*1 attention. jury’s brought information was prejudicial one, too this are rulings, including I our prior think one stated the juror For example, in this manner. restrictive time of accident out at was probably husband for a not appropriate himself in a manner conducting as proper man. I am not presented married sure Therefore, extraneous one uror considered j at least evidence. information. prejudicial remand for above I would reverse
For the reasons another trial. Dale DISTRICT HEAD CADDO HILLS SCHOOL
Joe Court Arkansas
Supreme delivered December Opinion *2 Roachell, Mitchell ir for appellant. Cearley, Smith, P.A., Ross G. appellee. Hickman, Darrell This is a case involving Justice. 1979;
Fair Dismissal of Teachers Stat. §§ find 1980). We through 80-1264.10 (Repl. Head, from Dale had no a appellant, Joe and, therefore, decision of the school board judgment affirmed. was a teacher in the Dale Head Caddo Joe
Hills during School his first school serving year term, he Near the end of the after had year 1979-1980. a contract for the next before it was
signed year accepted, but his a arose him and students. The controversy informed in all likelihood be Head he would superintendent of his a nonrenewal or termination before the board for up an investigation conducted superintendent contract. The 23, 1980, Head that the dated was notified July letter his for the next board recommended that contract school or not renewed. The letter five year gave terminated 14,1980, requested hearing August Head and on reasons. counsel, a was held before the board. Head had and there is no he was kept, provided
record question hearing, of due After the formal requirements process. the school was made terminate Head’s contract for
motion 1980-1981, it was with five votes. One year approved member abstained.
Head two reasons to the circuit court appealed raising a termina- for reversal: That the school board’s action was its own comply tion and that the school board did not with court policies. transcript hearing The considered the in not fact and other evidence that Head was and concluded not his contract had been terminated but that simply renewed, nonrenewal, as to a opposed and since it involved a termination, no reasons had to no was hearing required The court be the of a teacher. for renewal given a case of was doubt this was because without wrong of contract. termination not nonrenewal of 1980. He to Head early spring contract was delivered Act that it and it to the school. The signed returned of be notified that the case of nonrenewal the teacher must within ten fact in the term of contract or writing during year. By after the end of the days stipulation school 23, 1980, and the parties agreed May school term ended had to be Head policy school district’s clearly provided no than renewed later ten notified contract would not be his be would after school term which days expired, June relevant But Head terminated to the fact that 2nd. — on of decision turns the question ultimate Head to jurisdiction. His termination entitled one. and the Board him Ark. gave before the school board Stat. (Repl. 1980). Ann. § the Fair
We had cases before us have seven Act. Hamburg Teachers v. Public Chapman Dismissal of 391, Schools, Ark. v. (1981); 625 S.W.2d 477 274
485 402, 483 Ark. 625 S.W.2d Hartman Public 274 414, District, Ark. Allred v. Little Rock School 274 (1981); District v. School Springdale (1981); S.W.2d 487 625 78, v. Maxwell (1981); 860 Jameson, Ark. 274 89, District, 148 Ark. 618 School S.W.2d Southside District, Ark. v. School McElroy Jasper (1981); District, v. School Fullerton Southside (1981); S.W.2d have Nearly all of them a deci- and required us with different questions, presented certain new Act. this time questions sion this interpreting By First, a probationary been answered. undoubtedly have teacher, three for less than one that has been at a school way rights far less in the years, consecutive is granted is, that one than a teacher not on legal protection probation, more than service. years McElroy with three consecutive District, Before was passed School Jasper supra. teacher’s district could renew or decline renew a
school service, on an years contract annual basis regardless for decision. v. Col any accountability without Cato lins, F. aff’d 539 Supp. (E.D. 1975) (8th F.2d district still as to 1976). That of the school exists right Cir. techers, has to and no at all given reason
a nonrenewal. supra. Maxwell v. Southside School The Act provides “aggrieved that a nonprobadonary board”, a decision of has a the school the circuit court and then to this court. Stat. § *4 (Repl. 1980). 80-1264.9 has a
But we have not decided teacher probationary from a of the school board. statutory right to decision appeal fact, held did not quoted In we that the language statutory to v. Public Nordin Hartman apply teacher.
Schools, Therefore, has no supra. statutory such a teacher from a decision circuit to to the court. right appeal the that a dictum the case said While had a from a school right teacher of appeal if board decision termination “constitutional involved, the Act provision. issues” were no such makes no to fact that dictum in Nordin was in reference doubt no law of any can terminate teacher because discrimination. Sindermann, v. Cochran (1972) 408 593 v. U.S. Perry
See 486
Chidester School 456 390 F.Supp. (W.D. Ark. 1978). law process But due of does not teacher require that a be a right to to the court. granted circuit Due does appeal process Pittman, require judicial review. Lott v. U.S. 588 Missouri, Standard Co. v. (1916); Oil (1912); U.S. 270 v. Reetz Michigan, (1905). U.S. 505 Due process only which the Act requires proper hearing for.
Neither
addressed the
of
party
of
question
jurisdiction
the circuit court
This
below.
case arose in
before
Schools,
decisions
the cases of Nordin v. Hartman Public
v.
supra
Chapman
Public
Hamburg
supra. But
of whether Head
question
had a
right
circuit
appeal
court
a jurisdictional
question
we can address at
Glenn,
time. State
any
v.
A remedy teacher’s an termina- illegal tion is a suit for breach of contract. A nonprobationary board, “aggrieved” by the action has an exclusive remedy appeal to the circuit court. Ark. Stat. (b). 80-1264.9 § might
It more convenient for to have teachers matters, circuit court review these but that is nota judgment we can make. the General Only Assembly that power. court,
Since there was no to the circuit appeal the circuit court should have dismissed the appeal.
Affirmed. Dudley
Purtle, Hays, dissent. JJ., Hays, I Justice, dissenting. with the agree Steele majority termination, involves the rather *5 non-renewal, than the of a teacher. But the majority opinion on to hold that goes a probationary teacher no right to appeal termination to circuit court 1979, Act, The Teacher Fair Dismissal under disagree. there I 402, v. Hartman Public
In Nordin (1981) any we said that who is terminated teacher S. W. 2d appeal to circuit court: is entitled any Fair Dismissal Act] Teacher
[The teacher, otherwise, to a or is entitled subsequent the school board and a before appeal is circuit court when the contract to the 80-1264.4, opposed to ‘non-renewed’.§§ ‘terminated’ as (my italics) 1264.5 1264.9. language majority
The dismisses as merely only apply dictum, intended to where constitutional present. issues are But our statement of the law in Nordin support cited we was unconditional and the statutes we what said there. difficulty
Our stems from the fact that The Fair Teacher legislative clarity Dismissal Act lacks and the intent rights appeal obscure as to the of a teacher argument termination. But the better side of the favors upholding appeal, legislation because remedial broadly Company, construed, is to be Skelton v. B. C. Land (1976) Inc., and because we are required construe statutes accordance with the com meaning Phillips mon of the words used. Petroleum Co. v.
Heath, (b) The final sentence of reads: Section 80-1264.9 remedy any person aggrieved by The exclusive of the shall be an there- decision from to the circuit court of the school board county in which the thirty (30)days located, school district is within board, date of written notice of the action of the school (my italics.) majority correctly points that this sentence is out
part sub-paragraph (b), entirely which deals with non- *6 teachers, and on that concludes that reasoning teachers are an
only non-probationary given appeal. To interpretation reach that one must alter the plain language “a of the Act substituting words non-probationary “any teacher” ...” person because of the simply of the But placement sentence. the drafters were generally careful between distinguish non-pro- both, teachers where bationary meant except they I am to interpret “any as unwilling person” meaning only teacher. The non-probationary plain meaning words “any person” in the context means legislation both probationary and non-probationary teachers.
Moreover, Section that no teacher 80-1264.4 can be terminated on that are grounds arbitrary, capricious correct, or But if the in discriminatory. holding this case is and a teacher is entitled to nothing more than before the which already board acted terminate that then The Teacher Fair Dismissal Act leaves the board itself only body as the to decide whether its own act of termination was or arbitrary, dis- capricious Thus, criminatory. review is only before the same body have acted in may the matter the first instance. That construction with compatible traditional concepts teachers, “fairness” which the Act purports give all nor with our law that remedial statutes are to be broadly construed with appropriate regard to the spirit prompted enactment. Dudley,
Purtle JJ., join this dissenting opinion.