100 P. 222 | Mont. | 1909
delivered the opinion of the court.
This, action grew out of a controversy between the plaintiffs and defendants over the use of the water flowing in Seven-Mile creek and its tributaries, in Lewis and Clark county, and was brought to have determined the priorities of their several rights and for a perpetual injunction to restrain the defendants from diverting it or any of it to the detriment of plaintiffs’ rights. The trial court heard the evidence upon the issues made by the parties, and entered a decree fixing the dates and amounts, of their respective appropriations and enjoining them from interfering with the rights of the others. The plaintiffs, being
The contention made in this court is that the evidence submitted at the trial was not sufficient to sustain the findings as to the rights referred t'o. The rights of the other defendants are not brought in question. Plaintiffs assert the right to the use of two hundred and twenty-five inches under an appropriation by their predecessors in interest out of the main stream in the month of July, 1864, and continuous use of this quantity from that time until the bringing of the action, except when their rights had been interfered with by the defendants. It is alleged that all of the defendants other than the Northern Pacific Railway Company, during the summer of 1904 had wrongfully diverted the water from the stream and its tributaries to lands owned by them, thus depriving the plaintiffs of the use of it, and that they threatened to continue thus to invade the plaintiffs’ rights, to their irreparable damage. As against the Northern Pacific Railway Company it is alleged that it maintains water-tanks at various points along the line of its road in Lewis and Clark county where it is in proximity to the stream, for the purpose of supplying its locomotives with water and for general purposes in connection with the operation of its road, and that during the summer of 1904, by means of pumps, ditches, canals, and other devices located at points above the heads of plaintiffs’ ditches, it diverted from the stream large quantities of water, to the use of which the plaintiffs were entitled, and had continued this diversion down to the bringing of this action, to the irreparable damage of plaintiffs. Seven-Mile creek has its source in the mountains in the western part of Lewis and Clark
The plaintiffs’ lands are situate east of Austin station and below the mouth of Skelly Gulch, and, so far as we can learn from the record, the heads of their ditches are below this tributary. The railroad of the defendant company, running westward, proceeds up the stream to Austin station, where it turns to the northwest. Defendant Hines asserts his right under three separate appropriations — one, of all the water flow
It is not disputed that Beheim built a cabin on the land now occupied by Hines as early as 1867, and from and after that time until his death in 1879, diverted water from the “Mountain Stream” to irrigate a small garden, and that he used it for this purpose as well as for placer mining along Seven-Mile creek, with other water diverted from the main stream or the tributaries Austin and Greenhorn Gulches. Adopting the most liberal view of the evidence, the date of his alleged appropriations could not be fixed at an earlier date than the fall of 1865, which would necessarily assign to all the Hines rights later dates than those of plaintiffs, and make them inferior in point of priority. It is also impossible to reach a conclusion that any serious effort to use water for irrigation was ever made by Beheim, or any other person who occupied the Hines property after his death until Sloan and Coulter came into possession of it in 1881; for the only portion of the land ever cultivated until 1881 was the Beheim garden, which one of the witnesses said had an area about as extensive as the courtroom in which the court was sitting at the time of the trial. No witness estimated its area to be greater than two acres. Except for the irrigation of this small area, the diversions by Beheim were for placer mining purposes along the creek on what are now the Hines lands and upon lands some distance below. The water used for this purpose naturally found its way back into the stream, and was subject to recapture by the farmers on the stream below and to be appropriated to agricultural uses. (Alder Gulch Con. Min. Co. v. King, 6 Mont. 31, 9 Pac. 581.) Sloan and Coulter could not thereafter change the use to which Beheim had put the water
But it is not here important to inquire when Beheim made his appropriations, or for what purpose he made them, or the actual use made of them by him during his lifetime. He had only a squatter’s right in the lands, and, when he died, there was no heir or other person who followed him undér the laws of succession or by devise. The lands, forty acres in extent, seem to have been considered as abandoned. In any event, they remained without claimant or owner until 1881, when possession was taken by Sloan and Coulter, whom Hines succeeded in 1895, and from whom the Northern Pacific Railroad Company acquired its right in 1885. There is no suggestion in the evidence that Sloan and Coulter were the successors of Beheim by conveyance or under the laws of succession, or that they went into possession under any other claim than that of one who enters upon unoccupied public lands for mining purposes. Whatever rights they had, therefore, were obtained by appropriation as of that date, though it be considered, as the evidence shows the fact to be, that they thereafter repaired and used the Beheim ditches. In Farnham on Waters, section 670a, the rule of law on this subject is stated thus: “The question whether or not one in possession of a water right at a given time, which was originated by another, has sufficient title thereto to enable him to protect and defend it, depends upon whether or not he is in privity with the original owner. The rights of an owner of
The findings, in so far as they fix the date of any of the defendants’ rights here involved, are not justified by the evidence. It is not necessary, however, to order a new trial. The cause is remanded to the district court, with directions to amend its findings so as to fix the date of these appropriations as of the spring of 1881, and to amend the decree accordingly.
Reversed and remanded.