Healey v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.Healey v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Dated: November 10, 2010
DICKINSON, Presiding Judge.
INTRODUCTION
{¶1} Cynthia Healey is a former employee of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. After she was laid off by Goodyear and several other companies declined to hire her, she sued Goodyear and Barbara Medkeff, her former supervisor, for post-employment retaliation, alleging that Ms. Medkeff had given her bad references because she had complained about gender discrimination while working for Goodyear. The trial court granted summary judgment to Goodyear and Ms. Medkeff, concluding that Ms. Healey’s claims failed as a matter of law because she had not presented any admissible evidence that Ms. Medkeff had given her bad references. Ms. Healey has appealed, arguing that the trial court incorrectly entered summary judgment for Goodyear and Ms. Medkeff. We affirm because Ms. Healey failed to offer any non-hearsay evidence that Ms. Medkeff gave her bad references and because she failed to
POST-EMPLOYMENT RETALIATION
{¶2} Ms. Healey’s assignment of error is that the trial court incorrectly granted Goodyear and Ms. Medkeff’s motion for summary judgment. In reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we apply the same standard that the trial court is required to apply in the first instance: whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Parenti v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 66 Ohio App. 3d 826, 829 (1990).
{¶3} Under
{¶4} Ms. Healey has argued that she presented evidence that Ms. Medkeff engaged in post-employment retaliation. At her deposition, Ms. Healey testified that a secretary who worked for one of the companies to whom she applied for work told her that Ms. Medkeff had given her a bad reference. The secretary was not in charge of making the hiring decision, but was in charge of checking Ms. Healey’s references. According to Ms. Healey, the secretary told her that the company really wanted to hire her, but asked if she had any other supervisors who could give her a recommendation to replace the poor one she received from Ms. Medkeff.
{¶5} The trial court concluded that the secretary’s alleged statements about Ms. Medkeff’s bad recommendation did not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Goodyear and Ms. Medkeff took an adverse employment action against Ms. Healey because they were inadmissible hearsay. Ms. Healey has argued that the statements were admissible under the present sense impression and then existing mental, emotional, and physical condition exceptions to the hearsay rule.
{¶6} Under
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{¶8} The secretary did not tell Ms. Healey what Ms. Medkeff said to her while she was still talking to Ms. Medkeff or immediately thereafter. She was merely relating what Ms. Medkeff had told her at some unidentified point in the past. Accordingly, her statement about Ms. Medkeff’s alleged bad reference was not “describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.”
{¶9} Under
{¶10} Ms. Healey’s argument fails because she is attempting to use the state of mind exception to testify about the secretary’s belief about a past event, specifically, what Ms. Medkeff told her during a previous telephone conversation. The trial court, therefore, correctly
{¶11} We further note that, even if Ms. Medkeff provided a bad reference for Ms. Healey, there is no evidence in the record to demonstrate that it was causally connected to Ms. Healey’s engagement in a protected activity. According to Ms. Healey, while she worked for Goodyear, she complained about a coworker who had engaged in discriminatory conduct toward her. In her brief in opposition to Goodyear and Ms. Medkeff’s motion for summary judgment, she argued that the reason Ms. Medkeff retaliated against her was because Ms. Medkeff was romantically involved with that coworker. There is no evidence in the record, however, to support that argument. Ms. Healey testified at her deposition that Ms. Medkeff told her that she had been romantically involved with one of their coworkers, but it was a different coworker than the one Ms. Healey accused of discrimination.
{¶12} The trial court correctly concluded that Ms. Healey failed to establish a prima facie case of post-employment retaliation. Ms. Healey’s assignment of error is overruled.
CONCLUSION
{¶13} The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Goodyear and Ms. Medkeff. The judgment of the Summit County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed to appellant.
CLAIR E. DICKINSON
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, J.
MOORE, J.
CONCUR
APPEARANCES:
JOHN F. MYERS, attorney at law, for appellant.
BRIAN J. KELLY, attorney at law, for appellees.