HEARD v STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
Docket No. 64040
Supreme Court of Michigan
Decided September 13, 1982
Rehearing denied post, 1111.
414 MICH 139
Argued November 13, 1980 (Calendar No. 3).
In an opinion by Justice Levin, joined by Justices Kavanagh, Ryan, and Moody, the Supreme Court held:
The plaintiff is entitled to personal protection insurance benefits because his vehicle was not in use as a motor vehicle at the time of the accident; rather, it was like other stationary roadside objects which can be involved in vehicle accidents.
1. The disqualification of an uninsured owner of a motor vehicle from entitlement to no-fault benefits is not absolute. The disqualification applies where an uninsured vehicle is “involved” in an accident, but the owner of an uninsured vehicle is entitled to recover personal protection insurance benefits if his uninsured vehicle is not “involved“. If he suffered injury in an accident while a pedestrian, a bicyclist, a motorcy-
2. The liability of a no-fault insurer does not depend on a causal relationship between an accident or injury and a vehicle. A no-fault insurer may be responsible for personal protection insurance benefits although the insured vehicle is not the cause of an accident, for example where an insured or certain members of his household suffer injury while they are pedestrians or occupants of other vehicles. Nor does the presence of a causal relationship between an accident and a vehicle resolve the question whether the vehicle is “involved” for purposes of the act. Whether a vehicle is “involved” cannot be determined by abstract reasoning or resort to dictionary definitions, but depends on the meaning derived from the purpose and structure of the no-fault act. Disqualification for benefits and the distribution of losses between insurance carriers were not meant to depend on adventitious circumstances which by “but for” analysis could be found to involve a vehicle.
3. Under the no-fault act, a parked vehicle is regarded merely as another stationary roadside object. The insurer of a parked vehicle is not subject to liability for no-fault benefits unless one of the parked vehicle exceptions is applicable. Where a moving vehicle collides with a properly parked vehicle, the insurer of the moving vehicle is obliged to pay property protection benefits for damage to the parked vehicle and its contents. The parked vehicle is not “involved” in the motor vehicle accident out of which the property damage arose for purposes of the act.
4. By reason of the exceptions to the parked vehicle provision, a parked vehicle is deemed to be involved in an accident under the act where an injury is sustained by a person while “occupying” the parked vehicle. In such a case, the injury is sustained by reason of the use of the vehicle as a motor vehicle insofar as the occupant is concerned.
5. No-fault liability may arise where an injury results from the maintenance of a motor vehicle. In this case, however, the plaintiff‘s injuries did not result from the maintenance or use of an uninsured vehicle as a motor vehicle, but from the operation and use of the vehicle insured by the defendant as a motor vehicle. The only vehicle in use as a motor vehicle at the time of the accident was the vehicle insured by State Farm. Heard‘s vehicle was a “tree or pole” for purposes of the act.
Reversed and remanded.
Justice Williams, joined by Chief Justice Coleman and Justice Fitzgerald, dissenting, would hold that the plaintiff‘s vehi-
1. The no-fault act provides that a person is not entitled to no-fault benefits for accidental bodily injury where he was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle which was involved in the accident and that vehicle was not insured as required by the act. The maintaining of a vehicle, in this case by pumping gasoline into it, at the time of an accident in which a person is injured when pinned against his vehicle by another vehicle provides a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the vehicle being maintained to constitute “involvement“. Thus, because the plaintiff‘s automobile was involved in the accident, and was not insured at the time of the accident, the plaintiff is precluded from recovering no-fault benefits.
2. The denial of no-fault benefits to injured persons whose uninsured vehicles are involved in accidents is in accord with the legislative intent of the no-fault act. The no-fault scheme contemplates that every owner of a vehicle will be insured in order to take advantage of the benefits under the system. The penalties and exclusions from coverage which are provided in the act must be given full force to achieve its goals of encouraging owners and registrants to obtain insurance and reducing the cost of insurance.
93 Mich App 50; 286 NW2d 46 (1979) reversed.
110 Mich App 126; 312 NW2d 181 (1981) disapproved.
REFERENCES FOR POINTS IN HEADNOTES
[1-4, 6, 7] 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance §§ 351, 354, 356. Validity and construction of “no-fault” automobile insurance plans. 42 ALR3d 229.
[2] 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance § 355.
[4] 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance § 194.
[5, 6] 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance §§ 23, 341.
OPINION OF THE COURT
1. AUTOMOBILES - NO-FAULT BENEFITS - UNINSURED MOTORISTS.
The owner of an uninsured motor vehicle which is involved in an accident with an insured vehicle may not recover personal protection insurance benefits from the no-fault insurer of the other vehicle; however, where the uninsured vehicle is not in use as a motor vehicle at the time of the accident, but, rather, is like other stationary roadside objects which can be involved in vehicle accidents, the uninsured owner may recover personal protection insurance benefits from the insurer of the insured vehicle (
2. AUTOMOBILES - NO-FAULT BENEFITS - UNINSURED MOTORISTS - PARKED VEHICLES - PEDESTRIANS.
A person who is struck by an insured moving motor vehicle and is pinned against his own uninsured parked motor vehicle while pumping gasoline into the uninsured vehicle is entitled to personal protection insurance benefits from the insurer of the moving vehicle because, under the no-fault act, the accident did
DISSENTING OPINION BY WILLIAMS, J.
3. AUTOMOBILES - NO-FAULT BENEFITS - UNINSURED MOTORISTS.
The owner or registrant of an uninsured motor vehicle who sustains bodily injury in an accident involving that vehicle is not entitled to personal protection insurance benefits under the no-fault act (
4. AUTOMOBILES - NO-FAULT BENEFITS - UNINSURED MOTORISTS - MAINTENANCE.
Maintaining an uninsured motor vehicle by pumping gasoline into it at the time of an accident in which the owner pumping the gasoline is injured by being pinned against his vehicle by another vehicle provides a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the vehicle being maintained to constitute involvement for the purpose of applying the disqualification provision of the no-fault act (
5. AUTOMOBILES - NO-FAULT BENEFITS - COMPULSORY INSURANCE - LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE.
The Legislature believed that the goal of the no-fault insurance act to provide victims of motor vehicle accidents assured, adequate, and prompt reparation for certain economic losses could be most effectively achieved through a system of compulsory insurance; thus, the no-fault scheme contemplates that every individual owner of a motor vehicle will have insurance to take advantage of the benefits under the system (
6. AUTOMOBILES - NO-FAULT BENEFITS - UNINSURED MOTORISTS - DISQUALIFICATION - LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE.
The penalties and exclusions of the no-fault insurance act for uninsured motorists are necessary to encourage owners and registrants to obtain insurance; thus, they must be given their full force to achieve the goals of the no-fault act (
7. AUTOMOBILES - NO-FAULT BENEFITS - UNINSURED MOTORISTS - INVOLVED IN ACCIDENT.
Construction of the no-fault insurance act to preclude from benefits a plaintiff who, while standing behind and pumping
Marston, Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin & O‘Hare, P.C. (by David K. Barnes, Jr.), for plaintiff.
Eggenberger, Eggenberger, McKinney & Weber, P.C., for defendant.
LEVIN, J. (for reversal). William H. Heard seeks to recover no-fault automobile liability insurance benefits for injuries suffered when he was struck by an automobile while he was pumping gasoline, at a self-service station, into a vehicle owned by him. Heard was pinned between his vehicle and the vehicle which struck him.
Heard, who had not purchased no-fault insurance for his vehicle, brought this action to recover no-fault benefits from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the insurer of the vehicle which struck him.
The circuit court granted State Farm summary judgment, dismissing Heard‘s complaint on the ground that the no-fault act provides that a person is not entitled to no-fault personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits if he is the owner of an uninsured “motor vehicle involved in the accident” (§ 3113 of the no-fault act).1 The Court of Appeals affirmed.
At the time of the accident, Heard‘s vehicle was not in use as a motor vehicle; rather, it was like “other stationary roadside objects that can be involved in vehicle accidents“. Heard was entitled to PIP benefits from State Farm.
I
The disqualification of an uninsured owner from entitlement to no-fault benefits is not absolute. While the no-fault act does indeed provide that the owner of an uninsured “motor vehicle involved in the accident” is not entitled to recover PIP benefits, the converse is equally true: the owner of an uninsured vehicle is entitled to recover PIP benefits if his uninsured motor vehicle is not “involved in the accident“. An owner is entitled to PIP benefits, although he has not insured his vehicle, if he suffers injury in a motor vehicle accident while he is a pedestrian, a bicyclist, a motorcyclist, or a passenger in another vehicle.
Since the penalty for failing to purchase no-fault insurance is limited to disqualification for benefits when the uninsured vehicle is involved in the accident, it begs the question to argue that Heard
II
The dissenting opinion states:
“To determine whether a vehicle is involved in an accident, it is necessary to decide the required causal relationship between the injury and the uninsured vehicle. We hold that when one is maintaining his vehicle at the time of an accident, as by pumping gasoline, and is pinned between his car and another car as a result of the accident, there is a sufficient causal connection between his injury and his automobile to constitute involvement. The mere fact that plaintiff‘s automobile was stationary does not mean that the vehicle was not involved. Physically, even if a motor vehicle hits a tree or pole, those things are ‘involved’ in the accident. If those things had not been at the scene, there might not have been any accident at all, and certainly any accident that did occur would be of a different nature without them. Therefore, plaintiff‘s automobile was involved in the accident, and thus, as
an uninsured motorist, plaintiff is precluded from recovering no-fault benefits.”
The liability of a no-fault insurer does not depend on there being a “causal relationship” between the accident or injury and a vehicle. While there is often a causal relationship between the insured vehicle and the accident, a no-fault insurer may be responsible although the insured vehicle is not a cause of the accident. For example, the no-fault insurer of an insured person is subject to liability if the insured person or certain members of his household suffer injury while pedestrians or occupants of other vehicles.6
Just as the absence of causal relationship or of its corollary, fault, does not necessarily relieve the no-fault insurer of liability, so too the presence of a “causal relationship” does not resolve the question whether a particular vehicle is “involved” for the purposes of the act. Whether a vehicle is “involved” cannot be determined by abstract reasoning or resort to dictionary definitions. It depends on the meaning derived from the purpose and structure of the no-fault act.
While there will generally (perhaps always) be some causal relationship between the loss incurred and a “vehicle involved in the accident“, it does not follow that whenever there is any causal relationship the vehicle is “involved“. “But for” causal analysis would “involve” a vehicle which drops off a member of a car pool who, after he reaches the curb, is struck crossing a street; a vehicle which runs out of gas where a person who was an occupant is struck walking along the highway to a service station; and a vehicle left in a parking lot where a person who was an occupant is struck
“But for” analysis can, indeed, be limited by interposing a requirement of physical proximity. Because Heard was pinned between his vehicle and the offending vehicle, his vehicle is involved; or because he, rather than a service station attendant, was pumping the gasoline, his vehicle is involved. Heard had, he testified on deposition, been leaning against his vehicle, and State Farm argues that for that reason also his vehicle is involved.
We are persuaded, however, on examination of the no-fault act as a whole, that disqualification for benefits and the distribution of losses between insurance carriers (which depends in some circumstances on the meaning given the term “vehicle involved in the accident“, see part III) were not meant to depend on such adventitious circumstances. Disqualification and loss distribution does not turn on whether a person is pinned against a gasoline pump, the wall of a service station, a tree, his vehicle, or another vehicle unless the vehicle is being used as a motor vehicle. When a vehicle is parked, it is deemed not to be in use as a motor vehicle, and, for purposes of the act, it is like a gasoline pump, the wall of a service station, or a tree.
This Court observed in Miller v Auto-Owners, p 639:
“Injuries involving parked vehicles do not normally involve the vehicle as a motor vehicle. Injuries involv-
ing parked vehicles typically involve the vehicle in much the same way as any other stationary object (such as a tree, sign post or boulder) would be involved. There is nothing about a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle that would bear on the accident.” (Emphasis in original.)
III
It is apparent, upon examination of the sections of the no-fault act other than § 3113 (concerning disqualification), that a parked motor vehicle is indeed regarded for purposes of the no-fault act as if it were a “tree or a pole“. Just as the owner of a tree or pole is not required to purchase no-fault insurance, neither is the insurer of a parked motor vehicle subject to liability for no-fault benefits unless one of the parked vehicle exceptions is applicable.7
A
A basic principle of the no-fault act is that neither a motorist nor his no-fault insurer is subject to liability for damage to a moving vehicle,8 but that his no-fault insurer is subject to liability for damage to a parked vehicle. That principle is expressed in language which indicates that a parked vehicle is not “involved” in an accident with a moving vehicle.
In Miller, pp 639-640, fn 1, this Court said of § 3123(1)(a):
“Similarly, § 3123 of the act excludes damage to motor vehicles from the statutory obligation to pay
benefits for damage to property, unless the motor vehicle is parked in a manner so as not to cause an unreasonable risk of the damage that occurs. MCL 500.3123(1)(a) ;MSA 24.13123(1)(a) . A properly parked motor vehicle is thus treated under the act as nonvehicular property for purposes of the payment of property protection insurance benefits.”
The next subsection, 3123(1)(b),12 provides that property protection insurance benefits are not payable for property owned by a person covered by a no-fault policy if such person was the owner or operator of a “vehicle involved in the motor vehicle accident out of which the property damage arose“. (Emphasis supplied.)
It thus appears that subdivisions (a) and (b) of § 3123(1) are complementary. A no-fault insurer is not required to pay property protection benefits for damage to a motor vehicle or its contents. Nor is it required to pay such benefits for personalty owned by a person covered by a no-fault policy in respect to an owned or operated “vehicle involved in the motor vehicle accident out of which the property damage arose“. Nevertheless, the no-fault insurer of a moving vehicle that strikes a parked vehicle is subject to liability for damage to contents as well as for damage to the vehicle.
Reading the two subdivisions together, a parked vehicle is not “involved in the motor vehicle accident out of which the property damage arose“. If a parked vehicle were held to be involved in a motor vehicle accident, the operative effect of “and their contents” (§ 3123[1][a]) would be largely eliminated because, under § 3123(1)(b), benefits are not payable for personalty (contents) located in an involved vehicle owned or operated by a person (or family members domiciled in his household) cov-
B
Nor would the proffered construction be consistent with § 3125 which states that a person suffering accidental property damage shall claim property protection insurance benefits from the insurers of owners (or of operators) of “vehicles involved in the accident“.13 (Emphasis supplied.) Under the proffered construction, the no-fault insurer of the parked vehicle would contribute to the cost of reimbursing its insured for damage to the parked vehicle and its contents although a principle of the act is that a no-fault insurer has no liability to its insured for property damage unless he chooses to purchase collision or other insurance.
C
Another section of the act, § 3115(1), provides that a person who is not covered by a no-fault policy who suffers accidental bodily injury while not an occupant of a motor vehicle is entitled to PIP benefits from insurers of owners (or of operators) of “motor vehicles involved in the accident“.14
D
The construction which we believe to be correct is consistent with § 3111 which makes PIP benefits portable throughout the United States and Canada for persons covered by a no-fault policy and for occupants of a “vehicle involved in the accident“.16 (Emphasis supplied.) By reason of the exceptions to the parked vehicle provision, a parked vehicle is deemed to be involved in the accident where the injury was sustained by a person while “occupy ing” a vehicle. § 3106(l)(c). In such a case, the injury is sustained as a result of the use of the vehicle as a motor vehicle. The vehicle, although
IV
We have considered whether this Court‘s decision in Miller v Auto-Owners requires a different result. In Miller, this Court held that an insured owner is entitled to PIP benefits for injuries arising from the maintenance of his vehicle whether it is deemed to have been parked or not. Miller concerned a situation where no vehicle was involved in the accident unless it was the insured‘s vehicle.
Where no-fault liability arises from maintenance, the injury results from use of the vehicle as a motor vehicle, as when a battery or fuel line explodes or, as in Miller, a vehicle falls upon and injures a person. Heard‘s injury did not arise from the maintenance or use of an uninsured vehicle as a motor vehicle, but from the operation and use of the vehicle insured by State Farm as a motor vehicle. The only vehicle being used as a motor vehicle at the time of the accident was the vehicle insured by State Farm. Heard‘s vehicle was a “tree or pole” for purposes of the act.
We reverse and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
KAVANAGH, RYAN, and BLAIR MOODY, JR., JJ., concurred with LEVIN, J.
WILLIAMS, J. (dissenting). The ultimate issue on the merits in this case is whether an uninsured owner‘s car is “involved” in an accident, when the uninsured owner, while pumping gasoline into his car, was struck by another vehicle, pinned be-
I. FACTS
Plaintiff was injured when he was struck by another automobile and pinned against his own automobile while he was pumping gasoline into it at a self-service gas station. The automobile owned by plaintiff was not insured as required by Michigan law.
A claim for no-fault benefits from defendant, the insurer of the automobile that struck plaintiff, was denied. Plaintiff then filed suit in Oakland Circuit Court. Plaintiff pled that he “sustained bodily injury caused by an automobile collision * * * arising out of the ownership, operation or use” of defendant‘s insured‘s automobile. Defendant responded by a general answer, except that it pled “that the said auto collision involved the plaintiff and his automobile, said automobile of the plaintiff being an uninsured vehicle” under the no-fault act. A motion for summary judgment was filed by defendant pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(1). The
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a 2 to 1 opinion. Heard v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 93 Mich App 50; 286 NW2d 46 (1979).
II. ISSUE
Resolution of this case requires this Court to decide whether the statutory language of
III. DISCUSSION
This case presents an issue of first impression regarding the interpretation of the word “involved” as used in § 3113 of the no-fault act. Section 3113 provides that no-fault benefits shall not be recovered if the owner of the vehicle “involved” in the accident was uninsured at the time of the accident.
To determine whether a vehicle is involved in an accident, it is necessary to decide the required causal relationship between the injury and the uninsured vehicle. We would hold that when one is maintaining his vehicle at the time of an accident, as by pumping gasoline, and is pinned between his car and another car as a result of the
IV. PUBLIC POLICY
While we understand that to so construe the term “involved“, as we have here, precludes plaintiff from collecting no-fault benefits,4 we feel it is in accord with the legislative intent. The no-fault act was:
“offered as an innovative social and legal response to
the long payment delays, inequitable payment structure, and high legal costs inherent in the tort (or ‘fault‘) liability system. The goal of the no-fault insurance system was to provide victims of motor vehicle accidents assured, adequate, and prompt reparation for certain economic losses. The Legislature believed this goal could be most effectively achieved through a system of compulsory insurance, whereby every Michigan motorist would be required to purchase no-fault insurance or be unable to operate a motor vehicle legally in this state. Under this system, victims of motor vehicle accidents would receive insurance benefits for their injuries as a substitute for their common-law remedy in tort.” Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 578-579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978).
Thus, the no-fault scheme contemplates that every individual owner will have insurance in order to take advantage of the benefits under this system.
As a corollary, the act provides for certain penalties and exclusions for those who are uninsured. See
Another important goal of the no-fault act is that of cost reduction. An important aspect of reducing costs is assuring that benefits be paid only to those entitled to such benefits under the statute. In this case, if plaintiff were insured, he would, as a contributing member to the fund from which benefits are to be paid, be entitled to recover benefits. However, in this case plaintiff was not insured. He was not a contributor to the success of the no-fault scheme. Rather, by this
CONCLUSION
Defendant‘s motion for summary judgment was properly granted and affirmed in this case. The statutory language of § 3113, as well as the legislative intent and policy of the no-fault scheme as a whole, supports our conclusion that plaintiff‘s vehicle, under the facts in this case, was “involved” in the accident. The decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed, but in part for different reasons.5
COLEMAN, C.J., and FITZGERALD, J., concurred with WILLIAMS, J.
Notes
* * *
“(b) The person was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in the accident with respect to which the security required by subsections (3) and (4) of section 3101 was not in effect.”
“A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed:
* * *
“(b) The person was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in the accident with respect to which the security required by subsections (3) and (4) of section 3101 was not in effect.” (Emphasis added.)
“(a) The vehicle was parked in such a way to cause unreasonable risk of the bodily injury which occurred.
“(b) Except as provided in subsection (2), the injury was a direct result of physical contact with the equipment permanently mounted on the vehicle, while the equipment was being operated or used or property being lifted onto or lowered from the vehicle in the loading or unloading process.
“(c) Except as provided in subsection (2) for an injury sustained in the course of employment while loading, unloading, or doing mechanical work on a vehicle, the injury was sustained by a person while occupying, entering into, or alighting from the vehicle.
“(2) Accidental bodily injury does not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle if benefits under the worker‘s disability compensation act of 1969, Act No. 317 of the Public Acts of 1969, as amended, being sections 418.101 to 418.941 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, are available to an employee who sustains the injury in the course of his or her employment while loading, unloading, or doing mechanical work on a vehicle unless the injury arose from the use or operation of another vehicle.”
The foregoing reflects amendments made by 1981 PA 209. The editor‘s note to the Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated states:
“1981 Amendment. Inserted the subsection numbering; in subsec. (1)(b), inserted ‘the’ following ‘contact with‘, and ‘Except as provided in subsection (2),‘; in subsec. (1)(c), inserted ‘Except as provided in subsection (2) for an injury sustained in the course of employment while loading, unloading, or doing mechanical work on a vehicle,‘; and added subsec. (2).
“P.A. 1981, No. 209, § 2, provided:
“This amendatory act shall take effect January 1, 1982 and shall be applicable to all causes of action which occur after the effective date of this amendatory act.’
“P.A. 1981, No. 209, was ordered to take immediate effect and was approved Dec. 30, 1981.”
See also Miller v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 411 Mich 633; 309 NW2d 544 (1981), discussed in fn 6. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he was standing behind his car when another vehicle struck him from behind and pinned him between the two cars. He states these same facts in response to several different questions.
“(a) Insurers of owners or registrants of motor vehicles involved in the accident.
“(b) Insurers of operators of motor vehicles involved in the accident.”
“(2) Property protection insurance benefits are due under the conditions stated in this chapter without regard to fault.
“(3) Damage to tangible property consists of physical injury to or destruction of the property and loss of use of the property so injured or destroyed.”
“(a) Vehicles and their contents, including trailers, operated or designed for operation upon a public highway by power other than muscular power, unless the vehicle is parked in a manner as not to cause unreasonable risk of the damage which occurred.
“(b) Property owned by a person named in a property protection insurance policy, the person‘s spouse or a relative of either domiciled in the same household, if the person named, the person‘s spouse, or the relative was the owner, registrant, or operator of a vehicle involved in the motor vehicle accident out of which the property damage arose.”