ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
On July 23, 2015, after thirteen days of emotional and contentious testimony, a
To say that the Defendant raised this issue late is an understatement, but unlike virtually any other legal issue, a court’s jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any time, even after verdict and on appeal, because jurisdiction goes to whether the court can legally hear the case. After the issue was presented to the First Circuit, the appellate court remanded the case to this Court to make factual findings and resolve the question of Mr. Geilenfeld’s domicile. On remand, the Court admitted exhibits, received testimony from Mr. Geilenfeld and others, and reviewed memoranda submitted by the parties.
After analyzing the evidence and applying the law, the Court has concluded that Mi*. Geilenfeld was domiciled in Haiti, not Iowa, as of February 6, 2013 and that the Court did not and does not have jurisdiction over the case. The consequence of this decision is that the hard-fought verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs must be rendered a nullity and the case must be dismissed.
Although the Court is issuing its ruling in strict accordance with the facts as it has found them and the law as it understands it, the Court profoundly regrets that this issue was not raised earlier. In a court whose purpose it is to resolve sometimes contentious disputes, this case stands apart. Even though there were many side issues, the case turned on whether Mr. Geilenfeld had sexually abused young boys under his care at the St. Joseph Family- of Haiti, an orphanage he founded in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Utterly convinced that Mr. Geilenfeld had done wrong, Mr. Kendrick repeatedly proclaimed Mr. Geilenfeld’s guilt to all who could listen or read, including Hearts With Haiti (HWH) and other financial backers of the St. Joseph Family. Equally determined to clear his name, Mr. Geilenfeld steadfastly denied Mr. Kendrick’s accusations. The discovery period was unusually rancorous, resulting in this Court’s imposition of sanctions, a rare event in the District of Maine. The trial was long, arduous, and consisted of difficult—occasionally searing—testimony from supporters and detractors of Mr. Geilenfeld, including a number of men who testified that Mr. Kendrick’s allegations were true. Championed by one of the state of Maine’s finest trial attorneys, the result of the trial was an unconditional victory for Mr. Geilenfeld and HWH, a United States nonprofit corporation whose main purpose has been to support St. Joseph.
The Court is keenly aware that this case has taken an extraordinary toll on its participants: untold hours of attorney time and expense; the acute stress of the con
In this opinion, the Court endeavors to explain why it has reached this conclusion. The Court understands that its explanation is small solace to the disappointed litigants.
1. BRIEF OVERVIEW
An American citizen domiciled abroad is considered “stateless” and does not satisfy the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. During the pendency of Mr. Kendrick’s appeal to the First Circuit, the Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to reflect their position that Mr. Geilenfeld remained a citizen of his home state of Iowa when they filed suit. Mr. Kendrick then moved to dismiss .for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that Mr. Geilenfeld was domiciled in Haiti at that time. The First Circuit remanded the jurisdictional issue for resolution by this Court. On remand, the Court held a jurisdictional hearing, and the parties submitted briefs on the issue after the hearing.
Domicile requires both physical presence in a place and intent to remain there. A review of the voluminous record establishes that Mr. Geilenfeld left Iowa decades ago, that he traveled extensively for a time, and that he moved to Haiti in the 1980s. From then until the filing of this suit on February 6, ■ 2013, he lived and worked for an organization he founded in Port au Prince. While he maintained some ties to Iowa, his life was firmly rooted in Haiti. As such, the Court concludes that Mr. Geilenfeld was beyond its jurisdiction as a stateless American citizen domiciled abroad. It further concludes that considerations of finality cannot trump the jurisdictional defect, and that Mr. Geilenfeld’s status as an indispensable, nondiverse party to this case requires the other plaintiff, HWH, to lose its verdict as well. The Court denies the Plaintiffs’ motion to amend complaint and grants Mr. Kendrick’s motion to dismiss.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Initiation of the Suit
On February 6, 2013, Michael Geilenfeld and HWH filed suit in this Court against Paul Kendrick. Compl. (ECF No. 1) (Compl.). The Plaintiffs invoked jurisdiction- “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 based on diversity of citizenship and because the amount in controversy exceeds Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000).” Id. ¶ 4. Regarding the parties’ citizenship, the Plaintiffs alleged that HWH “is a North
B. Trial
Although the Court originally scheduled the trial to begin on October 7, 2014, Trial List (ECF No. 231), Mr. Geilenfeld’s arrest by Haitian authorities necessitated a continuance of the trial date. Oral Mot. to Continue (ECF No. 260); Oral Order Granting Mot. to Continue Trial for 90 Days (ECF No. 261). Eventually, the Court learned of Mr. Geilenfeld’s release by Haitian authorities, Min. Entry (ECF No. 316), and on July 6,2015, the jury trial commenced. Tr. of Proceedings I (ECF No. 484). On July 23, 2015, the jury returned a verdict for the Plaintiffs: the jury awarded $2,500,000 on the defamation claim and $5,000,000 on the intentional interference claim to HWH, and it awarded $7,000,000 on the defamation, false light, and intentional interference claims to Mr. Geilenfeld. Jury Verdict Form as to Michael Geilenfeld (ECF No. 474) (Geilenfeld Jury Verdict Form)] Jury Verdict Form as to Hearts with Haiti (ECF No. 475) {HWH Jury Verdict Form); J. (ECF No. 480). ■
C. Appeal
After the Court denied Mr. Kendrick’s motion for new trial on October 30, 2015, Order on Def’s Rule 59 Mot. for a New Trial or Alternative Post-J. Relief and Pis. ’ Rule 59(e) Mot. to Alter or Amend J. to Include Pre- and Post-J. Interest, to Include the April 22, 2015 Sanction, and to Reflect Dismissal without Prejudice of Pis. ’ Punitive Damages Claims (ECF No. 498), Mr. Kendrick filed a notice of appeal to the First Circuit on November 18, 2015. Def.’s Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 502).
On January 8, 2016, while the case was on appeal, the Plaintiffs moved to amend the pleadings to allege facts establishing diversity of citizenship. Hearts With Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, No. 15-2401, Pls.-Appel-lees’ Mot. to Amend Pleadings to Show Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (Doc. No. 00116942323) {Pis.’Mot.).
On February 16, 2016, the First Circuit remanded to this Court the questions “as to whether the amendment proposed by the appellees should be allowed and as to whether diversity jurisdiction existed at the time the action was commenced.” Order of the a. (ECF No. 508).
D. Events on Remand
On March 30, 2016, the Court held a hearing on the jurisdictional issue. Tr. of Proceedings (ECF No. 532) (Hr’g Tr,). The Plaintiffs filed their post-hearing brief on April 15,2016. Pis. ’ Post-Hr’g Br. (ECF No. 534) (Pis.’ Br.). Mr. Kendrick filed a response on April 29, 2016, Def.’s Suppl. Br. on Jurisdiction (ECF No. 535) (Def.’s Resp.), and the Plaintiffs replied on May 6, 2016. Pis.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Jurisdiction (ECF No. 538) (Pis.’Reply).
On May 20, 2016, Mr. Kendrick filed a motion to supplement the record by including an excerpt of one of Mr. Geilenfeld’s earlier depositions. Def.’s Mot. to Suppl. Jurisdictional Hr’g Ex. D2S (ECF No. 541) (Def.’s Mot, to Suppl.). On May 25, 2016, the Plaintiffs responded and objected to the inclusion of the exhibit. Pis. ’ Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Suppl. Jurisdictional Hr’g Ex- D2S (ECF No. 544) (Pis. ’ Resp. in Opp’n to Suppl. Jurisdictional Record). On May 27, 2016, Mr. Kendrick replied.- Def.’s Reply Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Suppl. Jurisdictional Hr’g Ex. D23 (ECF No. 545). On June 9, 2016, the Court granted the Defendant’s motion to supplement over the Plaintiffs’ objection. Order on Mot. to Suppl. Jurisdictional Hr’g Record (ECF No. 547)-.
III. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. Arguments before the First Circuit
1. The Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend
The Plaintiffs moved to amend pleadings to show jurisdiction, arguing that complete diversity existed on the date the suit commenced: February 6, 2013. Pis.’ Mot. at 1. They write that “while diversity of citizenship was uncontested and in fact existed at the time the action was filed (and continues to exist to this day), the pleadings do not address citizenship specifically.” Id. at 2. They emphasize Mr. Geilenfeld’s ties to Iowa, the state where he was born and raised, maintained his voter registration and driver’s license, and kept a mailing address and a bank account. Id. at 2-3. According to the Plaintiffs, their error was merely technical in that they referred to “residency” rather than “citizenship” in the Complaint, and they ask the First Circuit, to allow them to correct this error pursuant, to 28 U.S.C. § 1653. Id. at 3.
2. Mr. Kendrick’s Objection to Plaintiffs’ Motion and Motion to Dismiss
Mr. Kendrick alleges that “[t]here is simply no doubt that when Mr. Geilenfeld filed his complaint in 2013, and during trial, Mr. Geilenfeld was domiciled in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, as he had been for a long, long time, and not by any stretch of the imagination living in Iowa.” Def. ⅛ Mot at 6 (footnote omitted). As Mr. Kendrick sees it, this factual allegation carries fatal implications for this case’s jurisdictional validity given the rule that “American citizens who are domiciled abroad do not satisfy any of the enumerated -categories required for a federal court’s- exercise of diversity juris
Mr. Kendrick then turns his attention to the other plaintiff, HWH, which he contends “must be dismissed from this case because Mr. Geilenfeld is an indispensable party and HWH gained a significant tactical advantage by the introduction of evidence of Mr. Geilenfeld’s time in a Haitian prison made possible only due to Mr. Geil-enfeld’s presence in this case as a party.” Id. Mr. Kendrick recalls Mr. Geilenfeld’s “elegantly scripted and humbly delivered” testimony, as well as other evidence regarding his life that he believes affected the jury, and claims that this “is not a case where the appellate court is permitted to ignore the lack of complete diversity and dismiss only Mr. Geilenfeld ....” Id. at 13, 15 (citing Newman-Green,
3. The Plaintiffs’ Response
The Plaintiffs begin by chronicling the case’s protracted history and write that “[n]ow facing an impending deadline to brief a meritless appeal, Kendrick perceives in Plaintiffs’ Motion for a technical conforming amendment of the pleadings, an opportunity for a ‘get out of jail free’ card, claiming for the first time ever that he denies Geilenfeld’s domiciliary intent.” Pis. ’ Resp. at 3-4. But as the Plaintiffs see it, the case has proceeded to final judgment, so “considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming.” Id. at 4 (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis,
On the merits of Mr. Kendrick’s motion, the Plaintiffs assert that “[mjere residence is insufficient to determine a party’s jurisdictional status.” Id. at 5 (quoting Chico v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth.,
[H]is voter registration is in Linn County, Iowa (valid at the time suit commenced); his home address is at the same Linn County, Iowa location, and is a physical residence where he receives mail, has physical presence, and to which he returns when he has been away; his drivers licenses are and have always been Iowa licenses; his personal banking and financial headquarters were and remain based in Iowa banks.
Id. at 6. Of these indicia, the Plaintiffs find especially significant the fact that Mr. Geilenfeld retained an Iowa voter registration—a “weighty” factor, according to the First Circuit. Id. at 14-15 (quoting Bank One v. Montle,
Addressing Mr. Kendrick’s argument that Mr. Geilenfeld’s supposed lack of diversity would also require HWH to lose its judgment, the Plaintiffs urge the Court to take a pragmatic approach:
[A] party that is a “jurisdictional spoiler” may be dropped from the case, particularly when—as here—the objecting party has waited until appeal to raise the challenge and requiring dismissal of the whole action “after years of litigation, would impose unnecessary and wasteful burdens on the parties, judges, and other litigants.”
Id at 16 (quoting Newman-Green,
4. Mr. Kendrick’s Reply
Mr. Kendrick takes issue with several of the Plaintiffs’ statements of fact and law. On the facts, Mr. Kendrick seeks to contradict Mr. Geilenfeld’s declared intention to return to Iowa by quoting a deposition in which he said: “I will always continue to do good works with Haitians because my whole life is in Haiti.” Def.’s Reply at 2 (quoting Def.’s Obj. and Opp’n Mem. to Pis.’ Mot. in Limine to Include Test, of Alain Lemithe Attach. 2 Extracts from the Mins, of the Ct. Registry of the Ct. of the First Instance in Port an Prince, at 2 (ECF No. 392) (Ct. of First Instance Mins.)). Mr. Kendrick also tries to undermine the Plaintiffs’ reliance on the domicile factors, writing, inter alia, “it is very common for U.S. citizens living in a foreign country, especially a developing country like Haiti, to maintain a U.S. mailing address so that they can hold a U.S. driver’s license.” Id. at 3.
On the law, Mr. Kendrick clarifies that “the burden is on the proponent of federal jurisdiction to prove the jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 4- (citing García Pérez v. Santaella,
B. Arguments on Remand
1. The Plaintiffs’ Brief
In their post-hearing brief, the Plaintiffs stress the' anomalous aspect of statelessness doctrine, which they describe as a jurisdictional “loophole” that the Court ought to avoid if it can do so. Pis. ’ Br. at 3 n.l. They say that Mr. Geilenfeld is a missionary and argue that “[t]he issue of domicile must be viewed through this lens.” Id. at 4. While Mr. Geilenfeld “maintained his domiciliary intent in Iowa with all other objective indicia of domicile in Iowa,” the' Plaintiffs nonetheless caution against adherence to “[ajbstract lists of indiciá of domicile” for persons—like Mr. Geilenfeld—fitting within the “recognized exceptions for United States citizens who, in pursuit of a calling or occupation, spend significant periods of time abroad .... ” Id. at 5-6; see also id. at 8 (citing Kaiser v. Loomis,
.The Plaintiffs document Mr. Geilenfeld’s and his.family’s deep ties to Iowa, as well as the fact that he often referred to-Iowa as “home” and to himself as an “Iowan.” Id. at 9-11. After Mr. Geilenfeld’s mother died in 2003, the family sold its home, in Algona, Iowa, and Mr. Geilenfeld began keeping a room in a house owned by Lucille Dietrich—a close friend whom he considers “surrogate” family—at 212 Wesley Drive NW, Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Id. at 11-12. The Plaintiffs allege this address was Mr. Geilenfeld’s “home” from that time to this day. Id. at 12.
Turning to the indicia, the Plaintiffs point to Mr. Geilenfeld’s voter registration, driver’s license, and bank accounts bearing his Iowa address, as well as ties between his mission work and Iowa.- Id. at 12-14. From the Plaintiffs vantage, “[tjhere is not much more that Geilenfeld could have done to establish and maintain domicile in Iowa .... ” Id. at 18. They maintain that Mr. Geilenfeld “has very little by way of personal possessions,” and that while he “technically” owns the assets comprising his mission work in Haiti, these assets are “essentially” held in trust by Mr. Geilen-feld for the benefit of the children whom he .serves. Id. at 14-15, Regarding Mr. Geilenfeld’s immigration status in Haiti, they explain that he applies annually for an extended visa referred to as “Permis de Sejure.” Id. at 15.
Finally, “in an abundance of caution,” the Plaintiffs reiterate the argument they made to the Ffet Circuit that if Mr. Geil-enfeld is found to be non-diverse, he should also be found to be a dispensable party with regard to HWH’s claim against Mr. Kendrick. Id. at 18-20. As a consequence, they maintain, HWH’s verdict against Mr. Kendrick should stand however the Court resolves the issue of Mr. Geilenfeld’s domicile. Id.
2. The Defendant’s Brief
On the law, Mr. Kendrick argues that “[t]he intent to remain need not be permanent, only indefinite,” Def.’s Resp. at 2 (citing Hawes v. Club Ecuestre el Comandante,
Meanwhile, Mr. Kendrick sees any Iowa ties as superficial matters of “personal convenience,” noting that “Mr. Geilenfeld has not lived or worked in Iowa for over forty years, does not own any real property in Iowa, does not pay any taxes in Iowa, and has had no involvement in any civic affairs, charitable works, or organizations of any kind in Iowa.” Id. at 12-13. Mr. Kendrick points out that Mr. Geilenfeld has been to Iowa twice since 2010 and has not voted there since the 1972 presidential election. Id. at 13-15. He also alleges that
Mr. Kendrick advocates for an application of diversity jurisdiction’s usual rules notwithstanding “practical concerns” and “considerations of finality.” Id. at 18-19 (citing Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P.,
3. The Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief
- The Plaintiffs portray Mr. Kendrick as making “two central, categorical errors” in his brief. Pis. ’ Reply at 1. His first is “to equate ‘residence’ with ‘domicile,’ and to urge, incorrectly, that every reference to Haitian residence is a reference to citizenship or domicile.” Id. His second relates to his understanding of Mr. Geilenfeld’s missionary work:
[I]f it is true as the Defendant appears to concede that the Court would exercise jurisdiction over Geilenfeld had he not left the Brothers’ ecclesiastical order, because his native Iowa domicile would have continued presumptively, then there must still be jurisdiction over him despite whatever canonical decision permitted him to leave the Brothers but to engage in precisely the same work.
Id at 3.
IV. LEGAL STANDARD
In Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfomo-Larrain, the -Supreme Court wrote that “[i]n order to be a citizen of a State within the meaning of the diversity statute, a natural person must be both a citizen of the United States and be domiciled within a state.”
Here, the crucial question is domicile, which must be determined from
In assessing the latter requirement, intent, the First Circuit has instructed courts to consider these factors: “current residence; voting registration and voting practices; location of personal and real property; location of brokerage and bank accounts; membership in unions, fraternal organizations, churches, clubs and other associations; place of employment or business; driver’s license and other automobile registration; [and] payment of taxes.” García Pérez,
In terms of the evidence the Court may consider in making its domicile determination, the Court—consistent with First Circuit guidance—takes an inclusive approach in ■ an effort to bring before it all relevant, probative facts. See, e.g., Padilla-Mangual,
V. DISCUSSION
A. Physical Presence
“Physical, presence” is a particular concept in the domicile context. It does not literally mean actual physical presence in the state on the date the lawsuit was filed; otherwise, a life-long resident of a state would lose that status because he hap
The First Circuit has described two indispensable requirements to' change a legal domicile as “[f]irst, residence in a new domicil[e]; and second, the intention to remain there.” Hawes,
Mr. Geilenfeld’s decades-long residence in Haiti establishes his physical presence there, and in fact, there does not appear to be a dispute that he was physically residing in Haiti, as he originally alleged, as of February 6, 2013, the date the Complaint was filed. Compl. ¶ 2 (“Plaintiff Michael Geilenfeld is an individual residing in Pétion-Ville Commune, Port-au-Prince Arrondissement, Republic of Haiti ...”).
Even though a person’s absence from the state on the date of the filing of a complaint does not bar a claim of domicile in that state, a person’s physical presence in the state where he claims a domicile remains relevant. The testimony on this issue was detailed and reveals that ever since January 31, 1985, when he founded his own mission, Hr’g Tr. 18:5-13, Mr. Geilenfeld has lived in Haiti and only occasionally visited Iowa. As noted earlier, Mr. Geilenfeld grew up in Algona, Iowa and his parents remained there together until 2003, when his mother died. Id. 33:25-34:3. During this period, Mr. Geilenfeld visited Iowa about twice a year: typically once in September and again during Christmas. Id. 19:13-20:5. He mentioned that the September visit was ideal because there was a lull in activity in Haiti and both his parents had September birthdays. Id. 19:21-20:5. During these visits, he would stay in his own room at his parents’ home in Algona. Id. 20:6-12. When Mr. Geilenfeld’s mother became ill in 2003, he returned to Algona to be with her in the time preceding her death and through her funeral, a period of about two months. Id. 33:25-34:18.
After his mother passed away, his father, who was suffering from Alzheimer’s Disease, was transferred to a nursing home in Oelwein, Iowa, where Mr. Geilen-feld’s brother lived, about three and one-half hours from Algona and about forty minutes from Cedar Rapids. Id. 34:22-35:13, 36:9-12. At the reception following his mother’s funeral, Lucy Dietrich, who considers Mr. Geilenfeld “an emotional part of [her] family,” and her husband Gary Dietrich approached Mr. Geilenfeld, informed him that they understood that the Geilenfeld family would be selling the Algona house, and offered Mr. Geilenfeld a room, in their house at 212 Wesley Drive, Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Hr’g Tr. 35:20-36:8; Pis. ’ Resp. Attach. 2 Decl. of Lucille Dietrich ¶¶3-4 (Lucille Dietrich Decl.)-, Pis.’ Resp. Attach. 1 Decl. of Michael Geilenfeld ¶ 10 (Geilenfeld Decl). Mr. Geilenfeld accepted. Hr’g Tr. 36:9.
From 2003 through 2009, Mr. Geilenfeld visited Cedar Rapids at least once, and sometimes twice, a year. Id. 37:21-25. During these visits, he stayed at the Dietrichs’ home at 212 Wesley Drive in Cedar Rapids. Geilenfeld Decl. ¶ 10; Def. ⅛ Hr’g Ex. 65, PI. Michael Geilenfeld’s Suppl. Answers to Interrogs. Propounded by Def. for Hr’g on Jurisdiction ¶ 2 (Geilenfeld Inter-
In December 2009, Mr. Geilenfeld’s brother contacted him, said that their father was failing, and urged Mr. Geilenfeld to return to Iowa. Hr’g Tr. 45:4-11. Mr.' Geilenfeld did so, but he had gone back to Haiti by the time his father passed away on December 23, 2009. Id. 45:16-19. Mr. Geilenfeld returned to Iowa to attend his father’s funeral on December 29, 2009 then returned to Haiti a few days before the Haitian earthquake on January 9, 2010. Id. 45:22-46:3.
The record reveals that Mr. Geilenfeld returned to Iowa only once between early January 2010 and February 6, 2013, a span of just over three years. Id. 50:16-18. In September 2011, Mr. Geilenfeld returned to Oelwein, Iowa for a family reunion. Id. 50:3-15, 54:8-55:2; Pis.’ Hr’g Ex. 91-92. From September 2011 to February 6, 2013, during the sixteen month period immediately before the filing of this lawsuit, Mr. Geilenfeld did not set foot in Iowa.
Home is a place you return to without having a reason to do so. In the words of the First Circuit, “[a] person’s domicile ‘is the place where he has his true, fixed home and principal establishment, and to which, wherever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.’” Padillar-Mangual,
B. Intent
The Court turns to the nub of the jurisdictional question: whether Mr. Geil-enfeld intended to make Haiti his home or whether he intended to return to Iowa. Under First Circuit law, “[t]here must be an intention to remain at the new residence indefinitely; it is not required that the intention be to stay there permanently. A ‘floating intention’ to return to a former domicile does not prevent the acquisition of a new domicile.” Hawes,
1. An Overview of Mr. Geilenfeld’s Life
At the outset, the Court presents an overview of where Mr. Geilenfeld has resided based on his own testimony at trial, consistent with the declaration he submitted on appeal, and the testimony he gave
It was an adventure, you know, I was driving my car and the first time I was really leaving Iowa, you know, getting out of the cornfields and going to what ' was like a big city, and it was the first' time I had kind of struck out on my own, you know. And it was a very exciting time for me, a sense of independence and really liberation and a new beginning.
Id. 31:9-15. He stayed in Michigan for about a year and a half, id. 32:6-7; Hr’g Tr. 8:6-15, then traveled to Assisi, Italy for six months. Geilenfeld Test. I 32:20-24; Hr’g Tr. 8:16-25. There followed a period during which Mr. Geüenfeld travelled from place to place; he lived in Utah, Geüenfeld Test. 134:6-9; Hr’g Tr. 11:20-24, in Vietnam, and Cambodia, Geüenfeld Test. I 40:6-8; Hr’g Tr. 12:20-13:2, and spent a month in India before returning to the United States to work in Los Angeles, California. Geüenfeld Test. 143:8-23; Hr’g Tr. 14:17-15:12. At the jurisdictional hearing, Mr. Geüenfeld emphasized that he returned to Iowa during his time with the Missionaries of Charity; for a while, he “was only allowed to go home once every three years, but outside of: that, I was always home at least once or twice a year.” Hr’g Tr. 9:13-10:6.
In 1981, Mr. Geilenfeld arrived in Haiti, Geüenfeld Test. I 44:23, where he worked at a Haitian shelter for two years. Id. 48:9-11. In 1984, he decided to leave the missionary organizatioh with which he had worked for eleven years in many locations throughout the world. Id. 51:15-25. Mr. Geüenfeld founded his own organization— St. Joseph’s Family of Haiti—in Port-au-Prince, on January 31, 1985, id. 134:19-20, which was located at 47 Delmas for the first, six months and then.moved up the street to 91 Delmas, where it would remain for decades. Id. 60:24-61:6. According to his declaration, Mr. Geüenfeld lived in Haiti for this extended period: “Since the founding of St. Joseph’s Family of Haiti, I have lived in Port au Prince, Haiti, because my charitable mission work in .Haiti is full-time and requires me to be there.” Geilen-feld Deal. . ¶ 7. This suit commenced on February 6, 2013, about twenty-eight years after the founding of his organization, and Mr. Geüenfeld was still residing in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Compl. ¶ 2.
2. The Factors
The Court first addresses two contested factors, voting and property, that require more extensive analysis, then turns to a brief consideration of the remaining factors. . . .
a. Voting
In their briefing to the First Circuit, the Plaintiffs argue that “[vjoter registration in Iowa should be nearly dispositive” of the jurisdictional issue, Pis. ’ Besp. at 14, and they submit along with their argument evidence establishing that Mr. Geüenfeld possesses an Iowa voter registration. Geü-enfeld Decl. ¶¶ 8, 12, 17; id. Attach. 3 Michael Karl Geüenfeld Voter Identification Card (Geüenfeld Voter ID). In their briefing after the jurisdictional hearing, the Plaintiffs likewise write that “[a]fter relocating his home to Cedar Rapids, in 2005 Geüenfeld registered to vote in Linn County, Iowa, and remained registered to vote there as of February 6, 2013.” Pis.’ Br. at 12. Voter registration, according to
Mr. Kendrick, meanwhile, infers that Mr. Geilenfeld “has never bothered to vote in local, state, or national elections in Iowa before,” and charges that “this demonstrated lack of concern for what happened politically in Iowa for thirty years is evidence of abandonment of Iowa as his domicile long ago .... ” Def. ⅛ Reply at 2-3. After the jurisdictional hearing and additional factual development, Mr. Kendrick writes that Mr. Geilenfeld must have had “some purpose other than a desire to vote in Iowa” given that he has not voted there since 1972, and he presumes that the other purpose was to create a presumption of residency in Iowa, which in turn made it easier to obtain an Iowa driver license. Def.’s Resp. at 15.
In Bank One, the First Circuit wrote: While no single factor is controlling, some courts have established a presumption of domicile in the state in which a party is registered to vote. This court has not recognized such a presumption, but we have said that the place a person is registered to vote is a “weighty” factor in determining domicile.
First, those cases dealt with litigants who had moved from one state to another state. Bank One,
Second, and more importantly, Mr. Geil-enfeld never used his current Iowa voter registration. Hr’g Tr. 117:25-118:1 (“I’ve not voted since I registered in Cedar Rapids”). In fact, the last time he voted in Iowa was 1972. Hr’g Tr. 118:6-9. The Court takes Mr. Kendrick’s point that actually voting—as opposed to just maintaining voter registration—makes for a weightier claim to domicile. The language the First Circuit uses in listing the domicile factors explicitly mentions voting registration in tandem with the act of voting. García Pérez,
On these facts, Mr. Geilenfeld concedes he has not used his Iowa current voter registration but announces his intention to “vote in Iowa in the upcoming November elections.” Geilenfeld Interrog. ¶4. The Court notes that future conduct is immaterial to domicile, which must be assessed at the time of the filing of suit. Padilla-Mangual,
b. Real and Personal Property
Another contested factor is Mr. Geilen-feld’s personal and real property. The Plaintiffs insist that Mr. Geilenfeld “main-taints] a permanent physical address [in Iowa] to which he returns and intends to return when he is away.” Pis. ’ Resp. at 14, They say that it is “the only real property Geilenfeld calls home” and that “he has a room with a cherished photograph.” Id.; see also Hr’g Tr. 52:15-53:13 (Mr. Geilen-feld keeps a photograph in Cedar Rapids); PL’s Hr’g Ex. 72. Indeed, the Plaintiffs submit evidence that Mr. Geilenfeld’s voter registration, driver’s license, and bank account are all tied to this address: 212 Wesley Drive, Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Geilen-feld Voter ID; Geilenfeld Heel.. Attach. 2 Geilenfeld Driver’s License (Geilenfeld Driver’s License); Geilenfeld Decl. Attach. 4 Letter from Grace E. Freeburg, Assistant Vice President, Consumer Banking, Iowa State Bank, to Devin W. Deane, Attorney, Norman, Hanson & DeTroy LLC (Jan. Ik, 2016) (Geilenfeld Bank Account). Lucille Dietrich, not Mr. Geilenfeld, is the owner of the house at 212 Wesley .Drive. Lucille Dietrich Decl. ¶¶3-4; Geilenfeld Decl. ¶ 10. Ms. Dietrich sequesters a room in her home for Mr. Geilenfeld. Within the room are some of Mr. Geilenfeld’s clothes hung in a closet, Pis. ’ Hr’g Ex. 74; Hr’g Tr. 53:11-13, and two photographs of people involved with St. Joseph’s. Pis. ’ Hr’g Ex. 72; Hr’g Tr. 52:15-53:10. Other than these few items of personal property, Mr. Geil-enfeld owns no property in Iowa. Geilen-feld Decl. ¶ 10; Hr’g Tr. 69:11-13.
By contrast, Mr. Geilenfeld owns three pieces of real estate in Haiti. Hr’g Tr. 76:22-25; Geilenfeld Interrog. ¶ 9. In particular, he owns the real estate where St. Joseph’s Home for Boys, Wings of Hope, Trinity House, and Lekol Sen Trinite are located. Geilenfeld Interrog. ¶ 9. Mr. Geil-enfeld has stressed that he considers these properties to be owned by God and that they are used exclusively for his mission, not for his personal use. Id, Nevertheless,
Mr. Geilenfeld’s ownership of three parcels of real estate in Haiti and only a few items of personal property in Iowa is a factor that weighs against his domicile being in Iowa and in favor of it being in Haiti.'
c., Driver’s License and Motor Vehicle
Mr. Geilenfeld possesses an Iowa driver’s license. He first obtained an Iowa driver’s license when he was in high school. Hr’g Tr. 16:22-17:1. When he was in' California, Mr. Geilenfeld obtained a California driver’s license. Id. 17:2-17. In 2005, he obtained an Iowa driver’s license, using 212 Wesley Drive in Cedar Rapids, the Deitrich house, as his address, which he renewed in 2010 and again in 2015. Id. 17:18-23, 39:19-40:13. Mr. Geilenfeld does not own a motor vehicle in Iowa. Id. 78:5-6. He jointly owns a blue minivan in Haiti. Id. 78:7-9; Geilenfeld Interrog. ¶¶ 9-11.
The fact that Mr. Geilenfeld possesses an. Iowa driver’s license is some evidence of an Iowan domicile. At the same time, the fact that the only motor vehicle he owns is in Haiti is some evidence of a Haitian domicile. This factor is mixed.
d.Employment
Ever since the early 1980s, Mr. Geilen-feld has worked in Haiti. In a sworn declaration Mr. Geilenfeld filed with the Court of Appeals, he stated in pertinent part:
In 1985, I received a calling to start a home and family for street children in Port au Prince, Haiti. Since the founding ■ of St. Joseph’s Family of Haiti, I have lived in Port au Prince, Haiti because my charitable mission work in Haiti is full-time and requires me to be there.
Geilenfeld Deal. ¶ 7; Hr’g Tr. 65:13-66:2. By contrast, from 1985 onward, Mr. Geil-enfeld never held a job in Iowa. Id. 69:1-6. This factor favors a Haitian domicile.
e.Social Security Card
After Mr. Geilenfeld accepted Lucille Dietrich’s invitation to have a room in her house, he “took the time to start putting things into the Cedar Rapids base.” Id. 38:17-25. He had lost his social security card and obtained a new one, using 212 Wesley Drive, Cedar Rapids as his address. Pis.’Hr’g Ex. 58; Hr’g Tr. 38:22-25, 39:8-10. This is some- evidence of an Iowan domicile.
f.Banking Accounts
The record on Mr. Geilenfeld’s banking is mixed. Mr. Geilenfeld keeps what he refers to as his “core personal bank account” in Iowa, Geilenfeld Interrog. ¶ 14, has joint control with his brother over another Iowa account, id. and set up a third account in Haiti during rebuilding efforts after the earthquake there. Id. ¶ 13; Def. ’s Hr’g Ex. 23, Tr. of Michael Geilen-feld’s Dep. Dated Feb. 27, 2014- 148:7-8; Hr’g Tr. 62:25-63:15. The evidence suggests that Mr. Geilenfeld used his “core” account, at Iowa State Bank, in relation to this work in Haiti, as he added St. Joseph’s Home’s name to the account in 1995. Hr’g Tr. 61:22:62:20. In fact, at the jurisdictional hearing, there was an .extended back-and-forth about just how personal Mr. Geilenfeld’s “core personal banking account” was, id. 124:21-133:19, and he ultimately conceded that he does not use money from the Iowa State Bank account “for personal expenses unrelated to the operation of St. Joseph Family homes.” Id. 133:14-19; see also id. 22:10-12 (“I didn’t really trust the banks in Haiti, so I set up the bank system for the St. Joseph Family in my hometown in Algona [at Iowa State Bank]”). In short, the bank account was in Iowa, but it serviced the Haitian operation.
g. Taxes
Mr. Geilenfeld has not filed Iowa state income taxes for lack of taxable income in the years 2003-2015, Geilenfeld Interrog. ¶ 5, but he has paid “[s]ome form of annual taxes” on real estate in his name in Haiti from 2000 to the present. Id. ¶ 7; see also Hr’g Tr. 77:22-78:4. Mr. Geilenfeld also pays the registration fees in Haiti for Saint Joseph’s Home’s two vans. Def’s Hr’g Ex. 5, PI. Michael Geilenfeld’s Ans. to Def’s Fourth Set of Interrogatories ¶ 6, This factor weighs in favor of a Haitian domicile.
3. Caselaw: Presumption of Continuing Domicile
The Plaintiffs urge the Court to focus on the “undisputed steps” that Mr. Geilenfeld has taken “to maintain a presence and home base in Iowa.” Pis. ’ Resp. at 9. This argument assumes that Mr. Geilenfeld never really left his home state of Iowa and is entitled to a “presumption of continuing domicile” there. Id. at 7; see also Pis. ’ Br. at 7-8 (likewise arguing for presumption of continuing domicile). None of the eases the Plaintiffs cite in support of their continuing domicile theory persuades the Court of its applicability to Mr. Geilen-feld’s facts. See Mitchell v. United States,
4. The Mission Home Argument
During his testimony at the jurisdictional hearing, Mr. Geilenfeld consistently referred to Cedar Rapids, Iowa as his “home” and Port-au-Prince as his “mission home,” See e.g., Hr’g Tr. 7:16-21. After the jurisdictional hearing, the Plaintiffs’ briefing shifts focus to how Mr. Geilenfeld’s work as a missionary bolsters his claim to a presumption of continuing domicile. Pis. ’ Br. at 4-6, 8-11; Pis.’ Reply at 2-3, 8-9. According to the Plaintiffs, “Geilenfeld’s missionary work has caused him to live and work in numerous impoverished countries all over the world, often for extended periods of time, but he has always maintained his personal physical presence in Iowa with a subjective intent to return
Kaiser is the only domicile case they cite involving a missionary.
Kaiser turned on the propositions that (1) residence is different from domicile and (2) temporary residence does not effect a change in domicile. The Court readily accepts these propositions, but it does not read Kaiser as establishing a separate rule for missionaries. See Hawes,
There was a period when Mr. Geilenfeld was formally a member of a religious order, the Missionaries of Charity, and was subject to assignment by the order. For example, the order sent him to Southeast Asia for “[j]ust a little over a year,” and during that time, he was not able to return home. Hr’g Tr. 12:20-13:20. As Mr. Geilen-feld explained it, he was under a “vow of obedience,” was instructed to go. to different places in the world, and was given an “allotted time” of one month every three years to return home. Hr’g Tr. 14:3-9, 18:14-19:7.
During this interval, the Missionaries of Charity ordered Mr. Geilenfeld from place to place—places as divergent as Calcutta, Vietnam, Cambodia, Los Angeles, Honduras, Korea, and Hong Kong, from which he would return home to Iowa on rare breaks. Id. 12:20-16:6. The Court views Mr. Geilen-feld’s situation during this time as similar to Americans who work overseas for the government in a military or civilian capaci
But things markedly changed in 1985 when Mr. Geilenfeld left the order and decided to make a life for himself in Haiti. From that point onward, he was not subject to anyone’s orders but his own. The distinction between a-mission home and a real home, though deft, does not fit the facts, and the analogy to his days of geographic and temporal obedience becomes strained. From 1985 onward, Mr. Geilen-feld chose to live, work, pay taxes, own property in Haiti—and not in Iowa. The difference between being subject to direction and being self-directed is, in the Court’s view, significant for the purposes of domicile.
5. Other Caselaw
Having dispensed with the Plaintiffs’ claim to a presumption of continuing domicile, the Court turns to the remaining case-law. The parties cite several First Circuit cases that address domicile in the rather particular context of medical malpractice lawsuits in which plaintiffs had moved between Florida and Puerto Rico.
As the Court sees it, Freidrich v. Davis presents closely analogous facts.
6. Michael Geilenfeld’s Descriptions of his Status
A crucial question is how Mr. Geilenfeld described his status in Haiti and Iowa, especially before the legal significance of his domicile became apparent. The first indication is the allegation in the Complaint itself:
2. Plaintiff Michael Geilenfeld is an individual residing in Pétion-Ville Commune, Port-au-Prince Arrondissement, Republic of Haiti ....
Compl. 12. Similarly, on April 12, 2013 when Mr. Geilenfeld made his initial discovery disclosures in this case, he identified himself as a resident of Pétionville, Haiti. Def. ⅛ Hr’g Ex. 3, Pis. ’ Initial Disclosure at 1. When Mr, Geilenfeld was first deposed on February 27, 2014, he was asked about his status in Haiti: ■
■ Q. You —■ where do you presently reside?
A. I reside at Delmas 91, No. 26.
Def. ⅛ Mot. to Suppl: Attach. 1 Excerpt of Dep. of Michael Geilenfeld 54:4-5 (ECF No. 541), The questioning continued:
Q. I just want to backtrack for a second. In 1985 did you personally purchase 91 Delmas?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And do the real estate laws of Haiti, if you know, áre they similar to the U.S. where you can purchase a piece of property and own it in fee simple absolute for all time?
A. It depends on who are.
Q. How about you?
A. I am able to because I had residency there.
Q. Are you presently a U.S. citizen?
A. I am.
Q. And your status in Haiti, is that as a permanent resident?
A. Exactly.
Id. 55:13-56:2. Just before trial, on June 11, 2015, Mr. Geilenfeld was deposed in Portland, Maine and the following interchange took place:
Q. Can you tell me where you currently reside?
A. Delmas 91. Currently, as of today?
Q. Yes.
A. In this city?
Q. I understand —- no. I understand that you were recently released from prison. A. I went back home.
Q. And for the record, where is home? A. Delmas 91, No. 26 —
Q. And Is that —
A. Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
Def ⅛ Hr’g Ex. 7, Confidential Tr. 10:3-14. At trial, Mr. Geilenfeld testified:
Q. Where do you live, Michael?
A. I currently reside in Port-au-Prince, , Haiti.
Geilenfeld Test. 121:25-22:1.
Before the issue of domicile arose, Mr. Geilenfeld consistently and repeatedly represented in legal filings, including sworn testimony, that he resided not in Iowa, but in Port-au-Prince. More significantly, Mr. Geilenfeld emphatically agreed with the characterization that he was a “permanent resident” of Haiti. Contra Kaiser,
C. Summary of Findings
Since this case was filed on February 6, 2013, the Court has become particularly well acquainted with it. From July 6, 2015 through July 23, 2015, the Court presided over the jury trial and vividly recalls Mr. Geilenfeld’s testimony. The Court thus relies on its knowledge of the record and its experience with the parties in making its finding regarding jurisdiction. First, it is clear that Mr. Geilenfeld was physically present in Haiti. Second, based on the intent factors and on the caselaw applying them, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs are unable to meet their burden of showing diversity jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.
Taking a larger view of the factors, the Court heeds the First Circuit instruction that “[jjust as no single factor is controlling, domicile need not be determined by mere numerical comparison of the number of factors that may appear to favor each side of the issue.” Lundquist,
Finally, at a deposition on February 24, 2014, Mr. Geilenfeld—unaware of the jurisdictional issue that would surface almost two years later—made a statement relating to his real estate ownership in Haiti in which he represented himself as a permanent resident there:
Q: Are you presently a U.S. citizen?
A: I am.
Q: And your status in Haiti, is that as a permanent resident?
A: Exactly.
Def.’s Hr’g Ex. 23a. Legally, Mr. Geilen-feld has since clarified that he holds a “Permis de Sejour,” which he renews annually and which permits him to stay for longer than three months. Geilenfeld In-terrog. ¶ 17. Nonetheless, the Court perceives Mr. Geilenfeld’s description of himself as a permanent resident of Haiti as a candid response that naturally followed from his decades of residence there. It also notes that his intent to remain in Haiti needs to be only indefinite, not permanent, Hawes,
In sum, the Court finds that Mr. Geilen-feld’s “true, fixed home and principal establishment” is at the St. Joseph’s Family of Haiti at 91 Delmas, Port au Prince, Haiti. Padilla-Mangual,
D. A Note on Caterpillar
The Plaintiffs cite Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis,
[[Institutional interests adhere and considerations of finality “become overwhelming” when there is a clear showing of jurisdiction that existed at the outset of the case, and a jurisdictional challenge raised for the first time on appeal threatens “to wipe out the adjudication post-judgment, and return to state court a case now satisfying all federal jurisdictional requirements.”
Pis. Resp. at 4 (quoting Caterpillar,
The Caterpillar decision turned on the case’s complex procedural history. After sustaining injuries in the operation of a bulldozer, the Kentucky plaintiff brought suit in state court against the bulldozer’s manufacturer (a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois) and its servicer (a Kentucky corporation with its principal place of business in Kentucky); the plaintiffs employer’s insurer (a Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business in Massachusetts) then intervened to assert subrogation claims against both defendants. Cater
Caterpillar, then, discussed a procedural posture in which there was not diversity at the time of removal, but there was complete diversity by the time of trial and through judgment on account of the nondi-verse party’s dismissal. Id. at 64-67,
As the Supreme Court wroté in Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P.,' the “time-of-filing rule is hornbook law” that “measures all challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction premised upon diversity of citizenship against the state of facts that existed at the time-of-filing—whether the challenge be brought shortly after filing, after the trial, or even for the first time on appeal.”
In keeping with the First Circuit’s remand, the Court has considered whether diversity existed at the time the action was commenced and found that it did not. The Remand Order directed the Court to enter an order “resolving the motion to amend and ruling whether diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 existed at the time the underlying action was commenced.” Remand Order at 1. The First Circuit allowed “[a]ny party” to appeal the Court’s ruling. From this language, the Court concludes that it should decide the impact on HWH of the absence of jurisdiction over Michael Gielenfeld. Cf. B. Fernández & Hnos., Inc. v. Kellogg USA, Inc.,
A. The Law
Rule 21 provides that “[o]n motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. As the Supreme Court wrote in Newman-Green, “it is well settled that Rule 21 invests district courts with authority to allow a dispensable nondiverse party to be dropped at any time, even after judgment has been rendered.”
Rule 21 looks to Rule 19 for guidance on whether a litigant is dispensable. Wright, Miller & Cooper § 1685. As the First Circuit has written, “the factors which must be considered in determining whether a non-diverse party is indispensable are set forth in [Rule] 19(b).” H.D. Corp. of P.R. v. Ford Motor Co.,
[T]he court must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed. The factors for the court to consider include:
(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties;
(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by:
(A) protective provisions in the judgment;
(B) shaping the relief; or '
(C) other measures;
(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence would be adequate; and
(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.
Fed. R. Civ, P. 19(b). These factors promote important interests, including “the defendant’s interest in avoiding multiple litigation, inconsistent relief, or sole re
Moreover, even if the nondiverse party is dispensable, the court should consider “whether the dismissal of a nondi-verse party will prejudice any of the parties in the litigation. It may be that the presence of the nondiverse party produced a tactical advantage for one party or another.” Newman-Green,
B. Application
The overarching question is “whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed.” Fed. R. Crv. P. 19(b).
The plain fact is that this case would not have been the same case if Mr. Geilenfeld had not been a plaintiff. This can best be seen in two of the Plaintiffs’ most telling arguments: first, that the child abuse charges’ against Mr. Geilenfeld, who freely acknowledged he is homosexual-, were driven by superstitions and unjustified fears about homosexuals; and second, Mr. Geil-enfeld’s harrowing experience in Haitian jail was brought' about in part by Mr.
The Rule 19(b) factors support this conclusion. The Court focuses on the first and second factors as the ones most relevant to these, facts. Under the first factor, the Court considers “the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties,” and under the second, “the extent to which any prejudice • could be lessened or avoided.” Fed. R. Crv. P. 19(b)(l)-(2).
If the Court were to allow HWH’s judgment to stand and dismiss Mr. Geilenfeld without prejudice, Mr. Kendrick could be subject to a separate suit in state court by Mr. Geilenfeld. Of course, allowing the judgment to stand would also leave Mr. Kendrick liable for HWH’s $7,500,000 verdict—a verdict inextricably interwoven with Mr. Kendrick’s actions against Mr. Geilenfeld. Moreover, doctrines of preclusion, which like Rule 19(b) exist to promote judicial efficiency, might prevent Mr. Kendrick from re-litigating either certain critical issues (e.g., whether Mr. Kendrick defamed the Plaintiffs knowing his statements were false or with reckless disregard for their truth) or the entire claim (if, inter alia, the Plaintiffs were found to be the same party for preclusion purposes). See Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co.,
There is of course an extraordinary prejudice against both Mr. Geilenfeld and HWH from being deprived of the fruits of their victory. But this is a markedly unfortunate but necessary consequence of trying a case to completion in a court without proper jurisdiction.
The Court thus concludes that Mr. Geil-enfeld is an indispensable party under Rule 19(b). That being the case, it need not reach' the Neurman-Green’s question of whether “the presence of the nondiverse party produced a tactical advantage to one party or another.” Newman-Green,
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES the Plaintiffs’ motion to amend complaint and DISMISSES the case for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
. To answer an obvious worry, there has been no suggestion that the Defendant has been aware of this jurisdictional issue throughout this litigation and strategically stifled the question until after an adverse verdict. The Court has no reason to suspect that the Defendant knew about this issue all along, and the Plaintiffs do not suggest that he did. Nor would it have made sense for the Defendant to have litigated this expensive and bitter case to conclusion at the trial level and to pocket an argument that could have resulted in dismissal in its formative stages. If the Court suspected otherwise, the issue before the . Court would be different. It does not. • ■
. The parties submitted the filings in this paragraph to the First Circuit, At a telephone conference on February 18, 2016, the parties agreed that the Court should consider these filings in deciding the issues on remand. Min. Entry (ECF No. 510).
. Mr. Geilenfeld testified he returned to Iowa for Christmas in 2015. Hr’g Tr. 50:16-18. This fact has only a tangential impact on the Court's analysis because the critical time for the determination of jurisdiction is as of the date of the filing of the Complaint on February 6, 2013. Furthermore, Mr. Geilenfeld testified that his travel to Iowa for Christmas 2015 came about as a result of a gift from Lucy Dietrich. Id. 48:17-49:1. His Christmas 2015 visit to Iowa would be stronger evidence of his domicile if he had paid to return, not because a friend paid his way to visit.
. The Court need not reach Mr. Kendrick’s argument that Mr. Geilenfeld procured the voter registration in 2005 as part of a fraudulent scheme, but the argument appears farfetched. See Def.’s Resp. at 15.
. The Plaintiffs’ other citations are factually distinct and thus not persuasive. See Lewis,
. Section 1332(e) brings the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico within the meaning of “State” for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(e).
. The Court acknowledges the Plaintiffs’ argument that there is no such thing as permanent residency in Haiti. Pis.' Resp. in Opp’n to Suppl. Jurisdictional Record at 2. Instead, Haiti recognizes a different concept for long-term foreign residents called a "Permis’ de Sejour", which requires annual renewal. Id. But this argument misses the point. The phrase “permanent resident” is simple and . unmistakable, Mr. Geilenfeld was telegraphing his intention to remain as a resident in Haiti permanently. This testimony, which the Court credits, is convincing evidence of his true intent. -
. Mr. Kendrick suggests that Rule 19(a) is the correct procedural lens through which to determine indispensability. Def.’s Mot. at 15-16. As one of his own citations makes clear, however, it is Rule 19(b) that determines indispensability. Acton Co., Inc. of Mass. v. Bachman Foods, Inc.,