The primary issue in this Chapter 7 bankruptcy case is whether the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Tenth Circuit (BAP) had jurisdiction to review an “order for relief’ entered by a bankruptcy judge serving in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (Delaware Bankruptcy Court). The Delaware bankruptcy judge entered the order for relief after the effective date of a transfer of venue he had ordered under 28 U.S.C. § 1412 to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado (Colorado Bankruptcy Court).
The parties agree that the order should be vacated on the ground that it is void because it was issued after the transfer was complete and therefore in the absence of jurisdiction, a proposition that finds footing in the case law of both the Third and Tenth Circuits.
See Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Conn., N.A.,
I. BACKGROUND
An involuntary Chapter 7 case may be commenced by “three or more entities, each of which is ... a holder of a claim against such person that is not contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute.” 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1). Appel-lees Centennial River Corp., f/k/a Imme-dient Corp.; Axiom Systems, Inc.; and Johnson-Laird, Inc. (together, the Petitioning Creditors) filed their involuntary petition against HealthTrio, Inc., in the Delaware Bankruptcy Court. HealthTrio answered the petition and filed counterclaims, but it also moved to dismiss the petition and to transfer venue to the Colorado Bankruptcy Court. The transfer motion was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1412, which authorizes a transfer of venue “in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the parties.” HealthTrio claimed that although it was a Delaware corporation in “delinquent” status, its books, records, principal offices, assets, business operations, and some of its officers were located in Colorado. App. at 48-49.
After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the Delaware bankruptcy judge denied it in a written order entered as Docket No. 19. Petitioning Creditors then moved for summary judgment on the involuntary petition, requesting that an order for relief be entered against Health-Trio.
*1157
Before continuing our discussion of the procedural facts, some background on an “order for relief’ is helpful. Used extensively in the bankruptcy code, the phrase is defined by statute as follows: “ ‘order for relief means entry of an order for relief.” 11 U.S.C. § 102(6). As fleshed out in case law, an order for relief is “the equivalent of an ‘adjudication’ under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,” and therefore is “a judgment
in rem,
a conclusive determination of the debtor’s status in bankruptcy.”
Mason v. Integrity Ins. Co. (In re Mason),
With this understanding of an order for relief, we return to the procedural history of our case. The Delaware bankruptcy judge held a hearing on September 15, 2009, at which he stated “[i]t appears to me that an Order for Relief ... should be entered in this case,” but there is “not ... a sufficient record before me today to answer that question.” App. at 148. Although the judge repeated his belief that an order for relief was appropriate, see id. at 152, he ultimately ordered discovery pertaining to the motion to transfer, set a hearing on that motion, and set a trial on the merits for October 7, 2009, stating that “if the parties can come to agreement on the issue of the order for relief, then I would expect that under certification. Otherwise, we’ll deal with it on the 7th,” id. at 154.
After a continuance and a hearing on a discovery dispute, the judge held another hearing on November 12, 2009, at which the parties again presented a discovery dispute. The judge took matters under advisement and stated his intent to review the record in order to “understand the full context of these proceedings.” Id. at 178. The judge informed the parties that he would either issue rulings on pending motions or set up another hearing, and that he would issue an order on the discovery dispute. The judge did not mention or issue an order for relief.
The same day as the hearing, November 12, the Delaware bankruptcy judge entered an order granting HealthTrio’s motion to transfer venue to the Colorado Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1412. The judge referred to “an order for relief having been entered in this involuntary case [Docket No. 19]” as one of the factors that informed his decision. Id. at 169 (brackets in original). As noted, however, Docket No. 19 was the order denying HealthTrio’s motion to dismiss, not an order for relief.
On November 16, 2009, the case was docketed in the Colorado Bankruptcy Court. The transmittal letter sent by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, dated the same day, states that “[documents were electronically filed and can be viewed through the Court’s ecf [electronic case filing] link.” Id. at 180.
*1158 On November 23, 2009, Petitioning Creditors filed a motion in the Delaware Bankruptcy Court for clarification of the transfer order. They noted that the order entered as Docket No. 19 denied Health-Trio’s motion to dismiss but did “not explicitly enter an Order for Relief against [HealthTrio].” Id. at 182. Petitioning Creditors asked the court to clarify the transfer order “by amending it to expressly enter an order for relief against [HealthTrio].” Id. In response, the Delaware bankruptcy judge entered an “Order of Relief’ [sic] on December 10, 2009, which read, in its entirety:
And now, this 10th day of December, 2009, upon consideration of the Motion for Clarification filed by the Petitioning Creditors in the above-captioned case, and the Court having determined that the clarification requested is appropriate under the circumstances; it is hereby Ordered that the Court’s Order dated November 12, 2009 is amended to explicitly provide that an Order for Relief against Health Trio, Inc. be and hereby is entered under Chapter 7 of Title 11, U.S.C.
Id. at 184.
The order for relief was docketed in both the Delaware Bankruptcy Court and the Colorado Bankruptcy Court, and HealthTrio filed timely notices of appeal from that order in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware and in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.
2
Meanwhile, the Colorado Bankruptcy Court granted HealthTrio’s motion to stay the case pending appeal, concluding that HealthTrio was likely to prevail on the merits of its argument that once the case was docketed in Colorado, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court lost jurisdiction to enter the order for relief, and therefore the order for relief was void. The Colorado Bankruptcy Court expressed its opinion that the reference to “an order for relief having entered” in the transfer order was “simply an error” and “that no order for relief was ever entered at any time during which the Delaware court had jurisdiction over this case.”
In re HealthTrio, Inc.,
No. 09-34404-HRT,
In the Colorado appeal, HealthTrio asserted that the BAP had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and presented its arguments on the merits, including that the Delaware Bankruptcy Court lost jurisdiction once the case was docketed in the Colorado Bankruptcy Court.
3
Petitioning Creditors joined with HealthTrio in requesting expedited disposition and agreed that the relief HealthTrio sought — vacatur of the order for relief — was proper. App. at 224-25. The BAP agreed with the parties that the transfer appeared to deprive the Delaware Bankruptcy Court of jurisdiction to enter the order for relief. However, the BAP dismissed the appeal, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to review an order of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court because the second sentence of § 158(a) provides that an appeal of a decision by a bankruptcy judge “ ‘shall be taken only to the district court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving.’ ”
Health Trio, Inc. v. Centennial
*1159
River Corp. (In re Health Trio, Inc.),
No. CO-09-073,
II. DISCUSSION
A. This Court’s Jurisdiction
Before considering whether the BAP had jurisdiction over the Delaware Bankruptcy Court’s order for relief, we first must establish that our jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1), which provides “[t]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees entered under subsections (a) and (b) of this section.” 5 To determine finality under § 158(d)(1),
we look to the order of the BAP itself, determining whether it is final by considering the effect that the order will have in the context of the particular appeal. If the BAP’s order results in significant further proceedings in the bankruptcy court, the BAP’s order is not final, and we do not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal therefrom.
Strong v. W. United Life Assurance Co. (In re Tri-Valley Distrib., Inc.),
We have found only two circuit cases that have considered whether an order for relief in an involuntary case is a final order for purposes of circuit court jurisdiction. In the first,
In re Mason,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that an order for relief is final and appealable because, as an “adjudication” that is a “conclusive determination of the debtor’s status in bankruptcy,” it is “res
judicata
between the actual parties to the proceeding to all the facts and subsidiary questions of law on which it is based.”
In the second case to consider whether an order for relief is final,
McGinnis v. Jenkins & Associates, Inc. (In re McGinnis),
We consider the reasoning of these cases sound, and therefore conclude that the order for relief is a final order, and the BAP’s dismissal of the appeal from that order is appealable under the framework set out in In re Tri-Valley Distributing.
B. Effective Date Of Transfer
Before turning to the BAP’s jurisdiction, we must first ensure that the transfer was complete before the Delaware Bankruptcy Court filed the order for relief, as this is a controlling procedural fact. Our rule is that “[t]he date the papers in the transferred case are docketed in the transferee court, not the date of the transfer order, ... forms the effective date that jurisdiction in the transferor court is terminated.”
Chrysler Credit Corp.,
C. The BAP’s Jurisdiction
We next must decide whether the BAP had jurisdiction over an appeal, filed in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, of a post-transfer order of a bankruptcy judge serving in the District of Delaware under § 158(a), which again requires that an appeal be “taken only to the district court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving.” Based on the long-standing principle that a judgment entered in the absence of jurisdiction is void, HealthTrio contends that § 158(a) does not require an appeal to be taken in the district where the order was entered. Instead, HealthTrio argues, the statute directs that an appeal be taken in the district where the presiding bankruptcy judge is serving, i.e., a bankruptcy judge with jurisdiction, which apparently is determined at the time the appeal is filed. Aplt. Opening Br. at 18-19. We disagree.
Because the BAP’s jurisdictional dismissal rested on statutory interpretation, our review is de novo.
See Karr v. Hefner,
Given that the transfer of venue in this case was completed before entry of the order for relief, the literal language of § 158(a) provides little help, and we have found nothing significant in the legislative history or published case law. A leading bankruptcy treatise characterizes § 158(a)’s territorial mandate as “self-explanatory.” 1 Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, Collier On Bankruptcy ¶ 5.02[2] (16th ed.2011). This view, however, proves too little when applying § 158(a)’s mandate in a case transferred under § 1412 since the jurisdictional statute does not plainly contemplate such a scenario. We do, however, note the statute’s territorial limitation may serve a clarifying function when a bankruptcy judge appointed to serve in one judicial district temporarily serves in or is transferred to another judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 152(d) or 155(a).
Because we find no firm answers in the statutory language, the legislative history, the underlying public policy, the treatises, or the case law regarding § 158(a) in the context of a § 1412 transfer, we turn to analogous statutes outside the bankruptcy context.
Cf. True Oil Co. v. Comm’r,
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Like § 158(a), § 1294(1) confers jurisdiction in a territorial manner. It provides that “appeals from reviewable decisions of the district and territorial courts shall be taken to the court of appeals as follows: (1) From a district court of the United States to the court of appeals for the circuit embracing the district.” 28 U.S.C. § 1294(1). Also like § 158(a), the literal language of § 1294(1) does not account for transferor court orders or judgments in transferred cases. However, in
McGeorge v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,
The territorial limitations in § 158(a) and § 1294(1) are analogous. Thus, although McGeorge involved this court’s jurisdiction to review pre-transfer decisions of an extra-circuit district court, we see no reason to distinguish it here, where HealthTrio seeks Tenth Circuit BAP review of a posi-transfer order of an extra-district bankruptcy judge. Applying this circuit’s territorial view of appellate jurisdiction in McGeorge, we hold that § 158(a)’s mandate that an appeal of a decision by a bankruptcy judge “shall be taken only to the district court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving” forecloses Tenth Circuit BAP review of the Delaware bankruptcy judge’s order for relief because the issuing bankruptcy judge was serving outside of the judicial district (Colorado) where the appeal was filed.
This does not leave the parties without a remedy. In
Chrysler,
we stated that although “traditional principles of law of the case counsel against the transferee court reevaluating the rulings of the transferor court,” a “prior ruling of a transferor court ... may be reconsidered when,” among other things, “a
clear error has been committed
or to prevent manifest injustice.”
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Tenth Circuit.
Notes
. Under certain circumstances described by statute, bankruptcy appellate panels hear appeals from decisions of bankruptcy judges rather than the district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) — (c). Such is the case here.
. Because no party filed a timely election to have the Colorado appeal heard by the district court, that appeal proceeded before the BAP according to 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8001(e). In the other appeal, the Delaware District Court granted HealthTrio’s motion to transfer the appeal filed there to the Colorado District Court, and the transfer was completed on June 25, 2010.
. HealthTrio also argued that the Delaware Bankruptcy Court’s order for relief was procedurally improper under 11 U.S.C. § 303 and Fed. R.App. P. 52, but it has not raised those issues in this appeal.
. Section 158(a) provides in full:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals
(1) from final judgments, orders, and decrees;
(2) from interlocutory orders and decrees issued under section 1121(d) of title 11 increasing or reducing the time periods referred to in section 1121 of such title; and
(3) with leave of the court, from other interlocutory orders and decrees;
and, with leave of the court, from interlocutory orders and decrees, of bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings referred to the bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title. An appeal under this subsection shall be taken only to the district court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving.
. Among other things, subsection (b) authorizes a bankruptcy appellate panel to hear appeals brought under subsection (a).
. Although
In re Mason
concerned circuit court jurisdiction under a substantially identical predecessor statute, “28 U.S.C. § 1293(b), which was eliminated by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,” its discussion of "finality” is "applicable to cases arising under section 158.”
Allen v. Old Nat’l Bank of Wash. (In re Allen),
. We note that the bankruptcy transfer statute, § 1412, sets forth an analogous interests-of-justice/convenience-of-the-parties standard as § 1404(a).
. Notably, the procedural posture in
Chrysler
was partly analogous to this case because it involved appellate review of a post-transfer decision issued by the transferor district court. But there is no discussion of this court’s jurisdiction to do so. Therefore,
Chrysler
is not strong precedent for the proposition that it is the transferor appellate court (in bankruptcy, either the district court or BAP) that has jurisdiction to review a post-transfer order of the transferor court, or the corollary of such a proposition — that a transferee appellate court does not.
See Rice v. Office of Servicemembers’ Grp. Life Ins.,