is 480. "[t]he improvements which proceeds landowner with of an ordinance adoption proscribed by will be know is Id. pending.” he knows or should which omitted). (citations fact, begin if or developers In after notice that construction have continue changes proposed, they merely have been zoning " proceeding 'calculated risk’ in undertake good not relying their construction and [are] non-adoption on absence ordi faith Sandwich, 421, 124 v NH Biggs nance.” Town of (1984).10 427; 470 A2d 928 instant zoning possible that could have led to a reversion dum was designation ing therefore, status; expectation any unjustified. of maintain- its zoning designation preferred was 10Moreover, generally suspended remains after "a ordinance by petition duly filed the elector for a referendum is until decision (citations 25.246, McQuillin, supra, p on the issue.” 8A § ate omitted). Refining Co, Producing Jackson v & F2d See also Denver (CA 1938); CJS, 92, 10, Planning, p Zoning Land § 101A alia, Metropolitan Housing citing, inter W B Gibson Co Warren (1940); Anderson, supra, 84; App Authority, 65 Ohio NE2d 236 4.25, suspended p Accordingly, if the referendum new § ordinance, any by not was defendants after invalid, utilizing petition any expectation the favorable however, 5.2963(12), inappropriate. invalidated until mandates that an ordinance "shall be v Sall Riley, J. newly defendants were well aware that their won zoning designation quick was at risk of revocation. prerequisite good Hence, defendants lacked the recog faith, and no use Biggs, supra supra nized. 426-427; Kenner, at 868. majority Furthermore, eviscerates the stat by encouraging developers engage quick ute construction before a referendum can occur. The majority concludes that "construction between February 13, 1986, October 2, 1987, the date zoning, ger the referendum invalidated the R-3 inquiry.” mane to the current Ante at 441-442. analysis clearly This circumvents the statute potentially finding prior nonconforming that a during period was created either before the *18 expiration thirty-day petition filing period of the petition holding or after the but before the statute, referendum. therefore, The becomes developer enough if quickly moot a is clever to gen undertake sufficient construction to meet the nonconforming Contrary eral assertion, use doctrine. to its majority opinion will almost cer tainly "encourage a frantic race toward an arbi trary percentage completion” by developers to denigration process. of the democratic Ante at Indeed, n if in the instant case defendants simply completed had more construction in rejected by majority registered it is this clause voters . . . .” Whether general open question, nullifies the rule is to but need not proper disposition be resolved for the controversy. of the instant analysis process Nor does rights this violate the due of defen- "[Wjhere dants. the classification of a measure is held to be a legislative act, may subject it be ap- to enactment initiative or proval by referendum and such action does not violate the process rights.” McQuillin, §25.246, supra, owner’s due 249, pp 8A 248- alia, citing, City Enterprises, Inc, inter Eastlake v Forest 426 US 668; (1976). 2358; 96 S Ct L 49 Ed 2d 132 "In such a owner still retains the to seek administrative review and to seek judicial (citations relief to declare the ordinance invalid.” Id. at 249 omitted). Riley, J. majority time, found a would have

shorter nonconforming use; result circumvents such a disagree Legislature. Hence, I intent majority’s "[t]he restric conclusion point in the critical deter enactment date is tion’s mining vests,”12 at use ante when a no nonconform hold instead that and would peti thirty-day ing until after the use could vest filed) (if petition period expired or no was had tion filed).13 (if petition was after a referendum holding unfortunate effect could have the Such improvements upon development delaying of newly Developers properties. often would zoned beginning thirty days construction, before wait awaiting re and those quired referendum would postpone The further.14 construction even Dingeman Advertising, proposition, 223 cited for this authorities (1974), 89; Dawley, Algoma Twp, NW2d Inc v supra 125.282; 396-397, application MSA do not involve the MCL 5.2963(12). applies only analysis very By very its narrow and nature 5.2963(12) 125.282; specific interplay to MCL between MCL MSA 5.2961(16)(1). 125.216(1); nearly every non MSA other Unlike conforming situation, instant case at no time use possessed expectations preferred that the ordinance reasonable subject change in If defendants not the immediate future. was then-existing zoning designation, land in with a utilized accordance 5.2963(12), 125.282; subject MCL MSA which was not zoning designation conforming altered, any prior subsequently then non likely would most be vested because defendants would expectation manufacturer possessed a that the use would continue. have For reasonable example, operating plant in con an industrial designation then-existing zoning subject formity with the that was 5.2963(12) to use the would have a vested zoning designation city if the then altered the to residential. On *19 hand, developer began other if a to construct subdivision on 125.282; petition pursuant property, 5.2963(12), MSA to MCL and voters filed rezoning, developer subsequently rejected prior nonconforming use because the would not have established expectations good necessary applica for the valid faith would be nonextant. tion of doctrine 5.2963(12) suspend Assuming MCL does not a new designation, developers proceed improvements could designation, pursuant to the new but such work would their risk. Opinion by Riley, J. course, wisdom of this policy, is not for this debate, honorable Court Legislature. but Griffin, J., Riley, concurred with J.

Case Details

Case Name: Heath Township v. Sall
Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court
Date Published: Jun 22, 1993
Citation: 502 N.W.2d 627
Docket Number: 92479, (Calendar No. 3)
Court Abbreviation: Mich.
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