ORDER
This matter came before the court for oral argument on April 3, 2012. A jury found appellant Billy Headspeth guilty of two counts of possession of an unregistered firearm (“UF”), in violation of D.C.Code § 7-2502.01(a) (2001), and two counts of unlawful possession of ammunition (“UA”), in violation of D.C.Code § 7-2506.01(a)(3) (2001). Appellant was arrested on June 20, 2007, after police officers, who were executing a search warrant that day at an apartment on Birney Place, S.E., found two handguns in a dresser in his bedroom. The evidence at trial established that appellant was eighteen years old at the time.
Prior to trial, and in reliance on District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), appellant moved to dismiss the charges against him on the ground that the District of Columbia’s virtually absolute ban on gun registration, coupled with its law making it a crime to possess a handgun or corre
This court subsequently held in Plummer v. United States, 983 A.2d 328 (D.C.2009), that a defendant has “standing to raise the Second Amendment issue as a defense to the criminal charges against him by moving to dismiss the [charges], even though he did not attempt to obtain a registration certificate ... for his handgun prior to his arrest.” Id. at 341-42 (footnote omitted). We remanded the case to the trial court “with instructions to hold a hearing to determine whether, prior to the imposition of charges in this case, Mr. Plummer would have been able to satisfy the then existing and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements for obtaining a registration certificate and license for his handgun.” Plummer v. United States, No. 04-CF-857, 2010 D.C.App. LEXIS 785, at *2 (D.C. May 20, 2010) (amended opinion). On appeal, appellant has not renewed his challenge to the constitutionality of the restrictions on gun registration by persons in the 18-to-20 age group that were in effect at the time of his arrest. Instead, he argues that he is entitled to a remand for the same type of evidentiary hearing this court mandated in Plummer.
The District of Columbia argues that appellant forfeited the claim that he is entitled to such a hearing because, in the trial court, he did not make a record that, on the date of his offense, he would have been able to do what the law required for a person of his age to obtain a registration certificate: present an application “accompanied by a notarized statement of the applicant’s parent or guardian ... [t]hat [he had] the permission of his parent or guardian to own and use the firearm to be registered” and that “[t]he parent or guardian assume[d] civil liability for all damages resulting from the actions of such applicant in the use of the firearm to be registered[.]” D.C.Code § 7-2502.03(a)(l)(A)-(B) (2001). The District asserts that a remand would be warranted only if appellant could meet the rigorous requirements of plain-error review, which would include demonstrating that it was plain on the trial court record (which it was not) that he could have qualified (with a signatory parent) to obtain a registration certificate.
The District contends that the plain-error standard applies. The District correctly states that while appellant asserted in the trial court that he had “no prior record, and no other disqualifying features for gun ownership such as a felony conviction or mental illness,” he made no showing or proffer that he could have satisfied the requirements applicable to 18-to-20 year olds set out in § 7-2502.03(a)(l)(A)-(B). On the other hand, predicting that this court would order a remand in Plum-mer for the trial court in that case to make factual findings about whether Plummer
Finally, we address appellant’s claim that the principles of merger apply, and that, in any event, no more than one of his UF convictions and one of his UA convictions may stand. Relying on Cormier v. United States, 137 A.2d 212, 217 (D.C.1957) (holding that the simultaneous possession of two unlicensed pistols constituted a single offense under the statute prohibiting the carrying of a pistol without a license), the District agrees with appellant. Although Cormier was concerned with a different statute, we will accept the parties’ agreement and direct that if the trial court determines that appellant could not have qualified for gun registration, it shall nevertheless vacate one of his UF convictions and one of his UA convictions.
So ordered.
. Heller did not “directly address restrictions on the possession of ammunition per se," but this court has concluded that "the Second Amendment guarantees a right to possess ammunition in the home that is coextensive with the right to possess a usable handgun there.” Herrington v. United States, 6 A.3d 1237, 1243 (D.C.2010).
. The District has suggested that a remand will be futile, questioning in particular whether the requirements could have been met to permit issuance of a registration certificate to appellant “and his signatory parent or guardian,” D.C.Code § 7-2502.03(a), and also noting that police officers found drugs and drug paraphernalia in appellant’s bedroom where the guns were found. We note, however, that in Plummer, this court remanded for an evi-dentiary hearing on whether Plummer would have been able to satisfy the requirements of § 7-2502.03(a), even though subparagraph (a)(2) thereof required that an applicant for registration not have been "convicted of a ... weapons offense,” and even though the record indicated that Plummer had a prior conviction of “CDW gun.” 6/18/04 Tr. 6 in Superior Court Case No. F 6520-03.