This case concerns a falling out between two partners in a drug operation — appellant Bobby Hazel and his erstwhile colleague Walter Curry — and their multiple venting of bad blood by shooting at each other in a variety of public settings. The two principal issues on appeal deal with, first, the admission of evidence of uncharged criminal acts as background to and occurring in the course of the on-going feud, assertedly in violation of
Drew v. United States,
I: The Facts
Appellant was charged in a seven count indictment with two cоunts of assault with intent to kill while armed (AWIKWA), D.C.Code §§ 22-501, -3202 (1989), two counts of carrying a pistol without a license, id. § 22-3204, conspiracy to kill, id. § 22-105a(a), obstruction of justice, id. § 22-722(a)(1), and bribery, id. § 22-713(a)(1).
At the ensuing trial before a jury, the government was permitted to present evidence establishing the following series of events. During late 1982 and early 1983, Curry, appellant, and a number of others were all confederates in a drug operation. On January 11, 1983, at appellant’s behest, Terry Caison, who was not part of the drug operation, and appellant broke into an apartment in Maryland and stole a safe where drug proceeds were stored. Curry suspected appellant of the theft, confronted him, and demanded return of his portion of the cash. Appellant denied the theft and refused to pay Curry.
Then began a series of violent reprisals. In immediate retaliation that same day, Curry stole heroin from two of appellant’s “runners” and gave it out free on the streets. The next day, January 12, Curry again went to demand his money, but when appellant saw him coming, appellant commenced shooting at Curry, chasing Curry through the street until he escaped by climbing over a fence. Thereafter, appellant drove to Curry’s residence, and again engaged Curry in a gun battle in the streets. None of these shootings resulted in any of the charges against appellant.
On February 13, 1983, Curry and a friend were sitting in a Rib Pit restaurant when Curry was suddenly hit by three bullets. An ambulance took Curry to Howard University Hospital. Curry identified apрellant as his assailant. For this shooting, appellant was charged with one of the counts of AWIKWA and one of the counts of carrying a pistol without a license.
During Curry’s stay in the hospital from February 13th through the 16th, appellant allegedly conspired with Caison and two *40 women to have Caison kill Curry in his hospital bed. This formed the basis for the conspiracy count.
On February 21, 1983, after his release from the hospital, Curry again saw appellant on the street, and a gun battle ensued, allegedly initiated by appellant, including a chase into a Popeye’s eatery. This incident did not result in any charges against appellant.
After a period of relative calm, on May 19, 1984, appellant shot Curry one final time as Curry sat on a stoop talking to a friend. Curry was hit in the chest and, after he raised his arm to protect himself, in the arm. Curry and his friend identified appellant as the gunman. This was the conduct subjecting appellant to the second set of charges of AWIKWA and carrying a pistol without a license.
On June 26, 1984, in the District of Columbia jail, appellant allegedly offered Curry money if he would refuse to testify against him. This conduct generated the obstruction of justice and bribery counts.
The trial court dismissed the obstruction count, and appellant was found not guilty of the bribery and conspiracy counts. He was convicted of both AWIKWA counts and the related counts of carrying a pistol without a license. 2
II: Other Crimes Evidence
Appellant first challеnges the trial court's admission of evidence of the drug operation, the burglary, and the uncharged shootings as violative of the prohibition against the admission of “other crimes” evidence except for certain specific purposes. See Drew v. United States, supra, and succeeding cases. The trial court’s ruling on the government’s motion to admit this evidence followed an extensive dialogue with counsel. The trial court admitted the evidence 3 as probative of the defendant’s identity, motive, and intent in committing the offenses for which he was being tried, to prove a common scheme which included the offenses being tried, and to explain the surrounding circumstances. 4 The government presses for affirmance under the motive and common scheme exceptions. 5
A: Motive/Identity
With respect to the motive exception, appellant contends that since his de
*41
fense was misidentification, intent and state of mind were not contested issues, and the use of
Drew
evidence of motive as probative of his intent was error.
See Thompson v. United States,
This argument understates the nature of the motive exception. We have permitted the introduction of
Drew
evidence to prove motive in circumstances very similar to those of the instant case.
See Hill v. United States,
In
Green,
relied upon by
Hill,
we upheld the admission of evidence that, during the month preceding the charged offenses (including murder), the appellant had assaulted the decedent with a knife when she refused to resume a relationship with appellant, tried to break into her home, and made threatening phone calls. On appeal, the aрpellant argued that the testimony was irrelevant to any controverted issue because appellant’s defense was misidenti-fication
7
and his counsel had conceded for the record that whoever committed the charged crimes had done so deliberately. We distinguished
Thompson, supra,
finding the evidence admissible not only to prove motive, but also because it was highly relevant to the unquestionably contested issue of identity. We said: “This court has held that where the identity of the decedent’s murderer is drawn into issue, evidence of prior altercations of a substantive and violent nature between the accused and the decedent is probative provided such incidents are proved by something other than hearsay.”
Green, supra,
Although
Green
analyzed the admissibility of the evidence under the separate
Drew
exceptions of motive and identity, it implicitly recognized the relevance of the motive exception, not because motive was an element of the crime or a controverted issue as such, but rather because proof of motive inferentially proved identity, an actually controverted material issue or element.
See Hill, supra,
Here, just as in
Green
and
Hill,
identity was a specifically identified “contested element of the charged crime which [motive] evidence inferentially proves.”
Ali v. United States,
B: Common Scheme or Plan
Under much the same reasoning, the trial court did not err in admitting the other crimes evidence to prove common scheme or plan. In
Ali, supra,
where appellant was charged with committing sexual offenses against one child and the trial court admitted evidence of uncharged sexual abuse against that child’s younger sister, we stated that “common scheme or plan evidence is inadmissible unless the proponent specifically identifies the contested element of the charged crime which the common scheme or plan evidence inferentially proves.”
is strikingly similar to the ... motive cases [, where] the uncharged act evidences the motive or emotion that impels the charged crime as well; the charged and uncharged crimes both are effects of the same cause, a motive such as hostility toward the victim of both crimes.
*43 E. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 3:20, at 51 (1984 and 1990 Supp.).
The evidence of the drug operation, burglary, and uncharged shootings flowing from them offered the jury “the inference of a specific plan in the accused’s mind which interconnect[ed] the uncharged and charged acts,” and thus the other crimes evidence was not presented to show “the accused’s propensity to commit a series of similar but discrete bad acts.”
Ali, supra,
It is important to note as well that consideration of the “common scheme or plan” here is markedly different from the situation in
Ali,
where the uncharged incident of sexual abuse was against a different person than the complainant in the charged crime
8
and where the issue was not whether the defendant or someone else committed the crime but whether the crime was committed at all by defendant.
9
Here, where there was no significant dispute that the assaults occurred, the issue was whether Hazel committed them; the prior incidents'directly related to that issue, involving as they did the identical parties. Thus, unlike the situation in
Ali,
where the events involved “discrete acts of misconduct” and “similar but non-interlocking crimes,”
C: Intent
Appellant argues that even if the trial court properly admitted the
Drew
evi
*44
dence under one or more specific exceptions, its instructions to the jury impermis-sibly allowed the evidence in “on every conceivable theory: identity, intent,' common scheme or plan, motive, and surrounding circumstances.” This, he argues, is the “ ‘shotgun,’ ‘laundry-list,’ or ‘banquet-style’ approach” which “has been criticized by this court” because “potential misuse of
Drew
evidence under one exception is not cured by simultaneous admission under an appropriate exception.” Appellant is correct in asserting that individual trial court attention should be given to each potential ground for admissibility and the limiting instruction tailored to permit use of the
Drew
evidence only for the purposes for which it is properly admissible. “The shotgun approach short-circuits the process [of the
Drew
-exception analysis] in a number of ways,”
Bartley, supra,
However, in this case, as demonstrated above, the evidence was in fact permissible for consideration by the jury as probative of motive and a common scheme or plan in bearing upon the ultimate issue of identity. Thus, the only purpose listed by the trial court in its final instructions to the jury
11
which may not have been a permissible one was “intent.” We have previоusly pointed out at some length the caution that must be used with the admission of
Drew
evidence under the intent exception, given the danger that it may be treated as nothing more than proof of predisposition.
See Thompson, supra,
Moreover, without discounting the need for precision in fashioning a
Drew
instruction, our opinions in general recognize that once
Drew
evidence has been found properly admissible under one exception, the evidence is in the case and before the jury; therefore, any instructional error in also permitting its consideration for unfounded
Drew
purposes is typically not so prejudicial as to warrant reversal.
See Groves, supra
note 3,
Here, we do not think that the inclusion of intent in the instruction constituted reversible prejudice. In addition to the considerations already discussed, we note that the jury found appellant not guilty of two of the charged counts, and the prosecutor’s use of the evidence was to portray the Hatfield-McCoy nature of the relationship between appellant and Curry so the jury could understand the charged crimes and аppellant’s motive to commit them. This was the very thrust of admissibility. The jury need not be read the story beginning in the middle of the book. In sum, we perceive no grounds for reversal in the admission of the challenged Drew evidence. 13
Ill: Defendant’s Absence at Reinstruction
Appellant further argues that reversal is warranted because the trial court rein-structed the jury in appellant’s absence in contravention of Super.Ct.Crim.R. 43 and the Fifth Amendment due process clause.
A: The Reinstruction
At about 4:30 p.m. on the day before the jury’s verdict and after two and one half days of jury deliberation, the trial court reconvened, with appellant continually in presence, to consider three questions posed in a jury note, including a question about the meaning of the “beyond a reasonаble doubt” standard. 14 After a discussion between both counsel and the trial judge, the court determined to reread the relevant portions of the instructions to the jury. Appellant’s counsel explicitly made no objection to the rereading, but did suggest that it take place the next morning. Since it was approaching time for the evening recess anyway, the trial court agreed to give the reinstruction the next day; thus, after the jury returned, and still in appellant’s presence, the trial court excused the jury until the next morning.
At 9:15 the next morning, since appellant was absent due to the government’s transportation delay, appellant’s counsel decided to waive appellant’s presencе for him so the judge could move things along. The judge promised to give a cautionary instruction that appellant was absent because of travel conditions, which he later forgot to give when he actually reinstruct-ed the jury. 15 Defense counsel neither objected nor restated a demand for the cautionary statement, however. Later that morning, the jury reached its verdict, and appellant was present by the time the verdict was returned.
*46 B: Right to be Present
Appellant argues that the trial judge erred in reinstructing the jury in his involuntary absence, despite the fact that his counsel waived his presence, and that he was thereby prejudiced. Cases in this jurisdiction have held that reinstruction constitutes a “stage of the trial” for the purposes of Super.Ct.Crim. Rule 43(a).
16
Wade v. United States,
C: Harmless Error
Assuming that the trial court constitutionally erred in going forward with reinstruction in appellant’s absence, we nonetheless find that the government has met its burden of proving the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
18
Chapman v. California,
*47
In
Wade,
the court credited the “psychological influence" factor of a defendant's presence at reinstruction, stating that “the same influence pertains to the right of confrontation of defendant and jury” as to the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.
However, appellant’s absence from the reinstruction here was highly unlikely to lead to any prejudice. The reinstruction was an entirely mechanical process, which might just as well have been sent to the jury in writing.
See Quarles v. United States,
Finally, appellant was present the evening before the reinstruction, heard the trial judge’s intention to reinstruct on all three issues the next morning, and had ample opportunity to assist his counsel in any strategic response to the request for reinstruction. Especially in light of defense counsel's express refusal to object, stated in appellant’s presence, it is difficult for us to fathom what more appellant himself could have done the next morning, in the absence of any suggestion on appeal that the reflection of one night somehow brought to mind some new ground of objection. None is even suggested now. There is thus no reason for us to believe that appellant “enjoyed knowledge superior to or different from that of his counsel,”
Harris, supra,
Affirmed.
Notes
. Appellant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant his motion to sever the two charged shooting offenses and erred in refusing to conduct a hearing on his motion for new trial due to newly discovered evidence. To show abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying severance, an appellant must show "the most compelling prejudice" from which "the court would be unable to provide protection.”
Winestock v. United States,
. Subsequent to the original indictment, appellant was charged with a count of failing to appear in violation of D.C.Code § 23-1327(a). This count, joined with the others for trial, resulted in a fifth conviction.
. Other crimes еvidence, at least where unrelated to the charged crimes, must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence."
Groves v. United States,
. In this jurisdiction, evidence of other criminal activity to explain “the circumstances immediately surrounding the charged offense" may be admitted without any cautionary instruction only when such activity is temporally proximate to the charged crime.
Parker v. United States,
.It is not clear why the government has not advocated the other bases 1 ’accepted by the trial court for admitting the disputed evidence.
. Appellant also cites to
Pounds v. United States,
. Likewise, appellant’s defense in the case before us was that Curry had been assaulted by others and that Curry had a bias against appellant. Appellant presented evidence of an alibi with respect to the second charged incident.
.
Cf. Pounds, supra
note 6,
. Indeed, it may be said that in a broader sense, all the so-called other crimes evidence here is somewhat distinct from what might be called the "classic"
Drew
situation;
viz.,
where the defendant has allegedly committed two distinct, unrelated crimes, but typically similar in nature, one of which is sought to be introduced in the trial of the other.
See, e.g., Bartley, supra,
.Moreover, just as with the motive exception, it is relevant to establishing admissibility under the common plan exception that the jury would not have understood appellant’s plan to kill Curry without hearing the background misconduct evidence.
. See supra note 4.
. As to all of the uncharged crime evidence, the court instructed the jury to consider it, if the jury accepted the evidence at all, “only for the[ ] limited purposes” of establishing intent, motive, identity, and common scheme or plan. The court cautioned that the jury could only use the evidence "for these limited purposes, and you should riot consider it as in any other way tending to show the defendant’s guilt of the offenses for which he is now on trial."
See
Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 2.49 (3d ed. 1978). The defendant made no request for any elaboration or change in this standard instruction. Appellant’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that the evidence may have been erroneously admitted and used in part as showing the victim’s motives, rather than appellant’s, comes too late.
Cf. United States v. Miller,
. Appellant at trial did not differentiate in his objection among the several instances of other crimes evidence or seek to sanitize certain portions, perhaps because the totality of the evidence tended to paint Curry, the key government witness, in a very negative light. On appeal for the first time, appellant singles out the evidence of the burglary and the drug relationship.
Cf. Hill, supra,
. The jury note read in its entirety: “Please explain to the jury what “beyond a reasonable doubt' means. Please explain the consideration we are to give to circumstantial evidence. What constitutes bribery?”
.The transcript of the proceeding reads as follows:
THE COURT: [A]s I recall, we were to rein-struct the jury this morning. However, I understand that Mr. Hazel is not here yet.
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I am aware of that. [The prosecutor] and I discussed the matter. It’s been no secret to this jury that Mr. Hazel is incarcerated. I am prepared to waive his presence. Go ahead and reinstruct the jury as long as the court gives them a cautionary instruction that there has been a traffic problem, and go ahead and reinstruct.
THE COURT: I will simply say that, because of travel conditions, Mr. Hazel is not with us, and I am going to proceed with instructions.
The trial judge thereupon proceeded to rein-struct the jury in open court on all three questions presented by the jury, without any reference to appellant.
. Rule 43(a) states, in pertinent part:
The defendant shall be present at ... every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this Rule.
The exceptions include waiver of the right to be present where the defendant, initially present, "[i]s voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced.” Rule 43(b)(1).
. The decision was rendered January 18, 1971, before the effective date of
M.A.P. v. Ryan,
. Appellant does not argue that any error here calls for per se reversal. As this court has recently stated, "in at least one instance we appear to have concluded there was reversible error
per se
when the trial court found, after a remand, that the defendant’s absence from trial during the testimony of witnesses had been involuntary.”
Kimes, supra,
. Thus, the fact that appellant was also being tried on a failure to appear count, see supra note 2, is not particularly significant. Moreover, appellant’s own counsel could have easily obviated any such concern by alerting the trial court to its oversight in failing to explain appellant's absence.